---

SaakNo 64/94

IN DIE HOOGGEREGSHOF VAN SUID-AFRIKA (APPèLAFDELING)

In die saak tussen :

LANGEBERG VOEDSEL BEPERK Appellant

vs

SARCULUM BOERDERY BEPERK Respondent

CORAM : JOUBERT, HEFER, STEYN, MARAIS et

SCHUTZ ARR
AANGEHOOR : 10 NOVEMBER 1995

GELEWER : 28 NOVEMBER 1995

UITSPRAAK

HEFER AR :
2

In die bevel waarteen geappelleer word, word die appellant gelas om vergoeding aan die respondent te betaal vir skade wat laasgenoemde gely het as gevolg van die gedeeltelike mislukking van sy suikermielie-oes weens 'n verborge gebrek in saad wat die appellant aan hom verskaf het. Wat in geskil is, is of die respondent voldoende getuienis voorgelê het om die appellant se aanspreeklikheid vir gevolgskade te grondves.

In die besonderhede van die respondent se vordering is die eis gefundeer,

eerstens, op 'n bewering (in paragraaf 5) dat die appellant die geskiktheid en

goeie gehalte van die saad uitdruklik of stilswyend gewaarborg het. Tweedens
word in paragraaf 3(b) beweer dat die appellant :

"onder andere handel gedryf [het] as verskaffer van plantsaad, insluitende suikermieliesaad...en openlik voorgegee dat dit ten opsigte van die saad oor eienskappe van bedrewenheid en deskundige kennis beskik."

Hoewel die betrokke bewerings in die verweerskrif ontken is en by die

3

verhoor steeds betwis was, het die verhoorhof bevind dat 'n waarborg stilswyend verleen is en dat die bewerings in paragraaf 3(b) bewys is. Die respondent is gevolglik gelyk gegee op beide grondslae van sy eis.

In hierdie hof is namens die appellant aangevoer dat nóg die een nóg die ander skuldoorsaak bewys is. Aangesien ek van oordeel is dat die eis tereg toegestaan is op grond van die bewerings in paragraaf 3(b) van die besonderhede van vordering is dit onnodig om die getuienis ten opsigte van die bewerings in paragraaf 5 breedvoerig te bespreek. Gedagtig aan die vereistes gestel in sake

soos Alfred McAlpine & Son (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal Provincial Administration 1974(3) SA 506 (A) op 532H-533C, Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd and Another v Ocean Commodities Inc and Others 1983(1) SA 276 (A) op 292B-C en Delfs v Kuehne & Nagel (Pty) Ltd 1990(1) SA 822 (A) op 827B-828B,

volstaan ek met die opmerking dat die verhoorhof se bevinding dat 'n stilswyende waarborg bewys is nie ondersteun kan word nie.

4

Die bewerings in paragraaf 3(b) is geskoei op die lees van die uitspraak

in Kroonstad Westelike Boere-Ko-operatiewe Vereniging Bpk v Botha and
Another 1964(3) SA 561 (A) op 571G-572A waar die reël neergelê is dat :

"liability for consequential damage caused by latent defect attaches to a merchant seller, who was unaware of the defect, where he publicly professes to have attributes of skill and expert knowledge in relation to the kind of goods sold...Whether a seller falls within the category mentioned will be a question of fact and degree, to be decided from all the circumstances of the case. Once it is established that he does fall within that category, the law irrebuttably attaches to him the liability in question, save only where he has expressly or by implication contracted out of it."

