South Africa: Supreme Court of Appeal
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‘‘‘‘‘‘‘‘
CASE NO
12/97 REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
In the matter
between
SEA HARVEST CORPORATION (PTY)
LTD First Appellant
SOUTH ATLANTIC ISLANDS
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
Second Appellant
and
DUNCAN
DOCK COLD STORAGE (PTY) LTD First Respondent
TRANSNET
LIMITED t/a PORTNET Second
Respondent
CORAM : SMALBERGER, HOWIE, MARAIS,
SCOTT et
STREICHER JJA
HEARD
: 1 & 2 NOVEMBER 1999
DELIVERED: 26 NOVEMBER
1999
Delict - determining the issue of culpa
before the issue of wrongfulness - foreseeability in relation to culpa -
no formula when applied strictly can be appropriate in every case - need for
measure of flexibility.
J U D G M E N
T
SCOTT JA/...
SCOTT
JA:
[1] Shortly after midnight on 1 January 1993 the first
respondent’s cold store at K berth, Duncan Dock, Table Bay Harbour,
was
set alight by a distress flare fired by an unknown reveller in celebration of
the New Year. The city fire brigade was summoned
but by the time the fire was
eventually extinguished the cold store and its contents had been largely
destroyed. The cold store was
recently built and had been in operation for no
more than a few months. It was the product of a joint venture between the second
respondent (“Portnet”) and a company, Afco Holdings Limited, the
latter having a shareholding of 70% and the former
a shareholding of 30% in the
first respondent which was established to operate the cold store. The building
was erected on land belonging
to Portnet and let to the first respondent. The
facilities provided included those suitable for the storage of tuna fish at
extremely
low temperatures, ie in the region of -60°C, and intended for
export. According to the port engineer, Portnet’s participation
in the
venture was mainly to ensure that the facilities provided by the cold store were
made available to all.
[2] Prior to the fire, the first respondent
entered into oral agreements of deposit with both the first and second
appellants in
terms of which it undertook for reward, in the case of the first
appellant, to freeze and store certain fish and fish products and,
in the case
of the second appellant, to store pre-frozen raw and cooked lobster tails. The
property of both appellants was destroyed
in the fire and each, as plaintiff,
instituted a separate but similar action for damages against the respondents in
the Cape Provincial
Division. The actions were consolidated and in due course
the trial proceeded before King J who was asked to decide only the issue
of
liability and to permit the question of quantum of damages to stand over. The
learned judge found in favour of the respondents
on the issue of liability,
hence the present appeal.
[3] The appellants’ claims were founded
in the first instance on oral contracts of deposit and were directed at the
first respondent
alone. In the alternative they sued in delict, alleging that
the destruction of their respective property in the fire was occasioned
by the
negligence of the first respondent or alternatively the negligence of Portnet or
in the further alternative the negligence
of both the first respondent and
Portnet. I shall set out the grounds of negligence relied upon later in this
judgment. The first
respondent admitted the contracts of deposit but alleged
that each was subject to one or other implied or tacit term or trade usage
to
the effect, stated broadly, that it would be liable only in the event of wilful
misconduct on its part and not for negligence.
In their respective replications
the appellants denied the existence of such additional terms or trade usage and
alleged that in
any event any exemption or limitation applied only to acts or
omissions committed subsequent to the conclusion of the contracts of
deposit and
not to those committed prior to the conclusion of the contracts and upon which
they relied to found their claims in delict.
The appellants contended further
that the first respondent was precluded from relying on the alleged terms by
reason of a non-disclosure
on its part of various facts relating to the
construction of the cold store, which facts form the basis of the claim in
delict and
to which I shall refer in more detail later.
[4] It was
common cause that in the event of it being held that the contracts of storage
were not subject to one or other of the
additional terms or the trade usage
alleged by the first respondent it would be obliged, in order to escape
liability, to establish
on a balance of probabilities that the loss suffered by
the appellants was not caused by dolus or culpa on its part.
(Stocks & Stocks (Pty) Ltd v T J Daly & Sons (Pty) Ltd 1979 (3)
SA 754 (A) at 761 H - 762 C.) As far as the claim against Portnet was concerned,
the onus, of course, remained on the appellants. The court
a quo did not
deal with the appellants’ claim in contract against the first respondent.
It considered only the question of negligence
and concluded that neither the
first respondent nor Portnet had been negligent. In other words, even assuming
that the first respondent
bore the onus of proving it was not negligent, it was
held to have discharged that onus. Before considering the grounds upon which
the
appellants contend that the respondents were negligent and in order better to
understand them it is necessary first to set out
certain facts and circumstances
which are largely common cause.
[5] A firm of consulting engineers
specialising in industrial refrigeration, Worthington-Smith and Brouwer, was
engaged by the first
respondent to design the cold store in question. Mr
Worthington-Smith, or more accurately his firm, was also appointed as
project-leader
to co-ordinate the work to be performed by the various
professional firms engaged to assist in the project, including structural
engineers, mechanical engineers, electrical engineers and architects. Work
began in about the last quarter of 1991. By the end
of June 1992 it was all but
completed.
[6] The main section of the building, and the section which
contained the refrigeration chambers, was steel-framed with a roof of
fibre
cement sheeting made up of two pitches separated by a 70 m-long valley gutter.
The gutter was a custom-built box gutter and
made of fibreglass as specified by
the structural engineers, Kantey and Templer. Although difficult to ignite,
fibreglass is combustible
and burns quickly with a high heat output. Its obvious
advantage is that it is non-corrosive. The roof sheeting was non-combustible.
It was insulated, however, by panels of insulation material fitted above the
roof purlins. These panels were referred to in evidence
by their trade name
“Kulite” and I shall do the same. They consisted of a core of
expanded polystyrene 25 mm thick enclosed
in a sheath of aluminium foil. Kulite,
as in the case of the fibreglass gutter, was specified by Kantey and Templer.
