THE FINANCIAL SERVICES TRIBUNAL

Case No. PFA71/2023

In the matter between:

DIAMOND RAMABELE RAPUDI	APPLICANT

and

CAXTON NEWSPAPERS DISTRIBUTORS	FIRST RESPONDENT 

HORTORS PROVIDENT FUND	SECOND RESPONDENT

PERSKOR PROVIDENT FUND	THIRD RESPONDENT

THE PENSION FUNDS ADJUDICATOR	FOURTH RESPONDENT

Summary: Reconsideration of a decision of the Pension Funds Adjudicator (30M) in terms of Section 230 of the Financial Sector Regulation Act 9 of 2017 ("the FSRA").

DECISION

INTRODUCTION

1.	The Applicant is Diamond Ramabele Rapudi, who, until 2012, was employed by the First Respondent.

2.	The First Respondent is Caxton Newspaper Distributors.

3.	The Second Respondent is the Hortors Provident Fund.

4.	The Third Respondent is the Peskor Provident Fund.

5.	The Fourth Respondent is the Pension Funds Adjudicator ("the Adjudicator"), the statutory ombud as defined in section 1(1) of the FSRA and is established in terms of the Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956 ("the PFA")

6.	This is an application in terms of Section 230 of the Financial Sector Regulation Act 9 of 2017 against the decision taken by the Adjudicator in terms of Section 30M of the PFA.

7.	The parties have waived their right to a formal hearing, and this is the Tribunal's decision.

8.	Section 230 of the Financial Sector Regulation Act 9 of 2017 ("the FSR Act") provides the basis for an appropriate Applicant to lodge an application for reconsideration and seek appropriate relief.

THE FACTS

9.	This is an application for the reconsideration of the Adjudicator's decision indicating her refusal to entertain the Applicant's complaint lodged on the 21st of June 2023 due to it being time-barred.

10.	The Applicant's employment terminated in 2012, and the complaint relating to the quantum of his withdrawal benefit was made to the Fourth Respondent 11 years later. The Applicant attempted to set out reasons for his delay, which, while challenging to follow, are irrelevant in the light of the peremptory provisions of Section 30I of the PFA.

LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATION TO THE FACTS

11.	Section 30I of the PFA provides as follows:

12.	As foreshadowed above, the language of Section 30I of the PFA is couched in peremptory terms. Put differently, the Adjudicator does not have a discretion that it can exercise if it is provided with facts that may convince it to overlook the three-year time limit for the lodging of complaints. The only factors that would extend the three-year time limit would be factors that would have interrupted prescription from running.

13.	The reference to the Prescription Act No 68 of 1969 does not assist the Applicant as it provides as follows:

14.	The Applicant stated the reason for the 11-year delay as follows: "…I was confused, and did not know office of pension fund adjudicators, that's why I made unclaimed benefits after 10 years…"

15.	The Applicant's excuse is not enough to interrupt the running of prescription, and he was in a position to have lodged his complaint within the three-year period, which would have commenced at the end of May 2012.

CONCLUSION

16.	The Applicant has failed to make out a case for interfering with the Adjudicator's determination.

ORDER

(a)	The application is dismissed.

Signed on behalf of the Tribunal on 13 December 2023.

PJ Veldhuizen (member of the Tribunal)
o.b.o. self and
LTC Harms (deputy chair)