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[2007] ZAGPHC 33
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Gerotek Test Facilities (formerly known as Gerotek Test Facilities (Pty) Ltd, a division of Armscor Business (Pty) Ltd v New Generation Ammunition (Pty) Ltd (31225/2004) [2007] ZAGPHC 33 (19 April 2007)
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IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA (TRANSVAAL PROVINCIAL
DIVISION)
NOT
REPORTABLE CASE NO: 31225/2004
DATE: 19/4/2007
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In
the matter between: GEROTEK
TEST FACiliTIES (formerly known as GEROTEK TEST FACILITIES (PTY)
LTD, a division of ARMSCOR BUSINESS (PTY) LTD
Applicant
and
NEW
GENERATION AMMUNITION (PTY) LTD
Respondent
JUDGMENT
LEDWABA. J
2
[1]
Applicant
sought an order against the respondent for payment
of
an amount of R 376 576,20 plus interest and costs.
[2]
The
brief backdrop of the matter is as follows:
2.1.
On 4th October 1999 Gerotek Test Facilities (Pty) Ltd
leased immovable property to
respondent in terms a
written
lease agreement. The monthly rental for the initial
period
was R 14 4000, 00 (excluding VAT) and would
escalate
by 10% per year. The lease was for one year
with
effect from 1st October
1999 - 30th September 2000.
The
respondent had the option to renew the lease from
time
to time for a further period of one year "upon terms
and
conditions to be agreed" between the parties. The
option
to renew the lease had to be in writing at least
three
months prior to the termination of the lease.
2.2.
The
respondent renewed the lease from time to time untiI 30th September
2003. The rental payable agreed upon
for
the period 1st
October
2002 -
30th September 2003
was
R 25 410,00 per month.
3
2.3.
On 13th May 2003 the lessor notified the respondent in
writing,
that the lease would terminate on 30th September
2003
because it required to use the leased premises for
it's
own requirements.
2.4.
1st July
2003 lessor concluded a written agreement with
Armscor
Business (Pty) Ltd (applicant) in terms of which it
sold
its business with effect from 31st March 2003. The
ownership
of the
leased
premises
was
officially
transferred
to applicant on 27th June 2003.
2.5.
In October 2003 applicant instituted an action against the
respondent
in the Magistrate's court of Pretoria for
payment
of arrear rental for September 2003 and for an
eviction
order against the respondent.
2.6.
In November 2004 applicant launched an application
wherein
an order of eviction and payment of an amount of
4
R 385 993, 01 which was amended to an
amount of
R
376 576, 00 was sought.
2.7.
The respondent raised a point that the application should
not
be adjudicated in the High court because the matter
was
lis pendens in the Magistrate court.
2.8.
The learned judge in hearing the application dismissed
the
application with costs.
2.9.
Applicant appealed against the decision to the full
bench
of this court which made the following order:
"1.
The
appeal succeeds only to the extent that the
order
of the court a quo is altered by replacing it
with
the following:
"(a)
The hearing of the application is postponed
until
judgment is given in the action between
the
parties under case nor 124750/03 in the
magistrate's
court at Pretoria.
5
(b)
The
applicant is ordered to pay the
respondent's
costs of suit."
2.
The
appellant is ordered to pay the respondent's
costs
of appeal."
2.10
The magistrate's court has now finalised the action
between
the parties and the magistrate made the
following
order:
"1.
Die
huur interdik word bekragtig;
2.
Die
verweerder word gelas om die perseel te
ontruim
voor
of
op 27 September 2005, by
gebreke
waarvan
die Balju gemagtig word
om
alle redelike stappe te neem en ten einde
die
uitsetting van die Verweerder vanuit die perseel
te
Elandsfontein te bewerkstellig;
3.
Die
Verweerder word gelas om die bedrag van
6
R
29 691. 77 aan die Eiser te betaal;
4.
Die
Verweerder word gelas om rente op die
voormelde
bedrag te betaal teen 'n koers van
15.50%
bereken vanaf 1 Augustus 2003 tot op
datum
van volle en finale vereffening;
5.
Die
Verweerder word gelas om die Eiser se koste
van
die aksie te betaal op prokureur en klient
skaal,
welke koste insluit die verhoogde koste
van
Advokaat ooreenkomstig die parameters
van
die Pretoria Vereniging van Advokate,
binne
die
diskresie van die Takseer Meester, welke koste
onmiddellik
takseerbaar en betaalbaar is."