Although the
sheath provided some protection, the polystyrene core was
combustible and would burn once the panel delaminated or the joining strips
failed, allowing the polystyrene to flow from the panel when it melted. Kulite
was widely used as a roof insulation. It was the
subject of a report dated
January 1986 by the National Building Institute of the CSIR in which it was
stated that Kulite panels “will
not add to the growth and spread of fire
when used as lay-in ceilings or as over-purlin roof insulation”. The
reason, shortly
stated, was said to be that the polystyrene core would melt
before it ignited so that the panels would “drop out of the hot
zone of a
fire long before the ignition temperature of polystyrene .... [was]
reached”. It was common cause that in the present
case the Kulite panels
had not been capped and had been allowed to protrude from under the roof
sheeting into the valley gutter.
[7] There were five refrigeration
chambers; three operated at -30°C and two at -60°C. A
‘T’-shaped passage
provided access to all five. The height of each
was 10 m. The total floor area was in the region of 5000 square metres. They
were
constructed of insulation material similar to Kulite save that both the
core of polystyrene and the metal sheet-covering were thicker.
Panels of this
nature are used almost exclusively in cold stores. They were referred to in
evidence by their trade name “Chromodeck”
and I shall do the same.
In the case of the chambers operating at -30°C, the thickness of the
polystyrene cores in the panels
of both the walls and ceilings was 200 mm. In
the case of the chambers operating at -60°C, it was 300 mm. The total
quantity
of polystyrene in the Kulite roof panels was of the order of 3% of the
total quantity in the Chromodeck panels.
[8] The products stored in the
refrigeration chambers were generally set on wooden pallets piled in stacks some
9 m high. Corridors
were maintained between the stacks to permit access by
forklift loaders. Whether the products were contained in cardboard cartons
or
not depended on what they were. Frozen tuna was not; most other products were.
On the night of the fire the store was approximately
88% full. The products
stored comprised fish (including lobster), chicken and vegetables with a total
weight of 8 000 tons. The quantity
of wood and cardboard in the store amounted
to approximately 430 and 80 tons respectively, ie in the region of 6.5% of the
total
of the frozen products.
[9] The area above the refrigeration
chambers, i e between the Chromodeck roof of the refrigeration chambers and the
roof of the
building, was referred to as the roof void or service area. It
housed amongst other things various service pipes and items of equipment
relating to the freezing process. Access was gained to it by means of a catwalk.
Finally, and to complete the picture, it is necessary
to mention that adjoining
what I have called the main section of the building were an office block and
other structures containing
a workshop, plant and the like. These, however, were
sealed off from the main section. The building was relatively isolated in the
sense that there were no other buildings nearby from which a fire could spread
to the cold store.
[10] The port area did not fall within the
jurisdiction of the Cape Town municipality. Accordingly, the erection of any
building
in the area did not require the approval of the City Council but the
approval of the port engineer. The latter would cause the plans
to be circulated
amongst the various departments of Portnet which would scrutinize them to see
that they complied inter alia with the current building regulations.
These departments included a fire department. Portnet had previously had its own
fire brigade
but in terms of an agreement concluded with the City Council on 10
February 1992 the latter had undertaken to provide a fire fighting
service
within the port area. The agreement, however, made no provision for the
approval of plans by the City Council.
[11] In the course of 1991 the
plans for the cold store at K berth were submitted to the port engineer in the
ordinary way. Although
not required in terms of the agreement, the plans were
referred to the City Council’s fire department for its comments. In
the
event, they were considered not only by the fire department but by all the
relevant departments of the Council. By letter dated
11 May 1992 addressed to
the head of Portnet’s drawing office, the city planner set out the
“requirements” of his
various departments, including those of the
chief officer, fire and rescue services. In addition to requiring a number of
hose-reels
and fire extinguishers which were in due course provided, the chief
officer classified the cold store as a “J2 Occupancy”,
i e as a
“moderate risk storage” within the meaning of the regulations framed
under s 17(1) of the National Building
Regulations and Building Standards Act
103 of 1977 (“the National Building Regulations”), and required
“the entire
ground floor and first floor (the roof void) ... to be
protected by an approved sprinkler installation”. I shall refer to the
question of classification in more detail later. It is sufficient at this stage
to explain that in terms of the regulations (which
are to be read with a Code of
Practice issued by the Council of the South African Bureau of Standards - code
SABS 0400) buildings
in which materials are stored are classified as either
“high risk” (J1), “moderate risk” (J2) or “low
risk” (J3). A classification of the cold store as J2 would in terms of
code SABS 0400 require the installation of a sprinkler
system both in the roof
void and the store itself in the absence of some alternative rational design
such as, for example, the provision
of carbon dioxide sprays or a dry-pipe
sprinkler system in the refrigeration chambers.
[12] In 1992 none of the
cold stores owned by the group of companies to which the first respondent
belonged was fitted with a sprinkler
system nor did any other cold stores in
South Africa, except perhaps for one or two, have sprinkler systems. Even
those recently
constructed were classified J3 so that sprinkler systems were not
required. Generally in 1992 the same was true of the United Kingdom
and Europe
where sprinkler systems in cold stores were neither required nor used. However,
in the United States of America they were
required, mainly at the insistence of
insurance companies. It was common cause that, generally speaking, cold stores
had a good reputation
as far as fire was concerned. Worthington-Smith testified
that he knew of no fire having occurred in a cold store while in
operation.
[13] The classification and “requirements” of the
chief fire officer contained in the city planner’s letter of
11 May 1992
were, after some delay, communicated to the first respondent’s architect
who in turn advised Worthington-Smith.
