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[2000] ZASCA 75
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Gauteng Provincial Legislature v Kilian and 29 Others (562/98) [2000] ZASCA 75; 2001 (2) SA 68 (SCA); [2001] 1 All SA 463 (A); 2001 (3) BCLR 253 (SCA) (29 November 2000)
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
CASE NUMBER: 562/98
In the matter between:
THE GAUTENG PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE
APPELLANT
AND
J D KILIAN AND 29 OTHERS
RESPONDENTS
CORAM : NIENABER, HOWIE, SCHUTZ and ZULMAN JJA
et MTHIYANE AJA
DATE OF HEARING : 9 NOVEMBER 2000
DATE OF JUDGMENT : 29
NOVEMBER 2000
Powers of the Speaker of the Gauteng Legislature to
give an undertaking in regard to costs concerning the resolution of a dispute
as
to the constitutionality of a Bill by the Constitutional Court in terms of ss
98(2)(d) of the Constitution of the Republic of
South Africa Act 200 of
1993
JUDGMENT
ZULMAN JA
[1] The thirty respondents were at the relevant time
members of the appellant (the Gauteng Provincial Legislature (“the
legislature”).
They constituted at least one-third of the total
membership of that body. Pursuant to the provisions of ss 98(9) of the
Constitution
of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 (“the interim
Constitution”) they petitioned the Speaker of the legislature
requiring
him to request the Constitutional Court to exercise its jurisdiction in terms of
ss 98(2)(d) of the interim Constitution.
[2] The subsections
provide as follows:-
“98(2) The Constitutional Court shall have jurisdiction in the Republic as the court of final instance over all matters relating to the interpretation, protection and enforcement of the provisions of this Constitution, including-
......
......
(d) any dispute over the constitutionality of any Bill before Parliament or a provincial legislature, subject to subsection (9);
......
......
(9) The Constitutional Court shall
exercise jurisdiction in any dispute referred to in subsection (2)(d) only at
the request of the
Speaker of the National Assembly, the President of the Senate
or the Speaker of a provincial legislature, who shall make such a request
to the
Court upon receipt of a petition by at least one-third of all the members of the
National Assembly, the Senate or such provincial
legislature, as the case may
be, requiring him or her to do so.”
[3] The request was
directed towards resolving a dispute which had arisen as to the
constitutionality of certain provisions of the
Gauteng School Education Bill,
then awaiting adoption or rejection by the legislature. The Speaker
communicated the request to
the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court
declared that the provisions of the Bill were not inconsistent with the interim
Constitution. It declined to make any order as to the costs of the
parties.
[4] Prior to embarking upon the litigation in the
Constitutional Court the respondents sought an undertaking from the Speaker that
their
costs would be paid by the legislature. The respondents contend that such
an undertaking was given. The appellant denies this and
alleges that what was
given was a mere ruling. After the proceedings before the Constitutional Court
were concluded the respondents
sought to recover their taxed costs from the
legislature. When payment of such costs was not made proceedings were
instituted
in the Transvaal Provisional Division of the High Court for their
recovery. An exception to the particulars of the respondents’
claim
having been dismissed, the trial then proceeded, in which certain of the
respondents gave evidence. The court a quo (Van Dijkhorst J)
granted judgment in favour of the respondents for the amount of their taxed
costs together with interest and costs.
The legislature, with the leave of the
court a quo, appeals against that order.
[5] In order to
determine whether an enforceable undertaking was given or an inconsequential
ruling, it is necessary to refer to the
following undisputed
facts.
[6] On 7 September 1995 the petition by one-third of the
members of the legislature previously referred to was lodged with the Speaker
in
terms of s 98(9) of the interim Constitution.
