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4.1 The first question is which persons or bodies should be involved in an administrative system. The answer that immediately comes to mind is the banking sector. While it is true that banks are at risk of being abused for purposes of money-laundering schemes, it will be naive to assume that the banking sector alone should carry the responsibility of guarding against money laundering. The Commission recommends that the following institutions be included in the scope of an administrative framework: attorneys, accountants in respect of investment advice and services rendered, bureaux de change, executors, estate agents, dealers in securities, insurers, insurance agents and insurance brokers, unit trust schemes, banks, mutual banks, stokvels, the Post Office Savings Bank, persons acting as investment advisors and intermediaries, gambling institutions including totalisator betting services, money brokers, dealers in bullion, coins and Kruger Rands, and dealers in travellers’ cheques and money orders.[46]
4.2 The inclusion of attorneys in the scope of the administrative framework needs further reference. The rationale behind this decision is that trust accounts can be easily used to facilitate money laundering with the advantage that the money launderer will be able to hide behind the cloak of the attorney-client privilege or confidentiality. Consequently the attorney becomes involved, albeit unwittingly, in some form of criminal enterprise. The same goes for other professionals who operate accounts similar to attorneys trust accounts such as chartered accountants for instance. Consideration should therefore be given to the inclusion of all such professionals in an administrative framework. An exception should, however, be made where an attorney is approached for advice or legal assistance in respect of an offence. In such a case disclosure of any information that may have a bearing on that specific case in which he or she is to represent the client, will be in conflict with the client's best interest which the attorney must promote, as well as the public interest in ensuring unfettered legal advice to accused persons.[47]
4.3 A result of listing the institutions to which the administrative measures will apply is that there will always seem to be room for the expansion of the list. In this respect the Commission received a number of suggested additions to the institutions mentioned paragraph 4.1 above. These include vehicle and art dealers, auditors and accounting officers of companies and close corporations, shippers and import - export companies.
4.4 Institutions such as import - export companies and shippers can easily be used to provide a cover for transactions by means of which international transfers of money are facilitated. This seems to indicate that there may be merit in including such institutions in the definition of “accountable institutions”. On the other hand the type of transactions that form part of the reporting scheme do not comfortably fit in with the type of business that these institutions carry on. Furthermore the methods used to provide this type of cover (such as over or under invoicing or false bills of lading and letters of credit) implies complicity with the money launderer which would amount to offences such as fraud or assisting a person to benefit from the proceeds of crime.[48] With these factors taken into account the Commission suggests that these institutions should not be included.
4.5 The auditor or accounting officer of a company or close corporation does not deal with the clients of the institution. Such a person will therefore not be in a position to comply with the duties of customer identification and record-keeping. An auditor or accounting officer will also not be in a position to report the required information on specific transactions. To include such persons will furthermore extend the scope of the proposed Bill too far and will make administration of the reporting scheme impossible. The Commission is therefore of the opinion that such persons should not be included.
4.6 Although the Commission proposed the inclusion of a wide range of institutions the Commission is of the opinion that the inclusion of certain institutions such as hotels, retailers, car rental companies etc would make an administrative framework unwieldy and impossible to administrate. Specifically in respect of retailers it would not be possible to justify the inclusion of some retailers and not others. To add to this it would be impossible to decide where to draw the line based on anything but purely arbitrary grounds. The Commission therefore decided not to propose the inclusion of these institutions in the scope of an administrative system.
4.7 Various respondents suggested that an open-ended list should be adopted, giving the responsible Minister (possibly the Minister of Finance, henceforth referred to as “the Minister”) the discretion to include other institutions without necessitating a subsequent amendment of the Act. This will facilitate flexibility and enhance the ability to adapt to changing circumstances. The Commission is, however, of the opinion that this approach will result in conferring a dispensing power upon the Minister and that the scope of the Act will therefore not be fixed by the Act itself. It must be further kept in mind that the inclusion of an institution or type of institutions in the scope of the administrative measures will have to be preceded by a consultative process. This will negate any considerations of urgency in the amendment of the scope of the administrative framework. The Commission therefore suggests that the list contained in clause 1 should remain an exhaustive list which may be adapted through the normal procedure of legislative amendment.