A meeting was arranged between the
port engineer, Mr Visser, the architect and Worthington-Smith to discuss the
matter. This
was probably sometime early in August 1992. At the meeting,
Worthington-Smith advised Visser that in South Africa sprinkler systems
had not
in the past been required in cold stores and referred in particular to a
recently constructed cold store in George which
had been classified J3 after the
municipality had sought the guidance of the Council of the SABS. Visser did not
take a decision
immediately. He consulted the National Building Regulations and
code SABS 0400 and after considering the matter further, came to
the conclusion
that the correct classification was J3 and that a sprinkler system was
accordingly not required. His decision was
duly conveyed to Worthington-Smith.
A sprinkler system was not installed.
[14] The firing of distress flares
in the harbour area other than for assistance is prohibited by regulation.
Nonetheless it appeared
from the evidence of a member of the Royal Cape Yacht
Club that the firing of flares at midnight on New Year’s eve was a
regular
occurrence and had been for at least the past 20 years. Distress flares
(or more accurately, in the present context, parachute pyrotechnic
signals) are
designed to burn out before they reach the water. There was no evidence to
suggest that a flare had ever caused a fire
in the harbour or its surrounding
area.
[15] Although there was some dispute in the evidence as to the
precise course the fire was likely to have taken, the parties were
in agreement
as to its probable cause and the manner of its probable spread. Their agreement
was recorded as follows:
“A parachute distress signal (flare) probably landed in the catchment area of the central box gutter, rolled into the gutter and ignited same. This, in turn, ignited the over-purlin expanded polystyrene insulation and spread along the insulation through the roof void to the roof of the cold rooms and into the cold rooms.”
Mr Goring, a fire expert who testified on
behalf of the appellants, characterised the fire as “bizarre”. Mr
Basson, a
former head of the fire and research laboratory of the building
research institute at the CSIR, described it as “unique”.
It was not
in dispute that a sprinkler system would have extinguished the fire or at least
served to control it.
[16] Against this background I set out the grounds
upon which it was alleged that the first respondent, alternatively Portnet or
alternatively both, were negligent; viz that one or other or both
-
“1. negligently failed to instal or have installed a sprinkler
system which was capable of extinguishing or containing
a fire, such
sprinkler system being essential having regard to:
1.1 the inflammable
nature of the:
(a) materials used in the construction of the
building;
(b) the goods stored therein; and
(c) the containers in which
the goods are stored;
1.2 the method of construction employed in the
construction of the cold store;
1.3 the design of the cold
store;
2. negligently failed to follow the advice of the Chief Fire
Officer as aforesaid to instal a suitable or any water sprinkler
system;
3. negligently permitted highly flammable material, namely
expanded polystyrene sheeting, to protrude into the gutters and box gutters
of
the cold store, thereby exposing such material and creating a serious fire
hazard.”
The particulars of claim in both actions were amended to
allege an additional and distinct ground of negligence against each of the
respondents. It is convenient, however, to consider first the grounds set out
above relating, as they do, to both respondents before
turning to the
additional grounds.
[17] Dr Bland, a fire expert who testified on behalf
of the appellants, was of the view that once the fibreglass gutter ignited the
protrusion of the Kulite into the gutter would have been of little consequence
as the substantial and prolonged ignition source created
by the burning gutter
would in any event have been sufficient to ensure the spread of the fire. This
evidence was not disputed by
the appellants’ other
witnesses.
[18] Much evidence was adduced on both sides as to the
correct occupancy classification of the cold store. Not surprisingly the
appellants’
experts thought it was J2 while those called on behalf of the
respondents thought it was J3. Moderate risk storage, ie J2, is defined
in the
National Building Regulations as “occupancy where material is stored and
where the stored material is liable in the
event of fire to cause combustion
with moderate rapidity”. What is immediately apparent is that the
definition assumes a fire.
In other words, it does not take into account the
likelihood or otherwise of a fire starting. Furthermore, it relates solely to
the combustibility of the material stored (including presumably the packaging)
but not to the combustibility of the building itself.
To this extent, therefore,
it is not an entirely appropriate yardstick for determining the need for a
sprinkler system, although
this, it would seem, was largely the basis upon which
the municipality’s chief fire officer recommended the installation of
a
sprinkler system. It is unnecessary to attempt to analyse the evidence relating
to the classification. What is apparent is that
there is much to be said for
both viewpoints. The court a quo accepted for the purposes of its
judgment that the building was probably correctly classified J2 but pointed out
that:
“this only really became evident after weeks of debate and
dispute and minute analysis amongst experts of international stature,
called by
the parties.”
and that the appellants’
“foremost experts Bland and Van Rensburg recognised that the classification was vague and inexact, requiring a value judgment and that there was room for differing opinions.”
I have no quarrel
with this approach or the observations made by the learned judge. Whatever the
correct classification may have been,
the true inquiry was whether in all the
circumstances Worthington-Smith was negligent in failing to install a sprinkler
system and
whether the port engineer’s failure to insist upon its
installation was both wrongful and negligent. Only if the answer is
in the
affirmative does it become necessary to consider the further question of whether
there was vicarious liability on the part
of either of the
respondents.
[19] In the course of the past 20 years or more this court
has repeatedly emphasized that wrongfulness is a requirement of the
modern
Aquilian action which is distinct from the requirement of fault and that the
inquiry into the existence of the one is discrete
from the inquiry into the
existence of the other. Nonetheless, in many if not most delicts the issue of
wrongfulness is uncontentious
as the action is founded upon conduct which, if
held to be culpable, would be prima facie wrongful. (Cf Lillicrap,
Wassenaar and Partners v Pilkington Brothers (SA) (Pty) Ltd 1985 (1) SA 475
(A) at 497 B - C.) It is essentially in relation to liability for omissions
and pure economic loss that the element of wrongfulness
gains importance.
