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Civil Judgment – Circle 7 Trading

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA

(BOPHUTHATSWANA PROVINCIAL DIVISION)

CASE NO: Civ App 7/2005

In the matter between:

CIRCLE SEVEN TRADING 814 BK FIRST APPELLANT

JAN AREND VAN DER WESTHUIZEN TWEEDE APPELLANT

EN

IRENE JANSJE THOMAS RESPONDENT

MMABATHO:

HENDRICKS J

LANDMAN J

MONALEDI AJ

UITSPRAAK

LANDMAN J:

dat sy van die verpligting om haar ma terug te betaal onthef word en dat die BK ‘n verband moet registreer ten gunste van haar ma.

[4] Die uiteinde was dat sy aansoek om die likwidasie van die BK gedoen het. Jan en die BK het ‘n teenaansoek kragtens art 36 van die Wet op Beslotekorporasies 69 van 1984 vir die beëindiging van Irene se ledebelang geloods.

[5] Die aansoek het voor Gura R gedien. Hy het die teenaansoek van die hand gewys met koste en ‘n voorlopige likwidasiebevel toegestaan. Gura R het verlof aan Jan en die BK verleen om te appelleer.

[6] Mnr Pistor, wat namens die Bk en Jan verskyn het, het aangevoer dat die hof die aansoek om likwidasise van die hand moes gewys het. Hy voer aan dat die hof ‘n bevel kragtens art 36(1) moes toegestaan het en reëlings getref het ten opsigte van die vergoeding daaraan verbonde.

Die teenaansoek

[7] Die gronde van appel teen die afwysing van hierdie deel van die uitspraak lees soos volg:

2. The learned judge erred in law and on fact by finding (in paragraph 28 of the Judgment) that on the papers before the Court, the Learned Judge could not exercise his discretion in favour of the Second Respondent.

2.1 The Learned Judge should have found that a distinction should be drawn between the nature of the onus on the Second Respondent (as Applicant in the counter application)

a. in terms of section 36(1) of the Close Corporation Act, 1984 (Act 69 of 1984 - "The act") on the one hand; and

b. in terms of section 36(2) of the Act on the other hand.

2.2 With regard to the onus in 2.1 (a) above the Learned Judge should have found that the Second Respondent, as Applicant in the Counter Application has proved, on a balance of probabilities, that an order in terms of that section should be made.

2.3 With regard to the onus in 2.1 (b) above the Learned Judge should have found:

a. that, even if the Learned Judge would not have been prepared to grant the orders in terms of section 36(2), that were suggested by the Second Respondent as Applicant in the Counter Applicant, the Counter Application should not, for that reason fail.

b. that as far as the orders contemplated in section 36 (2) of the Act are concerned, the Court is not bound by, or restricted to, what was put before the court by the Applicant in the counter application and that in the event of the Honourable Court not being convinced that the suggestions made by the Applicant in the counter application should be accepted, the Court could and should consider other possible formulations of the order that will do justice between the parties.

2.4 The Honourable Court erred in law and on fact by failing to consider, alternatively consider properly, alternative possibilities for an order in terms of section 36 (2).

a. Inter alia and in particular the Honourable Court failed to consider the suggestion made on behalf of the Respondents in the Court of first instance during argument from the bar namely that pursuant to an order in terms of section 36(1), an order in terms of section 36(2) can be made to the effect:

i. That the Applicant's interest as a member of the close corporation be transferred to the Second Respondent against payment by the Second Respondent of the amount contemplated in paragraph (ii) infra;

ii. That the Second Respondent pay, as a provisional payment to the Applicant for her said interest the amount of R2250-00 (suggested by the Second Respondent);

3. That Second Respondent provides, within a period of three months the full financial statements in respect of the close corporation since its incorporation to the date of this order;

iv. That, leave be granted to the Applicant to instituted an action against the First and/or Second Respondent for payment of such amount(s) that the Applicant might believe that she is entitled to as payment in addition to the amount of R2250-00 referred to above.

b. Inter alia and in particular the Honourable Court failed to consider the possibility of referring for evidence the question as what each of the parties is entitled to in terms of section 36(2) of the act.

