IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA 
(WESTERN CAPE HIGH COURT, CAPE TOWN)

							CASE NUMBER: 24710/2010

In the matter between:

CITY OF CAPE TOWN						Applicant

and

All those persons whose identities are to the 
Applicant unknown and who occupy Portion 5 
of Cape Farm 478 Elsies River situate at the 
corner of Stellenbosch Arterial and Modderdam 

JUDGMENT

CLOETE AJ:

[4] Since the respondents took occupation of the property pursuant to a lease entered into between the applicant and the first respondent in early 1992, a number of structures have been built by the respondents (and/or others who have at various times occupied it) on the property. Despite the respondents' denial in their answering affidavit, it is now common cause that some of these structures have encroached onto Erf 113476 Cape Town, an adjoining property of which ACSA is the registered owner. It is now also common cause that certain of these structures in fact straddle the boundary line between the two properties and are thus situated on both the applicant's property and ACSA's property. It is further common cause that ACSA is not a party to these proceedings although it has consented to and supports the relief sought.

[11] The applicant is both the landlord of the property as well as the local authority whose approval is required for the erection of structures or building works to be carried out. It must approve building plans prior to any work commencing in terms of the NBR Act. No plans had been submitted or approved for the aforementioned building works, alterations or additions, nor for the erection of structures, all of which the applicant said were patently unlawful.

UNAUTHORISED ADDITIONS AND ALTERATIONS: ERF 113476: MORGAN WAY: CAPE TOWN

An inspection of the above property has revealed that Sections 4(1) and Section 10(1)(i) & (ii) as well as Regulation A25(1) promulgated under Section 17(1) of the National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act, No 103 of 1977, as amended (the Act) are being contravened in that:-
1. Various alterations and additions have been made to the existing building without the necessary written approval from the local authority (Section 4(1)),
2. The buildings are erected in such a manner that, in the opinion of the local authority,

1. Building plans must be submitted in fourfold to the local authority for consideration.
2. The use of the building must be reinstated to the original class of occupancy. (Single residential dwelling unit)

Should you fail to comply with the above requirements, legal action will be instituted against you in terms of Sections 4(4) & 10(2) and Regulation A25(11) of the Act without any further notice.'

[13] A final notice was served on both the applicant and ACSA on 23 March 2009. ACSA responded and indicated that it was unaware of any alterations and additions to its property and did not consent to same. It also consented to the illegal buildings being demolished (at this juncture it should be mentioned that the relief sought by the applicant in respect of the structures on ACSA land does not include the informal housing settlement which has also sprung up on ACSA's land and which is reflected on the aerial photograph annexed to this judgment and to which reference will be made hereinbelow).

UNAUTHORISED ADDITIONS AND ALTERATIONS: ERF 113476: MORGAN WAY: CAPE TOWN

Your letters dated 19 February 2009, 23 March 2009 as well as a telephonic conversation last week between our Mr G Gopal and your Mr Riaan Booysen refers.

As ACSA we were unaware, nor did we grant approval for the alternations and additions made to the existing building on erf 113476 Morgan Way, Cape Town.

The additions and alterations span across land owned by ACSA as well as land belonging to the City and we are therefore willing to grant permission, together with the City, to have the structures demolished.'

(a) the provisions of this Ordinance or, in so far as they may apply in terms of this Ordinance, the provisions of the Townships Ordinance, 1934 (Ordinance 33 of 1934);
(b) the provisions incorporated in a zoning scheme in terms of this Ordinance, or
(c) conditions imposed in terms of this Ordinance or in terms of the Townships Ordinance, 1934,

and shall not do anything, the effect of which is in conflict with the intention of this subsection.'

[16] The respondents in conducting or allowing others to conduct various businesses from the property are acting in contravention of LUPO as the property is zoned rural. Although this zoning permits residential occupation, it does not permit business use. The respondents do not have the consent of the applicant as landlord or as local authority to do so. The respondents are operating a tavern selling liquor without a licence and refrigerators for the storage of fish for commercial purposes were also found at the property. Affidavits by three individuals who conducted (or currently conduct) these businesses were annexed to Mr Mbandazayo's affidavit. These affidavits had been filed in another matter in this court in an application by the National Director of Public Prosecutions against Messrs Quinton and Calvin Marinus (the second respondent's relatives) and various others for the forfeiture of certain assets found at the property.

