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[2000] ZASCA 76
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Thompson v South African Broadcasting Corporation (622/98) [2000] ZASCA 76; 2001 (3) SA 746 (SCA) ; [2001] 1 All SA 329 (A) (29 November 2000)
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Reportable
case no: 622/98
In the
matter between:
DESMOND JAMES THOMPSON Appellant
and
SOUTH
AFRICAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION
Respondent
Coram: F H Grosskopf, Harms, Olivier, Zulman, JJ
A and Mthiyane, A J A
Heard: 13 November
2000
Delivered: 29 November 2000
Summary: Claim for damages in delict - whether element of causation proved.
J U D G M E N T
F H GROSSKOPF JA:
[1] On 10 December
1993 the respondent and Houston Video & Film Distributors (Pty) Ltd entered
into a written agreement (“the
sponsorship agreement”) in terms
whereof Houston Video & Film Distributors (Pty) Ltd undertook to sponsor a
television
programme entitled “Food for Life” (“the television
programme”) and to pay a sponsorship fee of R264 639,60
to the
respondent by 26 January 1994 in consideration for exposure on the television
programme.
[2] On the same day the same parties entered into a
further written agreement called a television production commissioning agreement
(“the
production agreement”) in terms whereof the respondent
commissioned Houston Video & Film Distributors (Pty) Ltd to produce
the
television programme for a total contract price of
R240 581,04.
[3] Mr Robin Knox-Grant signed the two
agreements on behalf of the respondent while the appellant signed them on behalf
of Houston
Video & Film Distributors (Pty) Ltd. It is common cause that to
the knowledge of the appellant there never existed a company
with the name of
Houston Video & Film Distributors (Pty) Ltd. He therefore purported to act
on behalf of a company which was
in fact non-existent.
[4] The
television programme was nonetheless duly produced by the appellant as if the
production agreement were a valid agreement,
and the respondent duly paid the
contract price of R240 581,04 at the request of the appellant to Houston
Educational Distributors
on 31 December 1993.
[5] It is
further common cause that the respondent allowed the television exposure agreed
to in terms of the sponsorship agreement. Payments
totalling R63 825,00
were subsequently made to the respondent in reduction of the sponsorship fee of
R264 639,00. The
appellant however failed to cause any further payments to
be made to the respondent in terms of the sponsorship agreement, leaving
an
outstanding balance of R200 814,60.
[6] The respondent
brought an action in the Cape of Good Hope Provincial Division claiming payment
of the outstanding balance of
R200 814,60 from the appellant . The
respondent’s claim was based on the allegation that the appellant knew
that Houston
Video & Film Distributors (Pty) Ltd was non-existent, that he
acted as agent for a non-existent principal and that he was consequently
liable
in law as principal. This claim failed in the court a quo and there is
no cross-appeal by the respondent in respect of that order. It is accordingly
not necessary to consider the alleged
legal basis of that claim.
[7]
The respondent amended its particulars of claim prior to the hearing of the
case by introducing a claim for damages arising from delict.
This new cause of
action was based on the appellant’s alleged fraudulent, alternatively
negligent, misrepresentations. The
respondent relied in this regard on the
appellant’s representations that Houston Video & Film Distributors
(Pty) Ltd was
a duly registered company in existence and that he was authorised
to act on behalf of such company. It was also alleged in the
amended
particulars of claim that these representations were material and that the
respondent was induced thereby to enter into the
two agreements and to make
payment of the sum of R240 581,04 in terms of the production agreement.
The amended particulars
of claim concluded with the allegation that the
respondent suffered damage in the said sum of R240 581,04 as a result of
the
appellant’s alleged misrepresentations.
[8] The
court a quo came to the conclusion that the appellant acted fraudulently
and that his misrepresentations were material and intended to induce
the
respondent to enter into the agreements. The court a quo further held
that had it not been for the appellant’s fraudulent misrepresentations the
respondent would not have entered into
the agreements and would consequently not
have paid the R240 581,04 to the appellant. In the result the court a
quo granted judgment in favour of the respondent for the sum of
R240 581,04 plus interest. The judgment of the court a quo has been
reported under the name of South African Broadcasting Corporation v Thompson
and another [1998]3 All SA 586(C). Leave to appeal was refused by the court
a quo but granted on application to the Chief Justice.
