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Centurion Academy (Pty) Ltd v Quiver Training TY (Pty) Ltd (M247/19) [2020] ZANWHC 68 (31 August 2020)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA

NORTH WEST DIVISION - MAHIKENG

 

Case no: M247/19

In the matter between:



CENTURION ACADEMY (PTY)LTD                                          Applicant

(Registration number:1999/024870/07)

 

and

 

QUIVER TRAINING TY (PTY)LTD                                             Respondent

(Registration number: 1998/003012/07)

 

JUDGEMENT



MAHLANGU AJ

 

INTRODUCTION

 

[1]     The applicant seeks an order of winding up the respondent on the ground that the respondent is unable to pay its debts to the applicant as envisaged in section 344 and 345 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 as amended (“the Companies Act”). The applicant’s claims against the respondent are in the amounts of R639 283.00 and R62 842.52 respectively.

[2]     The respondent opposes the liquidation application on the basis that it is not indebted to the applicant in the amounts mentioned above. The respondent admits that it owes applicant but disputes the quantum thereof. The respondent alleges that it owes the applicant an amount of R21 882.89.

 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

[3]     The brief narration of the background of the facts is as follows:

3.1     On or about 22 October 2012, the applicant and the respondent, entered into a written agreement in terms of which the applicant granted the respondent a licence to offer certain educational programmes to students (“the Franchise Agreement”).

3.2      On June 2018, the respondent lawfully and in accordance with clause 3 of the Franchise Agreement terminated the agreement between the parties.

3.3      On 21 January 2019, the applicant addressed the letter of demand to the respondent in which it stated that:

1. The afore-mentioned matter refers.

2. We act on behalf of Centurion Academy (‘our client”).

3. Our instruction are that Quiver Tradinng t/a Centurion Academy Wilkoppies Campus (“Quiver Trading”) entered into a Franschise Agreement with Centurion Academy, which agreement was terminated on or about June 2018.

4. After the aforesaid termination, it was agreed that Quiver Trading would continue to enter pupils and collect registration fees on behalf of Centurion Academy.

5. Subsequent the termination agreement was negotiated and reduced to writing, which agreement is attached hereto an annexure “A” for your ease of reference, same was forwarded by Mr Schoeman to Mr Yaman on or about 17 January 2019.

5.1 Salient in terms of the agreement was that;

Centurion Academy acquires assets from Quiver Trading, which includes:

          5.1.1.1 Assets;

          5.1.1.2 Data;

          5.1.1.3 Files;

          5.1.1.4 Client Information;

          5.1..1.5 Licences

          5.1.1.6 E-books;

          5.1.1.7 Tablets; and

          5.1.1.8 Office equipment and furniture

to be able to continue with the operation of the business.

5.1.2 Centurion Academy would pay an amount of R456 953-11 (Four Hundred and Fifty Six Thousand Nine Hundred and Fifty Three Rand and Forty Four Cents) for assets acquired.

5.1.3 Quiver Trading would be entitled to a registration fee of R101 750.00 (One Hundred and One Thousand Seven Hundred and Fifty Thousand Rand).

5.1.4 An amount of R558 703-44 was received by Quiver Trading on behalf of Centurion Academy which amount Quiver Trading could appropriate in settlement of the purchase price for the assets acquired by Centurion Academy and the registration fees.

5.1.5 Ant further registration fees collected should be paid to Centurion Academy and all license should be made available to Centurion Academy.

5.2 Quiver Trading has repudiated the Agreement, alternatively failed to perform in terms of the agreement by not paying the additional registration fees and by failing to provide all license codes to our client.

6. Our instruction is to demand that quiver Trading, on/or before Friday, 25 January 2019, make available all license codes and to pay over any additional amounts received over and above the amount of R558 703-44, failure of which our client will forthwith proceed to claim specific performance of the agreement and damages.

7. in an attempt to limit its damages, our client will purchase new license codes by Monday, 28 January 2019, if not in receipt of same.

8. In the alternative, should Quiver Trading dispute the existence of the agreement as aforesaid, then in the very least, an agreement existed in terms of which Quiver Trading acted as an agent on behalf of Centurion Academy to facilitate the registration of students and to collect registration fees. In such circumstances, we have instruction to demand, and as we hereby do, payment of all registration fees received on behalf of Centurion Academy.