Liability for omissions has been a source of judicial uncertainty since Roman
times. The underlying difficulty
arises from the notion that while one must not
cause harm to another, one is generally speaking entitled in law to mind
one’s
own business. Since the decision in Minister van Polisie v Ewels
1975 (3) SA 590 (A) the courts have employed the element of wrongfulness as
a means of regulating liability in the case of omissions. If the omission
which
causes the damage or harm is without fault, that is the end of the matter. If
there is fault, whether in the form of dolus or culpa, the
question that has to be answered is whether in all the circumstances the
omission can be said to have been wrongful; or, as
it is sometimes stated,
whether there existed a legal duty to act. (The expression “duty of
care” derived from English
law can be ambiguous and is less appropriate in
this context. See Knop v Johannesburg City Council 1995 (2) SA 1 (A) at
27 D - E.) To find the answer the court is obliged to make what in effect is a
value judgment based inter alia on its perceptions of the legal
convictions of the community and on considerations of policy. The nature of the
enquiry has been
formulated in various ways. See for instance: Minister van
Polisie v Ewels, supra, at 597 A - B; Minister of Law and Order v
Kadir [1994] ZASCA 138; 1995 (1) SA 303 (A) at 318 E - H and the recent formulation, albeit
in a different context, in National Media Ltd and Others v Bogoshi 1998
(4) SA 1196 (A) at 1204 D. It is clear that the same facts may give rise to a
claim for damages both ex delicto and ex contractu so that the
plaintiff may choose which to pursue. But a breach of a contractual duty is
not per se wrongful for the purposes of Aquilian liability. (See the
Lillicrap case, supra, at 496 D - I, 499 D - G). Whether the
requirement of wrongfulness has been fulfilled or not will be determined in each
case by
the proper application of the test referred to above.
[20] Even
if the contractual nexus between the appellants and the first respondent is
disregarded, the position of the latter with
regard to the question of
wrongfulness would be somewhat different from that of Portnet. Nonetheless,
and by reason of the existence
of that contract, the issue of wrongfulness in
the context of a delictual action against the first respondent does not arise.
It
is common cause that the appellants stored goods in the cold store in
pursuance of contracts of deposit. What is in dispute is whether
the first
respondent successfully contracted out of liability for negligence. If it did,
the appellants cannot succeed in their claim
even if there was negligence. If
it did not, the first respondent would be liable unless it can show that the
loss occurred without
culpa or dolus on its part. As far as
Portnet is concerned, the appellants’ claims are founded solely in delict.
Portnet was not the party
that was directly responsible for the construction of
the cold store or the party that employed the persons engaged in its
construction.
Nonetheless the action is premised on the existence of a legal
duty on the part of Portnet to take steps to ensure that adequate
fire
protection measures were adopted in the construction of the cold store so that
Portnet’s failure to have a sprinkler system
installed or to see that
there was adherence to the advice of the chief fire officer was not only
negligent but also wrongful. It
is convenient to deal first with the issue of
negligence both on the part of the first respondent and Portnet. In the absence
of
negligence the issue of wrongfulness does not arise.
[21] A formula
for determining negligence which has been quoted with approval and applied by
this Court time without measure is that
enunciated by Holmes JA in Kruger v
Coetzee 1966(2) SA 428 (A) at 430 E - F. It reads:
“For the
purposes of liability culpa arises if -
(a) a diligens
paterfamilias in the position of the defendant-
(i) would foresee the
reasonable possibility of his conduct injuring another in his person or
property and causing him patrimonial
loss; and
(ii) would take reasonable
steps to guard against such occurrence; and
(b) the defendant failed to
take such steps.”
However, in Mukheiber v Raath and Another
1999 (3) SA 1065 (SCA) the following was said at 1077 E - F:
“The
test for culpa can, in the light of the development of our law since
Kruger v Coetzee 1966 (2) SA 428 (A) be stated as follows (see Boberg
The Law of Delict at 390):
For the purposes of liability
culpa arises if -
(a) a reasonable person in the position of the
defendant-
(i) would have foreseen harm of the general kind that actually
occurred;
(ii) would have foreseen the general kind of causal sequence by
which that harm occurred;
(iii) would have taken steps to guard against
it, and
(b) the defendant failed to take those steps.”
The
formula is that of Boberg. A reading of the reference cited reveals, however,
that the learned author’s formulation of the
test is in the context of the
so-called relative theory of negligence which he advances as being more logical
and convenient than
what has sometimes been called the absolute or abstract
theory. Broadly speaking, the former involves a narrower test for
foreseeability,
relating it to the consequences which the conduct in question
produces, and serves in effect to conflate the test for negligence
and what has
been called “legal causation” (cf Siman & Co (Pty)
Ltd v Barclays National Bank Ltd 1984 (2) SA 888 (A) at 914 F - H) so as,
it is contended, to eliminate the problems associated with remoteness. I do not
read the judgment in the
Mukheiber case to have unequivocally embraced
the relative theory of negligence. Indeed, elsewhere in the judgment and when
dealing with the
issue of causation the court appears to have applied the test
of “legal causation” which the strict application of the
relative
theory would have rendered unnecessary. (See par 36 -par 52.) Having said this,
it should not be overlooked that in the
ultimate analysis the true criterion
for determining negligence is whether in the particular circumstances the
conduct complained
of falls short of the standard of the reasonable person.
Dividing the inquiry into various stages, however useful, is no more than
an aid
or guideline for resolving this issue.
[22] It is probably so that there
can be no universally applicable formula which will prove to be appropriate in
every case. As Lord
Oliver observed in Caparo Industries PLC v Dickman and
Others [1990] UKHL 2; [1990] 2 AC 605 (HL) at 633 F - G,
“the attempt to state some general principle which will determine liability in an infinite variety of circumstances serves not to clarify the law but merely to bedevil its development in a way which corresponds with practicality and common sense.”