Soos prof JC de Wet aangedui het in 1964 Annual Survey of South

African Law 103 ev is die gedeelte van die reël wat ek gekursiveer het, 'n

kwalifikasie wat hierdie hof toegevoeg het tot Pothier se uiteensetting in Traité

du Contrat de Vente 214 van handelaars se aanspreeklikheid (naas dié van

fabrikante) vir gevolgskade as gevolg van latente gebreke. Prof de Wet het so

'n toevoeging ondersteun op grond van die verandering wat die handel sedert

5

Pothier se dae ondergaan het. Inmiddels het meer as dertig jaar weer verstryk waartydens nuwe handelsware en bemarkingstegnieke die lig gesien het. Van die uitgesproke verwagting in die Kroonstad Wes saak (op 572A-C) dat die howe sou bydra tot die verdere ontwikkeling van die reël of dat die wetgewer sou ingryp, het egter niks gekom nie. (Vgl Holmdene Brinkworks (Pty) Ltd v Roberts Construction Co Ltd 1977(3) SA 670 (A) op 682fin-683C; Sentrachem Bpk v Wenhold 1995(4) SA 312 (A).) Of die reël soos dit destyds geformuleer is tans nog geregverdig kan word, is debatteerbaar (vgl Jean Davids se artikels in 81 (1964) SALJ 419 en 83 (1966) SALJ 87). In die onderhawige geval het beide advokate egter die aangehaalde uiteensetting as 'n juiste weergawe van die huidige stand van die reg aanvaar. In die lig hiervan en van die getuienis waarna aanstons verwys sal word, ag ek dit nie nodig om my verder oor die onderwerp uit te laat nie.

Die enigste vraag wat in die betoë geopper is, is of die appellant bewese
6 'n handelaar is wat sigself as bedrewe ten opsigte van suikermieliesaad teenoor

die publiek voorgehou het.

Die eerste grond waarop namens die appellant aangevoer word dat dit nie

die geval is nie, is dat die appellant nie as 'n saadhandelaar beskou kan word

nie. Hierdie submissie hou geen steek nie. Dit blyk uit die getuienis dat die

appellant by uitstek 'n verwerker en inmaker van vrugte en groente is wat in

onbewerkte vorm van kwekers aangekoop word. Ten einde die toevloei van

voldoende voorrade onbewerkte produkte te verseker, word kontrakte met

geselekteerde kwekers aangegaan vir die aankoop van bepaalde hoeveelhede

produkte wat nog geproduseer moet word, en soms nog nie eens aangeplant is

ten tye van die aangaan van die kontrak nie. In laasgenoemde gevalle (waarvan

die onderhawige een van vele is) skryf die appellant self die kultivar van die

besondere vrugte of groente en die soort saad voor en verskaf self die saad wat

aangeplant moet word deur dit van erkende saadhandelaars te koop en weer teen

7

'n wins aan kwekers te verkoop. Die blote feit dat sy saadhandel beperk is tot die verkoop van saad aan kwekers en nie aan die algemene publiek nie ontneem die appellant klaarblyklik nie die status van 'n handelaar vir doeleindes van die bepaling van sy aanspreeklikheid vir gevolgskade nie.
Die res van die betoog namens die appellant behels 'n aanval op die verhoorhof se bevinding dat die appellant sig voorgehou het as 'n bedrewe saadhandelaar. Ek is nie van voorneme om die gronde waarop die aanval geloods word, volledig te bespreek nie. Die bevinding berus hoofsaaklik op die manier waarop die appellant jarelank teenoor sy kwekers opgetree het. Soos reeds aangedui, was dit die appellant wat voorgeskryf het watter kultivars geproduseer moes word en watter soort saad gebruik moes word, en het die appellant inderdaad self die saad verskaf. Op sigself getuig hierdie optrede natuurlik nie noodwendig van 'n deskundige seleksie van kultivars en saad nie; trouens, die getuienis is tot die effek dat kwekers beperk is tot een voorgeskrewe

8

kultivar met die oog eenvoudig op 'n eenvormige eindproduk en dat 'n bepaalde soort suikermieliesaad voorgeskryf is eenvoudig omdat dit in die verlede met groot sukses gebruik was. Van die werklike beweegredes het kwekers egter nie geweet nie. Vanuit hulle oogpunt gesien, was dit nie onredelik nie om die appellant te beskou as 'n ondememer wat, weens sy jarelange ondervinding in die bedryf, oor deskundige kennis van kultivars en saad beskik het en daarom presies geweet het wat om voor te skryf. Hierdie indruk was ongetwyfeld versterk en bevestig deur die feit dat appellant se veldbeamptes kwekers gereeld op hulle plase besoek het waar hulle soms die grootte van die grond wat 'n kweker moes beplant bepaal het, behulpsaam was met die berekening van die hoeveelhede saad wat benodig sou word en die verwagte opbrengs daarvan, planttye vasgestel het, die vordering van aanplantings dopgehou het en inligting aan kwekers verskaf het oor planttye, plantmetodes, bemesting en onkruid- en plaagbestryding. Optrede van hierdie aard skep ongetwyfeld die indruk van

