“THIS LAND IS MINE!”: AN ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION OF THE LAND CLAIMS COURT IN THE CASE OF THE SALEM COMMUNITY v THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA AND OTHERS (LCC27-09) [2014] ZALCC 11
Khulekani Moyo٭ 
Senior Lecturer, Nelson Mandela School of Law, University of Fort Hare, South Africa
Obeng Mireku٭٭
Professor of  Law and Dean, Nelson Mandela School of Law, University of Fort Hare, South Africa	

1	INTRODUCTION
Land restitution in South Africa is explicitly provided for under the South African Constitution (Constitution) and the Restitution of Land Rights Act (Restitution Act). The Restitution Act explicitly defines a set of criteria according to which claimants are entitled to restoration of land or equitable redress. The Restitution Act entitles a community dispossessed of a right in land after 19 June 1913 as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices to claim restitution or other equitable redress. In Devenish’s view, this remedial legislation was necessary in order to address the disempowerment of the indigenous people of South Africa as a result of the tragic history of land.

Although there are land restitution programmes across the globe, the South African approach is unique in that restitution affects not only State land but also threatens private property rights acquired through the country’s long history of racialised dispossession. Essentially, restitution entails the redistribution of an asset with a view to making a meaningful difference to the living standards of the beneficiaries of land restitution who might have been impoverished by land dispossession. This is in accordance with the constitutional vision which seeks to redress the injustices of the past, especially for the indigenous Black people who “suffered under the daily, soul-destroying indignities of apartheid” but also to create a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights.

The post-apartheid government has engaged in an ambitious programme of land redistribution and restitution, constituting acknowledgement that the legacy of land dispossession continues to shape the life chances of those affected and their descendants. Apart from land dispossession, Black people in South Africa were subjected to systemic deprivation and discrimination in their access to socio-economic needs such as water, healthcare, food, housing, social security and education because of apartheid policies. The land restitution programme thus enables former landholders or their descendants to reclaim spaces and territories which formed the basis of earlier identities and livelihoods or equitable relief. For the dispossessed in South Africa and elsewhere across the world, land “is both material and symbolic, a factor of production and a site of belonging and identity.”  As noted by Zirker:
“In apartheid South Africa, land was the pillar of the apartheid structure. The apartheid government used land as a means of economically and socially suppressing the African majority. By depriving Africans of property rights the foundation was set for profound poverty and social instability. The deprivation of property rights set the stage for the profound adversity Africans endured under apartheid.” 
Not surprisingly, return of the land was a rallying cry of the anti-apartheid struggles, and in the 1990s, as the transition was made towards a democratic South Africa, hopes were high that stolen lands would be returned. Land restitution was so important as a high priority issue for the transition to democracy in South Africa that special authorisation for land restitution legislation was built into the interim Constitution, but also that the Restitution Act was one of the first statutes to be passed by the post-apartheid legislature. As noted by the Constitutional Court in the case of Department of Land Affairs v Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (Popela), land, for the indigenous people of South Africa, “had a cultural and spiritual dimension that rendered the destruction of the rights more than economic loss.” It is within the above context that land restitution, and its twin cousin, land redistribution, are being carried out in South Africa.

In the case of The Salem Community v The Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others (Salem case), the plaintiff community, the Salem Community, brought a restitution claim for a piece of land in terms of the of the Restitution Act before the Regional Land Claims Commission, Eastern Cape (Commission). The Commission subsequently referred the case to the Land Claims Court (LCC) and the decision was delivered by the LCC sitting at Grahamstown on 2nd May 2014 by Acting Judge, Cassim Sardiwalla. This is an important case which, on one hand touched a highly emotive issue in a post-apartheid South Africa, given the potential effects of land restitution on prevailing systems of property rights and the economy and on the other, a test of the constitutional commitment to redress systemic inequalities and social injustice arising from the past and to speedily eradicate economic and social inequalities produced by racial discrimination. As noted by the LCC, “[t]he claim goes to the very heart of early contact and subsequent conflicts recorded in history books between the early British settlers who came in the 1820s and the native occupants.”

Section 1 the Restitution Act defines “restoration of a right in land” to mean “[t]he return of a right in land or a portion of land dispossessed after 19 June 1913 as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices.” As prescribed by section 2(1) of the Restitution Act, in order to establish entitlement to restitution, members of the plaintiff community had to allege and prove that they were: 
(1) a community who themselves or their forebears;
 (2) had been dispossessed of their rights in the subject land;
 (3) after 19 June 1913;
 (4) as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices; and, 
(5) no just and equitable compensation was received for the dispossession.

The following section deals with the facts of the case, highlighting the key issues on which the LCC had to make a determination.