2.11
The respondent vacated the premises at the end of
October
2004. Hence, the applicant is now only claiming
the
amount of R 376 576.00 and is not pursuing the
eviction
order
[4]
[5]
7
[3]
The applicant's counsel,
Mr J. F Grobler, submitted that the
claim
for the amount of R376 576,00 is the aggregate of the
damages
suffered by the applicant for the occupation of
the property by
the respondent for thirteen months, (1st
October
2003
- 31st October 2004), at a rental of R25 410. 00 (plus
VAT).
He submitted further that the rental amount of R25 410.
00
is based on the rental that was agreed upon between the lessor
and respondent for the period 1st October
2002: - 30th
September
2003.
Advocate
J.F. Grobler further submitted that applicant is entitled
to
be compensated for the occupation of the property by the
respondent
for the aforesaid period. He described this as a
claim
for damages for the so-called "holding over" because the
lease
expired and there was no further lease agreement
between
the parties. Mr Grobler referred me to Nedcor Bank
Limited
v Withinshaw Properties (Pty) Ltd 2002
(6)
SA
236.(Nedcor
Bank case) to support his submission for claiming
arrear
rentals
I
interpose to state that the locus standi of the applicant was
raised
in the Magistrate court action and the magistrate found
[7]
8
that
the applicant had locus standi to institute an action against
the
respondent. The question of locus standi is not an issue
before
me.
[6]
Respondent's
counsel, advocate N C Maritz, submitted that, on
the
papers, the applicant did make out a case to claim
damages
on the basis of unjust enrichment, as applicant
alleged
in its papers, because the essential requirement for
showing
that respondent has been enriched and that applicant
has
been impoverished were not proved.
See:
Brooklyn House Furnishers (Pty) Ltd v Knoetze and
Sons
1970 (3) SA 264 (A).
Advocate
N C Maritz further submitted, correctly in my view,
that
if the leased property was not restored timeously the
damages
that the applicant may recovered, if proved, are
(i)
the
value of the use and enjoyment of the premises for
the
period 1st October
2002 and 31st October
2003,
(ii)
what
the applicant had to disburse and
(iii)
it's
loss of profit
9
[8]
He
submitted further, that the applicant's claim is for the breach
of
the respondent to vacate the property, now since applicant is
claiming
damages, it should have proceeded by way of action
instead
of motion proceedings. Of significance was that
applicant
did not prove it's damages. Therefore application had
to
be dismissed with costs.
[9]
In
this case, it is abundantly clear that the lease terminated on 30th
September 2000, there was no agreement between the
parties
that the respondent should occupy the property and
respondent
remained in occupation of the property until
October
2004.
[10]
The respondent in an attempt to overcome his, in my view
insurmountable,
difficulties gave various reasons why it could
not
vacate the property. However, the issue of eviction is no
more
material since the magistrate has adjudicated on it.
[11]
Regarding the issue raised by Advocate N. C. Maritz, that the
applicant
in a matter of this nature, should have proceeded by
10
way
of action, in Room Hire Co.
(Pty) Ltd v Jeppe Street
Mansion
(Pty) Ltd 1945 (3) SA 1155 (T) at 116,
it was stated
that:
(1)
There
are certain matters in which, by statute, motion
proceedings
should be used,
(2)
There
are certain types of cases where motion
proceedings
are not permitted.
(3)
Between
the two extremes, however, there is a choice
between
motion proceedings and action proceedings
depends
on whether there is or is not a real material
dispute
of facts between the parties.
[12]
Advocate Grobler submitted, correctly in my view, that there are
no
material disputes of facts in this application.
However,
where
no dispute of fact exists and damages are claimed for
breach
of obligation to vacate the premises it is not appropriate,
in
my view, to proceed by way of motion proceedings.
11
See:
Estate Behr v Mactch 1924 CPD
[13] In the Nedcor
Bank case, Van Zyl J clearly referred to the
relevant
cases and the law relevant to cases involving matters
where
a lessee failed to vacate the property and the lessor
claimed
some damage or rental. On page 251 paragraph 45,
the
learned judge stated that:
"...
The
fundamental criticism has been that, if a
lease
agreement
has been terminated by cancellation or otherwise,
the
rights and obligations attaching thereto are terminated.The
lessor
cannot claim arrear rent from the lessee should_he
remain
in occupation of the premises after such termination.
