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IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA                 

(EASTERN CAPE DIVISION – GRAHAMSTOWN

                                                                                                            CASE NO: 3729/18

In the matter between:

PHUMELELA DLOMO JV KANTERA TRADING                                 Applicant

and

WALTER SISULU LOCAL MUNICIPALITY                                          1^ST Respondent

THE MUNICIPAL MANAGER: WALTER

SISULU LOCAL MUNICIPALITY                                                           2^ND Respondent

THE ADMINISTRATOR: WALTER

SISULU LOCAL MUNICIPALITY                                                             3^RD Respondent

AMADWALA CONSTRUCTION TRADING 363 CC

(Registration Number: 2005/022765/23)                                              4^TH Respondent

JUDGMENT

MBABANE AJ

[1]        The applicant is seeking confirmation of an interim interdict pendete lite.

[2]        On 14 December 2018, an urgent application was launched by the applicant.  The application was served on the first to third respondents on 18 December 2018, and the only respondent that received service of the application on the 14^th December 2018 was the fourth respondent.  The application was opposed by the first and second respondents and there was no opposition from the third and fourth respondents.  The third respondent was the administrator of the first respondent that was appointed in terms of section 139(1)(c) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa[1].  At the time of the hearing of the matter, the first respondent was no longer under administration hence the third respondent did not participate in the proceedings.

[3]        The matter was heard on 20 December 2018 and an interim order was granted on 21 December 2018 by my sister Robertson J in terms of which the following order was made: -

“1         A Rule Nisi is issued, calling upon the first, second and fourth respondents to provide reasons, if any, on the 5^th day of February 2019 at 9:30 why the following order should not be finally made:

(i)            the first and fourth respondents are interdicted and restrained from performing any rights and obligations (including the works) arising from Tender Bid number 67/2018 pertaining to the tender known as “Upgrading of Steynsburg internal roads from gravel to paving (“the Tender”) pending the outcome of an application to be brought by the applicant for the reviewing and setting aside of the award of the tender to fourth respondent.

(ii)           directing the applicant to file its review application in respect of the award of the tender, within thirty (30) days of date of this order, failing which this order will automatically lapse.

(iii)          that the first respondent be ordered to pay costs of this application and in the event of it being opposed by any of the other respondents that the first respondent together with such respondents who oppose the application be ordered to pay the costs jointly and severally.

2           the order contained in paragraph 1.1 shall have immediate effect and operation, pending the final adjudication of this application.

3           the sheriff is authorised to serve a photocopy of this order upon first, second and fourth respondents.”

[4]        The order granted on 21 December 2018 is seemingly ‘interim-interim order’ hence the return date is to decide whether to confirm the interim order or not.

[5]        Subsequent to the granting of the order, the fourth respondent delivered a notice of opposition and an answering affidavit on 14 January 2019.  The first and second respondents delivered their supplementary answering affidavits on 01 February 2019.  On the date that was scheduled for hearing of the matter, 05 February 2019, the applicant argued that the supplementary answering affidavits were filed out of sequence and that the leave of the court was not sought before such could be admitted as part of the affidavits to be considered.  I made an order that the supplementary answering affidavits were not filed out of sequence but were filed in compliance with the order of 21 December 2018, which invited them to show cause why the order should not be finally made.  The only way the respondents could have shown cause was to file affidavits, which is what they did on 01 February 2019.  There is therefore no basis for the submission that the supplementary answering affidavits were filed out of sequence.

[6]        Being confronted with the fact that they did not reply to the supplementary answering affidavits, the applicant sought a postponement of the matter.  Since the rule nisi was returnable on 05 February 2019 (date for unopposed roll), a letter dated 24 January 2019 (delivered on 30 January 2019) was received from Netteltons Attorneys (local attorneys for the applicant), requesting that the matter be accommodated on the opposed roll on 07 February 2019.  I reminded the applicant’s counsel about the letter to highlight the fact that they have indicated in that letter that they are available to have the matter being heard on 07 February 2019.  Moreover, this application was brought on an urgent basis and any undue delay was going to frustrate the very same urgency that the applicant sought.  I ordered that the matter be heard at 14h00 on 07 February 2019 and that the applicant file its replying affidavit to the supplementary affidavit by 14h00 on 06 February 2019.

[7]        The facts giving rise to the dispute between the parties can be summarised as follows.  The first respondent invited tenders for ‘Upgrading of Steynsburg internal roads from gravel to paving’ (Tender Bid number 67/2018).  According to the tender notice, the following are some of the conditions that applied:

(i)         A current tax clearance certificate (original) or tax compliant status pin must be supplied with the tender or the tender the tender will not be considered and in case of a [Joint Venture] JV a tax clearance certificate (original) or tax compliant status pins for both companies must be supplied.

(ii)        The municipal rates and taxes or municipal charges owed by the preferred bidder or any of its directors, to the municipality or municipal entity, or to any other municipality or its entity, must not be in arrears for more than three months.

(iii)       The tenders will be evaluated on the 80/20 preference points system as prescribed in the [Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act] PPPFA.

