FORM A
	  FILING SHEET FOR EASTERN CAPE JUDGMENT

							ECJ NO:  027/2006

PARTIES: LYNNE ANN VAN WYK(born MOUTON) and GERRIT CHRISTIAN BURGGRAF VAN WYK

REFERENCE NUMBERS –
•	Registrar:  136/05   

DATE HEARD:  27 FEBRUARY 2006  
DATE DELIVERED:  04 APRIL 2006  

JUDGE(S):  JONES J 

LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES –
Appearances:
•	for the State/Applicant(s)Appellant(s):  L SCHUBART
•	for the accused/respondent(s):   E HEYNEKE

Instructing attorneys:
•	Applicant(s)/Appellant(s): GOLDBERG & DE VILLIERS    
•	Respondent(s):  GREYVENSTEINS NORTIER  

Possibly reportable

In the High Court of South Africa
(South Eastern Cape Local Division)			Case No 136/2005
								Delivered:  04/04/06
In the matter between

LYNNE ANN VAN WYK (born MOUTON)		Plaintiff
and 
GERRIT CHRISTIAN BURGGRAF VAN WYK		Defendant

SUMMARY:	Divorce – maintenance – whether plaintiff wife entitled to permanent maintenance or rehabilitative maintenance for a fixed period – amount of maintenance for wife and child – factors to be taken into account.

JUDGMENT

JONES J:

[1]	The plaintiff and the defendant were married to each other by antenuptial contract on 23 February 1991. They have one minor child, a son, who was born on 3 April 1992. They lived most of their married life together in Port Elizabeth. After a brief sojourn in Johannesburg they relocated to Canada in 2003 where the defendant is presently employed as a specialist urologist. Unhappy differences have arisen between them with the result that they separated. The plaintiff returned to Port Elizabeth. She issued summons against the defendant, claiming a decree of divorce and certain ancillary relief. The defendant in turn counterclaimed for a decree of divorce and ancillary relief.

[2]	By the time the parties came to trial in February 2006 they had resolved most of the issues between them. They both gave evidence that they have no prospects of successfully resuming married life together. They have agreed that the accrual in the defendant’s estate is larger than that of the plaintiff’s, and that the defendant should be ordered to transfer to the plaintiff half of the difference, represented by the equity in the house in Canada, as a division of the family assets in terms of section 3 of the Matrimonial Property Act No 88 of 1984. In order to settle this part of the claim, the defendant has offered to pay an amount of R250 000-00 to the plaintiff. She has not accepted.

[3]	The plaintiff has also claimed maintenance for herself in the sum of R17 000-00 per month. The defendant has denied that she is entitled to maintenance until her death or remarriage, but concedes that she is entitled to rehabilitative maintenance for a limited period. In this regard, he has made an offer
(i)	to pay her R600 000-00 at a rate of R10 000-00 per month for 5 years as rehabilitative maintenance;
(ii)	to make over to her the full proceeds of his South African retirement annuity policies, with an estimated present value of R450 000-00, as and when they become payable.
The plaintiff has rejected this offer. But it remains open. The defendant consents to an order in those terms if I conclude that she should have rehabilitative maintenance for a limited period of 5 years and if I consider the amount appropriate.

[4]	In respect of the child, now 13 years old, the parties accept that it is in his best interests that he be placed in the custody of the plaintiff subject to agreed access. The defendant has offered to pay R5 000-00 per month towards his maintenance. The plaintiff has not accepted this offer either. She claims R10 000-00 per month.

[5]	The issues between the parties are set out in Exhibit B, a list of admissions and agreements. They are
(i)	whether the plaintiff is entitled to permanent maintenance or rehabilitative maintenance only;
(ii)	the amount of her maintenance, whether it be rehabilitative or permanent;
(iii)	the amount of maintenance for the minor child.

[6]	The issue of a spouse’s maintenance after divorce is regulated by section 7 of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979, which sets out the considerations to be taken into account in making maintenance orders. Section 7(2) reads:
‘. . . the court may, having regard to the existing or prospective means of each of the parties, their respective earning capacities, financial needs and obligations, the age of each of the parties, the duration of the marriage, the standard of living of the parties prior to the divorce, their conduct in so far as it may be relevant to the break-down of the marriage, an order in terms of subsection (3) and any other factor which in the opinion of the court should be taken into account, make an order which the court finds just in respect of the payment of maintenance by the one party to the other for any period until the death or remarriage of the party in whose favour the order is given, whichever event may first occur.’