I agree. A rigid
adherence to what is in reality no more than a formula for determining
negligence must inevitably open the way to
injustice in unusual cases. Whether
one adopts a formula which is said to reflect the abstract theory of negligence
or some other
formula there must always be, I think, a measure of flexibility to
accommodate the “grey area” case. Notwithstanding
the wide nature of
the inquiry postulated in paragraph (a)(i) of Holmes JA’s formula - and
which has earned the tag of the
absolute or abstract theory of negligence - this
court has both prior and subsequent to the decision in Kruger v Coetzee
acknowledged the need for various limitations to the broadness of the
inquiry where the circumstances have so demanded. For example,
it has been
recognized that while the precise or exact manner in which the harm occurs need
not be foreseeable, the general manner
of its occurrence must indeed be
reasonably foreseeable. (See generally: Kruger v Van der Merwe and
Another 1966 (2) SA 266 (A), Minister van Polisie en Binnelandse Sake v Van
Aswegen 1974 (2) SA 101 (A) at 108 E - F and also Robinson v
Roseman 1964 (1) SA 710 (T) at 715 G - H. For examples of where the manner
in which the harm occurred was held not to have been reasonably foreseeable, see
S v Bochris Investments (Pty) Ltd and Another 1988(1) SA 861 (A);
Stratton v Spoornet 1994(1) SA 803 (T).) The problem is always to decide
where to draw the line, particularly in those cases where the result is readily
foreseeable but not the cause. This is more likely to arise in situations where,
for example, one is dealing with a genus of potential
danger which is extensive,
such as fire, or where it is common cause there is another person whose
wrongdoing is more obvious than
that of the chosen defendant. It is here that a
degree of flexibility is called for. Just where the inquiry as to culpability
ends
and the inquiry as to remoteness (or legal causation) begins - both of
which may involve the question of foreseeability - must therefore
to some extent
depend on the circumstances. (Compare, for instance, S v Bochris Investments
(Pty) Ltd, supra, with International Shipping Co (Pty) Ltd v Bentley
1990 (1) SA 680 (A).) In many cases the facts will be such as to render the
distinction clear, but not always. Too rigid an approach in borderline
cases
could result in attributing culpability to conduct which has sometimes been
called negligence “in the air”. As
observed by Macdonald ACJ in
King v Dykes 1971 (3) SA 540 (RAD) at 542 G - H:
“Once
inflexible rules are adopted as the test of the existence of negligence, either
generally or in a special type of case,
a quite unwarranted inroad is made into
the basic concept underlying the law.”
Inevitably the answer will
only emerge from a close consideration of the facts of each case and ultimately
will have to be determined
by judicial judgment.
[23] There can be no
doubt that as a general possibility a fire in the cold store at Duncan Dock was
reasonably foreseeable. Indeed,
fire extinguishers and hose-reels were installed
at various places within the building to guard against such an eventuality. It
is also true that the causes of fire are varied and many. Nonetheless, it is
axiomatic that what is reasonably foreseeable must necessarily
be confined to
those fires, whatever their cause, which fall within the parameters of
reasonable possibility. Typically, what would
have been reasonably foreseeable
in the present case would have been the possibility of a fire starting somewhere
in the building
itself. Whether in such an event the fire fighting equipment
actually installed would have been sufficient to control it or whether
sprinklers would have been required is, of course, a matter of speculation. But
what actually occurred was something entirely different.
To simply equate it for
the purpose of determining culpability with just any fire could have the effect
of attributing culpability
for damage resulting from a danger which in truth
was not foreseeable as a reasonable possibility. . Expressed in abstract
terms,
the fire was the consequence of something in the nature of a projectile
falling onto the roof from above and burning at a temperature
sufficient to
ignite the fibreglass gutter. Only the gutter was combustible. The roof
sheeting and the outer shell of the building
was not. According to the evidence
it is the resin in the fibreglass that burns. It constitutes about 35% of the
material and once
it has set, requires what was described as a “high
calorific value” or “fairly substantial heat source” to
ignite. Indeed, Basson in the course of an experiment he conducted in his
laboratory experienced some difficulty igniting a fibreglass
gutter with a
bundle of burning newspaper. However, we are told that distress flares produce a
sustained flame and burn at a relatively
high temperature; in other words, just
the thing to ignite a fibreglass gutter. With the benefit of hindsight the
obvious and reasonable
step to guard against the danger of such an ignition
source would have been to instal wholly non-combustible gutters. But fibreglass
gutters were commonly used in the harbour area and elsewhere. According to
Visser his investigation subsequent to the fire revealed
that something like 50%
of the gutters in the harbour area were of fibreglass.
[24] Having
regard to the particular circumstances of the case, it seems to me therefore
that the question of culpability must be
determined not simply by asking the
question whether fire, ie any fire, was foreseeable but whether a reasonable
person in the position
of Worthington-Smith or Visser would have foreseen the
danger of fire emanating from an external source on the roof of the building
with sufficient intensity to ignite the gutter. This is the question to which I
now turn.
[25] As previously mentioned, the building was relatively
isolated in the sense that there were no other buildings in the immediate
vicinity from which a fire could readily spread to the cold store; nor was there
anything about its locality in the harbour which
rendered it more vulnerable to
fire. The region was not prone to lightning of the kind that would set fire to
buildings. Save for
a burning flare, which was the actual cause of the fire, it
is therefore difficult to conceive of any other source of fire which
could have
set the roof alight from above.
[26] It was not in dispute that the
firing of distress flares at midnight on New Year’s eve was a regular
occurrence and that
it had been so for many years. However, both
Worthington-Smith and Visser testified that they were unaware of the practice
and I
did not understand their evidence in this regard to have been challenged.