9. Kindly effect payment into our trust account, of which the particulars are as follows:

                   Bank account:     Standard Bank

                   Account Name: Jaco Roos Attorneys Incorporated

                   Account no:         411-016-555

                   Branch Code:      01-4645-00

                   Ref:                      H5364

10. We trust you find the above in order and wait your urgent response hereto.

 

[4]     On 23 January 2019, the respondent replied to the abovementioned letter and denied that there was ever an agreement that was made between the parties. The letter stated that:

Good day

We refer to your previous email directed to our client.

We are not going to answer to each and every allegation. This must not be construed as any admittance, rather a denied and do we reserve our client’s rights to do so at a later stage.

1. Ad paragraph 3

The contents of this paragraph are admitted.

2.   Ad paragraph 4

After termination our client agreed to collect, only for courses rendered by Centurion Business and IT, fees on behalf of Centurion.

3.   Ad paragraph 5

Save to admit that the parties negotiated and discussed a sale agreement, is the balance of paragraph denied. Mr Scheman simply produced the alleged agreement (annexure A to your letter) and forwarded same to our client. Nothing was agreed upon, especially as items 5.1.1.3, 5.1.1.4 and 5.1.1.5 were not included.

4.   Ad paragraph 5.1.2

The price Centurion would have paid for the assets was never agreed upon. Attached please find as annexure A1 and A2 a list of assets and the value thereof.

5.   Ad paragraph 5.1.3

Again your calculations are wrong. In terms of the breakdown of annexures B1,B2, B3, B4 on page B4 the amount is R117 400.00.

6.   Ad paragraphs 5.1.4

Again you are wrong, the amount received by Quiver is actually R639 283.00, close to R90 000.00 more than your client suggested. See annexure B4.

7.   Ad paragraph 5.1.5

All license were excluded from the transaction. The value of these licenses are approximately R200 000.00. See annexure A1…”

 

[5]     It is clear from the above two letters that were exchanged between the parties that, the parties could not agree on the agreement of the purchase of the franchise, the sale agreement and also the amount owed to the applicant.

 

POINT IN LIMINE

[6]     The respondent filed an opposing affidavit in which the following points in limine were raised:

6.1     That the application is based on the provisions of section 344 and 345 of the old Companies Act 61 of 1973 for the winding up of the respondent on the grounds that it is unable to pay its debt;

6.2     Factual dispute;

6.3     That the application was not served on the registered address of the respondent and/or proof that service was effected on employees and or trade unions as required;

 

6.4     That the Registrar of the High Court, Pretoria is cited as registrar.

 

[7]     At the hearing of this matter, the respondent only dealt with the factual dispute point in limine. The respondent did not dwell on the other points in limine even though the applicant mentioned them in his address to this Court.

 

[8]     The respondent also raised a counter claim to the amounts of R1 300 000 and R2 200 000 respectively for the assets and enrolment agreements that were entered into between the parties. The applicant submitted that the counterclaim would be argued at the appropriate hearing. The applicant argued that the respondent’s counterclaim is vague, bald and sketchy.

 

ISSUES

[9]     The main issue to be dealt with in this matter is to determine if the defense raised by the respondent is bona fide and on reasonable grounds and also if there is a dispute of fact in this application.

 

[10]   As mentioned above, the respondent dispute the following:

10.1    The amount claimed by the applicant;

10.2    The sale agreement between the parties; and

10.3    The separate sale agreement.



THE R639 283.00 CLAIM

[11]   The parties entered into a termination agreement which stated that:

Quiver Trading operating as Centurion Academy Wilkoppies has notified Centurion Academy that it terminates the Licence Agreement with Century Academy in June 2018 with effect of 31 December 2018.

On order to finalise the agreement some practical matters have an influence between the parties. The Termination and proper hand over of the account and service ability of clients between the parties are of outmost importance for Centurion Academy.

Practical implications include:

(a) Clients paid registration fees and programme fees to Quiver.

a.   These payments are prepaid monies which have to be applied to the 2019 financial year and and which must appear on all client accounts

(b) (f)

(g) In order to legally transfer the accounts to Centurion Academy these accounts must be sold/transferred to Centurion Academy.

(h)…..

(i)In order to facilitate this parties have agreed that the Centurion Academy will also purchase assets, data, files, client information, licenses, e-books, tablets and other office equipment and furniture from Quiver to be able to continue with the operation of the business.