2	FACTS OF THE CASE
In the Salem case, the plaintiff submitted a restitution claim relating to the land which in the court judgment is described as “the Commonage in Salem that was subdivided and the Native location which was established and then disestablished.” For the sake of convenience, the land subject of this claim would be referred in this casenote as “Salem” or the “subject land.” 
Salem, which lies about 20km from Grahamstown, was founded in 1820 when British settlers arrived there and had subsequently become known as a settler village. From the 1940s, the area was sub-divided up between descendants of the 1820 settlers. The Salem Community alleges that it lost land rights enjoyed at the time. It was alleged that Salem Community members were forced to make a choice to remain as labourers on the farms of the settlers or move away. Some of the properties that were part of the plaintiff’s original claim were subsequently restored by the State defendants to the Salem Community and due compensation paid to the respective landowners. Consequently, the State decided to support the Salem Community’s land restitution claim. The LCC had to decide on the remainder of the Salem land that had not been restored which claim was opposed by the landowners. The defendants’ response to the Salem Community’s claim was that the plaintiff does not constitute a community as defined in section 1(iv) of the Restitution Act; in the alternative, even if such a community existed such community did not have any right in land as defined in section 1(xi) of the Restitution Act; the subdivision of the commonage was not as a result of the application of any racially discriminatory law or practice; the plaintiff never held rights in land in respect of the commonage prior to or after 1913; and, that the plaintiff was not dispossessed of rights in land as a result of racially discriminatory laws or practices. 

3	ISSUES THAT THE COURT HAD TO DECIDE
The LCC had to decide the following issues in order to adjudicate the Salem Community’s restitution claim: 
1) whether the plaintiff is a community; 
2) whether it was dispossessed of rights in land as a result of racially discriminatory laws or practices; 
3) whether the indigenous community being the forefathers of the claimants acquired a right in the land; and, 
4) whether the periodic absence from the land as a consequence of colonial conquest or by a court upholding racially discriminatory practices by subdividing the commonage and evicting the communities from the land, extinguished their rights. 
By agreement between the parties, the LCC focused on the validity of the Salem Community’s claim and deferred the question of feasibility of the restoration. 

3 1	Was the plaintiff a community?
Section 25(7) of the Constitution read together with section 2(1)(d) of the Restitution Act entitle a community dispossessed of a right in land after 19 June 1913 to claim restitution or other equitable redress. It must be noted that the initial cut-off time of 31st December 1998 as the deadline to lodge restitution claims has been extended to 30th June 2019 through the enactment of the Restitution of Land Rights Amendment Act (Amendment Act) which came into force on 1st July 2014.  The Amendment Act reopened the lodgement period for restitution claims from the 1st July 2014 until 30th June, 2019.

One of the key issues that the LCC had to determine was whether the plaintiff was a “community” in terms of the Restitution Act. The Restitution Act defines a community as “any group of persons whose rights in land are derived from shared rules determining access to land held in common by such group, and includes part of any such group”. The plaintiff and the Commission argued that a community composed of indigenous people with historical records to the subject land existed as early as the 1800s. In support of this assertion, the Commission led expert historical evidence on the indigenous communities’ existence prior to the arrival of the 1820 European settlers. The plaintiff contended that the community enjoyed indigenous rights to the land until the alleged dispossession in the 1940s. 

It was disputed by the defendants that an indigenous community ever existed in the area known as the Zuurveld. The defendants further argued that the plaintiff does not constitute a community as defined in section 1(iv) of the Restitution Act as the Black inhabitants of the subject land were all employees of the White landowners and as such did not constitute a community. Casting aspersions on the evidence adduced by the plaintiff’s witnesses, the defendants contended that such testimony was largely hearsay evidence which lacked probative value.

The Constitutional Court has previously explained that section 2(1)(d) of the Restitution Act requires that there must be a community or part of a community that exists at the time the claim is lodged; and that the community must have existed sometime after 19 June 1913 and must have been victim to racial dispossession of rights in land. The Constitutional Court has further endorsed Dodson J’s interpretation in the Kranspoort Community case that in deciding whether a community exists at the time of the claim there must be:
“a sufficiently cohesive group of persons to show that there is a community or a part of a community, regard being had to the nature and likely impact of the original dispossession on the group; and (b) some element of commonality between the claiming community and the community as it was at the point of dispossession.”

Concerning the question of whether the plaintiff was a community, the LCC pointed out that in defining a community, the threshold provided in the Restitution Act is deliberately low hence the court is empowered to adopt a generous interpretation of what constitutes a community. Such a generous notion of what constitutes a community fits in well with the wide scope of the “rights in land that are capable of restoration.” According to Devenish, the bold teleological approach in the interpretation of the relevant legislation and the Constitution “is perceptive and purposive, and not merely technical or parsimonious.” Significantly, such an approach “is a triumph for social and political justice in relation to land restitution, reﬂecting the philosophy of ubuntu.”
In that regard, the court relied on the Constitutional Court judgment in Popela. In the Popela case, the Constitutional Court held that:
“This generous understanding of what constitutes a community is consistent with the retroactive reach of the restitution process back to 19 June 1913. With the passage of time, the composition and cohesion of communities who were victims of dispossession would be compromised in that communities would be displaced and alienated from their original homes at huge human and social expense. Also, that interpretation advances the declared purpose of the operative legislation, which is to provide restitution and equitable redress to as many victims of racial dispossession of land rights after 1913 as possible.”
The court accepted the plaintiff’s testimony that it used the subject land in terms of shared rules and practices, and the right to use the subject land was held communally; the community had shared interest in the land, the families grazed their cattle and ploughed the land according to communal rules. Accordingly, such persons could not have lived on the land in such large numbers and not have formed a community. The court held that given the constitutional imperative to perceive the notion of a community generously, the plaintiff constituted a community as defined in the Restitution Act.