[7] On 3 October
1995 the Speaker sent a memorandum concerning the petition to the secretary and
legal advisor of the legislature
in which he stated:
“SUBJECT: PETITION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT EDUCATION BILL
Please be informed that this petition should be handled as follows:
1. Should the Constitutional Court request the Speaker to hear oral or legal argument from both parties on this petition the Legislature will bear the legal costs of counsel appointed by each side to represent its case. Please note that as there are two sides i.e. the petitioners and those opposing the petitions, only one counsel representing each side will be paid for by the Legislature. Should individual members or parties decide on their own specific legal representative outside the group they then have to foot the bill for the same.
2. Should the Legislature appoint counsel for both sides, each side will nominate their counsel.
3. The Legislature shall not pay for members who use the amicus curiae procedure and such members will have to meet their own costs.”
[8] In a letter dated 13 October 1995 addressed by the registrar of the Constitutional Court to the Speaker, the views of the President of the Constitutional Court are set out as follows:-
“Education policy is a matter of considerable public interest. Where it is alleged that provisions of a Bill dealing with educational policy are unconstitutional, the Court would want to allow every opportunity to the objectors and interested parties to place their views before the Court.”
[9] Arising from this letter various
discussions were held with the Deputy Speaker and the Speaker concerning, inter
alia, the payment
of costs of attorney and counsel to represent the petitioners
before the Constitutional Court.
[10] The Speaker ruled that the
legislature would make payment of the petitioners’ costs, such costs to
cover the cost of an attorney,
counsel and senior counsel. This ruling was
confirmed by the Deputy Speaker at a meeting held on 11 October
1995.
[11] On 16 October 1995 Mr Richard Mdakane representing the
ANC members of the legislature wrote the following note to the Speaker:
“On behalf of ANC MPL’s I wish to lodge an objection to your apparent decision allowing the Gauteng Legislature to finance counsel for parties supporting the petition to the Constitutional Court on the School Education Bill. It is our view that they constitute a minority within the Legislature and it is therefore inappropriate that Legislature monies should be used to finance activities which are contrary to the democratic wishes of the vast majority of MPL’s and the constituencies they represent.”
[12] In a memorandum
dated 17 October 1995, sent by the Speaker to senior whips and leaders of all
parties in the legislature, notice was
given that a meeting would be held to
discuss the payment for legal representation for the petitioners and
non-petitioners in the
dispute concerning the provisions of the Gauteng School
Education Bill. The memorandum records that:-
“A concern has been raised by the Government and members of the ANC that payment of such counsel would be a misuse of Legislative funds.”
[13] The envisaged meeting
was held on 19 October 1995. The minutes record that it was the Speaker’s
initial opinion that his office
represented the legislature, and therefore both
petitioners and non-petitioners, and that “it would therefore be
appropriate
for the office to pay one legal team for each of the parties to the
dispute.”
[14] The legal department of the legislature
sought the opinion of the state attorney. His opinion as expressed in a letter
of 24 October
1995 was that he could “see no basis in principle for the
Legislature not to pay the legal costs when a portion of its members
(whether a
majority or minority) exercise their Constitutional rights”. The letter
concludes by advising an investigation
of the possibility that the question of
costs in the matter be put to the Constitutional Court to be dealt with in terms
of s 98(8)
of the interim Constitution.
[15] Under cover of a
letter dated 25 October 1995 the respondents’ attorneys sent a copy of a
memorandum dated 24 October 1995
prepared by counsel submitting that the ruling
of the Speaker that the legislature should bear the legal cost of the
petitioners
in regard to the determination of the dispute by the Constitutional
Court, was correct. In the memorandum which was circulated to
all members of
the legislature attention is drawn to the views of the President of the
Constitutional Court to which I have referred.
In addition the following is
stated:
“7. Should members of a Provincial legislature exercising their Constitutional right under section 98(9) to petition the Speaker to refer disputes concerning the Constitutionality of a Bill to the Constitutional Court be required to bear their own costs in regard to the determination of the disputes, this would effectively deter members of a Provincial legislature from raising issues of Constitutionality and thereby effectively serving the electorate and constituencies which they represent. It should be borne in mind that the Gauteng Government has at its disposal the wealth, machinery and expertise available to the State in order to ensure that its submissions are fully and properly placed before the Constitutional Court.