[17] A Mr van Tonder had also filed an affidavit in that matter (which is also annexed to Mr Mbandazayo's affidavit) confirming that he built various refrigeration units which are at the property for Mr Quinton Marinus. He states that he was always paid in cash for the work done (totalling R280 000). He was told that there should be no paper trail in respect of the work done. Mr van Tonder confirms that he witnessed liquor being sold at the property and that whilst he was working there he noticed that people were selling drugs. He also witnessed various people being assaulted at the property.

[18] Affidavits deposed to by various law enforcement officers confirm that when they conducted law enforcement operations at the property they found many taxis parked and operating from there and were told by those present that this was Mr Quinton Marinus' taxi business. They also found large refrigeration trucks ostensibly used for refrigeration of fish. The latest inspection of the property on 5 August 2010 confirmed that at least six persons were working there. The applicant has never authorised the running of businesses from the property, nor that employees of these businesses may reside there.

[26] In light of the contentions raised by the respondents regarding ACSA's property, the applicants sought amended relief (without objection by the respondents from a procedural point of view) to include the eviction of those of the respondents (and all who hold title under them) from the structures encroaching on ACSA's property.

[27] The question which now arises is whether, against this background, the applicant is entitled to the amended relief sought in respect of ACSA's property (provided of course that I am satisfied that it is entitled to the relief sought in respect of its own property, as the one will follow from the other).

[29]   The PIE Act caters for two different types of eviction applications, under s 4 and s 6 respectively. Section 4 contemplates that an applicant must be the owner or person in charge of the occupied land, while s 6 contemplates that the applicant is an organ of state, such as (in the present matter) a municipality with jurisdiction over the area concerned. The respondent argues that the applicant was not the person in charge of ACSA's property when it instituted the present proceedings against the respondents. In order to evict the respondents from ACSA's property and demolish the structures thereon, the applicant should have instituted proceedings in terms of s 6 of the PIE Act.

[31]   At 111d-f Brand JA said:
'PIE provides for essentially two different types of eviction applications, under sections 4 and 6 respectively. Both sections presuppose that those to be evicted are "unlawful occupiers" as defined in section 1. The difference is that under section 4 the applicant must be "the owner or person in charge" of the occupied land while section 6 contemplates that the applicant is an organ of State, such as a municipality, with jurisdiction over the area encompassing the occupied land. In its application papers, the municipality made no specific reference to section 6. At the same time, however, it did not claim to be the owner or person in charge of the school site. On the contrary, its relationship with the property was plainly set out in the founding affidavit. On these facts it was apparent that the application could only be founded on section 6. That is how the matter was understood and dealt with by everybody concerned, both in this court and in the court a quo.'

[32] The high court had granted the eviction order. Three grounds were advanced on appeal, all of which were of a technical nature. The ground of appeal which is relevant to the present matter was the following. The appellants contended that the eviction application did not meet the procedural requirements of the PIE Act. Although the application was brought under s 6 the procedural requirements of s 4(2) applied. Section 4(2) stipulates that, apart from the service of the eviction application as prescribed by the rules of court, an additional notice must be served upon a respondent at least 14 days before the date upon which the application is to be heard. There were several defects in the content of that notice. The Supreme Court of Appeal agreed that there were several defects in the notice. The question however was whether, in spite of these defects, the object of the statutory provision had been achieved.

[33]   At 116a-117b Brand JA said:

[35] How have the respondents dealt with these allegations? In short, with a bare denial that their structures and activities have encroached onto ACSA's land, coupled with a vague allegation that the photocopies of photographs annexed to the applicant's founding papers are of such a quality that the respondents are unable to relate the photographs to the allegations that they are meant to support. As I have already said the respondents had ample opportunity - before filing their answering affidavit - to satisfy themselves whether in fact the applicant's allegations were correct insofar as they related to ACSA and its property. The respondents failed to do so. They did not raise non-joinder as a separate defence. In addition there is no suggestion on the papers that any of the remaining respondents - irrespective of whether they reside or conduct business at the applicant's property or on ACSA's land or both - have not known about this application, including that the applicant sought demolition of the illegal structures on ACSA's land, from the outset.

[40] I now turn to the merits of the application. At the outset it should be mentioned that in argument the respondents' counsel did not address the merits of the application at all. He confined his submissions to those which I have already dealt with above, save that he also contended that the applicant is not entitled to an order that the respondents, once evicted, are interdicted and restrained from being upon the property for the purpose of unlawfully occupying or carrying on business thereat. This aspect will be considered later in this judgment.