Concerning the question of hearsay evidence, the court noted that the nature of land restitution claims is such that, in many cases those that suffered dispossession are no longer alive.  Accordingly, in order to ensure that the Restitution Act is meaningful the legislature deemed it necessary to intervene on this point and make hearsay evidence permissible. The LCC thus ruled that there were no compelling grounds for it to reject the evidence merely because was hearsay.  

3 2	Right in land
The land restitution enterprise is predicated on the claimant community having had a right in land and such a community must have been dispossessed of such a right after 19 June 1913 in order to be eligible to claim restitution or other equitable redress. Section 25(7) of the Constitution and section 2(1)(d) of the Act entitle a community dispossessed of a right in land after 19 June 1913, to claim restitution or other equitable redress. The LCC had to decide whether the Salem Community had a “right in land” in Salem as one of the prerequisites for the restitution of the subject land. Section 1 of the Restitution Act defines a right in land as:
“any right in land whether registered or unregistered, and may include the interest of a labour tenant and sharecropper, a customary law interest, the interest of a beneficiary under a trust arrangement and beneficial occupation for a continuous period of not less than 10 years prior to the dispossession in question”.

Expert testimony was submitted on behalf of the plaintiff that the latter has indigenous rights as descendants of Xhosa who occupied the south-eastern Zuurveld prior to colonisation by European settlers. It was further argued that independently of their claim to indigenous rights, the plaintiff’s members have rights to land and cultivation as a result of their descent from occupants of Salem from which they were not removed until the 1940s when they were dispossessed and evicted as a result of racially discriminatory laws. The plaintiff also testified that before the settlers arrived and right up to 1940, numerous of their ancestors occupied the commonage and used it to live on, graze cattle, grow crops and bury their dead. It was further testified on behalf of the plaintiff that after the dispossession in the 1940s, plaintiff’s members were forced to either remain only as labourers or to move away. Resultantly, the plaintiff allegedly lost rights in ownership, residence, grazing firewood, burial sites and the use of the land for agricultural purposes in the subject land without compensation. 

It is noteworthy that the plaintiff’s case thus made reference to the history of occupation before 1913 in line with the principles in Richtersveld Community and others v Alexkor Ltd and Another (Richtersveld Community). In Richtersveld Community, the Constitutional Court held that in adjudicating land restitution claims, it is necessary to look at the history of the land and its people. The Commission also dealt extensively with the history of the plaintiff from the 1820s until the alleged dispossession in 1941. The Commission argued that the reliance on the pre-1913 history was to show that the premise of the defendants’ case was false as the land was not vacant. It was further alleged that after the dispossession, the plaintiff’s members were to either remain only as labourers or vacate the land. The Commission thus argued that the claimants had rights pertaining to the land after 19 June 1913. It was further contended by the Commission that the phrase “right in land” is extremely widely defined in the Restitution Act hence it should be given a beneficial interpretation. 

Moreover, the plaintiff contended that indigenous rights continue despite colonial conquest for as long as the indigenous people assert them, and exercise them - they are not extinguished. In this case expert testimony was submitted on behalf of the plaintiff that the original Xhosa people and their descendants returned to their land time and time again, up until their dispossession; in particular, over the period 1913 to 1947. 

The defendants denied that the plaintiff had a right in the subject land as defined in section 1(xi) of the Restitution Act. It was argued that since the Xhosa’s holding of the land was not registered in the Office of the Governor in the Cape Colony, or the offices of the Landrost, it did not exist. The defendants further denied that any indigenous title existed, and if it did, they argued that prior to 1913, any such rights would have been extinguished by colonial conquest. The defendants further rebutted the evidence adduced by the plaintiff’s witnesses, arguing that it largely consisted of hearsay evidence, and had no probative value. It was contended that there was no credible evidence to prove that Blacks occupied the entire commonage, nor did they do so unhindered as of right until 1947. It was further pointed out that any allegation that Black inhabitants of Salem could rely on any indigenous title was not borne by the evidence. 

The defendants argued that the 1820 settlers settled on virgin land as a result of the expulsion of the Xhosa in Zuurveld during the Fourth Frontier War of 1811-1812. In that regard, the defendants relied on the above to argue that Colonel John Graham (known for founding Grahamstown in 1814) had expelled the Xhosa from the Zuurveld in the Fourth Frontier War in 1812 (of an eventual nine such wars), prior to which they had occupied the Zuurveld. It was therefore argued that the conquest of the Zuurveld by Colonel Graham is a key factor that extinguished the rights of the Xhosa in the Zuurveld. 