A proper application of the section involves a balanced assessment of maintenance needs and ability to pay. On the facts of this case the parties have very properly not suggested that the conduct of the parties in relation to the breakdown of the marriage is relevant to the maintenance issue in this case. But the other considerations listed in the section are all to be taken into account. The starting point is the existing and prospective means of the plaintiff and her earning capacity, because, if she has the ability to support herself, she is not entitled to maintenance from the defendant.

[7]	The plaintiff’s case is that she is unable to maintain herself and will remain so. Her assets are insufficient to provide enough income for her needs, and she will not be able to supplement it sufficiently from employment or any other source. As I have said, her pleadings make claims for R17 000-00 per month for herself and R10 000-00 per month for the child. The claims are allegedly based upon the standard of living enjoyed by the parties before their separation. She did not lead evidence to support the claim for R17 000-00 per month for herself. Her evidence was that her actual expenses in the past year average out to R20 000-00 per month for her and the child. She gave a detailed account of how this amount is made up, which is summarized in a list of monthly expenses, Exhibit E. Counsel argued that of the expenditure of R20 000-00 a month, the actual amount for the child comes to nearly R10 000-00 per month if realistic amounts are allocated to his personal requirements. This argument was based on both the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s evidence. Mr Schubart handed in a schedule Exhibit G showing how he arrived at the figure of R10 000-00 for the child. The logical result of the argument is that the plaintiff requires the balance of her total expenditure of R20 000-00 per month as maintenance for herself. In effect, she and the defendant are ad idem that her monthly requirement is R10 000-00.

[8] 	The plaintiff is 51 years of age. She has been married to the defendant for 15 years. She is not a wealthy woman in her own right. The parties divided their assets when they separated. The plaintiff has used some of the capital. She bought a motor car on her return to South Africa and she used some capital to supplement the defendant’s maintenance payments. She has invested the balance. Her investments are presently worth about R225 000-00. She also has two paid up retirement annuity policies which mature when she turns 60 and 66 years old, with a combined present value of about R166 000-00. In addition, she is entitled to her half of the equity in the house in Canada, which has a current value of $209 000-00 and over which there is a bond of $138 176-00. If the valuation of $209 000-00 is accurate, she will receive half of the balance of nearly $71 000-00 as her share. During the trial, counsel used an exchange rate of just over R5 to the Canadian dollar, which would make her share about R180 000-00. In my view these assets are insufficient to make her self-sufficient. Although I do not have the benefit of calculations by an investment expert, I am satisfied that a sensibly conservative investment of her assets will not produce sufficient income for her maintenance. Even if her assets are increased by the value of the defendant’s South African retirement annuities of R450 000-00, I believe that the prospective income is unlikely to produce an after-tax income of R10 000-00 per month, which is what she says she needs and what he offers to pay, albeit for a limited period only.

 [9.1]	Will the plaintiff be able to support herself from her investments supplemented by income from other sources? The only other source which suggested itself on the evidence was employment. The plaintiff qualified as a medical technologist in microbiology in about 1974 and was employed in that field until she married the defendant in 1991. Since then she has not been employed except, for a while, in the administration of his medical practice.

[9.2]	Does this make her readily employable? The plaintiff is well qualified, with a technicon diploma in a highly specialized technical field. But she has not practiced her speciality for 15 years. She is no longer young. She has not kept up to date. According to the evidence there are presently no vacancies in the medical laboratories in Port Elizabeth, and if employment should become available the present employment policy is to give preference to more recently qualified persons who satisfy affirmative action criteria. An expert witness in employment and employability, Mr Williams, expressed the opinion that it is doubtful that she will be able to find work in her chosen field. I think that this opinion is sound. Even if she were to update her qualifications, she is at a significant disadvantage. The suggestion in cross-examination that she relocate to other cities where there may perhaps be greater employment opportunities for her is not in my view practicable or reasonable. The result is that while employment in future as a medical technologist cannot be excluded, the likelihood is that she will have to seek other kinds of employment.

