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REPORTABLE
Case No: 336/97
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF
SOUTH AFRICA
In the matter between:
NAUSHAD
HOOSEN N.O. 1ST APPELLANT
YUSUF ALLY N.O.
2ND APPELLANT
MAHOMED KHAN N.O.
3RD APPELLANT
and
YASMIN DEEDAT
1ST RESPONDENT
YOUSUF AHMED DEEDAT 2ND
RESPONDENT
AHMED HOOSEN DEEDAT 3RD
RESPONDENT
EBRAHIM JADWAT N.O. 4TH
RESPONDENT
CORAM: MAHOMED CJ, SMALBERGER, OLIVIER, STREICHER JJA and MELUNSKY AJA
DATE OF HEARING: 17 MAY 1999
DELIVERY DATE: 16 JULY 1999
Religious Trust - Purported delegation of Trustee’s powers and duties - Legally impermissible on proper interpretation of Trust Deed
________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
________________________________________________________
. . . SMALBERGER JA
SMALBERGER JA:
[1] The Islamic Propagation Centre International
(“the Trust”) was formed by a Notarial Deed of Trust (“the
Trust
Deed”) in April 1985 and duly registered with the Master of the
Supreme Court (“the Master”) on 19 June 1985.
The third respondent
was a co-founder and one of the original trustees of the Trust, a position he
has continued to occupy since.
The Trust Deed initially provided for five
trustees; in August 1986 the number was increased to seven. The Trust owns very
substantial
assets including four valuable income - producing
properties.
[2] Regrettably the affairs of the Trust have not always run
smoothly. Factionalism within the ranks of the trustees has led to
deteriorating
relationships between them. This has inevitably been prejudicial
to the proper management of the Trust. It has resulted in deadlock
and frequent
litigation between individual trustees or groups of trustees.
[3] On 4 May
1996 the third respondent unfortunately suffered a stroke leaving him paralysed
from the neck down and unable to speak.
For present purposes it may be accepted
that notwithstanding his physical disability he remains of sound mind and is
able to communicate
in a fashion through a computer aided communication system.
However, his disability precludes him from attending meetings of the
trustees
and performing his related duties as a trustee. This effectively led to a shift
in the balance of power within the ranks
of the feuding trustees. To remedy
this the third respondent, on 10 March 1997, granted a Special Power of Attorney
(“the
Power of Attorney”) to his daughter-in-law, the first
respondent, to represent him at meetings of the Trust.
[4] This gave rise to
an application in the Durban and Coast Local Division by the appellants (as
applicants) to have, inter alia, the Power of Attorney “declared to
be null and void and of no legal force and effect” and to interdict the
first respondent
from acting “as a trustee of the [Trust] as the agent of
. . . . the third respondent.”
[5] When the application was launched
the trustees of the Trust were the three appellants and the second, third and
fourth respondents.
The position of the seventh trustee was vacant. The
appointment of the third appellant as trustee has since been set aside (see
Deedat and Another v The Master and Others 1998(1) SA 544 (N)). An
application by the Master for the removal of the remaining trustees is currently
being heard in the Durban
and Coast Local Division.
[6] The history of the
course taken by the application appears from the judgment of the court a
quo (Magid J) which is reported as Hoosen NO and Others v Deedat and
Others [1997] 3 ALL SA 32 (D) and need not be repeated.
[7] The issue
which ultimately fell to be decided was whether the third respondent was
entitled in law to delegate his duties qua trustee in terms of the Power
of Attorney. The learned judge found for the respondents, holding that the
Power of Attorney did not
constitute an invalid delegation of the third
respondent’s functions. He further awarded costs against the appellants
de bonis propriis. He subsequently granted leave to appeal to this
Court. The issue referred to is the sole issue on appeal.
[8] In terms of
the Power of Attorney the third respondent purported to appoint the first
respondent
“to act on my behalf and in my name and place for the express purposes of voting on my behalf in all meetings of the ISLAMIC PROPAGATION CENTRE INTERNATIONAL TRUST as the said YASMIN DEEDAT may deem fit so long as it does not militate against the aims, objects and conditions as contained in the Constitution of the ISLAMIC PROPAGATION CENTRE INTERNATIONAL TRUST, that I am a founder member of.”