A key argument advanced by the defendants was that even if any communities existed, their rights were extinguished by colonial conquest arguing that the land had been conquered by the colonial government in 1819 and that effectively destroyed any right any Black could have in the Zuurveld. Although the defendants conceded that Xhosa people occupied the Zuurveld before the 1820 settlers, they contended that such occupation was temporary and sporadic and did not constitute a right of occupation. Relying on Dugard, the defendants argued that conquest was an accepted method of acquiring title until after World War I. The application of this international law principle implies that the consequences of colonial annexation of the subject land have to be examined on basis of the law in force at the time of colonial annexation, not at the time of the dispute. The defendants thus argued that intertemporal law demands that the law at the time is applied and as the conquest pre-dates 1928, such conquest was valid at the time and was an acceptable way of acquiring title. Consequently, it was argued that there was no community, as defined in the Restitution Act which had been formed comprising of Blacks in Salem that had rights to land.

3 2 1	Frontier Zone Argument
It is significant to note that the court accepted the plaintiff’s contention that the Zuurveld in which Salem falls under was a frontier zone hence the defendants’ argument ignores the concept of a frontier zone which is a zone where different communities resided with no single authority. The court accepted expert testimony from the plaintiff that the Zuurveld was a highly contested area, with expert reports indicating that the Dutch colonists found it extremely difficult to settle families to farm due to the raids and attacks from the Xhosa, leading to many families fleeing from the Zuurveld. It was further pointed out by the court that it was evident from the ten frontier wars that there was a continuing claim over the Zuurveld by the Xhosa. 

Another point noted by the court was the absence of any evidence showing that the settlers at any time managed to have complete authority over the Zuurveld and that the Xhosa relinquished their rights and were completely expelled. The court further ruled that contrary to the defendants’ argument that the Xhosa were expelled, the archival evidence indicates that a large number of Black people were resident on the commonage who were not employed by the erven owners.  It was further noted by the court that the presence of Blacks on the commonage was evident in the documentary evidence presented to the court. 

The LCC thus rejected the claim by the defendants that the 1820 settlers settled on virgin land. As a result, the LCC ruled that the plaintiff enjoyed a right in land in the subject land after 19 June 1913.  Such right stemmed from the Xhosa occupation of the Zuurveld which was never extinguished and extended to the community that occupied the commonage in Salem after 1913. Accordingly, the court ruled that there was no evidence that the settlers at any time managed to have complete authority over the Zuurveld and that the Xhosa relinquished their rights and were completely expelled. The LCC concluded that this right was not extinguished prior to 19 June 1913.

3 2 2	Colonial conquest
Conquest and its legal consequences for those involved, especially the claimants, was also considered by the court, in particular whether it extinguished the claimants’ rights, however precarious or tenuous they were. The court agreed with the dictum in Richtersveld Community where the Constitutional Court indicated that indigenous law ownership can be extinguished in a number of ways, one of which is if the land was taken by force. It was, however, held that there was no evidence to suggest that the Fourth Frontier War had amounted to the Xhosa’s rights being extinguished as argued by the defendants. As pointed out by the court, if it has to accept the conquest argument, it would have to be convinced that the land had been taken by force and as a result of such conquest the rights had been extinguished. In the court’s view, such argument ignores the fact that there were six more frontier wars in the Zuurveld, and in those wars the Xhosa and the settlers fought to establish authority over the land. Accordingly, the court ruled that the Fourth Frontier War did not amount to the rights of the Xhosa being extinguished, the different communities continued to fight over the Zuurveld in the decades that followed.

3 2 3	Rights should be determined through customary law
The LCC, citing the Constitutional Court decision in the Richtersveld Community case, explained that the rights which people enjoyed must be determined by reference to customary or indigenous law. Although in the past, indigenous law was seen through the common-law lens, in the context of our constitutional dispensation, it must be seen as an integral part of our law. The reason is that the Constitution acknowledges the originality and distinctiveness of indigenous law as an independent source of norms within the legal system although it has to be interpreted in the light of values enshrined in the Constitution.
The LCC further explained that:
“[i]ndigenous law could be established by reference to writers on indigenous law and other authorities and sources, and may include the evidence of witnesses where necessary.  In the present case, the historical literature that formed part of the record with the testimonies of witnesses, formed the basis of such customs and norms consequently the sources of customary law observed by the people.” 
Such an approach is in accordance with the Constitutional Court’s assertion that rights acquired under customary law must be determined with reference to that law subject only to the Constitution. Accordingly, in appropriate cases, registered ownership in land will not be held to have extinguished rights in land recognised under customary law.

The court also referred to the Popela case in which the Constitutional Court explained that in ascertaining a right in land under the restitution regime:
“[t]he threshold set by s 2(1)(d) is well met if the right or interest in land of the group is derived from shared rules determining access to land that is held in common and these rights go well beyond the orthodox common law notions of rights in land. This is because the legislative scheme points to a purpose to make good the ample hurt, indignity and injustice of racial dispossession of rights or interests in land that continued to take place after 19 June 1913.”

3 3	As a result of racially discriminatory laws or practices
One of the requirements for restitution of a right in land provided in section 2(1) of the Restitution Act is that the loss of the claimed land must be as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices. Section 1 of the Restitution Act explains that “racially discriminatory practices” means:
	“racially discriminatory practices, acts or omissions, direct or indirect, by… (a) any department of state or administration in the national, provincial or local sphere of government; (b) any other functionary or institution which exercised a public power or performed a public function in terms of any legislation.” 