[9.3]	Other kinds of employment and other sources of income were indeed suggested to her in cross-examination – that she qualify herself in other fields, for example, as an estate agent, or that she start her own business. These are not realistic suggestions if regard is had to her age and her lack of experience. But this is not to say that she is totally unemployable. She impresses as an intelligent, presentable and resourceful woman who has much to offer to prospective employers. She has experience in running a medical practice, and also has contacts in the medical world which gives her an advantage. The evidence of both parties, supplemented by the expert evidence of Mr Williams, leads me to conclude that there is a probability that she will be able to find some form of gainful employment in the future. Mr Schubart acknowledged in the course of his argument on her behalf that I should build into my conclusions the probability that she will be able to earn a small salary – perhaps R4 000-00 per month – as a contribution towards her maintenance, and that it will not be unjust to her to reduce the amount of monthly maintenance payments by that amount to make proper allowance for her earning capacity.

[9.4]	The result is that I am satisfied that an award of rehabilitative maintenance for the five year period offered by the defendant is not adequate for the plaintiff’s future maintenance requirements. On the evidence presently before me she will require maintenance until her death or remarriage. I have come to this conclusion with a measure of reluctance. There is much to be said in a case such as this for achieving a clean break between the parties. This is normally only possible, in a case of spouses of mature age, where there are assets of sufficient worth to enable both parties to be self-sufficient if the assets are divided. That is not the position here. As it is, the defendant’s offer of rehabilitative maintenance for 5 years plus the retirement annuities acknowledges that there cannot be a clean break with immediate effect. The upshot is that the parties must remain tied to each other on a monthly basis by a maintenance order, and the plaintiff will have to accept the concomitant risk of her maintenance payments ceasing if the defendant should meet an untimely death. It will, of course, be different if circumstances change to the extent that they are in a position to negotiate a clean break settlement. In that event it will be in both of their interests to vary the maintenance order that I must now make.

[10] 	It is now necessary to return to the amount of maintenance. Section 7(2) does not confer upon the plaintiff a right to maintenance. Like its predecessor, section 10 of the Matrimonial Affairs Act 37 of 1953, it gives the court a discretion to award her maintenance in an amount which is just. The underlying consideration is fairness to both parties. After the plaintiff returned to South Africa the defendant sent her $2 000-00 – a little more than R10 000-00 – each month for maintenance for his wife and child. The plaintiff’s evidence is that this was insufficient to maintain them at the level at which they were accustomed. During the year immediately preceding the trial she spent R20 000-00 per month for their ordinary living, of which nearly R10 000-00 was for the child. In her view this fairly represents their current maintenance requirements. The expenditure is summarized in the list Exhibit E. I have given careful consideration to the contents of this list and to the level at which the plaintiff thinks she should be maintained. I have come to the conclusion that her evidence is not acceptable. This is not to say that I think she is being untruthful. On the contrary, both she and the defendant were credible witnesses. Where they differed it was because they view their marriage, its breakdown, and the issues now arising between them from their own perspective, which is understandable. But neither of them has given deliberately untruthful evidence. I accept that the plaintiff spent what she says she spent and that her evidence accurately reflects her views on what she was entitled to spend. But she is wrong about the standard of living of the parties and she has confused her wants with her needs, with the result that her claims are inflated.

[11]	I am satisfied from an objective view of the evidence of both parties that they did not enjoy a luxurious standard of living when they lived together. They were able to afford a nice home in a good area and expensive motor cars, though not always new models. They went on holiday overseas, but this was combined with attendance at medical conferences and the like. Their lifestyle was that of normal, fairly well-to-do middle class South Africans. It is clear from all the evidence that the defendant did not earn enough to be able to accumulate considerable assets. He explained that as time went by he found it more difficult to make ends meet. More urologists opened up practices in Port Elizabeth and he had to share with them a patient base able to pay proper fees which had shrunk over the years from 13% to 9% of patients. Eventually he stopped private practice and took employment in Johannesburg, at the same time exploring employment opportunities overseas. He then decided to take a salaried job in Canada. This is not conduct consistent with an earning capacity which enabled the parties to spend what they liked when they liked.