3. The learned Judge erred in failing to find that the parties had entered into an oral agreement with terms similar to the written "samewerkings ooreenkoms". In this regard the Learned Judge should have found:

3.1 That on all facts available to the Honourable Court, the parties had entered into an oral agreement of which at least the following terms can be found to have been proved:

a. That they (the parties) agreed to become married to each other;

b. That they agreed to form the close corporation and to run a business in the name of the close corporation;

c. They each would have a 50% interest in the close corporation;

d. That they each would contribute labour and knowledge towards the business.

3.2 That by virtue of the provisions of section 44(3) and (4) of the Act such oral agreement is valid and binding between the members of the close corporation inter se and between the members on the one hand and the close corporation on the other hand.

3.3 That the Applicant repudiated the said oral agreement.

3.4 That such repudiation was wrongful.

3.5 That such repudiation was accepted by the Second Respondent.

3.6 That, in the premises the Applicant was responsible for causing the "deadlock" between the parties and that she was therefore not entitled to approach the Honourable Court with an application for the liquidation of the close corporation on the ground of such "deadlock".

4. The Learned Judged erred on fact by finding (in paragraph 27 of the judgment) that the Respondent did not make a full disclosure to the Honourable Court in respect of the financial affairs of the close corporation. The Learned Judge:

4.1 should have accepted the Respondents evidence (in paragraph 32.5 at page 71 of the record) to the effect that the financial statements of the close corporation are not yet available.

4.2 over-emphasised the importance of the financial statements of the close corporation.

[8] Gura R het tereg besluit dat hy eerstens met die teenaansoek moet handel. Hy sê:

“An application for liquidation has drastic consequences. A court should therefore look at workable alternatives which can save the CC from extinction. In my judgment it is therefore desirable that I consider the counter-application first (See De Franca v Exhaust Pro CC (De Franca Intervening) 1997 3 SA 878 (E) at 891H; Kanakia v Ritzshelf 1004 CC t/a Passage to India 2003 2 SA 39 (D & CLD) at 46H -1).”

[9] Jan wou gehad het dat die hof Irene moes gelas dat Irene haar lidmaatskap en ledebelang in die BK beëindig. Hy wou ook ‘n bevel gehad het dat 'n bedrag van R2 250.00 aan Irene oorbetaal word by ondertekening van die nodige dokumentasie en dat Irene die koste van die teenaansoek moet betaal.

[10] Artikel 36 van die wet bepaal dat op aansoek van 'n lid van 'n BK kan 'n Hof op een of meer van die volgende gronde beveel dat enige lid ophou om 'n lid van die korporasie te wees:

“(a) Behoudens die bepalings van die samewerkingsooreenkoms (as daar is), dat die lid blywend onbekwaam is, as gevolg van kranksinnigheid of om 'n ander rede, om sy deel by te dra tot die dryf van die besigheid van die korporasie;

(b) dat die lid hom skuldig gemaak het aan optrede wat, met inagneming van die aard van die besigheid van die korporasie, waarskynlik ‘n nadelige uitwerking op die dryf van die besigheid sal hê;

(c) dat die lid homself op so 'n wyse met betrekking tot die besigheid van die korporasie gedra dat dit nie vir die ander lid of lede redelikerwys moontlik is om die besigheid van die korporasie saam met hom te dryf nie; of

(d) dat omstandighede ontstaan het wat dit reg en billik maak dat sodanige lid behoort op te hou om 'n lid van die korporasie te wees:

(1) Met dien verstande dat so 'n aansoek by 'n Hof op 'n grond in paragraaf (a) of (d) genoem, ook gemaak kan word deur 'n lid met betrekking tot wie die bevel van toepassing sal wees.

(2) ʼn Hof wat 'n bevel ingevolge subartikel (1) maak, kan die verdere bevele wat goeddink, maak in verband met—

(a) die verkryging van die betrokke ledebelang deur die korporasie of deur ander lede as die betrokke lid;

(b) die bedrae (as daar is) wat betaal moet word ten opsigte van die betrokke ledebelang of die eise teen die korporasie van daardie lid, die wyse en tye van sodanige betalings en die persone aan wie dit gemaak moet word; of

(c) enige ander aangeleentheid betreffende die beëindiging van lidmaatskap wat die Hof goeddink.