In this regard the Petitioners have been given to understand that the Speaker and the Gauteng Government have already consulted two senior counsel who specialise in Constitutional Law as well as other Constitutional experts.
8. The objection raised on 16 October 1995 by RICHARD MDAKANE on behalf of the ANC members of the Provincial legislature to the decision of the Speaker that the Petitioners’ costs be borne by the Gauteng Provincial Legislature, is without merit. It is the Constitution which is supreme, and not the ANC as the majority party. The fact that the ANC holds a majority in the Provincial legislature and the Petitioners constitute a minority, is irrelevant; the essential question is whether the provisions of the Bill objected to are unconstitutional or not, and the view which the ANC majority may hold cannot be decisive of that question.”
[16]
Thereafter the Speaker addressed a letter dated 27 October 1995 to the attorneys
for the respondents. He also sent copies to other
political parties represented
in the legislature as well as to all members of the legislature. The letter is
fundamental to the
respondents’ case and is the basis of the undertaking
upon which they rely. The letter, which is on the letterhead of the
office of
the Speaker, reads as follows:
“RE: PETITION ON EDUCATION BILL - LEGAL COSTS
Dear Sirs
The Gauteng Legislature is prepared to pay attorneys’ reasonable fees (including Counsel’s charges) either as agreed or as taxed.
It is clear that there is no agreement between the various political parties making up the body of Petitioners as to the employment of one firm of attorneys and one set of Counsel to represent all the Petitioners as a body. In fact, the memorandum written by myself and dated 3 October 1995 was clearly predicated on the assumption that the Petitioners would be acting as one body and would utilise the services of one legal team.
It is also clear that those of the Petitioners who are members of the Freedom Front, have appointed one set of attorneys whereas those of the Petitioners who are members of the Democratic Party and National Party have appointed another set of attorneys and Counsel.
It appears to us, prima facie, that the appointment of attorneys and Counsel has not yet been approached on the basis of unanimity between the Petitioners but, to some extent, along party political lines.
We see no basis for agreeing to pay the costs incurred by members of the Legislature as members of a political party, rather than as members of the Legislature. It is not reasonable or even warranted at this stage at least that the Legislature should incur any costs other than those incurred on behalf of a body of members of the Legislature, acting as such, unless the Constitutional Court orders us to do otherwise.
In summary therefore our undertaking is to pay the costs, agreed or taxed as aforesaid, of one set of attorneys and Counsel.
We suggest you make available to your attorneys a copy of this letter, and that they then confirm with us if they so then desire, the contents hereof.
Upon conclusion of the matter, their accounts may be submitted to Gauteng Legislature for payment in accordance with the aforegoing.
Notwithstanding the hereinbefore mentioned decision by myself, there remains a dispute within the Legislature regarding the responsibility for legal costs.
In this connection I deem it appropriate that the Constitutional Court should be invited to make a determination on this matter. Accordingly members of the Legislature who wish to place arguments to the Court on this matter are invited to do so.
It follows therefore that the validity of my decision will be subject to the determination of the Court.
Yours faithfully
(Sgd) T. G. Fowler.” (Emphasis
supplied)
The letter was drafted by a private firm of attorneys and
senior counsel engaged by the Speaker although the last three paragraphs
were
added by the Speaker himself. Senior counsel’s advice to the Speaker (not
counsel who appeard either in the Constitutional
Court or this court) was that
“subject to certain qualifications, that it would only be fair that their
costs should be borne
by the Legislature. In requiring that the Bill be
referred to the Constitutional Court, the petitioners acted, not in their
personal
capacities, but qua members of the Legislature. They
acted in a representative capacity and there would be no good reason why they
should have to bear
the costs themselves.”
[17] On 30
October 1995 the respondents’ attorneys replied to the Speaker’s
letter of 27 October 1995. They indicated that:
“In the light of the comments made in the penultimate and last paragraphs of your letter and particularly because of the fact that you are not prepared to unreservedly accept responsibility for the legal fees of the petitioners you leave us no alternative but to approach the court for a declaratory order in this regard.” They went on to contend that the Speaker’s failure to accept responsibility for payment of the petitioners’ legal fees frustrates the petitioners in the proper preparation of their case.