9

deskundigheid en kwekers sou kwalik kon raai dat sekere veldbeamptes inligting aan hulle deurgegee het wat hulle (die beamptes) ook maar van die verskaffers van produkte soos onkruid- en insektedoders ontvang het. Myns insiens het die verhoorhof tot die korrekte gevolgtrekking gekom.

Die appêl word van die hand gewys met koste.

J J F HEFER AR

STEM SAAM :

JOUBERT AR STEYN AR MARAIS AR SCHUTZ AR

SCHUTZ JA:

Whilst agreeing with the judgment of my brother Hefer, I must

admit to having had difficulty in applying the test in the Kroonstad case (above) to the facts: facts of a kind common in modem commerce.

The appellant recommended, indeed required the use of a particular cultivar, Commander. If that cultivar had been unsuitable there would have been little difficulty in concluding that the appellant had guaranteed suitability. But there was nothing wrong with Commander as such. The evidence is that it is a good seed, fit for the use intended. The problem lay in the individual seeds in the sealed packets delivered to the appellant

3

and in turn by it to the respondent. For some reason they were defective, and there is no evidence that the appellant had a practical means of finding that out; or had failed to buy its stock of Commander from a reputable seed merchant. Quite how does one spell a profession of expertise out of such a set of facts?

On a date lost in the annals of the ancient Roman republic the curule aediles imposed a new rule upon sellers of slaves in the markets under their control, a rule which is still the foundation of our law of liability for latent defects. Sellers were to apprise purchasers of any disease or defect in their wares, as also of certain unbecoming propensities considered worthy of special mention, such as running away, loitering on errands and subjection to noxal surrender: D 21.1.1.1

4

(Watson's translation). The purpose of the aediles' edict (as it was called) was to check the wiles of vendors and to give relief to purchasers circumvented by them. However, the real innovation was that the seller was liable even if he was ignorant of the defects required to be declared (D 21.1.1.2). The justifications for the rule were expressed thus: "There is nothing inequitable about this; the vendor could have made himself conversant with these matters; and in any case, it is no concern of the purchaser whether his deception derives from the ignorance or the sharp practice of his vendor" (loc cit).

This is an instance of the imposition of a clear general rule of law, the generality of which renders it unnecessary to enquire in each instance whether the considerations motivating the rule are present - in this case

5

fraud or carelessness on the seller's part. However the aediles may have thought about the matter, today we would call their decision one of policy.

Although the grounds of liability were extended, the extent of liability in money where latently defective goods were sold was limited below the level for ordinary breaches of contract - except in cases of fraud or consensual warranty (ie warranty over and above that now implied by law). By the time of Voet the limitation had fallen away in the case of the artifex or craftsman (Voet Commentarius Ad Pandectas 21.1.10). He was liable also for consequential loss. Today we commonly refer to this person as a manufacturer. This usage tends to conceal but also to reveal important changes in commerce, as will be

6

discussed later. Pothier, speaking for the France of his day, in his Traité

du Contract de Vente 214, says that the artisan (Voets' artifex or Gane's

craftsman) who sells goods of his own manufacture, by the profession of
his art, spondet peritiam artis (guarantees his skill). If he does not work
alone but employs workmen he should employ none but good workmen.
Pothier goes further than Voet and equates the tradesman who
makes a business of selling the products of others to the artifex. By
professing his trade he renders himself responsible for the goodness of
merchandise which he sells. Again the basis of liability is his public
profession of his trade, and the reason for it: "he ought to expose for sale
none but good articles. He ought to have knowledge of his wares, and
ought to sell none but good" (Gushing translation 132). As in the case

7

of the aediles' edict a clear rule of law is stated: he who deals in particular goods warrants their quality: and again it is not necessary to enquire in each case whether the considerations motivating the rule are present.