[41] The applicant says that it previously leased the property to Mr Japie Marinus. The latter gave notice of his intention to cancel his tenancy with effect from 31 January 1992. The applicant then - on or about 1 February 1992 - entered into an oral lease agreement with the first respondent, who is the son-in-law of Mr Japie Marinus.

[42] The applicant claims that the lease agreement with the first respondent was subject to the following material terms, namely that: the first respondent would lease the property from the applicant at a monthly rental of R180 until the lease was validly cancelled; the rental would increase from time to time; the first respondent would personally reside at the property with his immediate family (i.e. his spouse, children and other close family members); the property would be used solely for residential purposes and no other; no other persons were permitted to occupy the property without the prior consent of the applicant; building work, alterations, extensions and the like would not be permitted at the property without the applicant's prior written approval; building works undertaken at the property would not encroach on the property of any other person; the property could not be utilised contrary to the zoning scheme regulations, the rural zoning and LUPO; the fifcst respondent could not sublet the property without the applicant's prior written consent; illegal activities were not permitted at the property; the first respondent was responsible for ensuring that good order was maintained at the property at all times; the lease was terminable on reasonable notice to the first respondent; and in the event that the first respondent committed any one or more breaches of the lease agreement, then the applicant would be entitled to cancel. (These terms are also contained in the applicant's standard written lease agreement.)

[43] The terms of the lease agreement are disputed by the first respondent. It is now common cause that the Marinus family (the' second respondent's family) originally occupied a property situated at 18 Tenth Avenue, Elsies River (also known as Erf 10111 Elsies River), where the second respondent was apparently born. This property had been owned by the second respondent's parents, and it would appear, her grandparents before them. According to the first respondent 18 Tenth Avenue was a large property on which two houses had been built. The older Marinus family occupied the one house and the younger Marinus family the other. There was stabling for horses, vegetable stores (a requirement at the time for obtaining a hawking licence), a fish processing area (with a cold store and packing area), accommodation for employees, parking facilities for the vehicles and equipment used in the hawking of fish and vegetables, and a venue where they held dances and from where they sold liquor.

[46] The applicant points out various significant difficulties in the respondents' version. Firstly, the first respondent was born on 6 September 1966. At the time when the expropriation agreement which preceded the missing written lease agreement was concluded, the first respondent would have been approximately 10 years old. It is highly unlikely that he would have been present at those discussions (he does not claim that he was) since he only married the second respondent some years later. (The first and second respondent subsequently divorced in 2001.) Further, the second respondent herself was born on 25 November 1961. Accordingly, in 1976 - when the expropriation agreement was allegedly concluded -the second respondent would have been about 14 years old. It is not alleged by the respondents that the second respondent was present at any of the discussions between Mr Japie Marinus and the CDC. The second respondent has not filed any affidavit to that effect. The affidavit of Mr Lionel Marinus, which was filed in support of the first respondent's answering affidavit, only confirms the correctness of the first respondent's affidavit insofar as it relates to him. From the first respondent's affidavit it is apparent that the involvement of Mr Lionel Marinus was limited to occasions when he accompanied Mr Japie Marinus to the CDC to make enquiries about the purchase of the applicant's property. Nowhere is it stated that Mr Lionel Marinus was a party to the discussions between Mr Japie Marinus and the CDC which resulted in the expropriation agreement governing the alleged terms of occupation by the Marinus family of the applicant's property.

[47] Further, the deed of transfer under which 18 Tenth Avenue was expropriated from Mr Japie Marinus in 1977 specifically reflects that included in the conditions of ownership of that property were the following:
'1. That no hotel, bottle-store, or bar, or any building used for or in connection with the manufacture or sale of intoxicating liquor shall be erected on the said land, nor shall the land be used in connection with the manufacture or sale of intoxicating liquor in any way.