[12]	Furthermore, the plaintiff is not entitled to be maintained at the same level after divorce as before. In Kroon v Kroon the point is clearly made.
‘The parties are no doubt aware that in most cases persons who have become divorced will be compelled by necessity to reduce their standards of living, for where the available means of support are not adequate to maintain both according to their former scale of living, each must of necessity scale down his or her budget. In the case of most of us divorce brings a measure of hardship or at least some degree of deprivation. To say that two can live as cheaply as one is not true. The fact of the matter is that two living together can live more cheaply than two living apart, for obvious reasons such as the need for two residences plus rates, maintenance, service charges and all the rest of it; two cars plus the concomitant expenses; two lots of household goods to buy and maintain; and so forth. The problem of "indivisible household expenses" is a real one: see Koch Damages for Lost Income at 194 para 9.6.2 and the examples given in Maasburg v Hunt, Leuchars & Hepburn Ltd 1944 WLD 2 at 15, a damages case. The position is the same in a matrimonial case. The fact that each former spouse now has to pay for things formerly enjoyed in common places a heavier burden on the finances than was formerly the case. It is therefore clear that in most cases both parties will have to reduce their standard of living to some extent. In Louis v Louis 1973 (2) SA 597 (T) at 598 MARGO J points out that the right to alimony after divorce under s 10 (1) of Act 37 of 1953 (now s 7 (2) of Act 70 of 1979), and the quantum of such alimony, are not determined on the same criteria as apply to the case of a wife separated from her husband and entitled to be maintained as his wife (Van Wyk v Van Wyk 1954 (4) SA 594 (W) at 595; Hossack v Hossack 1956 (3) SA 159 (W) at 165; Stone v Stone 1966 (4) SA 98 (C) at 103 - a Full Bench decision; and see the other cases cited by Hahlo in note 45). MARGO J goes on to say that, even though a wife may qualify on divorce for an award of alimony in terms of the Act, it by no means follows that the quantum thereof should be such as to enable her to live to the same standards as she enjoyed during the subsistence of the marriage. It all depends on what is available in the way of means of support.’

[13]	The difference between maintenance wants and needs is also underlined in Kroon v Kroon where Baker J said 
‘What does plaintiff want and what does she need? Wants and needs are two different things. People usually want more than they need’.

Section 7(2) authorizes the court to award maintenance by having regard to the financial needs of the parties, not their wants. I am satisfied from the evidence that many of the items in Exhibit E show that the plaintiff purchased what she wanted when she wanted it, with no real thought to the cost and without considering whether the purchase was needed. She purchased what she wanted on the basis that this was in accordance with her view of an acceptable standard of living, without considering the inevitable changes in lifestyle which must happen on separation and divorce. This is not a proper basis for measuring the amount of future maintenance. An examination of the expenditure in Exhibit E confirms that there was no attempt to make normal domestic economies and that some of her spending was on luxuries. When I consider the quantum of the plaintiff’s maintenance, however, it is not necessary for the purpose of this judgment to go through each item and each corresponding amount on the list because, as I have already pointed out, her evidence amounts to an acceptance of an amount of R10 000-00 for herself, which is also the amount tacitly acknowledged by the defendant as appropriate for her present requirements in his tender.

[14]	The amount of R10 000-00 for her requires further consideration in one respect. This is because, as I shall attempt to show in due course, the plaintiff has allocated unreasonably high percentages of her running expenses to the maintenance of the child. The result is that she could have understated some of her own maintenance requirements because she should have allocated a larger percentage of the running expenses to herself. If she has done so it is not possible on the evidence to quantify the extent, and, as against any understatement of part of her claim, she has exaggerated her entire claim by overstating her ‘needs’ and those of her child in other respects. Her claim is not only exaggerated. She has worked on a wrong principle by measuring her claim against a standard of living which is too high and by equating want with need. This probably cancels out any possible understatement. Furthermore, any understatement by the plaintiff arises directly from the way in which she has chosen to conduct her case, and she must live with it. While it is my duty to exercise my discretion on maintenance in a manner which is fair, I can only do so within the confines of the facts and circumstances of the case as disclosed by the evidence. It seems to me that on all the evidence I can only conclude that an amount of R10 000-00 reflects the plaintiff’s current maintenance needs. I am also of the view that this amount will enable the plaintiff to enjoy an acceptable standard of living, and that it is fair to both parties.

