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African National Congress Western Cape Province [1995] ZAConAsmRes 1319 (18 May 1995)

 


AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS
Western Cape Province

18 MAY 1995

The ANC in the Western Cape holds, with pleasure, of Economic Affairs and RDP, as we are committed to serving the principles of the RDP and realise the importance of this programme to our people. The philosophy of the ANC in the Western Cape has always been the upliftment and empowerment of our people and it is these principles that will make the RDP a success. Along with these principles, the honourable President Mandela has demonstrated a spirit and vision of reconciliation and has shown determination in his support for the RDP.

Based upon this philosophy of reconciliation and nationhood and the principles underlying the RDP, the ANC in the Western Cape cannot support the shifting of Parliament to Pretoria or, for that matter, to any other city in South Africa.

In this era of reconciliation, the loss of Parliament in the Cape would promote regional isolation and separation. The divisiveness wrought by the loss of Parliament and the consequent stimulation of provincial grievances and resentments would only serve to undermine the crucial task of national unity and reconciliation. If Parliament were to move, it would detract from the government's commitment to the building of a national consensus.

There are several salient and pressing reasons why it is in the best interest of the RDP and the nation as a whole to retain Cape Town as the legislative capital of South Africa

Firstly; there is the traditional argument relied upon and utilized by nations across the globe. This argument is a compelling one and relevant to the current debate. Traditionally, the site chosen as a nation's legislative capital is located not within that nation's industrial heartland. Rather, in an attempt to diversify the economic base of the periphery, a city quite apart from the nation's economic hub is chosen as the legislative capital. The modern convention is to
locate various governmental industries away from the centre in an effort to bring about regional economic development. Examples include the designation of Brasilia rather than Rio de Janeiro as the capital of Brazil, Canberra rather than Sydney or Melbourne and, to a lesser extent, Ottawa, Canada. It does not represent good sense to further develop the economic hub, Gauteng in the South African instance, with its comparatively low unemployment rate when the benefits of government could be accrued in the capital of a less developed region. It is not the function of a national government to increase benefits to an already wealthy region but, rather, to perform an equalizing function to benefit the nation as a whole. In this way government can distribute benefits in a manner the private sector cannot.

As stated, the undesirability of excessive centralization of state functions, government institutions and parastatals within a single city is made worse by the fact that South Africa's financial and economic hub is also within Gauteng. This tendency towards concentration further tilts the scales in favour of Gauteng as the focus of national activity and international interest. The economic equilibrium of the nation is already distorted by the fact that Gauteng, with a population of approximately 9.3 million, concentrates close to 25 per cent of the national population on 2.5 per cent of the land and produces 43 per cent of the national GDP. That region is home to half of the country's total manufacturing industry. In contrast, the Durban-Pinetown complex contributes 12 percent of the GDP and the Western Cape a mere 10 per cent.

Secondly; in terms of arguments concerning costs, the Pretoria Capital Initiative (PCI) estimates that establishing Parliament in Pretoria would save approximately R70 million per annum. Such an estimate is dubious. More realistically, to replace the existing buildings of Parliament, together with the adjacent and auxiliary governmental would cost in the order of R1, 5 billion. The interest payable on this sum alone is R255 million a year. In addition, it has been calculated that the cost of moving ministries up and down from Cape Town to Pretoria is R9 million a year. In reality, keeping Parliament in Cape Town will save the taxpayer R216 million a year.

Furthermore, the long term economic considerations are ultimately more important considerations. What is beyond dispute is that a move by Parliament to Pretoria would impose severe economic losses particularly in Cape Town's CBD. The most conspicuous economic damage will occur in terms of the property market. The immediate reduction in the demand for office space will be accompanied by a downward pressure on rentals and a steep reduction in the demand for office-related labour. This, in turn, will bring about a decline in property values and result in a decrease in new building activity. The abandonment of office will also have a significant impact on business and employment in the region.

Cape Town's economy is very much service oriented in nature and is, therefore, vulnerable to larger trends. Directly affected by the loss of Parliament will be the demand for services typically support by or contracted out by Parliament as well as any agencies reliant on or connected with its activities. These include foreign embassies, media outlets and various lobbies. Cape Town stands to loose much more than simply itself. For example, at risk are the services of caterers, computer and communications specialists as well as research and information personnel. Restaurants, hotels and taxis in Cape Town will feel a very tangible bite brought about by decreased demand. Less tangible economic effects brought about by the loss of Parliament are also likely to result. With a greater degree of isolation from national public life there will likely be a corresponding decrease in the level of domestic and international business interest. Ultimately, Cape Town will be marginalized rather than receive the promotion it merits as an asset to South Africa and the rest of the world.

Thirdly; in terms of the replacement costs involved in the relocation of Parliament, Australia serves as a good example. In the 1980's Australia decided to build a new parliamentary complex in Canberra. It is argued, in the South African scenario, that the Australian case is likely the most relevant because, while they did not move cities, they did entirely replace their existing facilities with a new purpose-built parliamentary facility. Furthermore, it is likely that the needs of South Africa’s 490 MP's and senators will be very similar to those of the Australians. The initial budget to provide a new parliamentary complex in Canberra for 148 MP's, 76 senators, support staff and media representatives totalling 2600, as well as facilities, totalled A278 million 1978. The final approved funding in 1989 was slightly over A$ 1 billion. Although it could be argued that labour costs in Australia are higher than those in South Africa, inflation is considerable lower. Therefore, it can be concluded that the cost escalation of a new parliamentary facility in Pretoria could be even higher than was the case in Australia.

Fourthly; and lastly, the findings of the public opinion surveys are patently obvious in demonstrating a high level of public support for the retention of Cape town as the legislative capital. Recent market surveys have demonstrated that there is no significant public support for the relocation of Parliament from Cape Town to Pretoria. A nation wide survey conducted by IDASA in August/September 1994 found that 51 per cent of the respondent argued that Parliament should remain in Cape Town and only 23 per cent believed that it should be moved to Pretoria. Respondents from every racial group preferred Cape Town over Pretoria. The report states "In every province including the PWV, which stands to benefit the most from the moving of the national legislative, support for keeping it in Cape Town is significantly greater than moving it to Pretoria. Only PAC supporters favoured Pretoria over Cape Town. Supporters form every other party, including the ANC, favoured retaining Parliament in Cape Town. Similarly, every language group favoured Cape Town over Pretoria with support being highest among Xhosa, Afrikaans and English speakers.

Likewise, a further study indicated "that about two thirds of South Africa’s top decision makers are in favour of keeping Parliament in Cape Town while about a third are in favour of relocating it to Pretoria. This, in addition to the support among the public in general for Cape Town found by the IDASA pool, provides ample evidence that South Africans of all walks of life and political persuasions, are not about to accept the relocation of Parliament of Pretoria without a fight". Precisely because democracy was finally achieved for the majority, in April 1994, the democratic process demands that the majority decision be respected. The relocation of Parliament and its loss to Cape town would represent an abrogation of the democratic process which was so long in coming to South Africa.


REV. A. C. NISSAN
LEADER: WESTERN CAPE