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3 July 1995
Voters' Representation
Enclosed please find my comments on Proportional and Constituency
Representation for voters in Parliament and Regional Councils.
My main idea is
an effort to combine the merits of each method. The mechanics by which this is
achieved may be better worked out
by others, but I have given a proposal to
start from.
J. G. Gie
PROPORTIONAL
REPRESENTATION
AND
CONSTITUENCY REPRESENTATION
Both of the above methods of representation of voters in Parliament and
Regional Councils have advantages and disadvantages. An effort
should be made
in the final Constitution to incorporate the better features of both
methods.
Proportional representation has the great advantage that it
reflects the numbers of voters in the whole country who support various
parties,
and give the truest idea of the broad opinions of the voters. It has the
disadvantage that the members elected have no
connection with the voters who put
them there, as they are chosen from a list drawn up by their party in order of
total number of
votes for the party. The ordinary voter has no specific elected
member to whom he can turn for advice, or complaint, or
comment.
Constituency representation has the great advantage that the
elected members are responsible to a specific group of voters (of whatever
party), and are answerable to them. On the other had, constituency
representation makes it possible for a party with a minority
of total votes to
gain a majority in Parliament, or for a part that draws a considerable number of
votes in each constituency to
have no representation in Parliament, if it does
not gain a majority in any single constituency.
The systems could be
combined, for example, by having the voters vote in constituencies, and
totalling votes for each party over the
whole country. If party A gained 60% of
the total votes, it would be given 60% of the seats in Parliament, and those 60%
would be
the constituencies where they had polled the most votes. In general
most of those constituencies would be headed in vote count by
the candidate from
Party A, but not necessarily so. Party B, with 30% of the total vote, would be
given 30% of the seats in Parliament,
which may well include some constituencies
where it did not head the poll. Similarly, Party C with only 5% of the total
vote (a
minimum qualifying proportion may be desirable) would have to be given
5% of the seats, some or all of which would probably be constituencies
where
Party C might have only come second or third. These anomalies can be considered
minor, when weighed against the advantage
of having a Parliament which is fully
representative, and where members have a responsibility to a specific group of
voters in one
constituency, of whatever party.
J. G. Gie
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