[18] On the next day the Speaker, by way of a
memorandum, informed the whips of the various parties of the receipt of the
aforementioned
letter. He attached a copy of the letter and advised that he
did not intend opposing the threatened application to court but
would leave it
to members who were not parties to the petition to decide whether to oppose the
application.
[19] On 31 October 1995 the petitioners had second
thoughts. Their attorneys wrote to the Speaker advising him that they had
reconsidered
the matter and on their understanding that the legislature
undertook to pay the reasonable fees of one firm of attorneys and one
set of
counsel representing the petitioners as a body, they would not approach the
court for a declaratory order, but that appropriate
argument would be addressed
to the Constitutional Court on the question of costs, in so far as the
Constitutional Court might be
prepared to hear such argument and make a
determination as envisaged by the Speaker. There was no reply to this
letter.
[20] The matter was thereafter heard in the Constitutional
Court. The same counsel who appeared before us was briefed by the Speaker
to
argue the matter of costs. The Constitutional Court was not prepared to hear
him as the Speaker was not a party to the proceedings.
[21]
Judgment was delivered by the Court on 4 April 1996. The Court refused to award
costs against the unsuccessful petitioners who are
the respondents before this
Court. The issue of the undertaking given by the Speaker in the letter of
27 October 1995
was not raised in the Constitutional Court and the
judgment of that Court does not seek to deal with the issue which is now before
this Court.
[22] The respondents’ attorneys then drafted a
bill of costs and presented it to the Speaker. The state attorney acting on
behalf
of the Speaker informed the respondents’ attorney that he had been
instructed to oppose the taxation of the bill of costs and
that as there had
been no award of costs by the Constitutional Court, the Speaker would not accept
liability for payment of the costs
or agree to the taxation thereof on an
attorney and own client basis.
[23] The respondents’
attorneys then advised the state attorney that they would proceed with taxation
of the bill of costs, would
ask the taxing master to tax the bill on an attorney
and own client scale and would thereafter issue summons to recover the costs
if
they were not paid. The bill was thereafter taxed on the attorney and own
client scale without any further notification to the
state
attorney.
[24] Section 98(9) of the interim Constitution afforded
a pre-emptive power to the Speaker of a provincial legislature to request the
Constitutional Court, upon receipt of a petition by at least one-third of all
the members of that legislature, to exercise jurisdiction
in regard to any
dispute referred to in ss 98 (2)(d) of the interim Constitution. Section
98(2)(d), in turn, conferred jurisdiction
on the Constitutional Court to deal
with a dispute concerning the Constitutionality of any bill before a provincial
legislature.
Interpretation of s 98(9) is, of course, a matter outside this
Court’s jurisdiction (see s 101(5)) but its scope and purpose
appear
clearly enough from two cases decided in the Constitutional Court. In Ex
parte Gauteng Provincial Legislature : In re Dispute Concerning The
Constitutionality of Certain Provisions of the Gauteng School Education Bill of
[1996] ZACC 4; 1995, 1996 (3) SA 165 (CC) concerning the referral to which the
present issue relates, Mahomed DP said at para 36 at 182F - 183C:
“It was submitted by Mr Trengove that the costs of the proceedings before us should be paid by the petitioners if they are unsuccessful in their attack on the impugned provisions. We were referred, in this regard, to the well-known rule in the Supreme Court that ordinarily, and subject to the discretion of the Supreme Court, costs should follow the result and the losing party should be directed to pay the costs of the successful party.7 There are obviously attractive grounds of policy which support such an approach in ordinary litigation between litigants in the Supreme Court and in the magistrates’ Courts. It does not follow, however, that it should also be the general rule in the Constitutional Court and more particularly the rule in cases brought to the Constitutional Court in terms of s98(9) of the Constitution at the request of the Speaker. A litigant seeking to test the Constitutionality of a statute usually seeks to ventilate an important issue of Constitutional principle. Such persons should not be discouraged from doing so by the risk of having to pay the costs of their adversaries, if the Court takes a view which is different from the view taken by the petitioner. This, of course, does not mean that such litigants can be completely protected from that risk. The Court, in its discretion, might direct that they pay the costs of their adversaries if, for example, the grounds of attack on the impugned statute are frivolous or vexatious or they have acted from improper motives or there are other circumstances which make it in the interest of justice to direct that such costs be paid by the losing party.