[9] The Power of Attorney proceeds:
“MRS YASMIN DEEDAT is also empowered to sign all documents on my behalf and to do all the necessary and to give effect to any decision that may be taken by the Trustees of the ISLAMIC PROPAGATION CENTRE INTERNATIONAL and generally to do all such things to give effect to the aforesaid wherever and whenever necessary.
And generally for effecting the purposes aforesaid, to do or cause to be done, whatsoever shall be requisite, as fully and effectually, to all intents and purposes, as I might or could do if personally present and acting therein; hereby ratifying, allowing and confirming, and promising and agreeing to ratify, allow and confirm all and whatsoever my said Agent shall lawfully do or cause to be done by virtue of these presents.”
[10] The
provisions of the power of Attorney must be interpreted objectively in order to
determine their precise ambit and legal effect.
It is legally irrelevant that
the third respondent may not have contemplated the first respondent exercising
an independent discretion,
and may have intended no more than that she be a mere
conduit for his wishes.
[11] The Power of Attorney empowers the first
respondent to vote at meetings of the Trust as she “may deem fit”.
On a
proper construction, this entitles her to exercise an independent judgment
and form her own view in relation to matters arising at
the meetings. She is
not legally obliged to ascertain the wishes of the third respondent or to give
effect to his directions, whatever
she may consider her moral obligation to be
in that regard. Where voting at a meeting calls for the exercise of a
discretion it
falls to her to exercise such discretion, thereby supplanting the
function of the third respondent in that respect. This renders
her position
akin to that of a duly elected trustee, which she is not.
[12] Moreover, any
decision to which the first respondent may come, as reflected in the way she
votes, would not be subject to control
or correction by the third respondent,
even though he may have to assume responsibility for it. This is because he
has, in terms
of the Power of Attorney, ratified her actions in advance, or at
least bound himself to ratify them. While he could revoke the Power
of
Attorney, he could not undo what had already been done.
[13] The
qualification in the Power of Attorney that the first respondent may vote as she
deems fit “so long as it does not
militate against the aims, objects and
conditions as contained in the Constitution of the [Trust]” is mere
surplusage and takes
the matter no further. It places no limitation on her
voting powers as compared to those of the third respondent. It merely makes
her
subject to the same constraints that applied to him. It does not detract from
the fact that she may, when voting, operate as
effectively and independently as
any duly and properly appointed trustee.
[14] To sum up, the Power of
Attorney, properly construed, seeks to transfer to the first respondent the
third respondent’s
rights and duties, and concomitant powers, arising from
attendance and voting at meetings of the Trust. This amounts to a delegation
to
the first respondent of the third respondent’s judgment and discretion in
relation to the decision making process of the
Trust. It constitutes at least a
temporary abdication of the third respondent’s functions in favour of a
non-trustee. The
question arises whether that is a legally permissible
delegation.
[15] The Trust, as the name implies, is a religious trust
established to further the aims of Islam. Clause 2 of the Trust provides
that
the objects of the Trust shall be
“2.1. to create a fund primarily to promote charitable and religious activities of the Islamic Faith;
2.2. To propagate the Islamic faith to Muslims and non-Muslims primarily through the offices of the [Trust] . . .”
The
latter object is to be achieved (in terms of clause 2.2.1 - 8) by means,
inter alia, of public lectures, the distribution of the Holy Quran and
various other ways of promoting Islam. The use of the word
“primarily”
in clause 2.2 indicates that the propagation of the
faith of Islam may go beyond the matters listed in clause 2.2.1 - 8. Any such
extension would call for consideration by the trustees and the exercise of the
necessary judgment and discretion on their part.
[16] Clause 3 deals with the
powers of the trustees in relation to the general administration of the Trust.
These include
“3.4 To manage and control the Trust or other institutions established or acquired by the Trust and to appoint, and at their discretion remove, or suspend managers, secretaries, clerks, agents and servants for permanent, temporary or special services, as they from time to time think fit, and to invest them with such powers (including power to sub-delegate) as they may think expedient . . .
and
3.6 Generally to do all such other things and carry out all such undertakings as may be expedient to further the interest of the Trust or which may be incidental or conducive to the attainment of the aforesaid objects.”
[17] Clause 4 provides that
“All the business and affairs of the Trust shall be managed and controlled by the Trustees, who shall have full power to carry out the objects of the Trust as hereinbefore provided . . . .”