(j)-(n)……”

 

 

[12]   The respondent admitted that there were termination agreement discussions which were not finalized as the agreement was not signed by both parties. Therefore, the above termination agreement is not binding to the respondent.

 

[13]   On 21 January 2019, the applicant sent the letter of demand mentioned above, claiming performance of the Termination/Sale agreement mentioned in paragraph [11] above.

 

[14]   According to paragraph 5.1.4 of the letter of demand sent to the respondents mentioned above, the amount of R558 703-44 was received by the respondent on behalf of the applicant which was the purchase price for the assets acquired by the applicant and the registration fees.

 

[15]   On 23 January 2013 the respondent responded to the letter mentioned above and state in paragraph 6 that, the applicant is wrong the amount of money received by the respondent was actually R639 283.00 which was for the 2019 year student account.

 

[16]   It was the applicant’s submission that, the respondent admitted that it owes the applicant an amount of R639 283.00 being the enrolment fees collected by the respondent on behalf of the applicant. The respondent admitted that, indeed it collected the enrolment fee but it denied that a specific agreement has been reached between the parties as per the percentage share of the payment. The respondent was adamant that the students belongs to it and not to the applicant and therefore the enrolment fees belongs to it.

 

[17]   The applicant submitted that there was an oral agreement entered into between the parties in which the respondent undertook to enter students on behalf of the applicant, but the aspect of the enrolment fees was never discussed between the parties. The respondent denied that there were any agreements entered into between the parties.

 

[18]   According to the respondent, the parties agreed in principle that the applicant would purchase the respondent as a going concern and transfer of the students with effect from 2019 academic year and onwards. The agreement was still to be finalized by the parties.

 

[19]   The respondent submitted that the purchase price of the school was still to be negotiated between the parties. They dispute that the respondent is indebted to the applicant. The respondent argued that the Termination agreement mentioned by applicant is not binding to them as it was not yet signed by both parties.

 

[20]   The respondent disputes that it is indebted to the applicant in the amount of R639 283.00. 

 

[21]   The respondent further submitted that it has, prior to the agreement of the purchase/ transfer price, in anticipation that the Termination agreement would be concluded, delivered its assets and transferred its students to the applicant. The respondent submitted that, the value of the assets delivered to the applicant amounted to R1 300 000.00 and the value of the students transferred to the applicant amounted to R2 200 000.00.

 

[22]   The respondent denied that there was an agreement to purchase the franchise, the sale agreement of the school and also denied that it is indebted to the applicant.

 

THE R62 842.52 CLAIM

[23]   This claim relates to the Franchise agreement between the parties which was terminated on 31 December 2018. The main dispute in this claim is the quantum thereof.

 

[24]   On 28 January 2019 the applicant sent a letter to the respondent with a statement and invoice of the 2018 financial year which amounted to R62 842,52 and consisted of certificates issued to students and royalties. On 28 January 2018, the respondent replied to the letter received from applicant and requested a calculation of this claim. The respondent submitted that it never received the calculations from the applicant.

 

[25]   The respondent made their own calculations of the amounts they owe the applicant and it amounted to R21 882.89.

 

[26]   The applicant insisted that the respondent admitted that it is indebted to the applicant and the dispute of the amounts owed to it is a delaying tactic. The applicant relied on the letter from the respondent mentioned at paragraph 5 above dated, 23 January 2019. The respondent argued that the applicant did not refer to the whole paragraph but selected the parts that only dealt with admission. The respondent argued that it admitted that there were negotiations between the parties where the discussions of the sale of the franchise were made but there was no conclusion reached.

 

[27]   The respondent’s attorney undertook to retain this amount of money in their trust account as provided by section 345 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973, as security pending the resolution of the dispute between the parties.

 

ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES

Bona fide and reasonable grounds

[28]   The respondent disputes the amount claimed by the applicant. In view of the above, the respondent disputes that there was an agreement of purchase/sale that was entered into between the parties. In the absence of these agreement the respondent submits that it is not indebted to the applicant. The respondent further submitted that there was no termination agreement as it was not signed by the parties. Therefore it cannot be binding on the respondent.

 

[29]   The respondent may only avoid liquidation on this basis if it can show that it disputes the debt bona fide and on reasonable grounds. Winding up proceedings ought not to be resorted to in order to enforce payment of a debt, the existence of which is bona fide disputed by the respondent on reasonable grounds.