Section 2 of the Restitution Act requires that only conduct or omissions that are causally connected to discriminatory laws or practices of the State or of a public functionary will entitle a dispossessed claimant to restitution. The LCC had to make a determination on whether the plaintiff’s loss of rights in land was a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices.

Significantly, the plaintiff submitted two main arguments in support of its contention, namely the non-recognition of indigenous title when the subject land was subdivided and parcelled out amongst the White settlers; and the judgment of the former Grahamstown Supreme Court (as it was then called) which ordered the subdivision and subsequent alienation of the subject land without regard to the rights of the Salem Community. The plaintiff argued that the sub-division of the commonage by order of the then Grahamstown Supreme Court and the disestablishment of the settlement without consultation with the resident indigenous people were in violation of the rights of the indigenous community. It was argued that by failing to consult with the indigenous community, who also had rights in the land before granting an order for its subdivision, the then Grahamstown Supreme Court was a party to a racially discriminatory practice. This is because in the 1940s, the White community which had, until then, shared the commonage with Blacks was allowed, by virtue of the judgment, to subdivide it and transfer portions of the land into their individual titles. Accordingly, the judgment thus affected the Blacks on Salem as it resulted in the claimant community losing all rights in the land with no compensation paid. The defendants, however, denied that the dispossession was as a result of any racially discriminatory laws or practices.

The court referred to the decision of the Constitutional Court in Popela which dealt with the use of the phrase “as a result of,” explaining that:
“the term ‘as a result of’ in the context of the Restitution Act is intended to be less restrictive and should be interpreted to mean no more than ‘as a consequence of’ and not ‘solely as a consequence of’…For that determination, a context-sensitive appraisal of all relevant factors should be embarked upon.” 

In Popela, the Constitutional Court elaborated on this requirement, holding that the causal connection under section 2 of the Restitution Act should not be interpreted to require that the State or a public entity should itself perpetrate the dispossession of rights in land.  According to the Constitutional Court:
“it is sufficient if the termination of rights in land is permitted, aided and supported by racially discriminatory laws or practices of the state or other functionaries exercising public power. The question is not whether the dispossession is effected by the state or a public functionary, but rather whether the dispossession was as a consequence of laws or practices put in place by the state or other public functionary.”

3 3 1	Failure to recognise indigenous title
In matters of this nature, the court emphasised the importance of always bearing in mind the racially discriminatory laws and practices that were in existence or took place before 19 June 1913.  According to the court, taking into account such laws or practices is necessary in order to “throw light on the nature of a dispossession that took place thereafter or to show that when it took place it was the result of racially discriminatory laws or practices that were still operative at the time of the dispossession.” 

The LCC accepted that the White community had been allowed to subdivide the shared commonage in the 1940s among themselves effectively dispossessing the claimant community of all their rights in the land. According to the court, racial discrimination lay in the failure to recognise and accord protection to indigenous law ownership while according protection to registered title. The LCC explained that:
“[i]ndigenous rights were accorded no protection whilst the registered title to land taken from the Xhosas was recognised and given protection...[t]he inevitable impact of this differential treatment was racial discrimination against the (claimants), which caused it to be dispossessed of its land rights.”

It was pointed out by the court that the Constitution acknowledges the originality and distinctiveness of indigenous law as an independent source of norms within the legal system. Consequently, racial discrimination lay in the failure to recognise and accord protection to indigenous law ownership while, on the other hand, according protection to registered title as was the case in Salem. The inevitable impact of this differential treatment was racial discrimination against the plaintiff, which caused it to be dispossessed of its land rights. It is also noteworthy that the Restitution Act expressly included indirect racial discrimination in the definition of racially discriminatory practices was significant. The inevitable result of this was to deprive the community of its rights in the land based on indigenous laws, while recognising rights of White registered landowners. According to the LCC, this is racially discriminatory and in the case of indirect discrimination, proof of motive or intention to discriminate on the part of the State was not required.

3 3 2	Effect of the former judgment of Grahamstown Supreme Court
The LCC also held that the judgment of the former Grahamstown Supreme Court had the effect of dispossessing the plaintiff of its grazing rights, residential rights, ploughing rights, and burial rights, among others, hence it amounted to a discriminatory practice. As noted above, the court accepted the testimony that Salem was a frontier zone. Consequently, when the former Grahamstown Supreme Court took the decision to sub-divide the commonage, it was aware that there were Blacks living on the commonage, who would be affected by its decision to subdivide the Salem land and parcel it out to settlers. 

Accordingly, the decision of the former Grahamstown Supreme Court had to be understood in the context of a tapestry of discriminatory practices. The decision “ensured that Blacks could not insist on the recognition of their existing rights in land and could not seek to protect those existing rights in land against further erosion”.  According to the LCC, “[t]he decision ignored the Natives, despite being aware of them, only because they were Black, they could not have rights and they did not need to be consulted, despite the fact they were affected. This was a racially discriminatory practice.”