[11] Art 36 bestaan uit twee dele. Eerstens moet die hof besluit of gronde bestaan vir die verpligte oordrag van ‘n lid se ledebelang. Indien die antwoord positief is kan die hof ‘n diskresie uitoefen om bloot die oordrag te gelas of om ‘n vergoedingsbevel kragtens art 36(2) te maak. Indien die hof nie so ‘n bevel maak nie is dit res judicate want slegs die hof wat die sub art (1) bevel maak, is gemagtig om ‘n sub art (2) bevel te maak.

[12] Ten einde te slaag met ‘n eis kragtens art 36(1) moet ‘n aansoeker, in hierdie geval die appellant, bewys dat:

(a) hy ‘n lid is van die BK;

(b) die respondent ‘n lid is van die BK; en

(c) dat gronde vir die toestaan van die bevel bestaan.

[13] Alhoewel Jan meestal ontken dat Irene ‘n lid is van die BK, maak hy staat op art 36. Ek moet dus aanvaar dat sy inderdaad ‘n lid van die BK is al het sy in gebreke gebly om sommige van haar verpligtinge teenoor Jan na te kom. Die afstanddoening van regte word nie sonder meer aanvaar nie. Daar is geen bewys hiervan nie. Trouens selfs in Jan se prokureur se brief van 21 Oktober noem hy dat Irene te kenne gegee het dat sy sal bedank indien bevredigende reelings getref kan word.

[14] Klaarblyklik was Gura R van mening dat Jan, waarskynlik op die gronde genoem in paragraaf (b) geregtig was op oordrag van Irene se ledebelang. Ek sou eerder bevind het dat dit reg en billik sou wees om Irene se ledebelang aan Jan oor te dra dws art 36(1)(d). Mnr Scheepers, wat vir Irene verskyn het tydens die appèl, het toegegee dat die aansoek op grond (d) gevestig kon word.

[15] Gura R het voorts ‘n diskresie om die moontlikheid van ‘n vergoedingsbevel kragtens art 36(2) te maak, uitgeoefen. Hy het die omstandighede ondersoek ten einde ‘n billike bevel te maak, maar tot die slotsom geraak dat:

“[27] It is rather with an air of disbelief to read that Jan offers Irene R2 250-00 as compensation being half of the maximum profit of the business per month as at July 2003. Jan provides no information pertaining to the financial affairs of the CC since July 2003 up to the date of this application. He cleverly accepts a rough estimation by Irene of the average profit of the business as at July 2003. For Jan to adopt this attitude is in my in view tantamount to playing hide and seek with this Court. Why is he playing his cards close to his chest? Surely, he has the information regarding the performance of the business. He is there everyday. Where are the financial statements of the CC? He has successfully avoided making a full disclosure to this Court about the financial affairs of the CC.

[28] Section 36 of the Act clearly confers a wide discretion on the Court but such discretion can only be exercised if there is sufficient information before the Court to enable it to decide whether or not to make any such orders (De Franca supra at 896G-H). On the papers before me, I am unable to exercise my discretion in favour of Jan.”

[16] Gedurende argument het ek gevra of dit aangewese vir die hof a quo sou gewees het om die tweede deel van die teenaansoek na getuienis te verwys.

[17] Dit is duidelik dat die hof a quo nie genoeg inligting gehad het om ‘n vergoedingsbevel te maak nie. Jan het geen inligting voor die hof ten opsigte van al die bates van die BK geplaas nie. Niks word gesê van die voorraad op hande nie. Jan swyg ten opsigte van die huidige waarde van die plaas en die inkomste wat die BK verdien. So ook sy trekking of lone, hoeveel aan Irene se ma terugbetaal is, hoeveel kontant op hande is, ens.

[18] Mnr Pistor het aangevoer dat Gura R te veel gewig aan die waarde van finansieële state geheg het. Ek kan geen fout met die regter se belangstelling in die state of die finansieele inligting vind nie. Hoe anders sou ‘n hof weet wat die waarde van ‘n belang in die BK is?

[19] Mnr Pistor was deeglik hiervan bewus. Hy het ook tereg toegegee dat Jan die bewyslas gedra het om die teenaansoek te bewys. Dit sluit die verpligting in om voldoende inligting voor die hof te plaas.

[20] Dit sou nie moontlik wees om ‘n bevel kragtens art 36(1) te maak en dit aan Irene oorlaat om ‘n dagvaarding uit te reik nie. Die twee stadiums van die aansoek kan nie sonder meer geskei word nie. Ek laat buite rekening of die partye aldus onderling ooreenkom om dit te doen.