Counsel for the appellants suggested in argument that Worthington-Smith
ought to
have made inquiries at the port captain’s office (which presumably would
have been aware of the practice) to ascertain
if buildings erected in the
harbour were subject to any particular fire risk such as that arising from the
firing of flares. With
hindsight it is no doubt possible to think of all sorts
of steps that could have been taken or inquiries that may have been made.
But
what has to be postulated is the foresight and conduct of a reasonable person at
the relevant time, ie in 1992 prior to the fire.
The plans for the building,
including precautions against fire, were required to be approved ultimately by
the port engineer. In
these circumstances, to expect Worthington-Smith in
addition to have made inquiries of the port captain as to the possibility of
some unforeseen source of fire, such as distress flares, is in my view
expecting too much. Had the cold store been situated in close
proximity to the
tanker basin or oil storage tanks or some other reasonably foreseeable source of
danger, the position may have been
otherwise; but it was not. I do not think
his failure to make such an inquiry was unreasonable.
[27] It should
not, of course, be overlooked that notwithstanding the long standing practice of
firing off flares in celebration
of the New Year there had never been a fire
caused in this way. According to the evidence flares are designed and required
by regulation
to ignite at a height of not less than 600 feet and to burn out at
a height of not less than 150 feet. In the course of some 20 years
Mr Mory, who
had apparently spent every New Year’s eve at the yacht club, and who
testified on behalf of the appellants, had
seen flares land on the ground still
burning no more than “a couple of times”. Mr Woodend, who became
port captain subsequent
to the fire, testified that in the course of more than
30 years experience working in various harbours around the country he had
never
once seen a flare fall to the ground still burning. Even if Worthington-Smith
and Visser knew or ought to have known of the
practice of setting off flares at
New Year, the possibility of a flare landing while still burning and setting
fire to the gutter
of a building with an otherwise non-combustible shell strikes
me as so remote as not to have been reasonably foreseeable. With the
benefit of
hindsight the situation may seem otherwise; it usually does. But that is not
the test. In S v Bochris Investments (Pty) Ltd and Another, supra, at
866 J - 867 B Nicholas AJA said the following:
“In considering this question [what was reasonably foreseeable], one must guard against what Williamson JA called ‘the insidious subconscious influence of ex post facto knowledge’ (in S v Mini 1963 (3) SA 188 (A) at 196E-F). Negligence is not established by showing merely that the occurrence happened (unless the case is one where res ipsa loquitur), or by showing after it happened how it could have been prevented. The diligens paterfamilias does not have ‘prophetic foresight’. (S v Burger (supra at 879D).) In Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock & Engineering Co Ltd (The Wagon Mound) [1961] UKPC 1; 1961 AC 388 (PC) ([1961] [1961] UKPC 1; 1 All ER 404) Viscount Simonds said at 424 (AC) and at 414G - H (in All ER):
‘After the event, even a fool is wise. But it is not the hindsight of a fool; it is the foresight of the reasonable man which alone can determine responsibility.’”
I respectfully
agree. Worthington-Smith testified that had he been aware of the practice of
firing flares he would have taken some
precaution against the danger such as
installing a different kind of gutter. Visser’s attitude was much the
same. (Neither
thought that a sprinkler system was called for.) But, yet again,
it is easy to be wise after the event and having regard to what
had happened it
would perhaps have been surprising had their attitude been different. By the
time they testified the cold store had
been rebuilt with a non-combustible
gutter. I do not think this concession on their part is of any
significance.
[28] It follows that in my view the evidence establishes
that the danger of fire emanating from an external source on the roof of
the
building with sufficient intensity to ignite the gutter was not reasonably
foreseeable; or, expressed differently, a reasonable
person in the position of
Worthington-Smith or Visser would not in my view have foreseen the danger as
real enough to warrant precautionary
measures. The conclusion that
Worthington-Smith and Visser were not negligent renders it unnecessary to
consider the further question
of whether their negligence could give rise to
vicarious liability on the part of the respondents.
[29] A further
ground relied upon by the appellants for contending that the first respondent
was negligent related to the conduct
of Mr Bell who, it was not in dispute, was
at all material times acting in the course and scope of his employment with the
first
respondent. The facts relating to the conduct in question were largely
common cause.
[30] At the time of the fire Bell was employed as the
engineering manager at the cold store. His principal function was to monitor
the
refrigeration equipment which was then still under guarantee. On the evening of
31 December 1992 he went with his wife and two
sons to the Waterfront for a
meal. On his way home he stopped at the cold store to check the plant. By doing
so then, he hoped
to get away a little earlier the next day which was a public
holiday. The register kept by the security guard at the gate records
that he
arrived at 11.10 pm. He testified that he first went to his office where he
conducted a check on the computer system which
gave him certain information such
as, for example, the temperatures in the refrigeration chambers. Thereafter he
went on a tour of
inspection along the catwalk to which I have previously
referred. Finding all was in order he left the building just before midnight.
Once outside he heard ships in the harbour sounding their sirens and observed
distress flares being fired off from several ships.
He testified that he and his
family stopped to watch the display. While doing so, he observed two flares
which were obviously defective
rise no more than a metre or two. Both were fired
from a nearby ship. One landed burning on the deck of the ship. The other landed
on the repair jetty some 300 metres from the cold store. For the rest, the
flares were shot up into the night sky where they burnt
out. Bell considered it
prudent, as he put it, to stay around a little bit longer. He was concerned that
a defective flare could
set fire to the wooden pallets in the yard and also to a
gas installation. By 12.10 am the noise had stopped; so had the flares.
He
waited a few more minutes and then decided it was safe to leave. On arriving at
the main gate he was met by a warden from the
security firm which provided
protection for the building. The latter informed him that a panic button had
been pressed. Bell returned
to the building with the warden. They examined the
alarm panel and saw that all was in order. The register kept at the gate records
that Bell left at 12.18 am. Before doing so he requested the warden to check on
the security guard who was on duty at the rear of
the building.