The LCC’s approach is consistent with the Constitutional Court’s approach in Popela where the court explained that in construing ‘as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices’ under section 2(1) of the Restitution Act, one is obliged to scrutinise the purpose of the legislation and in doing so “promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.” Consequently, a decision-maker “must prefer a generous construction over a merely textual or legalistic one in order to afford claimants the fullest possible protection of their constitutional guarantees.” The Constitutional Court further reminded us in Popela that:
“[i]n enacting the Restitution Act, the legislature must have been aware that apartheid laws on land were labyrinthine and mutually supportive and in turn spawned racist practices…Therefore, often the cause of historical dispossession of land rights will not lie in an isolated moment in time or a single act.” 
The LCC’s approach is thus not only to focus on the aim of the dispossession but also the impact of the dispossession. Such an approach is in accord with the Constitutional Court’s equality jurisprudence in which indirect discrimination falls within the scope of racially discriminatory practices.

4	SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DECISION
Undoubtedly, the Salem decision is significant as it makes an outstanding contribution to the emerging jurisprudence on land restitution claims in the country. Five reasons clearly point to the significance of this decision and these are enumerated below.

4 4 1	Generous interpretation of community and rights in land
A major significance of the decision is the LCC’s emphasis on the constitutional imperative to perceive the notion of a community generously in land restitution claims. Such a generous interpretation of what constitutes a community fits well with the wide scope of the “rights in land that are capable of restoration.” It is also important to note that the LCC adopted a generous and purposive approach in its interpretation of a right in land, an approach that is in accordance with the “[t]he legislative scheme [which] points to a purpose to make good the ample hurt, indignity and injustice of racial dispossession of rights.” It is also noteworthy that the LCC also emphasised that the rights which people enjoyed must be determined by reference to customary or indigenous law, thereby acknowledging the originality and distinctiveness of indigenous law as an independent source of norms within the legal system. Such an approach is in accordance with the Constitutional Court’s assertion that rights acquired under customary law must be determined with reference to that law, subject only to the Constitution rather than seeing customary law through the lens of common law.
The LCC’s interpretative approach in casu of affording claimants the fullest possible remedies for the iniquities of the past is in accord with the transformative nature of the Constitution. It must be noted that like other constitutions adopted during periods of political transition, the Constitution is “simultaneously backward- and forward-looking.” As a transformative document, the Constitution “provides a legal framework within which to redress the injustices of the past as well as to facilitate the creation of a more just society in the future.” In its backward-looking aspect, the Constitution deliberately seeks to facilitate the transformation of society by ameliorating the wrongs of the past as the legacy of apartheid’s social and economic policies are still deeply inscribed on the landscape of South African society especially inequitable land ownership.

4 4 2	Reception of hearsay evidence
Another noteworthy contribution of the LCC’s decision is that it provided a template on how to handle arguments based on the reception of hearsay testimony in restitution cases. The LCC acknowledged the unique nature of land restitution claims, stating that there were no compelling grounds for the court to reject such evidence, noting that:
“the nature of land claims is such that, in many cases those that suffered dispossession are no longer alive.  In order to ensure that the Act is meaningful the legislature deemed it necessary to intervene on this point.”
In practice, this requires courts to come to terms with the oral histories of indigenous societies, which, for many such communities, are the only record of their past. Consequently, such oral histories and oral traditions play a significant role in the enforcement of indigenous rights, particularly in land restitution claims. As noted above, the defendants had attacked the evidence adduced by the plaintiff’s witnesses, arguing that it largely consisted of hearsay evidence hence such testimony had no probative value. The LCC thus ably gave effect to section 30(2) of the Restitution Act which provides that:
“it shall be competent for any party before the Court to adduce hearsay evidence regarding the circumstances surrounding the dispossession of the land right or rights in question and the rules governing the allocation and occupation of land within the claimant Community concerned at the time of such dispossession.” 
Such an approach is also consistent with the philosophy behind the land restitution regime, which is to make good the ample hurt, indignity and injustice of racial dispossession of rights or interests in land by according restitution and equitable redress to as many victims of racial dispossession of land rights as possible. 

The hearsay exception in such claims can be of key importance where there is active opposition to a claim as in the Salem Community case. In a land restitution case in R v Van der Peet, the Canadian Supreme Court pointed out that with regard to hearsay evidence in land claims, the common law rules of evidence should be adapted to take into account the sui generis nature of aboriginal rights. The Canadian Supreme Court proceeded to explain that:
“A court should approach the rules of evidence, and interpret the evidence that exists, conscious of the special nature of the aboriginal claims and of the evidential difficulties of proving a right which originates in times where there were no written records of the practices, customs and traditions engaged in. The courts must not undervalue the evidence presented by aboriginal claimants simply because that evidence does not conform precisely with the evidentiary standards applied in other contexts.”
Flexibility in the application of rules of evidence is in accordance with the transformative nature of the Constitution which entrenches the values of dignity and equal worth and provides a framework to remedy the failure to respect such values in the past. Such an approach is also in line with the legislative scheme provided under the Restitution Act which attempts to make good the ample hurt, indignity and injustice of racial dispossession of land rights suffered mainly by Black people as a result of obnoxious pieces of legislation and racially discriminatory practices.