[21] Dit sou nie dienstig vir die hof a quo gewees het om die aansoek na getuienis te verwys nie. Jan was immers onwillig om die nodige inligting aan die hof te voorsien. Hy het ook nie, so ver ek kan sien, aansoek om ‘n uitstel om state te laat optrek, gedoen nie. Irene het die teenaansoek geopponeer. Dit is nie die funksie van ‘n hof om inkwisitories in die omstandighede op te tree nie. Die hof kan nie ‘n litigant verplig om ‘n behoorlike en deeglike saak uit te maak nie.

[22] Dit volg dat ek van mening is dat Gura R tereg die teenaansoek van die hand gewys het.

Die likwidasiebevel

Magtiging van BK om likwidasie teen te staan

Die gronde van appel, sover dit die magtiging van die BK opponering van die likwidasie aansoek aanbetref, lees soos volg:

[23] 1. The Honourable Judge erred in law by finding (in paragraph 17 of the judgement) that the Second Respondent does not have locus stand i to oppose, on behalf of the First Respondent close corporation, the application for liquidation without a resolution by the First Respondent authorising the Second Respondent to oppose such application on behalf of the First Respondent. The learned judge should in this regard have found:

1.1 That by virtue of the fiduciary relationship in which the Second Respondent stands to the close corporation, the Second Respondent is in the circumstances of this case entitled and empowered to oppose the application for liquidation of the close corporation on behalf of the close corporation without a resolution of the close corporation.

1.2 In the alternative to (a) above, that in any event and in so far as a resolution of the close corporation was necessary, the decision of the Second Respondent, taken for and on behalf of the close corporation, should be considered as a resolution of the close corporation since the Applicant has abandoned the close corporation:

[24] Gura R het op art 42 van die wet staat gemaak en besluit dat enige lid van ‘n BK verplig is om die belange van die BK te verdedig. Hy het egter besluit dat Jan ‘n (skriftelike) besluit moet verkry om die BK die aansoek te opponeer.

[25] Ek twyfel of dit nodig is om ‘n besluit aan te heg. Maar waar twee lede van ‘n BK nie kan besluit oor die toekoms van die BK nie is dit moeilik om te verstaan waarom die besluit van een lid die ander moet oorheers. Dit toon immers dat daar ‘n ernstige probleem bestaan wat kan, en in die geval wel, aanleiding gegee het tot die aansoek om likwidasie.

[26] Daarbenewens het die repudiasie van ‘n samewerkingsooreenkoms nie die uitwerking dat die lid wat kontrakbreuk pleeg, sy lidmaatskap net so verbeur nie. Dit kan egter aanleiding gee tot so ‘n aansoek. Ek het reeds hiermee gehandel.

[27] Ek is van mening dat die maatskappy, verteenwoordig deur Jan, nie geregtig was om die aansoek om likwidasie aansoek teen te staan nie. Jan sou egter wel in sy persoonlike hoedanigheid kon optree.

Gronde vir likwidasie

Die gronde van appél lees soos volg:

5. The Learned Judge erred by equating (in paragraph 33 of the judgment) the termination of the love relationship between the parties to the disappearance of the basis for the existence of the close corporation.

6. The Learned Judge erred in law and on fact by failing (in inter alia paragraph 35 of the judgment) to distinguish between the Applicants love relationship for the Second Respondent and her obligations as a party to a contract. In this regard the Honourable Court should have found:

6.1 That the Applicant was contractually bound by the terms of her oral agreement (referred to in paragraph 3(a) above).

6.2 That she wrongfully repudiated the said agreement.

6.3 That she, as any other contracting party in such circumstances, might be liable for damages in contract.

7. The Learned Judge failed to take into account, alternatively failed to properly take into account, facts on the strength of which an order of liquidation should have been refused and in particular did the Learned Judge fail to take into account:

7.1 That a substantial period of time (approximately 1 year) has lapsed before the Applicant brought the application for liquidation.

7.2 That during the said period:

7.2.1 The Second Respondent proceeded to conduct the business in the name of the company;

7.2.2 The Applicant made no contribution in respect of labour, know how or otherwise in respect of the business.

7.2.3 A liquidation (having the effect of an equal distribution of whatever net assets there might be found to be) would therefore in the circumstances be unfair to the Second Respondent and to the Close Corporation.