[31] Shortly
after retiring to bed Bell was woken up by the beeping of his computer at home
which was linked to the computer at the
cold store. The signal indicated a fault
in the cooling machinery. At the same time he received a telephone call from the
security
firm to report that the building was on fire. A further call informed
him that the burglar alarms on various channels were going
off simultaneously.
It was then 1.05 am. Bell hurried back to the cold store where he remained
until the afternoon of 1 January
rendering such assistance as he could to the
fire brigade.
[32] The appellants alleged in their particulars of claim
that Bell had been negligent in a number of respects. In this court only
one was
advanced, namely that Bell had been negligent in leaving the premises shortly
after midnight without first having carried
out an inspection of the roof
himself or without having instructed one of the security guards or other
personnel to do so. I do not
think there is merit in this contention. Mory
testified that he saw smoke coming from the roof of the cold store, but he was
far
from certain that this was before 12:18 am. Bell testified that had a
burning flare landed on the roof while he was there he would
have been aware of
it. If the flare ultimately came to rest in the valley gutter, as was agreed had
happened, it would seem unlikely
that Bell would have failed to see it if this
occurred before he left. In any event, Bell’s main concern was the
wooden pallets
and the gas installation. At the time he was unaware that
fibreglass was combustible. This he learned later. Once the firing of flares
had
stopped and no harm had befallen the pallets and gas installation it would not
have been unreasonable for him to have thought
that the danger had passed. Even
so, he did not leave the building unattended. A guard was posted both at the
front and the rear
of the building. To have expected him in these circumstances
to have climbed onto the roof or ordered someone else to do so before
leaving
would be to require of him a standard which in my judgment is beyond that
required of the ordinary reasonable person. It
follows that in my view Bell was
not negligent.
[33] Finally it is necessary to deal with a ground of
negligence which related solely to the appellants’ claim against Portnet.
Stated shortly, it is that the port captain acting in the course and scope of
his employment with Portnet had negligently failed
to apprise either the first
respondent or its consultants or the port engineer of the danger of fire
resulting from the practice
of firing flares in and around the Cape Town harbour
on New Year’s eve.
[34] The only evidence advanced on behalf of
the appellants in support of this allegation was of the practice of firing
flares at
midnight on New Year’s eve. That evidence, however, did give
rise to the inference that the port captain would or ought to
have been aware of
the practice. The appellants bore the onus of proof. What does appear from the
evidence is that to the extent
that the flares constituted a potential ignition
source, the “first worry” as Woodend expressed it, would have been
the
tanker basin where oil is loaded and discharged 24 hours a day throughout
the year and where there is always the possibility of gas
on deck even after
loading or discharging. Other potential danger spots would have included the oil
storage tanks and combustible
cargo or timber not under cover. Presumably it was
because of the vulnerability of these areas to fire that the firing of flares
is
prohibited in the harbour area. By comparison the danger to ordinary buildings
was minimal. The only practicable manner of averting
the risk of fire at the
danger areas would have been to enforce the regulation prohibiting the firing of
flares. Woodend, who became
port captain after the fire, used to send out
reminders of the prohibition to the ships’ agents on 31 December. Whether
this
was done by his predecessors is unknown; but whatever steps were taken, I
am unpersuaded that, without the benefit of hindsight,
those steps ought
reasonably to have extended to warning the port engineer or anyone erecting a
building in the harbour area that
the prohibition against the firing of flares
in the harbour area was invariably breached at midnight on New Year’s
eve.
[35] It follows that the appeal must fail. The appeal is dismissed
with costs, such costs to include the costs occasioned by the
employment of two
counsel.
D G SCOTT
JA
SMALBERGER JA
HOWIE JA -
Concur
MARAIS JA
STREICHER JA:
[1] I agree
that the appeal should be dismissed with costs including the costs of two
counsel but for slightly different reasons which
I shall state
briefly.
[2] In Kruger v Coetzee 1966 (2) SA 428 (A) Holmes JA
stated at 430E-F:
“For the purposes of liability culpa arises if -
(a) a diligens paterfamilias in the position of the defendant -
would foresee the reasonable possibility of his conduct injuring another in his person or property and causing him patrimonial loss; and
would take reasonable steps to guard against such occurrence; and
the defendant failed to take such steps.”
[3] In Groenewald v Groenewald 1998 (2) SA 1106 (SCA) at
1112 I it was said that fault would be established “if a reasonable person
in the position of the defendant would
have realised that harm to the plaintiff
might be caused by [his] conduct even if he would not have realised that the
consequences
of that conduct would be to cause the plaintiff the very harm she
actually suffered or harm of that general nature”. It was
said,
furthermore, that once fault in this way is attributed to the defendant one
proceeds to determine for what consequences caused
to the plaintiff in
consequence of the defendant’s conduct the defendant is liable in damages
to the plaintiff (see 1112J
to 1113A). This approach to the problem of
determining delictual liability has been criticized by Boberg, The Law of
Delict, at 381 to 382. He refers to the approach as the traditional
approach. Boberg is a proponent of what has been referred to as the
relative
view of negligence, according to which the requirement of "culpability is
satisfied only where the defendant intended or
ought reasonably to have foreseen
and guarded against harm of the kind that actually occurred". According to
Boberg those who adopt
this relative approach have no need to postulate a
further requirement that the plaintiff’s damage be not ‘too
remote’
(see Boberg loc. cit.). The two approaches have recently
been discussed in Mukheiber v Raath 1999 (3) SA 1065 (SCA). A number of
cases where this court has in recent times applied “the test of so-called
legal causation” to determine
whether damages should not be allowed for
being too remote, were referred to (see 1078J to 1079B). Groenewald is
one of the cases referred to. Unfortunately, the test for negligence was
formulated in Mukheiber in accordance with the relative view of
negligence without reference to the fact that a different formulation applies
when what Boberg
calls the traditional approach, is followed.