2.   That not more than one dwelling house shall be erected on an Erf.'

[48] It is thus difficult to accept the respondents' version that: (a) two houses had lawfully been built at 18 Tenth Avenue; and (b) liquor had lawfully been sold from that property during the period of ownership thereof by Mr Japie Marinus. By parity of reasoning it is also therefore difficult to accept that the CDC would have agreed -orally, with Mr Japie Marinus and subsequently, in writing with the first and second respondents - to permit the Marinus family, at the applicant's property, to erect buildings and to conduct business activities which had been unlawful at 18 Tenth Avenue.
[49] The applicant says that the lease was entered into on the basis that the first respondent qualified for low-cost subsidised housing by meeting certain criteria. This is denied by the first respondent who claims that he and the other respondents reside on the property, not in terms of a so-called housing scheme, but in terms of a written lease after having been relocated following an expropriation on agreed terms.

His son in law & his family are in occupation of the property & a new rent card at
same rental should be issued to him.
Details:
Jeffrey Blankenberg Desiree
Mervyn       15yrs Jasmine      16 "
Zola	5
Roxanne	10
Aletha	12
Lionel		34 yrs )  	Single sons of
Quinton 	24 " )		Mr J Marinus

Information obtained telephonically from Mr Marinus on 15 Jan 1992.'

[51]   The applicant has also produced an internal memorandum dated 16 April
1999 from a Mr Adriaanse, the applicant's Housing Manager at the time, to the Head
of Housing, the content of which reads as follows:
'RE l/S:   C.D.C. Properties Elsies River
Attached please find the completed leases for CDC properties.
The only ones that are still outstanding are:
1)	J. Blanckenburg ERF 55222 Vredehof Farm
2)	

Thanks Ralph O.'

[53] The applicant says that the first respondent has committed or permitted various breaches of the lease agreement and continues to do so. These breaches include that he is not in personal occupation of the property; he and/or the other respondents have operated or allowed businesses to be operated from the property which, in addition to being in breach of the lease, is contrary to the use permitted in terms of the zoning scheme regulations and thus LUPO; he has employed persons at the property; he has allowed unlawful occupants to occupy the property without the applicant's consent; unlawful building works, alterations and extensions have been done at the property without approved plans or the applicant's consent in contravention of the NBR Act; he has encroached onto the adjacent property owned by ACSA in breach of LUPO; illegal activities have been conducted and illegal substances and firearms stored at the property; he has failed to maintain the property; unlawful structures have been erected at the property and containers have been brought onto the property, without the applicant's consent; and some of the respondents, notably the first and second respondents, are involved in the illegal activities conducted at the property.

[55] The applicant has approximately 90 000 units as rental housing stock, all of which have been leased to tenants. The applicant says that it only evicts people from the rental housing stock who are in arrear with rentals as a last resort and that accordingly few houses become available for other occupants from this stock. The applicant has several measures in place in an attempt to keep rental defaulters in their homes rather than to evict them. The consequence of this is that, since there is already an inordinate delay in the provision of housing, the demand outstrips the supply by considerable margins. Leases are generally only terminated should a tenant no longer require a particular property or use same for illegal activities. Under these circumstances the applicant does terminate the leases as well as the tenant's right of occupation.

[57]   The applicant has also obtained information from one Inspector Rossouw

[58] Rossouw's investigations resulted in Messrs Quinton and Calvin Marinus, the first and second respondents and eleven co-accused facing criminal charges in this court. They were subsequently discharged in terms of s 174 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 in or about 2006 or 2007.

[59] However, Mr Mbandazayo says that the applicant has also been advised of more recent illegal activities at the property. The following incidents at the property have been reported to the applicant's officials by one Vellai, a law enforcement officer who was either part of the operations at the property or has obtained the information from police dockets under his control. These activities include murder, burglary, theft, robbery, possession of unlicensed firearms and ammunition, drug dealing and possession, arson and rape. From statements obtained from persons arrested for some of these activities it is clear that a shebeen is operated from the property where people drink and smoke tik and are targeted for robberies. In addition, the informal settlement on ACSA's land is in close proximity to the property and the residents of the informal settlement are patrons of the shebeen. In support hereof the applicant has set out in some detail what transpired during the course of four lawful traps which the relevant law enforcement agencies had set at the property during the period 12 August 2008 to 17 December 2008.

5090/2011 (WCC).