4 4 3	Concept of a frontier zone elaborated
A third novel feature of the decision is the LCC’s acceptance and elaboration of the concept of a frontier zone. It must be recalled that the defendants had contended that any rights the plaintiff may have had in the Salem were extinguished by colonial conquest, particularly the argument that the conquest of the Zuurveld by Colonel Graham was a key factor that extinguished the rights of the Xhosa in the Zuurveld. As discussed above, the LCC accepted expert evidence that the Zuurveld was a frontier zone, a zone where different communities resided with no single authority. In that regard the LCC pointed out that there was no evidence that the settlers at any time managed to have complete authority over the Zuurveld and that the Xhosa relinquished their rights and were completely expelled. 

Braun has explained that a frontier is a “region of nebulous political control and conflict.” It is “as a place characterised by the relative absence of a single dominant institution… but rather by the presence of multiple institutions and, at times, even an institutional vacuum within a larger region.”  The finding by the court that the Zuurveld was a frontier zone worked to the benefit of the plaintiff as it helped dispose of the defendants’ assertion that the plaintiff’s rights had been extinguished as a result of colonial conquest. The LCC’s acceptance of the “frontier zone” argument brings a refreshing perspective to the adjudication of land restitution claims given the temporal limiting nature of 19 June 1913. This is particularly relevant especially in the Eastern Cape province where not less than ten frontier wars were fought between the White settlers and the indigenous Xhosa people over a period approximating 100 years.

4 4 4	International and comparative law as interpretative guides
Another key feature of the decision is the LCC’s embrace of the interpretative injunctions enshrined in section 39 of the Constitution which requires courts to to be open to considering international and foreign law sources when interpreting the Bill of Rights. It is important that as part of its interpretative work, the LCC made reference to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 2007 (Declaration). Such an approach is consonant with section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution which enjoins that when interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court “must consider international law.” There is no doubt that the constitutional requirement to consider international law in land rights adjudication turns international law into a mandatory canon of constitutional interpretation when giving content to a right enshrined in the Bill of Rights. 

The LCC referred to the preamble of the Declaration which poignantly states that:
“[I]ndigenous peoples have suffered from historic injustices as a result of, inter alia, their colonization and dispossession of their lands, territories and resources, thus preventing them from exercising, in particular, their right to development in accordance with their own needs and interests…[and] [r]ecognising the urgent need to respect and promote the inherent rights of indigenous peoples which derive from their political, economic and social structures and from their cultures, spiritual traditions, histories and philosophies, especially their rights to their lands, territories and resources”

The Declaration thus recognises the inherent rights of indigenous peoples over their land and territory. The Declaration further provides for the redress when traditional rights have been confiscated, taken, occupied, used or damaged without free prior informed consent. According to the LCC, “[t]he terms used are unambiguous [that] if an indigenous Community has been dispossessed of land without free, prior and informed consent then such Community is eligible for redress.” 

The openness of the South African Constitution to international law in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights is in accordance with a dialogic conception of human rights. International law provides useful normative insights on which constitutional and human rights adjudication can draw. The LCC should be commended for invoking an international instrument as international law provides important normative standards that may assist in domestic constitutional interpretation in a country like South Africa whose constitutional tradition is fairly young. It is however unclear how the principles enshrined in the Declaration can be applied within the South African land restitution regime as the LCC only gave a summary of such norms without stating whether and how such principles are applicable in South Africa. Critical questions remain to be addressed, for instance the compatibility of the temporal bar of 19 June 1913 prescribed in the Restitution Act on one hand, and the international law right of indigenous people to the restoration of their lands recognised in the Declaration and other international law instruments.

It is also significant to note that the LCC also made reference to comparative case law on aboriginal title from foreign jurisdictions such as Australia and Canada. This is sanctioned by section 39(1)(c) of the Constitution which permits the courts to consider foreign law when interpreting the Bill of Rights. The court referred to the watershed Mabo v Queensland case which enunciated on the concept of “native title” or “aboriginal title.” In the second Mabo case, the Australian High Court declared that:
“Natives Title has its origin in and is given its content by the traditional laws acknowledged by the traditional customs observed by the indigenous inhabitants of a territory. The nature and incidents of Natives title must be ascertained as a matter of fact by reference to those laws and customs.” 

The LCC also referred to the case of Western Australia v Commonwealth where the Australian High Court held that aboriginal title is enforceable even if a colony had been deemed terra nullius at the time of colonisation; Ward v Western Australia where the Australian High Court held that “the question of use and occupation to establish Natives title must be looked at from the standpoint of the indigenous community; and the Canadian Supreme court case of Delgamuuk v British Columbia where the Supreme Court comprehensively defined the concept of aboriginal title, exposition of the content of aboriginal title and the way in which it can be proven.

References to and openness to learning from comparative constitutional law in the interpretation of a national constitution from other constitutional cultures and traditions constitutes a major resource for the development and enrichment of our own constitutional jurisprudence. As noted by Liebenberg, a willingness “to consider alternative interpretations generated by other legal cultures and traditions destabilises the inevitability of the interpretations generated by our own legal culture and tradition” and has the potential to deepen substantive legal reasoning. 