7. Fripp v Gibbon & Co 1913 AD 354 at 357-8; Merber v Merber 1948 (1) SA 446(A) at 452."
The other case is Ex parte
Speaker of the National Assembly: In re Dispute Concerning the Constitutionality
of Certain Provisions of the National Education
Policy Bill 83 of
1995, 1996 (3)SA 289 (CC) at 308 D-H, in which Chaskalson P, said:
[43] “We were asked by counsel for the Minister to lay down guidelines for the referral of issues to this Court under s 98(2)(d) and (9) of the Constitution. It was submitted that it would have been more appropriate for this matter to have been referred to the Court after the debate on its provisions had been completed......
[44] It would no doubt have been better in the circumstances of this case if the objectors had raised the Constitutional issue during the debate and deferred lodging the petition with the Speaker until after the government’s attitude to the disputed clauses had been clarified. If this procedure had been followed the disputed issues might have been resolved within Parliament. Parliament controls its own proceedings and there may be good reasons for the procedure whereby the petition was lodged at the commencement of the debate. The procedure to be followed in such matters is within the domain of Parliament and in my view it would not be appropriate for this Court to make any suggestions to Parliament in that regard.”
The pre-emptive power conferred by s 98(9) was thus obviously designed to
facilitate good governance in the public interest and was
not simply a general
power allocated to the Speaker. The determination of a bona fide dispute
concerning the constitutionality of a Bill, in advance of the Bill becoming
law, was clearly a determination in the interests
of the provincial legislature
and its effective and efficient functioning. Moreover, the petitioners acted
at all relevant times
not in their personal capacities, but in their capacities
as members of the legislature and, absent a special order such as referred
to
by Mahomed DP, were not personally liable for costs.
[25] Did
the Speaker have the requisite power to give the undertaking in question and did
he do so? Any reliance upon a contractual
undertaking brought about by the
making of an offer by the Speaker and the acceptance thereof by the respondents
was wisely abandoned
by counsel for the respondents. The act of the Speaker was
not one properly to be categorised as a contractual undertaking. On
a proper
construction of the undertaking evidenced in the letter of
27 October 1995, viewed in the light of the circumstances
in which it
came to be given, it amounted to a clear undertaking by the Speaker, enforceable
without the need for acceptance, to
pay the petitioners’ costs. As
correctly pointed out by Van Dijkhorst J, “it states so in so many
words”. Indeed,
the appellant in its plea categorised the action of the
Speaker as an “undertaking”. The last three paragraphs of
the
letter of undertaking detracted in no way from the undertaking. They did not
make it provisional. Plainly, if the Speaker acted
ultra vires in giving
the undertaking, it could not be enforced. However, he clearly intended that
in the absence of a determination by the
Constitutional Court that the
undertaking was ultra vires, it would stand.
[26] As to
his authority, in my view the Speaker was empowered to give the undertaking.
Firstly, in giving the undertaking he acted
in his official capacity. As to
that capacity, Sir William Holdsworth, in his monumental work on the history
of English law,
draws attention to the fact that the Speaker of the House of
Commons is the representative and spokesman “of the House in
its
collective capacity” (A History of English Law - Volume IV 176 n6).