[61]   By virtue of the fact that the lease has been properly and validly cancelled, the
respondents and all who hold title under them have no right in law to occupy the
property, and are unlawful occupiers within the meaning of the PIE Act. Since the
respondents had been in occupation of the property for more than six months at the
time when the eviction proceedings were initiated in November 2010, the application
falls to be determined in terms of s 4(7) of the PIE Act, which reads as follows:
'If an unlawful occupier has occupied the land in question for more than six months at the time when the proceedings are initiated, a Court may grant an order for eviction if it is of the opinion that it is just and equitable to do so, after considering all the relevant circumstances, including, except where the land is sold in a sale of execution pursuant to a mortgage, whether land has been made available or can reasonably be made available by a municipality or other organ of state or another land owner for the relocation of the unlawful occupier, and including the rights and needs of the elderly, children, disabled persons and households headed by women.'

'(a)     ensure that-

(iii) services in respect of water, sanitation, electricity, roads, storm water drainage and transport are provided in a manner which is economically sufficient;
(b) set housing delivery goals in respect of its area of jurisdiction;
(c) identify and designate land for housing development;
(d) create and maintain a public environment conducive to housing development which is financially and socially viable;
(e) promote the resolution of conflicts arising in the housing development process;
(f) initiate, plan, co-ordinate, facilitate, promote and enable appropriate housing development in its area of jurisdiction;
(g) provide bulk engineering services, and revenue generating services in so far as such services are not provided by specialist utility suppliers;

[64] In accordance with this legislative scheme the applicant is providing housing to persons on a progressive basis. Mr Mbandazayo has said that there is a backlog of over 400 000 housing units and that the demand for housing grows by 10 000 families each year. The applicant also has policies in place to accommodate persons in desperate need of housing.

[66] Returning to s 4(7) of the PIE Act. As I have said this section provides that a court may grant an order for eviction of persons in the position of the respondents if it is of the opinion that it is just and equitable to do so, after considering all the relevant circumstances, including whether land has been made available or can reasonably be made available by the applicant or other organ of state or another land owner for the relocation of the respondents, and including the rights and needs of the four categories of persons referred to in s 4(6), namely the elderly, children, disabled persons and households headed by women.

'As regards the effect of section 26(3) of the Constitution (as quoted above), read together with section 4(7) of PIE, it would appear from the judgment of Harms J A in Ndlovu v Ngcobo; Bekker & another v Jika (supra) at paras [17]-[19] that it is not necessary for an applicant, in proceedings to evict an unlawful occupier from such applicant's property, to place more before the Court by way of evidence than the facts that such applicant is the owner of the property in question and that the respondent is in unlawful occupation of such property. It is then up to the occupier to disclose to the Court "relevant circumstances" to show why the owner should not be granted an order for the eviction of the occupier (see also Ellis v Viljoen 2001 (4) SA 795 (C) at 805C-D; Ridgway v Janse van Rensburg 2002 (4) SA 186 (C) at 191I-192A; Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) at paragraphs [41]-[43]).'

If all the relevant circumstances of this case are weighed up, including the aforesaid rights and needs of the persons concerned and of those mentioned by s 4(6) and (7) and the availability of land, I am satisfied that it would be just and equitable to grant the order for ejectment prayed for. In this regard I again refer to the blatant invasion of the property, the short duration of the stay on the property, the probability of the occupants being able to return where they came from, the irreversible loss to the applicants should the order not be granted, the extreme danger to life and limb of the occupants themselves and of surrounding communities and, generally, to the public interest regarding the matter.'

[70] When the applicant's founding affidavit was prepared in October 2010, the first respondent was not residing at the property but at an address in Gordon's Bay. It appears from a windeed search conducted by the applicant on 17 August 2010 that the first respondent had resided at that address since at least November 2005. He also owned immovable property elsewhere during the period 2004 to 2006, thus after the tenancy of the property had been transferred to him. According to the same windeed search, one of these properties was purchased by the first respondent for the sum of R140 000. His ownership of immovable property renders him ineligible for subsidised housing.

[71] The second respondent was, as I have said, previously married to the first respondent. She resided at the property. However in a warning statement given to the SAPS and dated 24 October 2004 she indicated that she resided at another address in Elsies River. She informed Rossouw that this was her residential address and that she rented the applicant's property out to various third parties.