 

[30]   The applicant was made aware that should it bring this application, the respondent is going to defend it.  It is therefore my view that applicant brought this application with an attempt to force the respondent to pay the amount claimed.

 

[31]   In the matter of Orestisolve (Pty) Ltd T/A Essa Investments v NDFT Investments Holdings (Pty)Ltd and another 2015(4) SA 449 (WCC) at para 8-11(“Orestisolve”)

 

[8] Even if the applicant establishes its claim on a prima facie basis, a court will ordinarily refuse the application if the claim is bona fide disputed on reasonable grounds. The rule that winding-up proceedings should not be resorted to as a means of enforcing payment of a debt the existence of which is bona fide disputed on reasonable grounds is part of the broader principle that the court’s processes should not be abused. In the context of liquidation proceedings, the rule is generally known as the Badenhorst rule from the leading eponymous case on the subject, Badenhorst v Northern Construction Enterprises (Pty) Ltd 1956 (2) SA 346 (T) at 347H-348C, and is generally now treated as an independent rule not dependent on proof of actual abuse of process (Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies Act Vol 3 at 14-82 – 14-83). A distinction must thus be drawn between factual disputes relating to the respondent’s liability to the applicant and disputes relating to the other requirements for liquidation. At the provisional stage, the other requirements must be satisfied on a balance of probabilities with reference to the affidavits. In relation to the applicant’s claim, however, the court must consider not only where the balance of probabilities lies on the papers but also whether the claim is bona fide disputed on reasonable grounds; a court may reach this conclusion even though on a balance of probabilities (based on the papers) the applicant’s claim has been made out (Payslip Investment Holdings CC v Y2K Tec Ltd 2001 (4) SA 781 (C) at 783G-I). However, where the applicant at the provisional stage shows that the debt prima facie exists, the onus is on the company to show that it is bona fide disputed on reasonable grounds (Hülse-Reutter & Another v HEG Consulting Enterprises (Pty) Ltd 1998 (2) SA 208 (C) at 218D-219C)

 

[9] The test for a final order of liquidation is different. The applicant must establish its case on a balance of probabilities. Where the facts are disputed, the court is not permitted to determine the balance of probabilities on the affidavits but must instead apply the Plascon-Evans rule (Paarwater v South Sahara Investments (Pty) Ltd [2005] 4 All SA 185 (SCA) para 4; Golden Mile Financial Solution CC v Amagen Development (Pty) Ltd [2010] ZAWCHC 339 paras 8-10; Badge & Others NNO v Midnight Storm Investments 265 Pty Ltd & Another 2012 (2) SA 28 (GSJ) para 14)”.

 

[32]   In all fairness, the respondent’s defense is bona fide and on reasonable grounds, it cannot be made to pay the amount that it disputes or that the applicant cannot provide the calculations thereof.

 

[33]   The procedure for the winding up is not designed for the resolution of disputes as to the existence or non-existence of a debt. In the matter of Badernhost v Northern Construction Enterprises (Pty) Ltd 1956(2) SA 346 (T) at 347-348 (Badenhorst), it was held that, the winding up process is not meant to decide doubtful debts.

 

[34]   Badernhost rule is that, winding up proceedings should not be resorted to as a means of enforcing payment of a debt, the existence of which is bone fide disputed on reasonable grounds, is part of a broader principle that the court’s processes should not be abused. The foundation of this rule is that, courts will not entertain factual disputes in application proceedings because of the need to hear oral evidence to properly adjudicate the factual disputes.

 

[35]   In order to succeed on the ground that it disputes the applicant’s debts bona fide and on reasonable grounds, the respondent must genuinely believe that it has reasonable prospects of success. According to the applicant, respondent has no bona fide defence, he is just avoiding liquidation.

 

[36]   In the matter of GAP MERCHANT RECYCLING CC v GOAL REACH TRADING 55 CC 2016 (1) SA 261 (WCC) (“GAP Merchant”) the respondent has to satisfy the court that the ground which it advances for disputing the applicant’s claims are reasonable. The statement of material facts should simply be sufficiently full to persuade the court that what the defendant has alleged, if it is proved at the trial, will constitute a defense to the plaintiff’s claim.