[15]	I agree with Mr Schubart’s submission that after a period of time it will not be unjust to the plaintiff to reduce the amount of her monthly maintenance payments to make proper allowance for her earning capacity. He suggested a reduction of R4 000-00 for future earnings but I do not think that this obliges me to hold the plaintiff to that figure. In my view, furthermore, there should also be an adjustment to allow for income that can be derived from her own assets. She presently has capital amounting to R225 000-00 available for investment. This will be increased by some R166 000-00 when the retirement annuity policies become payable, but I do not propose bringing that amount into the reckoning because those policies mature in the more distant future. More to the point, she will shortly receive some R180 000-00 as her share of the house in Canada. This amount, together with the amount of R225 000-00, invested sensibly and with an awareness of income tax implications, will produce a monthly income which is not too small to be ignored. There has been a suggestion that the plaintiff may like to use these assets to buy her own home. But in my view, if the plaintiff has assets which she can use for her own maintenance, she is not entitled to use them for other purposes at the defendant’s expense.

[16]	It is not possible to fix with precision the amount which the plaintiff will have available for her own maintenance. The estimate of a salary of R4 000-00 is no more than a general estimate. It remains a general estimate even though it has the imprimatur of an expert on employment. There is no way of knowing for sure what employment may be available and what salary may be payable. I also cannot determine exactly how much the plaintiff will receive from the house in Canada, how much will be available for investment, and the amount of income which it will produce. I must nevertheless do my best to fix the amount by which the plaintiff will be able to contribute. It seems to me that after a period of 3 months from receipt of her share of the equity in the house in Canada, she will be in a position to provide a monthly income from her own assets, and by then she will have had more than enough time to get a job and earn a small salary. At that point it is fair to order a reduction in the maintenance payable by the defendant. I think it is fair and proper, because of the uncertainty and because of the possibility of the plaintiff having understated some of her maintenance requirements, to fix the amount of the reduction conservatively in an amount of R3 000-00 per month.

[17]	I would add in this context that the plaintiff may in fact earn more than R4 000-00 per month in future, and her combined income from investments and salary may be considerably more than R3 000-00. On the other hand, she may be quite unable to find suitable employment. It is also possible that she may unreasonably fail to take up available well paid employment. These possibilities, if they occur, may amount to changed circumstances justifying a variation of this order. It is my hope that any such variation will be achieved by negotiation and agreement, rather than by further litigation.

[18]	I turn to the amount of maintenance for the minor child. I have already mentioned that Mr Schubart’s analysis of the evidence, summarized in Exhibit G, is designed to show that of the R20 000-00 actually spent by the plaintiff during the past year, R9 156-00 was spent on the child’s maintenance. Hence his submission that I should award R10 000-00 for his maintenance. I have no doubt that the claim of R10 000-00 is excessive for the maintenance of a normal, healthy 13 year old boy who attends a standard ‘model C type’ school and who has no special requirements. An objective assessment of the evidence and the expenses in Exhibit G makes this clear. Mr Schubart’s argument that I should allocate half of the rent and the water and electricity bill, 60% of the food bill, and other high percentages of other domestic costs to the child’s maintenance does not commend itself to me. That is not how family life works. While proper allowance should be made for the child’s use of the home and all that is in it, the fact of the matter is that the plaintiff would, for example, probably have paid much the same rent, and would probably have run her geyser just as much, whether she lived alone or with her son. Another criticism is that the list of expenses includes luxuries, like two telephones for the child’s use, namely a cell phone (R145-00 per month) and a landline (R1 200-00 per month of which 60% is set aside for his use of the internet), R1 000-00 per month for entertainment (40% for the child), R350-00 per month for pocket money and gifts, and as much as R500 every month for medicine for herself and the child not covered by medical aid, without any suggestion that either of them has a special need for extra medication. These examples give rise to the inference that the plaintiff has not exercised the financial restraint and discipline in bringing up a teenage child which is found in most households. The defendant is patently willing to meet the reasonable maintenance requirements of his son; there is no suggestion that he seeks to avoid his responsibility. But it is not fair to him to be called upon to pay unreasonably high maintenance. His evidence was that he was able to maintain his son for a period of about 6 months in Canada, where the cost of living is on average a little higher than in South Africa, on an equivalent of R5 000-00 per month. He has based his offer on this experience. I think that it is a generous offer. It is more than sufficient to take into account his son’s use of the home and all that is in it. Our courts make numerous maintenance orders every week for children from all walks of life. Frequently, these orders are made by consent between parents who have assessed realistically and agreed upon the maintenance needs of their children. Sometimes, they are made for children who attend expensive private schools or who are being maintained while studying for a degree at a university. Even in these cases it is rare for more than R5 000-00 per month to be regarded as appropriate, unless there are extraordinary expenses to be met. Thus, in Childs v Childs and others NNO an amount of R3 500-00 each for the ordinary living expenses of a 17 year old boy and a 14 year old girl was ordered by the court as part of a maintenance order which was described as substantial, and additional amounts were allowed for extra medical and educational expenses making a total maintenance order of R6 000-00 for the boy, and R7 100-00 for the girl, who needed more because of special tuition for a learning disability. The plaintiff’s claim that in this case she needs R10 000-00 to bring up this child is not supported by any facts or circumstances which bring the case out of the ordinary. There are no special needs to be met. Indeed, the only motivation is that R10 000-00 is what she wants because that is what she spent last year. That is not a proper basis for determining the maintenance needs of a child.