(iv)       Adjudication criteria will be 80 points for price and 20 points for B-BBBEE status.

(v)        Potential service providers will have to achieve a minimum of 75 points out of 100 for their technical proposals before their financial proposals and B-BBEE status are evaluated.

[8]        The closing time and date for the tender submissions was 12h00 on 06 November 2018.  According to the tender evaluation report, there were nine tenders that were received on time in respect of both tenders.

The evaluation of the Tender

[9]        The evaluation report reveals the following important details:

(a)       That, according to the bid evaluation committee, the fourth respondent did not comply with the tender requirements and deemed non-responsive because: -

(i)         Tax status could not be verified due to company (fourth respondent) submitting contradicting tax related documents.

(ii)        According to the [Central Supplier Database] CSD report dated 21 September 2018, the tax affairs of the company are non-compliant.

(iii)       According to the [South African Revenue Service] SARS report issued on 04 June 2018 expiring on 04 June 2019, the tax affairs of the company are compliant.

(b)       The applicant’s tender complied with the tender requirements and was deemed responsive.

(c)        That only two bidders were deemed to be responsive, and thus evaluated for functionality, that is, the applicant and Milboard JV Masiso (Milboard).

(d)       That the applicant scored 77 points for functionality and Milboard scored 44.5 points.

(e)       That the applicant is the only company that met the required minimum threshold of 75, and therefore qualified for further evaluation on price and B-BBEE.

The adjudication of the Tender

[10]      The adjudication report reveals that the adjudication committee seems to have re-evaluated the submitted bids and made its own findings.  The following are its findings regarding the applicant and the fourth respondent: -

(a)         That the applicant complied with the tender requirements and deemed responsive.

(b)         That the fourth respondent complied with the tender requirements and deemed responsive as they submitted a valid tax clearance certificate and the SARS pin number to verify its tax matters and the results were that it is tax compliant with SARS.  That a SARS verification was done on 21 November 2018 from the SARS website and the tax affairs were found to be in good order.

(c)          That the fourth respondent scored 95.5 points for functionality.

(d)         That the applicant scored 70.5 points for functionality.

(e)         That the fourth respondent was the only tenderer that was found to be responsive and eligible for further evaluation.

(f)           That the adjudication committee concluded to recommend that the tender be awarded to the fourth respondent.

[11]      At the heart of this application is the decision by the adjudication committee of the first respondent to overturn the recommendations of the evaluation committee and the reasons given thereat.

[12]      The issue of the urgency was canvassed and dealt with when the matter was heard on 20 December 2018 and it was held that the matter was urgent.  It is therefore unnecessary to deal again with this aspect again because there is an existing finding that the matter is urgent.

[13]      The right which the applicant seeks to protect can be located in section 3 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act[2] (“PAJA”) which requires that the administrative action which materially affects the rights and legitimate expectation of any person must be procedurally fair.

[14]      The fourth respondent raised as a point in limine section 62 of the Systems Act.[3]  It is contended by the fourth respondent that the applicant cannot succeed in the application for an interdict because it failed to first pursue the internal remedies before approaching the court for the relief sought.  Section 7 of PAJA requires that available internal remedies are exhausted prior to the institution of review proceedings (emphasis added).  This argument is misplaced in my view because these are not review proceedings but an application for an interim interdict pending the finalisation of the review proceedings.  In addition, section 62 of the Systems Act does not provide for an interim relief pending the finalisation of the internal appeal process and the impugned decision may easily be implemented whilst the appeal process is still pending and thus rendering an appeal process ineffective.  Accordingly, there is no merit to this submission.

[15]      In order for an application for an interim interdict to succeed, the applicant must satisfy the court that the following requirements exist:

            (a)        prima facie right;

            (b)        reasonable apprehension of irreparable harm;

            (c)        balance of convenience in favour of the granting of interim relief;

            (d)        the absence of any other satisfactory remedy.[4]

[16]      The applicant must make out a case that he or she is entitled to a final relief in the main case in order to establish a prima facie right entitling him or her to an interim interdict.[5]  This presupposes the need to do a preliminary assessment of the merits of the applicant’s main case.  This is also linked to the balance of convenience.  Holmes J (as he then was) in Olympic Passenger Service[6] held that:

“It thus appears that where the applicant’s right is clear, and the other requisites are present, no difficulty presents itself about granting an interdict.  At the other end of scale, where his prospects of ultimate success are nil, obviously the Court will refuse an interdict.  Between those two extremes fall the intermediate cases in which, on the papers as a whole, the applicants’ prospects of ultimate success may range all the way from strong to weak.  The expression ‘prima facie established though open to some doubt’ seems to me a brilliantly apt classification of these cases.  In such cases, upon proof of a well-grounded apprehension of irreparable harm, and there being no adequate ordinary remedy, the Court may grant an interdict – it has discretion, to be exercised judicially upon a consideration of all the facts.  Usually this will resolve itself into a nice consideration of the prospects of success and the balance of convenience – the stronger the prospects of success, the less need for such balance to favour the applicant: the weaker the prospects of success, the greater the need for the balance of convenience to favour him.  I need hardly add that by balance of convenience is meant the prejudice to the applicant if the interdict is refused, weighed against the prejudice to the respondent if it be granted.”