 

[37]   In GAP Merchant, it is was held that:

 

[20] The rule that winding-up proceedings should not be resorted to as a means of enforcing payment of a debt the existence of which is bona fide disputed on reasonable grounds is part of the broader principle that the court’s processes should not be abused. Liquidation proceedings are not intended as a means of deciding claims which are genuinely and reasonably disputed. The rule is generally known as the ‘Badenhorst rule’, after one of the leading cases on the subject, Badenhorst v Northern Construction Enterprises (Pty) Ltd 1956 (2) SA 346 (T) at 347H-348C. A distinction is thus drawn between factual disputes relating to the respondent’s liability to the applicant and disputes relating to the other requirements for liquidation. At the provisional stage, the other requirements must be satisfied on a balance of probabilities with reference to the affidavits. In relation to the respondent’s liability, on the other hand, the question is whether the applicant’s claim is disputed on reasonable and bona fide grounds; a court may reach this conclusion even though on a balance of probabilities (based on the papers) the applicant’s claim has been made out (Payslip Investment Holdings CC v Y2K Tec Ltd 2001 (4) SA 781 (C) at 783G-I). However, where the applicant at the provisional stage shows that the debt prima facie exists, the onus is on the company to show that it is bona fide disputed on reasonable grounds (Hülse-Reutter & Another v HEG Consulting Enterprises (Pty) Ltd 1998 (2) SA 208 (C) at 218D-219C)”.

 

[38]   The requirement of a bona fide defence is satisfied if the respondent genuinely wishes to contest the claim and believes it has a reasonable prospects of success. Lack of a bona fide defence will usually go hand in hand with the intention to delay which would in turn indicate that the company is unable to pay its debts and militate with the exercise of the discretion in its favor.

 

Dispute of facts

 

[39]   In view of the above, it clear that there is a dispute of facts between the parties relating to:

39.1     how much is owed to the applicant;

39.2     the franchise purchase agreement; and

39.3     the sale agreement.

 

[40] The respondent indicated in his argument that, he intends to bring a counter claim in the amounts of R1.3 million and R2.2 million against the applicant for the assets and enrolment agreements handed over to the applicant. Taking into consideration the Badenhorst rule mentioned above, an application for liquidation will thus fail if the alleged liability to pay is disputed on bona fide and reasonable grounds.

 

[41]   In the matter of Orestisolve, it was mentioned that:

[10] The difference in approach to factual disputes at the provisional and final stages appears to me to have implications for the Badenhorst rule. If there are genuine disputes of fact regarding the existence of the applicant’s claim at the final stage, the applicant will fail on ordinary principles unless it can persuade the court to refer the matter to oral evidence. The court cannot, at the final stage, cast an onuson the respondent of proving that the debt is bona fide disputed on reasonable grounds merely because the balance of probabilities on the affidavits favours the applicant. At the final stage, therefore, the Badenhorst rule is likely to find its main field of operation where the applicant, faced with a genuine dispute of fact, seeks a referral to oral evidence. The court might refuse the referral on the basis that the debt is bona fide disputed on reasonable grounds and should thus not be determined in liquidation proceedings. (In the present case neither side requested a referral to oral evidence.)

 [11] If, on the other hand, and with due regard to the application of the PlasconEvans rule, the court is satisfied at the final stage that there is no genuine factual dispute regarding the existence of the applicant’s claim, there seems to be limited scope for finding that the debt is nevertheless bona fide disputed on reasonable grounds. It is thus unsurprising to find that the reported judgments where the Badenhorst rule has been relevant to the outcome have been cases of applications for provisional liquidation rather than final liquidation.

[12] Even where the facts are undisputed, there may be a genuine and reasonable argument whether in law those facts give rise to a claim. I have not found any case in which the Badenhorst rule has been applied, either at the provisional or final stage, to purely legal disputes. If the Badenhorst rule’s foundation is abuse of process, it might be said that it is as much an abuse to resort to liquidation where there is a genuine legal dispute as where there is a genuine factual dispute. But if the Badenhorst rule extends to purely legal disputes, I venture to suggest that the rule, which is not inflexible, would not generally be an obstacle to liquidation if the court felt no real difficulty in deciding the legal point. I have not conducted an exhaustive analysis of the English authorities but the position stated by the Court of Appeal in HMRC v Rochdale Drinks Distributors Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 1116 paras 79-80 indicates that the equivalent rule in England finds application where the dispute is shown to be one ‘whose resolution will require the sort of investigation that is normally within the province of a conventional trial’. A purely legal question would not have that character”.