The issue of whether the doctrine of aboriginal title, which has been used by indigenous groups in Australia and Canada to claim back their ancestral land, might be applicable in the South African context has loomed large over the restitution process for some time. In casu, as highlighted above, the LCC discussed the concept of aboriginal title as articulated by Canadian and Australian courts. The LCC did not, however, indicate whether such a principle is applicable under South African law or whether it is similar to the customary law right enunciated by South African courts. It is therefore unclear why the court went out of its way to discuss and enunciate a concept of aboriginal title and the apposite comparative jurisprudence yet did not pronounce itself on whether aboriginal title doctrine is part of South African law. The court’s cautious approach may be explicable on the sheer scale of land dispossession, and the proportion of the population that would be able to show a continuing connection to an indigenous group. The main fear is perhaps that the adoption of the aboriginal title approach as in other jurisdictions would have a significant impact on the stability of land titles across the country. 

4 4 5	Loss more than mere economic loss
A noteworthy issue pointed out by the LCC was that the rights of the Salem Community were not merely economic rights to graze and cultivate in a particular area. Instead, the court pointed out that there “were rights of families connected by indigenous forbearers.” As noted by Sachs, “land represents the link between the past and the future; ancestors lie buried there, children will be born there. Farming is more than just a productive activity, it is an act of culture, the centre of social existence, and the place where personal identity is forged.”

In many situations involving land dispossession, the State has more than just confiscated the victims’ land; it has also deprived the dispossessed of their dignity - what Atuahene has described as “dignity takings” to describe such a phenomenon. According to Atuahene:
“dignity takings” are when a State “directly or indirectly destroys or confiscates property rights from owners or occupiers whom it deems to be sub-humans without paying just compensation or without a legitimate public purpose.” 

Atuahene further explains that “dignity takings” would necessitate what she calls “dignity restoration” - that is compensation that addresses both economic loss and dignity deprivations involved. In that regard, dignity restoration is based on the principles of restorative justice and thus seeks to rehabilitate the dispossessed and reintegrate them in the fabric of the society. Restorative justice is thus focused on “restoring property loss, restoring injury, restoring a sense of security, restoring dignity based on a feeling that justice has been done and restoring social support.” The result is that “[w]hen reparations and restorative justice are married, dignity restoration is the offering of this formidable union.”

Thompson has also pointed out that ancestral lands usually contain sacred sites, the importance of which does not diminish with time. According to Thompson:
“People of a nation learn to structure their lives around the activities that their land makes possible. They alter it to suit their purposes; they construct dwellings and monuments; they bury their dead in its soil and establish institutions that take a physical form. They imbue the features of land with meaning; it features in their myths and becomes central to their traditions and spiritual life. The development of their culture is influenced by geography; the landscape plays an essential role in their stories and legends. They read off their history from landmarks and find their symbols in natural features.” 

According to the court, the loss of land “had a cultural and spiritual dimension that rendered the destruction of the rights more than just economic loss.” This is because colonial land dispossession and apartheid not only represented the disenfranchisement of the Black people of South Africa, but also an institutionalised system which maintained White domination and privilege entrenched through a myriad of political, legal, social and cultural institutions. Black people were cruelly dispossessed and deprived of access to their land, subjected to underdevelopment reserves and “homelands” and systemically discriminated against in their access to a range of social goods services. It is therefore fitting that the LCC noted that such factors require appropriate consideration by the Department of Rural Development and Land Affairs or the Land Claims Court when an appropriate remedy is fashioned thereby not only embracing the Constitutional Court’s commitment in Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal) that a commitment to transform society lies at the heart of our new constitutional order, but also advance the transformative ethos of the Constitution.

5	CONCLUDING REMARKS
The Restitution Act defines a set of criteria according to which claimants are entitled to restoration of the land or equitable redress. The Restitution Act entitles a community dispossessed of a right in land after 19 June 1913 as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices to claim restitution or other equitable redress. By ruling that the plaintiff was a community and that such a community had a right in land dispossessed as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices, the LCC rightly defined a community generously in line with the land restitution jurisprudence enunciated in such cases as Ritchersveld and Popela. The LCC further explained that the rights which people enjoyed must be determined by reference to customary or indigenous law. This is particularly important as the Constitution acknowledges the originality and distinctiveness of indigenous law as an independent source of norms within the legal system although it has to be interpreted in the light of values enshrined in the Constitution. Consequently, racial discrimination lay in the failure to recognise and accord protection to indigenous law ownership while, on the other hand, accorded protection to registered title as was the case in Salem. This accords well with the constitutional and the legislative scheme to make good the ample hurt, indignity and injustice of racial dispossession of land rights suffered mainly by Black people as a result of vile pieces of legislation and racially discriminatory practices.
The Salem decision is also important for its attempt to provide a template on how to handle arguments based on the reception of hearsay testimony in restitution cases, particularly when it relates to oral histories about a community’s land rights. This is important given that with many such land claimants, oral histories are often the only record of their past. Consequently, such oral histories and oral traditions play a significant role in the enforcement of indigenous rights, particularly in land restitution claims. 

It is important that as part of its interpretative work, the LCC made reference to international law and comparative jurisprudence thereby signifying openness to learning from comparative constitutional law in the interpretation of a national constitution from other constitutional cultures and traditions. Engagement between South African courts with international and comparative jurisdictions can generate new ways of interpreting these rights and thereby support transformative adjudication. Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether such international and comparative norms such as aboriginal title are now part of South African law.