[19] 	My conclusion is that the defendant should be ordered to pay maintenance in the sum of R10 000-00 for the plaintiff, reducing to R7 000-00, and R5 000-00 for the child. In coming to this conclusion I have not omitted to consider the defendant’s ability to pay. He has given evidence which shows that his gross monthly income, $31 000-00, exceeds his monthly deductions and expenses by about $3 000-00 or $4 000-0, after making allowance for the maintenance he offers. But that is not to say that payment of maintenance in these amounts will easily be affordable. I believe that they will not be easily affordable. He must provide for his own maintenance requirements. His present financial commitments are large and most of them cannot be reduced. He cannot supplement his income by taking on additional employment. He has given evidence of burdensome tax and other financial obligations. I must not forget that he is obliged to transfer matrimonial assets to the plaintiff. His evidence was that he will have to borrow the money to do so. He will therefore have to repay it. I must also take into account that he is liable for permanent maintenance, which will oblige him to make savings and to curtail his expenses in other directions to enable him to make provision for maintenance for the plaintiff after his retirement. Indeed, this obligation cannot be met without a large investment, which will place a considerable strain on the use of his resources for the rest of his working life. He is now 52 years old. Presumably, his working life will come to an end at about the age of 65 years, unless ill-health or other adverse contingencies force him into premature retirement. He does not have much time to accumulate a fund to make adequate provision for his needs and those of plaintiff after he stops earning a salary. I nevertheless accept that he can presently afford to pay what I intend to order, primarily because the amounts that I have fixed are in line with what he offers.

[20]	There remains the question of costs. The plaintiff has successfully established her right to permanent maintenance rather than rehabilitative maintenance. But I have ordered maintenance in the amounts offered by the defendant, and he has been substantially successful in that regard. Mr Heynecke has submitted on his behalf that in these circumstances each party should pay his and her own costs. I think, however, that as a solution this is an over-simplification. The issue upon which the plaintiff was successful was the most important and hard-fought issue. Either way, its resolution has the most serious of consequences for both parties. It is fair to say that her success is ‘greater’ than his. However both issues probably took up much the same preparation and court time, and the defendant had to come to court to vindicate his attitude to the amount he was called upon to pay. It seems to me that a proper exercise of my discretion will be to order that the defendant should not have to pay all the plaintiff’s costs, but only a proportion. I think that it is fair and just to both parties if he is required to pay half of her taxed party and party costs.

[21]	In the result there will be the following order:
1.	The bonds of marriage subsisting between the parties are dissolved.
2.	The defendant is ordered to transfer to the plaintiff the balance of half of the difference between the accrual of their respective estates in accordance with the provisions of their antenuptial contract and in terms of section 3(1) of Act 88 of 1984.
3.	The custody of the minor child is awarded to the plaintiff, subject to the defendant’s rights of reasonable access which shall include but not be limited to
a.	the right to have the minor child visit him in Canada at the defendant’s cost for at least one long school holiday per year;
b.	the right to have the minor child with him at all reasonable times when he visits South Africa.
4.	The defendant is ordered to pay maintenance for the plaintiff in the sum of R10 000-00 per month until her death or remarriage, the said amount of R10 000-00 to reduce to R7 000-00 per month from a date 3 months from the date upon which the defendant complies with paragraph 2 of this order.
5.	The defendant is ordered to pay maintenance for the minor child in the sum of R5 000-00 per month until he becomes self-supporting.
6.	The defendant is ordered to pay half of the plaintiff’s taxed party and party costs of suit.

RJW JONES
Judge of the High Court.