[18] In terms of
clause 5 (as amended) the Board of Trustees shall consist of not more than seven
(previously five) Muslim members,
all of whom shall hold office for life. The
first five trustees were the co-founders of the Trust. The relevant portion
(for present
purposes) of clause 7 reads:
“On the death, resignation or removal from office of any of the Trustees and as often as a vacancy shall occur, the remaining Trustees shall as soon as conveniently possible elect another Trustee, a two-thirds majority decision shall be considered sufficient for such election . . .”
[19] Clause 9 provides that any major decision of
the Trust has to be ratified by at least two-thirds of the Trustees then holding
office; clause 10 exempts the Trustees from the filing of any security with the
Master; clause 15 makes provision for the annual
balance sheet to be signed by
the auditor “and by such of the Trustees as shall be delegated to that end
from time to time.”
[20] Further relevant provisions are to be found in
clauses 21 and 22. They provide:
“21. The Trust shall be a body of perpetual succession and the Trustees or their successors shall neither have the right nor the power to terminate the Trust
. . . .
22. Any matter [for] which no provision has been included in this Deed of Trust shall be decided upon by the Trustees and such decision shall be binding and effective as if it were a clause in this Deed of Trust.”
[21] A trustee in the narrow or strict sense (the
kind with which we are dealing) is not an agent. (As to the main points of
distinction
between them see Honore’s South African Law of Trusts:
4th Ed, pp 57/8.) He, unlike an agent, does not derive his powers
from a principal to whom he is responsible. As he does not exercise
derivative
powers the maxim delegatus delegare non potest, initially relied upon by
the appellants’ counsel, cannot assist the appellants.
[22] As the
authority of the trustees derives from the terms of the Trust Deed its
provisions have to be considered in order to determine
whether it expressly or
impliedly authorises delegation by an individual trustee of his powers and
functions.
[23] It is apparent from a consideration of the Trust Deed that
no express provision is made for the delegation by any individual
trustee of any
of his rights, duties or powers. The Trust Deed only provides for collective
action by the trustees. Control and
management of the Trust vests in the
trustees jointly (clauses 3 and 4). Where specific provision is made for the
delegation of
functions (see clauses 3.4 and 15), such delegation is made by the
trustees acting in concert (or at least a majority of them).
The Trust Deed
makes no provision for the exercise of any powers or functions by individual
trustees unless authorised thereto by
the body of trustees. This is in keeping
with the general principle that where the administration of a trust is vested in
co-trustees
they must execute their duties in their joint capacity.
[24] It
is also noteworthy that where provision is made for delegation in the Trust
Deed, such delegation relates to matters that
are by and large purely
administrative. The delegation does not relate to areas where the exercise of a
discretion is called for
by the trustees in carrying out their duties of
management and control. This accords with the principle that the fundamental
decisions
relating to a trust need to be taken by the trustees; the
implementation of such decisions may be delegated to others, although ultimate
responsibility remains with the trustees (cf Erlank’s Trustee v
Allan [1909] TS 303 at 306).
[25] In the absence of express
authorisation in the Trust Deed permitting an individual trustee to delegate his
functions in the manner
sought to be done by the third respondent in terms of
the Power of Attorney, is there scope for an implied authorisation to that
effect? In my view not.
[26] The essentially collective nature of the
trustees’ duties and the general prohibition against the delegation of a
fundamental
discretionary power would militate against any such implied
authorisation. Nor is a power to delegate necessary for the proper exercise
of
an individual trustee’s rights and duties under the Trust. In considering
the issue one may also, by analogy, draw usefully
from an established principle
in the law of agency, while not losing sight of the essential differences
between a trustee and an
agent. That principle states that where the identity
and personal attributes or skills of the performer of an act are of material
importance, delegation is not permitted (Strydom v Roodewal Management
Committee and Another 1958 (1) SA 272 (O) at 273G; Pothier’s
Treatise on the Contract of Mandate: par 99; Kerr: The Law of
Agency: 3rd Ed, p 237).
[27] The Trust was established in the
interests of the Muslim community in order to propagate and promote the Islamic
faith. The
trustees would have to be people imbued with the spirit of Islam who
could be relied upon to give effect to the objects of the Trust.
Those objects
are of such a nature as to require the exercise of personal judgment and
discretion in relation to policy decisions
of one kind or another. The wide
powers accorded the trustees point to the founders of the Trust reposing faith
in their values,
judgment and discretion. The personal attributes of the
trustees would inevitably have played a significant if not conclusive role
in
their selection. Those same attributes would also be of concern to, and have an
influence on, potential donors of the Trust.