 

[42]   The respondent admitted that it owes the applicant the franchise to the amount of R21 882.89. The dispute is in the quantification of the amounts claimed by the applicant. The dispute that is raised by the respondent is therefore reasonable as it want to know how the applicant reached the claimed amount. There is, therefore, a real and genuine dispute of facts. As mentioned above, the applicant cannot use the liquidation proceedings to force the respondent to pay the money owed to it.

 

[43]   In the matter of Trinity Asset Management (Pty)Ltd v Grindstone Investments 2018(1) SA 94 (CC), Cameron J, held that:

 

[86] …… that [the Badenhorst] principle is less of a principle than a sensible rule of practice. It says that if you want to claim a debt you know is disputed, you should not bring liquidation proceedings to do it. You should claim the debt by way of action- and only once your claim has been established may you, if necessary, seek to liquidate or sequestrate.”

 

[44]   In this matter, after the respondent was provided with the letter of demand, it made it clear that it is going to dispute the amount claimed by the applicant. The applicant proceeded with the liquidation process instead of claiming the debt by way of action. It is very clear that there is a factual dispute in this matter.

 

[45]   It is not required of the respondent to prove its defence in liquidation proceedings. In the matter of Kalil v Decotex (Pty)Ltd & another 1988 (1) SA 943 AT 980C-D (“Kalil v Decotex”) it was held that:

 

Consequently, where the respondent shows on a balance of probability that its indebtedness to the applicant is disputed on bona fide and reasonable grounds, the court will refuse winding-up order. The onus on the respondent is not to show that it is not indebted to the applicant: it is merely to show that the indebtedness is disputed on bona fide and reasonable grounds”.

 

[46]   The principle in Kali v Decotex was also applied in Payslip Investment Holdings CC v Y2K TEC Limited 2001(4) SA 781 (C) at 783H-I in which it was stated that:

 

With reference to dispute regarding the respondent’s indebtedness, the test is whether it appeared on the papers that the applicant’s claim is disputed by respondent on reasonable and bona fide grounds. In this event it is not sufficient that the applicant has made out a case on the probabilities. The stated exception regarding disputes about an applicant’s claim thus cuts across the approach to factual disputes in general.”

 

[47]   The main dispute in this matter is the quantification of the amount said to be owed by the respondent to the applicant. The respondent alleges that it has since asked the applicant for the calculations on how the amount said to be claimed had been reached, which the applicant did not provide.

 

[48]   Furthermore it was held in the matter of Freshvest Investments (Pty) Ltd v Marabeng (Pty) Ltd [2016] JOL 36911 (SCA) that:

 

[8] The consequence of this referral were unfortunate. As recorded earlier, there was no need in these proceedings for a finding whether or not the respondent is indebted to the appellant, as the respondent, was to show that the appellant’s claims were disputed in bona fide and reasonable grounds”.

 

CONCLUSION

[49]   I am persuaded, based on the common cause facts in this matter, that the respondent’s disputes are based on bona fide and reasonable grounds.

 

[50]   In light of the principles set out above and bearing in mind the low threshold test that the respondent has to satisfy in order to discharge its onus, this application is deemed to be dismissed.

 

ORDER

[51]   In the circumstances, I make the following order:

51.1    The liquidation application is dismissed with costs.

51.2    Each party to pay its own costs of 25 June 2020.

 

 

 


M.E. MAHLANGU

ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT

NORTH WEST DIVISION: MAHIKENG

 

 

 

APPEARANCES

 

DATE OF HEARING                               :        20 August 2020

 

DATE OF JUDGMENT                           :        31 August 2020

 

 

COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT        :        Adv J Hershensohn

 

COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT    :        Adv J A Aswegen

 

 

 

ATTORNEYS:

 

For the Applicant                                    :        Jaco Roos Attorneys Inc

C/O Maree & Maree Attorneys 11 Agaat Avenue

RIVIERA PARK

MAHIKENG                                             

 

 

For the Respondent                              :        Theron Jordaan & Smit Inc

                                                                                               C/O Morweng Attorneys

                                                                                               Office 9, First Floor

                                                                                               Kelgor House

                                                                                               14 Tillard Street

                                                                                               MAHIKENG