4.8 Alternatively it was also suggested by some respondents that instead of listing all the institutions a generic definition should be adopted. This would be the preferable approach if a definition can be devised to include the same scope of institutions as are contained in the list of “accountable institutions” as well as others that ought to be included but may have been overlooked. Because of the wide variety of institutions that the Commission intends to include in the scope of the administrative framework it does, however, not seem to be possible to find suitable common characteristics to create an accurate generic definition without creating uncertainty about the scope of the administrative measures.
4.9 The general framework for the application of the administrative measures to the institutions referred to in the preceding paragraph should in the first place consist of the fundamental functions and duties contained in the proposed Bill. This should be extended by means of regulations in respect of specific institutions or classes of institutions. These measures should in the final instance be complimented by the implementation of internal policies in the relevant institutions. The Commission accepts the fact that in many instances compliance with the proposed measures will increase the volumes of work within the relevant institutions as well as intrude on the flow of business. The Commission therefore recommends a procedure for exemptions from compliance with all or any of the provisions of the administrative framework. Such exemptions will be granted by the Minister where this is merited.[49]
4.10 The starting point of an administrative system to combat money laundering is an institution’s ability to identify its customers. The aim in this respect should be the elimination of anonymous accounts and the identification of hidden principals or beneficial owners. Institutions should establish the actual ownership of accounts, and should refuse to enter into transactions with clients who fail to provide proof of their identity.
4.11 The Commission therefore proposes that institutions should be required to obtain proof of a client’s identity when a business relationship is established or a single transaction is concluded with that client.[50] The manner in which the required proof is to be obtained should be prescribed by regulation. This will probably entail that a copy must be made of an official identity document (or a passport in respect of a foreign national). Institutions should also ascertain the identity of all persons with whom transactions are concluded in the course of an established business relationship.[51] The manner in which this is to be done should likewise be prescribed by regulation and will probably entail requesting sight of an identity document or passport. Institutions should also obtain the identifying particulars of all accounts at the institution that are involved in a transaction. Where a person fails to provide the required information the institution concerned will be precluded from proceeding to enter into a business relationship or to conclude a transaction with that person.
4.12 Respondents commenting on behalf of the gambling industry indicated that in that industry the vast majority of business is done through single transactions and mostly in cash. Especially on behalf of the Totalisator Agency Board of Kwazulu-Natal it was indicated that the duty to obtain proof of identity of all customers would be an impossible task. It is suggested that this problem may be addressed by means of a possible exemption under clause 54 of the Bill. The opportunity presented to a money launderer by a totalisator betting agency lies in the possibility that a person can buy successful betting tickets from punters against payment in cash and present the tickets to a totalisator agent for payment by cheque. This type of practise should, therefore, be kept in mind in considering regulations to prescribe the relevant method of proof and in considering the possible granting of exemptions.
4.13 The Johannesburg Stock Exchange indicated that the duty to obtain proof of the identity of a person on whose behalf a prospective client is acting, would place an accountable institution in a position where it will obtain confidential information about the clients of the prospective client. The effect of this duty is in fact that an institution will be placed in a position where it is able to ascertain the identity of the person who is the true customer namely the beneficial party to the business relationship established by the prospective client. This is in keeping with internationally accepted principles such as those laid down by the Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices and the Financial Action Task Force.
4.14 The fear of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange that this provision will require a member to obtain details of another member’s client when a transaction is concluded between the two members is unfounded. A member of the Stock Exchange trading with another member on the Exchange cannot be described as a “prospective client” concluding a transaction with an accountable institution. A member of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange will, however, in keeping with the principle of eliminating anonymous accounts and identifying hidden principals, have to obtain details of the person on whose behalf his or her client is acting.