8. The Learned Judge erred in making a costs order against the Second Respondent. The Learned Judge should have made an appropriate costs order against the Applicant.”

[28] Gura R het bevind dat die substratum van die besigheid weggeval het. Met respek verskil ek van hom op die aspek. Die substratum van die besigheid het nie weggeval nie. Die verhouding het egter beslis skipbreuk gely. Die partye kommunikeer nie met mekaar nie. Irene stel geensins belang om met die besigheid voort te gaan nie. Die lede kan nie saamstem of die BK gelikwideer moet word of nie. Jan weier om voldoende inligting te verskaf om haar belang oor te neem. Jan het die aangewese oplossing (die uitkoop van haar belang) laat misluk. Alles dui dus aan dat dit reg en billik sal wees om die BK te likwideer.

[29] Het Irene ‘n saak uitgemaak vir die likwidasie van die beslote korporasie?

[30] Dit is gemenesaak dat die enigste gronde waarop Irene staatmaak vir die likwidasie van die BK is dat, ooreenkomstig art 344 van die Maatskappywet 61 van 1973 gelees met art 66 van die Wet op Beslote Korporasies 69 van 1984, dit reg en billik is om die BK te likwideer.

[31] Jali R het hom in Kanakia v Ritzshelf (supra) op 45 die volgende gesê:

“In interpreting the just and equitable ground as stipulated in s 344(h) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 (and s 111(g) of the Companies Act 46 of 1926), the Courts have concluded that the phrase postulates a conclusion of law for the winding-up, namely justice and equity (see Moosa NO v Mavjee Bhawan (Pty) Ltd and Another 1967 (3) SA 131 (T) at 136G-H and City Crushers Ltd v Central Crusher Supplies Ltd 1933 TPD 111). Various Courts have endeavoured to define what might be regarded as just and equitable grounds to wind up a company. It is clear that the grounds which would justify the dissolution of a partnership would also justify a winding-up order under the 'just and equitable' provisions of the Companies Act (see Lawrence v Lawrich Motors (Pty) Ltd 1948 (2) SA 1029 (W) at 1032 and the authorities quoted therein). Similarly, as the wording of the Companies Act is the same as that of this Act, a similar approach will have to be adopted in dealing with the provisions of s 68(d) of the Act. Thus the views which have been expressed with regard to companies are applicable in respect of close corporations.

In Moosa NO v Mavjee Bhawan (Pty) Ltd (supra) two principles which were said to overlap were identified as the relevant principles for such a winding-up order. In Rand Air (Pty) Ltd v Ray Bester Investments (Pty) Ltd 1985 (2) SA 345 (W) at 350 five broad categories of circumstances in which a Court would grant an order on the ‘just and equitable' grounds were set out to be:

(1) the disappearance of the company's substratum—where the company was formed for a particular purpose for instance and that purpose can no longer be achieved at all;

(2) the illegality of the objects of the company and fraud committed in connection therewith;

(3) a deadlock which results in the management of the company's affairs because the voting power at board and general meeting level is so divided between dissenting groups that there is no way of resolving the deadlock other than by making a winding-up order, for example where there are only two directors or only two shareholders;

(4) grounds analogous to those for the dissolution of partnerships— where the company is a private one and its share capital is held wholly or mainly by the directors and it is in substance a partnership in corporate form, the Court will order its winding up in the same kind of situation that it would order the dissolution of a partnership on the ground that it is 'just and equitable' to do that; and

(5) where there is oppression. Where the persons who control the company have been guilty of oppression towards minority share­holders, a winding-up order in suitable cases may be made.

These are the circumstances in which a company may be liquidated on the 'just and equitable' grounds in our law (see Meskin Henochsberg on the Companies Act vol 1 at 700 (1) 706). This is not a final or complete list of circumstances; it is open to courts to identify other circumstances or devise other categories in future (see also Erasmus v Pentamed Investments (Pty) Ltd 1982 (1) SA 178 (W) at 181B-185E and Pienaar v Thusano Foundation and Another 1992 (2) SA 552 (BD) at 581).”