The effect of the Kroonstad decision was to limit the Pothier rule, in my opinion, in a manner so as to elevate the reasons for the rule to the rule itself. I am not the first to have expressed this opinion. It was advanced by Jean Davids in 1966 at p 88 of her article referred to in the main judgment. The result is that the rule requires the investigation of the presence or absence of the reasons in each case.

By the time of the decision in 1964 conditions of manufacture and marketing had changed, probably more since Pothier's time than they had

8

changed from that of the aediles to his. The policy decision in the Kroonstad case, going beyond Voet or any other Roman Dutch authority, was rendered possible by the fact that the "Pothier rule" had been applied or approved in a number of Southern African decisions, but with much difference as to its exact content. As the scope of its application was commercially important, the certainty sought to be achieved was welcome. But in its search this Court, in my respectful opinion, rather overlooked that the reasons that had made the rule appropriate to the mid eighteenth century were largely anachronistic in the mid twentieth century. With the passing of time they have become more so. That is why I find that the rule in Kroonstad is difficult to apply in present day conditions. It is not a simple rule: its application must often involve

9

artificiality because its premises are not those of our time.
Let us go back to the facts of this case. The appellant was little more than an unwitting conduit. Breaching the seal would have vitiated the guarantee of the seed merchant from which it had bought, little as that guarantee was. Absent some manifest morbidity in the content of the packets there was little it could do to check effectively. But the rule is not concerned with manifest defect but with latent defect. The overall result is that it is artificial to speak of a profession of skill in relation to the seeds themselves - yet that is part of the factual enquiry envisaged by the rule in the Kroonstad case. It is true that the appellant could be careful in choosing its supplier. But even such care would be no fast fortress. Reputations are often based upon the marketing department and

10

not the manufacturing department. And even reputations once soundly based may become undeserved due to secret capitulation to the siren of market share. Before these things eventually become exposed they may remain concealed, often under near-impenetrable plastic packing.

This is but one example of the way in which commerce has changed. The merchant is denied the opportunity to see, to feel or to smell the produce that passes through his hands. He can as little examine the metal in the bearings as the beans in the tin or the chip in the computer.

There are many other examples of how commerce has changed. One of them is touched upon by Schreiner JA in his dissenting judgment in Hackett v G & G Radio and Refrigerator Corporation 1949(3) SA

11

664(A) at 692-3 - the article that has passed through several different hands, perhaps in different countries, in the course of manufacture. The "present day needs of the community" seemed to that learned judge to require the recognition of the justice of the generalisation that a seller who manufacturers or deals in a kind of goods should be treated equally as having given the buyer of such goods his expert assurance that the goods are free of latent defects. That was nearly 50 years ago. Even the notion of a trader dealing in "a kind of goods" comes from a bygone age. Today much is bought from unmanned acres of trading floor on which are displayed for sale goods of all kinds from all the world.

It seems to me cumbrous, wasteful and uncertain of result, and therefore unjust, to require a buyer to prove and a seller to resist in case

12

after case the proposition that the latter publicly professes to have attributes of skill and expert knowledge in relation to particular goods.

The Kroonstad test can be criticised from both sides: as having extended a dealer's liability unduly, which was the view of Prof de Wet (see the main judgment in this case) : or as having restricted it unrealistically, a view which I am not the first to express. The rule having stood for such a long time it is not surprising that both counsel accepted it as the final statement of the law. But the passage of time may have weakened rather than strengthened the authority of the decision. If it ever be challenged in the future that will be the time to decide whether it may and should be altered.

13

It remains to add that it is not only in this small, if important, branch of the law of purchase and sale, but in the much wider Geld of product liability generally that our law may be perceived to have lagged behind.

W P SCHUTZ
JUDGE OF APPEAL

JOUBERT JA)

HEFER JA) CONCUR

STEYN JA)
MARAIS JA)

---