[28] The importance of the
personal attributes and skills of the trustees is underscored by the fact that
the co-founders of the Trust
appointed themselves joint trustees of the Trust
for life. The self-perpetuating nature of the Trust enables the trustees, on
the
death or resignation of one of their members, to appoint to the vacancy
(also for life) someone with similar values (cultural and
spiritual) as their
own and someone whose judgment and abilities are respected by them. Thus the
person of the trustee assumes importance
in the overall design and functioning
of the Trust; and a person elected as trustee must have the support of at least
two thirds
of the remaining trustees. I accordingly conclude, contrary to what
was held by the judge a quo, that the trustees are people selected for
their personal attributes. Applying the principle referred to in paragraph [26]
above
precludes, in my view, any suggestion of implied authorisation.
[29] I
am thus of the view that the delegation by the third respondent of his powers
and duties to the first respondent in terms of
the Power of Attorney was legally
impermissible as it was neither expressly nor impliedly authorised by the Trust
Deed. I do not
consider it necessary to deal with the reasoning of the judge
a quo in arriving at a different conclusion.
[30] It follows that the
appellants were entitled to an order in the terms sought. Originally what was
sought was a rule nisi. It is common cause that at this stage the
appellants, if successful, would be entitled to a final order.
[31] There
remains the question of costs. In their application the appellants sought costs
against the first and second respondents
(in the case of the latter, de bonis
propriis). In dismissing their application the court a quo granted
costs against the appellants de bonis propriis. That order will now fall
away, and what is to be decided is the appropriate order as to costs both in the
court below and on appeal.
[32] Significantly, no order for costs has ever
been sought against the third respondent, yet it is his conduct in giving the
first
respondent a power of attorney that has led to the present litigation. It
is perfectly understandable that the third respondent,
as a founder of the Trust
- and by all accounts the guiding spirit behind the Trust - should, despite his
manifest incapacity, wish
to remain a trustee and maintain an interest in the
Trust’s affairs. The reason why no costs’ order was sought from
the
third respondent may well have been that the validity of the course he took was
linked to a proper interpretation of the Trust
Deed.
[33] A number of
disputed factual issues arose on the papers. These have remained unresolved.
The real issue, both in the court
below and on appeal, concerned the legal
validity of the Power of Attorney. This in turn involved the interpretation of
the Trust
Deed.
[34] The appellants were entitled to challenge the Power of
Attorney and have done so successfully. There exists no sound basis for
depriving them of their costs. The question is, who is to pay them?
[35] I
see no reason why first and second respondents should have distanced themselves
from the proceedings. Second respondent was
entitled initially to answer the
factual allegations made against him. When the only remaining issue related to
the validity of
the Power of Attorney, he was entitled to be heard as trustee
insofar as an interpretation of the Trust Deed was called for. In
addition he
was entitled to oppose the costs’ order sought against him
personally.
[36] The first respondent, as matters turned out, could have
abided the decision of the court (although she too had a costs’
order
sought against her). But she obviously (and understandably) feels a certain
loyalty towards the third respondent, and her
appearances in person on appeal
and in the court below could not materially have contributed towards the
costs.
[37] In all the circumstances I am of the view that as an
interpretation of the Trust Deed was reasonably called for it would be
appropriate,
in the proper exercise of our discretion, to order that the costs
of the proceedings both in this court and below be borne by the
Trust. This
must not be seen as a licence to the trustees to continue feuding. They should
be warned that the costs of any future
litigation between them, in the light of
what has occurred in the past, are likely to have to be borne by them
personally, and conceivably
on a punitive scale.
The following order is
made:
1) The appeal succeeds.
2) The order of the court a quo is set aside and there is substituted in its stead the following:
“1. The Special Power of Attorney purportedly executed by the Third Respondent in favour of the First Respondent on 10 March 1997 is declared to be of no legal force and effect.
2. The First Respondent is interdicted from acting in terms of the aforesaid Special Power of Attorney.”
3) The costs of all parties in respect of both the application in the court a quo and on appeal to this court are to be borne by the Islamic Propagation Centre International.
___________________
J W SMALBERGER
JUDGE OF APPEAL
Mahomed CJ )Concur
Olivier
JA )
Streicher JA )
Melunsky AJA )