[72] The first respondent now alleges that he is indeed residing at the property. The second respondent does likewise. She was however arrested at the property for illegal dealing in alcohol. Accordingly, whilst she is plainly running a business unlawfully from the property, she may well also reside there from time to time or she may have moved back permanently to the property. Be that as it may, both the first and the second respondents have demonstrated that they have alternative housing at their disposal. None of the other respondents have deposed to affidavits setting out their personal circumstances. This fact, coupled with the fact that illegal activities are being conducted from the property, not only by the first and second respondents but in all likelihood the other respondents as well, surely cannot be regarded as a relevant circumstance which should weigh in favour of the respondents. This is particularly so in light of the backlog of over 400 000 housing units and the demand for housing which grows by 10 000 families annually. The housing shortage is such that the applicant cannot reasonably be expected to permit persons to rent its housing stock in order to carry out illegal activities and to act in contravention of planning and regulatory instruments. The prejudice that the applicant and the community is likely to suffer were the respondents permitted to continue to occupy the property considerably outweighs the prejudice, if any, to the respondents should they be evicted.

[74]   The respondents against whom these eviction proceedings are directed are
all adults. Had there been minor children residing at the property, the obligation to
provide them with housing would not rest in the first instance with the applicant, but

[76] Section 4(8) also stipulates that I must determine: (a) a just and equitable date on which the respondents must vacate the applicant's property under the circumstances; and (b) the date on which an eviction order may be carried out if the respondents have not vacated the applicant's property by the aforesaid date. In terms of s 4(9) of the PIE Act, in determining a just and equitable date by which the respondents must vacate, I must again have regard to all relevant factors, including the period that the respondents have resided on the applicant's land. Sections 4(10) and (11) empower me, when granting an eviction order, to also make an order for the demolition and removal of the buildings or structures occupied by the respondents, if necessary with the assistance of law enforcement agencies.

[77] The applicant submits that a period of one month is reasonable for the respondents to vacate the property. Whilst the applicant correctly says that the respondents have known about these proceedings for a long time, I do not believe that it would be just and equitable to order that they vacate within a period of one month. Even on the applicant's version there are a number of people residing at the property. There are a number of businesses operated at the property with the attendant infrastructure. Christmas is a few weeks away. The respondents have resided at the property for a long time. In these circumstances, it is my view that it would be just and equitable to order the respondents (and all who hold title under them) to vacate the applicant's property and the house and any structures thereon, including those encroaching on ACSA's land, by not later than 29 February 2012.

[79] In regard to costs, the respondents' counsel submitted that they simply do not have the financial wherewithal to meet a costs order. However there is nothing on the papers to support this submission. On the contrary, it appears that not only does the first respondent at least own immovable property, but that the businesses being conducted from the property are lucrative. In my view there is no reason why, in these circumstances, costs should not follow the result.

[80] On 31 October 2011 the respondents applied for a postponement of the matter. After hearing argument, I postponed the matter until 8 November 2011 but ordered the respondents who still oppose the application to bear the wasted costs of the postponement jointly and severally. For sake of completeness I will include that costs order in the order which follows hereunder.

2. The respondents shall vacate the property by not later than 29 February 2012, failing which the applicant shall be entitled to evict them in accordance with this order;
3. The respondents and all who hold title under them, once evicted, are interdicted and restrained from being upon the property for the purposes of unlawfully occupying and/or carrying on business thereat;

4.1. Demolish and remove any unlawful structures or building works at the property; and
4.2. Remove any materials used to erect such structures or building works referred to in paragraph 4.1 above, which shall be kept in safekeeping by the applicant and/or the sheriff until released to the lawful owner thereof within one month of the removal, whereafter it may be disposed of by the sheriff and/or the applicant and shall be deemed to be abandoned; and
4.3. Remove any containers, refrigeration/freezer and/or storage facilities and all motor vehicles, together with any other goods and/or equipment found in or at the property which shall be kept in safekeeping by the applicant and/or the sheriff until released to the lawful owner thereof within one month of the removal, whereafter it may be disposed of by the sheriff and/or the applicant and shall be deemed abandoned; and
4.4. The sheriff and all persons appointed by him are authorised to remove any possessions belonging to the respondents found in, at or near the property, and all or any structures erected at the property, which possessions shall be kept in safe custody by the applicant and/or the sheriff until released to the lawful owner thereof within one month of removal, whereafter it may be lawfully disposed of by the sheriff and/or the applicant and shall be deemed to be abandoned;

5. The respondents (save for the eighteenth and twentieth respondents) are ordered to pay the applicant's costs of suit, jointly and severally, the one paying the other's to be absolved, which costs shall include the costs of the special service application, the costs of issuing the notice by the court and the costs of these eviction proceedings, including the postponements on 26 January 2011 and 31 October 2011.
J I CLOETE