[9]
The appellant’s case was that the company which entered into the two
agreements was incorrectly described as Houston Video
& Film Distributors
(Pty) Ltd instead of Hauston Distributors (Pty) Ltd (a registered company
controlled by the appellant), alternatively
that Houston Video & Film
Distributors (Pty) Ltd was actually the trading name of Hauston Distributors
(Pty) Ltd. The appellant
accordingly denied making any fraudulent
misrepresentations. For the purposes of this case I shall assume in favour of
the respondent
that the appellant did in fact make the aforesaid
representations fraudulently. Non constat that these misrepresentations
were material. (Cf Service v Pondart-Diana 1964(3) SA 277(D)
per Miller J at 279 A-C.) It is unnecessary however to pursue this
aspect any further inasmuch as the respondent, who is claiming
damages in
delict, in my view failed to prove both causation and damage. I shall first
deal with the question whether the respondent
has proved that the fraudulent
misrepresentation was the cause of its alleged loss.
[10] The
respondent’s claim for damages for fraudulent misrepresentation is a claim
in delict and not contract (Trotman and Another v Edwick 1951(1) SA
443(A) at 449 B-C; Ranger v Wykerd and Another 1977(2) SA 976(A) at 991
B-G). In claiming delictual damages the respondent had to prove the causal
connection between the fraudulent
misrepresentation and the alleged patrimonial
loss (Trotman’s case supra at 450 C-F). In dealing with the
question whether the fraudulent misrepresentation caused any loss, Trollip JA
remarked as follows
in Ranger’s case supra at 991 F:
“One of the problems sometimes encountered in seeking to apply the measure [i e the basic measure of damages claimable for delict] is whether or not the fraud complained of did occasion, as cause and effect, the alleged patrimonial loss. This involves ascertaining whether the fraud influenced the claimant’s mind and conduct in entering into the contract in question or his agreeing to particular terms thereof and, if so, to what extent.”
[11] Ms Human, who was
responsible for the production of educational programmes on behalf of the
respondent, met the appellant through
a certain Ms Myers who had produced a
number of successful programmes for the respondent in the past. Ms Human
explained that she
was willing to negotiate with the appellant because she knew
and trusted Ms Myers. The respondent was dealing with artists, and productions
were often done on the basis of a “gentleman’s agreement”.
Although the respondent required such agreements to
be concluded in the name of
a company it was of no consequence to the respondent with which company it
contracted. The witnesses
who testified on behalf of the respondent conceded
that it would have made no difference if the name of the other contracting party
in this case had in fact been Hauston Distributors (Pty) Ltd instead of Houston
Video & Film Distributors (Pty) Ltd. The respondent
did not even take the
trouble to enquire whether the other contracting party was an existing and
viable company which would be able
to perform its obligations in terms of the
agreements. The production of the television programme had in fact commenced
even before
the agreements were signed and it was conceded that the signing was
regarded as a mere formality. It appears therefore that the
respondent placed
no reliance on the identity of the company but looked to the appellant as the
true contracting party who had to
perform in terms of the agreements. There is
accordingly no evidence in my opinion to show that “the fraud influenced
the
claimant’s mind and conduct in entering into the contract in
question.” (Ranger’s case supra at 991F). I am
therefore of the view that the respondent failed to establish a causal
connection between the fraudulent misrepresentation
complained of and the
damages claimed. (Scheepers v Handley 1960(3) SA 54(A) at 59
A-B).
[12] A related aspect is the assessment of damage and
proof of the quantum thereof. (See generally Neethling Potgieter and Visser
Law of Delict 2nd ed par 3.5 at 205-206.) In my judgment the
respondent failed to prove that it suffered damage in the amount awarded by the
court
a quo, i e R240 581,04. That was the amount paid by the
respondent in consideration for the production of the television programme,
as
explained in [4] above. By ordering the appellant to pay that amount as damages
the court a quo in effect allowed the respondent to retain the television
programme for no consideration at all. There is no evidence to suggest
that but
for the fraud the terms of the production agreement would have been any
different. There appears to have been proper performance
by both parties in
terms of the production agreement and in my view there is no reason to set aside
the result of the production
agreement. (Cf Wilken v Kohler 1913 AD 135
at 144.)
[13] For these reasons the court a quo should
in my judgment have granted absolution from the instance.
[14]
There is one further aspect that should be mentioned. The court a quo
found the appellant to be “a very unreliable and dishonest
witness”. (See [16] p 593-594 of the reported judgment.)
I fully agree
with that conclusion. The appellant committed fraud and then relied on spurious
defences. In my view this court should
indicate its displeasure by making no
order as to costs in the court a quo.
The following order is
accordingly made:
1. The appeal is allowed with costs.
2. The order of the court a quo is set aside and replaced by the following order:
“Absolution from the instance is granted, but no order is made as to costs.”
_______________
F H
GROSSKOPF
Judge of Appeal
Harms, JA)
Olivier, JA)
Zulman, JA)
Mthiyane,
AJA) concur