[32] Gura R het die betekenis van die frase ondersoek. Onder andere sal dit reg en billik wees indien die substratum vir die bestaan van die BK verdwyn het. Gura R het bevind dat die substratum vir die bestaan van die beslote korporasie verdwyn het. Alhoewel hy dit nie in soveel woorde sê nie, was Gura R van mening dat alhoewel die besigheidsrede vir die BK nog bestaan, was hy van mening dat hy geregtig was om die onderliggende rede vir die stigting van die BK te ondersoek. Die BK is deur die partye gestig om besigheid te dryf ten einde ‘n bestaan te maak as getroude paar. Dit kom my voor dat Gura R egter die beëindiging van die liefdesverhouing as die verdwyning van die substratum beskou het.

[33] Dit is nie vir my nodig om my hieroor uit te spreek nie. Die verdwyning van die substratum is bloot een faktor wat kan lei tot die gevolgtrekking dat dit reg en billik is om die BK te likwideer.

[34] Myns insiens toon die volgende faktore dat dit reg en billik is om die BK tot niet te maak:

(a) Die gesamentlike stigting van die BK was aangegaan sodat die partye as getroude paartjie ‘n besigheid kon bedryf ten einde ‘n inkomste te verdien;

2. Die verhouding het ongelukkig tot ‘n einde gekom;

2. Die partye praat nie meer met mekaar nie;

2. Die partye kan nie gesamentlike besluite neem nie.

2. Alhowel dit dienstig sou gewees het om Irene se belang

teen ‘n redelike vergoeding aan Jan oor te dra, het Jan se gebrek aan sameweking en sy versuim om die hof a quo van voldoende inligting te voorsien die opsie gekelder.

2. Terwyl sy nog lid is van die BK loop Irene die risiko dat sy

dalk vir die skulde van die onderneming verantwoordelik sal wees.

[35] Dit is betoog dat Irene die hof met “vuil hande” genader het omdat sy die verhouding tot ‘n einde gemaak het of ten minste nie aan die samewerkingsooreenkoms voldoen het nie. Ek meen egter dat Gura R heeltemal korrek in sy benadering is dat waar iemand nie meer ‘n ander lief het nie dit nie gesê kan word dat sy dus eensydiglik verantwoordelik is vir die mislukking van die besigheidsverhouding nie. Daarbenewens moet die aansoek vir likwidasie op gronde van reg en billikheid beoordeel word. Hierdie is ‘n wyer begrip as kontraktereg en dit kan ‘n situasie insluit waar een party kontrakbreuk teenoor die ander gepleeg het.

[36] Joubert, LAWSA, Vol 4, eerste hersiene uitgawe, deel 3, para 112 se:

“Abuse of process: The court has an inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of its process, and even where a ground for winding-up is established, the court will not grant a winding-up order where the sole or predominant purpose of the applicant is not to bring about the company's liquidation for its own sake (that is to achieve a concursus creditorum and a distribution of its assets by a liquidator), but is mala fide and with an ulterior or improper purpose, or to harass or oppress the company or fraudu­lently to defeat its rights. In pursuance of its inherent right to prevent an abuse of its process, the court may grant an interdict restraining a person from bringing or proceeding with, or dismiss, an application for the winding-up of a company if that application is or would be an abuse of the process of the court.”

[37] Irene is nie besig om die proses van die hof te misbruik nie. Jan wil die BK behou as enigste lid ten spyte van Irene se bydrae en sonder om billike vergoeding aan te bied.

[38] Myns insiens moet die appèl van die hand gewys word met koste.

______________

A A LANDMAN

REGTER VAN DIE HOOGGEREGSHOF

Ek stem saam

______________

R D HENDRICKS

REGTER VAN DIE HOOGGEREGSHOF

Ek stem saam

_____________

S R MONALEDI

WAARNEMENDE REGTER VAN DIE HOOGGEREGSHOF

VERSKYNING:

VERHOORDATUM: 2 SEPTEMBER 2005

UITSPRAAKDATUM: 28 OKTOBER 2005

VIR APPELLANT: ADV JH PISTOR

PROKUREURS VIR APPELLANT: GERHARD MAREE

VIR RESPONDENT: ADV JHL SCHEEPERS

PROKUREURS VIR RESPONDENT: VAN ROOYEN, VAN TLHAPI &WESSELS

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