This
would, it is suggested by A J Kerr 'Incompatible Remedies
for
Breach of
Contract:
Is Lease a
Special
Case?
in
(1973) 90
SALJ
229-33 at 229, constitute 'a radical
departure from the
general
rule that an aggrieved party cannot both cancel a
contract
and sue for specific performance'. See in this regard
Custom
Credit Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Shembe 1972 (3) SA
462
(A) at 469G-H. His
remedy would under
norma1
12
circumstances.
Kerr opines. be directed at damages for breach
of
contract. " (own underlining)
[14]
Van Zyl J correctly stated that in matters where the lessee
occupied
the property without the consent of the lessor that
constitutes
unlawful 'holding over'. Where there is unlawful
'holding
over' and the agreement has been terminated by
cancellation
or otherwise the lessor is entitled to claim damages
and
not damages and arrear rental.
[15]
Mynhardt
J in the full bench judgement when the aforesaid
order
of Pretorius AJ, as she then was, was appealed against,
commented
as follows:
"I
am equally unimpressed by the predicament in which the
applicant
found itself. If needs be, the applicant could have
hired
suitable storage space for its records. It did not allege that
it
endeavoured to do so but could find none. The rentals that
it
would
have had to pay, and other expenses that it would have
had
to incur, could have been recovered from the respondent
as
damages arising from the respondent's breach of contract to
13
make the premises available
to the appellant as from 1
October
2003."
[16]
I fully agree with the comment since it is relevant in the
adjudication
of the matter before me.
[17]
Advocate Grobler further referred me to the last paragraph on
pages
14 - 15 of paragraph 12 of the judgement of
Mynhardt J..1
where
the learned judge said:
"In
paragraph 14.5 of the founding affidavit the deponent stated,
rightly
in my view, that the appellant "is entitled to be
compensated
for the said occupation on the basis of unjust
enrichment/damages
in the amount of at least R330 330,00"
[18]
In my view, Mynhardt J, did not make a finding that the
applicant
is entitled to proceed by motion proceedings. The
learned
judge expressed, in my view, that the applicant is
entitled
to be compensated for the damages it suffered.
14
[19]
In this case, it is my respectful view, that the applicant is
entitled
to damages instead of the recovery of rental.
[20]
The other factor to be considered is that the written lease
agreement
stated that the lease was to be upon "terms and
conditions"
to be agreed upon by the parties.
[21]
It is clear from the papers that the rental amount of R 25 410.00
per
month claimed by the applicant is not the correct amount if
the
rental amount of R 14 400. 00 (excluding VAT) in the
original
written lease agreement is used as the basis to
calculate
the annual 10% escalated from 10 October 2000, the
rental
would have been as follows:
R
15 840. 00 (excluding Vat) for the period- 1 October
2000
- 30 September 2001
R
17 424. 00 (excluding Vat) for the period - 1 October
2001 -
30 September 2002
R
19 166. 40 (excluding Vat) for the period - 1 October
2002
- 30 September 2003 and
15
R
21 083. 04 (excluding Vat) for the period - 1 October
2003
- 30
September 2004
[22]
The above calculations are an illustration that the rental or
damages
cannot be merely assumed by the amount that should
be
agreed upon by the parties. The above figures, further show,
that somewhere during the lease the
parties agreed on a
certain
amount for the rent, they did not merely use the annual
10%
escalation formula.
[23]
Using the above mentioned formula of 10% annual escalation,
the
amount to be claimed if the arrear rentals are calculated for
thirteen
months amounts to R 27 4079. 52
(excluding VAT)
which
would still be less than the amount the applicant is
now
claiming
even if the VAT is added to it.
[24]
The above clearly shows how important is it that in claims for
damages
proceedings should be by way of action instead of
motion
proceedings.
16
[25]
On the papers the applicant did not prove the claim. There are
no
affidavits to confirm the value of the use and enjoyment or
the
market value thereof.
[26]
The fact that respondent in the answering affidavit stated that if
it
made provision for the security of 'rental' does not, in my
view,
assist the applicant to prove its damages. the onus is on
the
applicant to prove the damages it suffered. The claim
should
have proceeded by action proceedings in my view.
[27]
I therefore, make the following order:
The
applicant's application is dismissed with costs.
A.
P: LEDWABA JUDGE OF
THE HIGH COURT