[4] I shall
follow the approach followed in Groenewald. As will become apparent the
same result is arrived at as would be reached if the relative view of negligence
is applied. In the circumstances
I do not consider it necessary to embark on a
discussion as to the respective merits or demerits of the two
approaches.
[5] The appellants allege that the respondents were negligent
in having failed to instal or to have installed a sprinkler system in
the cold
store. In my view a fire in the cold store at Duncan Dock was reasonably
foreseeable by a reasonable person in the position
of Worthington-Smith and
Visser. I shall assume that reasonable steps to guard against a fire at the cold
store included the installation
of a sprinkler system and that a reasonable
person in the position of Worthington-Smith and Visser would have required the
installation
of such a system. Assuming further as I do that if
Worthington-Smith was negligent such negligence can be attributed to the first
respondent and that the second respondent in the circumstances owed a legal duty
to the appellants not to approve plans unless provision
was made for such a
sprinkler system, it follows that the failure to instal a sprinkler system in
the cold store was due to the negligence
of the first and the second
respondents.
[6] The question then arises whether the respondents should
be compelled to compensate the appellants for the damage caused by the
particular fire that occurred. That will only be the case if it can be said that
the aforesaid negligence caused the damage claimed.
In the law of delict
causation involves two distinct inquiries. In International Shipping Co (Pty)
Ltd v Bentley 1990 (1) SA 680 (A) at 700E-I Corbett CJ formulated them as
follows:
“The first is a factual one and relates to the question as to whether the defendant’s wrongful act was a cause of the plaintiff’s loss. This has been referred to as ‘factual causation’. The enquiry as to factual causation is generally conducted by applying the so-called ‘but-for’ test, which is designed to determine whether a postulated cause can be identified as a causa sine qua non of the loss in question. In order to apply this test one must make a hypothetical enquiry as to what probably would have happened but for the wrongful conduct of the defendant. This enquiry may involve the mental elimination of the wrongful conduct and the substitution of a hypothetical course of lawful conduct and the posing of the question as to whether upon such an hypothesis plaintiff’s loss would have ensued or not. If it would in any event have ensued, then the wrongful conduct was not a cause of the plaintiff’s loss; aliter, if it would not so have ensued. If the wrongful act is shown in this way not to be a causa sine qua non of the loss suffered, then no legal liability can arise. On the other hand, demonstration that the wrongful act was a causa sine qua non of the loss does not necessarily result in legal liability. The second enquiry then arises, viz whether the wrongful act is linked sufficiently closely or directly to the loss for legal liability to ensue or whether, as it is said, the loss is too remote. This is basically a juridical problem in the solution of which considerations of policy may play a part. This is sometimes called ‘legal causation’.”
[7] As stated by Scott JA it was not in dispute that a sprinkler system
would have extinguished the fire or at least served to control
it. I shall once
again assume that for this reason at least some of the damages suffered by the
appellant’s would have been
prevented. It follows that had the first and
the second respondents not been negligent the appellants would not have suffered
the
damages they actually suffered. Subject to the correctness of the assumption
the test for factual causation has been satisfied.
[8] The test to
determine legal causation
“is a flexible one in which factors such as reasonable foreseeability, directness, absence or presence of a novus actus interveniens, legal policy, reasonability, fairness and justice all play a part”.
(See Standard Chartered Bank of Canada v Nedperm Bank Ltd [1994] ZASCA 146; 1994 (4) SA
747 (A) at 765A to 765B.)
[8] For the reasons stated by him, I agree
with Scott JA that “the evidence establishes that the danger of fire
emanating from
an external source on the roof of the building with sufficient
intensity to ignite the gutter was not reasonably foreseeable; or
expressed
differently, a reasonable person in the position of Worthington-Smith or Visser
would not . . . have foreseen the danger
as real enough to warrant precautionary
measures”. For this reason the wrongful acts by the first and second
appellants, assuming
that they acted wrongfully, is not linked sufficiently
closely or directly to the loss suffered by the appellants for legal liability
to ensue. There are in my view no considerations of reasonableness, fairness or
justice which militate against this finding.
[9] It was submitted that
Bell had been negligent in leaving the premises shortly after midnight without
first having carried out
an inspection of the roof himself or without having
instructed one of the security guards or other personnel to do so. Implicit in
this submission is a submission that Bell should have foreseen the possibility
of a flare having fallen on the roof and of that flare
causing a fire. I agree
with Scott JA, for the reasons given by him, that it would not have been
unreasonable for Bell to have thought
that the danger had passed when he left. I
therefore agree that a reasonable person in the position of Bell would not have
considered
it necessary to carry out an inspection of the roof or to instruct
one of the security or other personnel to do so. For these reasons
negligence on
the part of Bell has not been established.
[10] It remains only to deal
with the alleged negligence of the port captain. It is alleged that he, acting
in the course and scope
of his employment with Portnet, had negligently failed
to apprise either the first respondent or its consultants or the port engineer
of the danger of fire resulting from the practice of firing flares in and around
Cape Town harbour on New Year’s eve. It is
implicit in this allegation
that a reasonable person in the position of the port captain would have foreseen
the possibility of flares
causing fire to buildings in the harbour, in the
position where the cold store was erected, as such a real risk that he would
have
considered it necessary to warn the people involved in the erection of the
building against that danger. In the light of the facts
stated in paragraph 27
of the judgment by Scott JA it can in my view not be found that
a reasonable
person in the position of the port captain would have done
so.
_____________________
P E STREICHER
JUDGE OF
APPEAL.