[17]      There are various court decisions regarding the test for a prima facie right in the context of an application for an interim interdict.  In Simon,[7] the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) held:

“The accepted test for a prima facie right in the context of an interim interdict is to take the facts averred by the applicant, together with such facts set out by the respondent that are not or cannot be disputed and to consider whether, having regard to the inherent probabilities, the applicant should on those facts obtain final relief at the trial.  The facts set up in contradiction by the respondent should then be considered, and if serious doubt is thrown upon the case of the applicant he cannot succeed.”

[18]      In Spur Steak Ranches Ltd[8], Selikowitz J held as follows:

“…the requirement for a right pima facie established, though open to some doubt, involves two stages.  Once the prima facie right has been assessed, that part of the requirement which refers to the doubt involves a further enquiry in terms whereof the court looks at the facts set up by the respondent in contradiction of the applicant’s case in order to see whether serious doubt is thrown on the applicant’s case and if there is a mere contradiction or unconvincing explanation, then the right will be protected.  Where, however, there is serious doubt then the applicant cannot succeed.”

[19]      The same dictum was again echoed in Msunduzi Municipality[9] as it was held as follows:

“The prima facie right which needs to first to be identified by the applicant is one which is of course, in less stringent terms than one where an applicant claims a final interdict.  This means that the applicant bears the onus to place sufficient evidence before the court to show the existence of a right even though by reason of denials by the respondent, some doubt is thrown into the existence of that right.  If on the probabilities there is great doubt, then the applicant will not be entitled to an interdict, even temporary.  The applicant bears the onus to show that, that right has been infringed by the respondents.”

[20]      For a tender to be eligible for consideration, it must be an acceptable tender.[10]  An acceptable tender is defined as meaning any tender which, in all respects, complies with the specifications and conditions of tender as set out in the tender document.[11]  Scott JA in Sapela[12] explained the concept of an acceptable tender as follows:

“The definition of ‘acceptable tender’ in the Preferential Act must be construed against the background of the system envisaged by section 217(1) of the Constitution, namely one which is ‘fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and effective’.  In other words, whether ‘the tender in all respects complies with the specifications and conditions of tender as set out in the contract documents’ must be judged against these values.”

[21]      In applying the above principles and considering whether the applicant has been able to establish the existence of the prima facie right, it is important to mention the following from the onset.  The adjudication committee is entitled to make its own assessment and can overturn the decision of the evaluation committee if there are valid grounds to do so.  However, in this matter, the adjudication committee wrongly deducted the points that were awarded to the applicant by the evaluation committee from 77 points to 70.5 points without giving explanation as to the reason.  Therefore, there is a prima facie proof that the applicant was prejudiced and its rights to a fair and administrative action may have been violated.  I am therefore satisfied that the applicant has prima facie demonstrated that its right to just administrative action has been violated by the adjudication committee of the first respondent.

[22]      The issue of irreparable harm is linked to the question whether the rights of the applicant were infringed by the adjudication committee of the first respondent.  The applicant contends that if the award is allowed to stand, the applicant and the public will suffer irreparable damages and that the damages are self-evident to the extent that there has been a subversive bidding process and the first respondent is guilty of non-compliance with its constitutional imperatives.  I agree with this submission because I have alluded to the fact that the adjudication committee wrongly deducted the points that were awarded to the applicant without providing valid grounds to do so.

[23]      I also agree with the applicant that the balance of convenience favours the granting of the relief claimed as the applicant will be prejudiced if the interim interdict is refused and the respondents did not provide any tangible evidence that they will be prejudiced if the interim relief is granted.

[24]      In the result I make the following order:

(i)            the first and fourth respondents are interdicted and restrained from performing any rights and obligations (including the works) arising from Tender Bid number 67/2018 pertaining to the tender known as “Upgrading of Steynsburg internal roads from gravel to paving (“the Tender”) pending the outcome of the review application that was brought by the applicant for the reviewing and setting aside of the award of the tender to fourth respondent.

(ii)          the first and fourth respondent be ordered to pay costs of this application jointly and severally.

___________________

S M MBABANE

JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT (ACTING)

Appearances:

Counsel for the Applicant:                                      Adv Delarhape

Instructed by                                                             Honey Attorneys

c/o Nettelton Attorneys

118A High Street

GRAHAMSTOWN

Counsel for the 1^st and 2^nd Respondents:           Adv Sishuba

Instructed by                                                        Mabece Tilana Inc.

                                                                             Attorneys of the 1^st & 2^nd Respondents

                                                                             100 High Street

                                                                             GRAHAMSTOWN

Counsel for the 4^th Respondent:                           Adv Greyling

Instructed by                                                         Maruis Van Zyl Inc.

                                                                               Attorney for the 4^th Respondent

                                                                               c/o J D Haydock Attorneys

                                                                                Room 4, Eskom Building

                                                                                110 High Street

                                                                                GRAHAMSTOWN

Matter heard on:                               7 February 2019

Judgment delivered on:                  26 March 2019

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