Referring to Redlich’s Procedure of the House of Commons,
Holdsworth comments that the position of the Speaker in relation to the law
“is strikingly similar to the relation of a judge
to the common law and to
the rules of his court”; the orders of the Speaker are a regular part
“of the apparatus of
the House”; these orders “cover almost
the whole field of the regulation of its business” (vol II 433, vol
VI
89). Kilpin, Parliamentary Procedure in South Africa (3rd Ed
(1955) 153), refers to Sir Erkine May’s nine editions of his treatise,
The Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of Parliament where the point
is made that the duties of the Speaker of the House of Commons “are as
various as they are important”.
Kilpin concludes his discussion of the
Speaker’s duties by referring to a letter of 6 December 1905 by a Mr
Speaker Lowther
in which it is stated that: “The Speaker is the
interpreter and custodian of the rights and privileges of the members of the
House.” Kilpin then states that:-
“The plain fact is that Mr Speaker’s duties are too numerous to set out in detail. In the Union of South Africa they are specifically referred to in the South Africa Act, the Powers and Privileges of Parliament Act, the Electoral Act and the Standing Rules and Orders of the House of Assembly, but they depend so much on tradition that no better summary can be given than that which May originally wrote.”
(p 153)
[27] The Speaker’s common law powers
therefore includes the power to regulate the business of the legislature and its
business
was the legislative process.
[28] Secondly, as far as
the interim Constitution conferred powers on the Speaker, regard must be had to
s 131(2) read with s 41(3)
to (10). Section 41(3) declared that the Speaker of
the National Assembly was vested with all the powers and functions assigned
to
him or her by the Constitution, an Act of Parliament and the rules and orders.
A provincial Speaker acted mutatis mutandis under the same authority.
In so far as national legislation is concerned, s 31(1) of the Powers and
Privileges of Parliament
Act 91 of 1963 provides that the control of the
expenditure and the appropriation of moneys for the service of Parliament
“shall
be vested in the Speaker” and that his “authorization
for such expenditure and appropriation of moneys” be taken
subject to the
provisions of the section, “to be in all respects good, valid and
effectual.”
[29] It follows that the Speaker in this case,
like the Speaker of Parliament, had the authority to direct the expenditure of
moneys for
the legislature’s services in relation to the legislative
process. The court a quo correctly held, therefore, that the
determination of the dispute concerning the constitutionality of a bill in its
formative process
is a determination in the interests of the provincial
legislature and its effective and efficient functioning. As such it is part
and
parcel of the legislative process. It follows that the costs incurred in order
to bring about a resolution by the Constitutional
Court of the disputes which
have arisen within the legislature are costs which should properly be borne as
part of the costs of
administration of such provincial legislature. The
Speaker was thus empowered to give an undertaking on behalf of the legislature
to pay the costs of the minority incurred in the referral of a pending bill to
the Constitutional Court under the interim Constitution.
[30] I
believe that the Speaker in this case was guilty of an obvious about-face.
Having given the undertaking, he bowed to political
pressures to renege upon it.
Notwithstanding the fact that the Speaker may be removed by the legislature or
that his decisions may
be overridden by it, he should not submit to such
pressure. He is required by the duties of his office to exercise, and display,
the impartiality of a judge. Having obtained persuasive and authoritative legal
advice he chose to ignore it. Not only that. He
attempted to justify himself
in evidence with the unconvincing, and unbecoming, protestation that he had
never given an undertaking
but had merely issued a ruling.
[31]
Counsel for the appellant contended that because no notice of taxation had been
given that there was no basis for recovering the
taxed amount of the costs from
the appellant. This contention is also without merit. It was not disputed that
the fees and disbursements
in the bill which was taxed were reasonable after
taxation and were regarded as such by the taxing master. The taxation was
between
attorney and own client. The clients were the plaintiffs. There is no
obligation in law upon a taxing master to require notification
of non-parties to
a taxation. The state attorney had in any event been informed of the fact that
a bill was to be taxed but indicated
that he was not prepared to participate in
such taxation.
In the circumstances the appeal is dismissed with costs.
R
H ZULMAN JA
NIENABER JA )
HOWIE JA ) CONCUR
SCHUTZ
JA )
MTHIYANE AJA )