4.15 The Council of South African Banks indicated that the prohibition upon entering into a business relationship or transaction without having obtained the required proof would stifle the flow of business. A measure of this nature is, however, necessary in order to ensure that all institutions do take the necessary steps to identify their customers. An alternative to the proposed provision is to implement a suspension of all business activity pending the obtaining of the required proof of identity. The Commission therefore recommends that the establishment of a business relationship should be allowed, but no activity should take place in the course of that relationship until the required proof of identity is obtained. In the case of a single transaction the concluding of the transaction may be proceeded with but no effect may be given to the transaction until the required proof of identity is obtained.
4.16 Effective record-keeping is essential to the investigation of money-laundering schemes. The only way of identifying a transaction through which the proceeds of an offence have been laundered, and those involved in it, is to follow the so-called audit trail. This means that by identifying the nature of the transaction and the true participants in that transaction, the money-laundering scheme can be exposed. This will only be possible if sufficient records have been kept by the institution at which the transaction had occurred. Mechanisms ensuring effective record-keeping must therefore be part of an administrative scheme.
4.17 The Commission proposes measures to ensure that records are kept of information obtained when an account is opened or another form of business relationship is established.[52] This will be the information identifying the client that has to be obtained when the business relationship is established. It is also proposed that records must be kept of information in respect of specific transactions, carried out either in the course of a business relationship[53] or as single transactions.[54] In this case the records should reflect the identity of the person who concluded the transaction, the identifying particulars of the accounts at the institution that are involved and the nature of the transaction.
4.18 Recorded information should be kept for a period of at least five years. This should be sufficient to enable investigators to trace existing trends where a possible money-laundering scheme is uncovered. The manner in which records are kept should be prescribed by regulation and should include provision for the possibility of electronic storage of information. Further provision should be made for the admissibility as evidence of information stored in accordance with the regulations.[55]
4.19 Some respondents indicated that it may be necessary for an investigator to be able to establish who dealt with a customer on behalf of the institution, especially if complicity with a money laundering scheme from within the institution is suspected. The Commission agrees with this suggestion. It is therefore recommended that the particulars of the identity of the person who obtained the information on behalf of the institution should also be reflected in the records.
4.20 The most important component of an administrative framework is a duty to report certain information. The aim of a reporting system should be to identify transactions involving the proceeds of crime. Such transactions will probably, upon further investigation, appear to be part of a money-laundering scheme. It is therefore not expected from institutions to identify the money-laundering scheme itself, but to identify transactions that may involve illegally derived assets or at least the suspicion that particular assets have an illegal origin.
4.21 The Commission proposes a reporting system that is based on a combination of threshold and suspicion-based reporting.[56] Suspicious transactions will include transactions that appear unnecessarily complex, unusual transactions, regular transactions that form a peculiar pattern and transactions that may have been structured to avoid the threshold.
4.22 The setting of an amount for a threshold is of course inherently arbitrary. However, there are a few important factors that should be kept in mind when deciding upon such an amount. The first is that the South African financial system is largely cash driven. Another is that the amount should make structuring of transactions to avoid the threshold without drawing the attention of a reporting body as difficult as possible. Thirdly the threshold should not be so low that the reporting system becomes clogged with reports of insignificant transactions. For these reasons the Commission is of the opinion that the threshold(s) for reporting transactions should not be prescribed in primary legislation. These should rather be determined by regulation. This will facilitate greater flexibility in adapting to changing circumstances and will also provide for the possibility that different thresholds may be set in respect of different institutions or types of institutions. This flexibility in the application of a reporting duty can be enhanced further by providing for the possibility that the Minister may grant exemptions from this requirement were this is warranted.
4.23 On the reporting of suspicious transactions some respondents indicated that an institution should also report an attempt to conclude a transaction that was aborted when the institution required information in compliance with this Bill. The Commission agrees with this suggestion and recommends that this type of information should also be reported.[57]
4.24 An issue raised in respect of the time limit for reporting of suspicious transactions is that circumstances will arise where an employee only forms a suspicion at a stage when the relevant period has already elapsed. In such a case the employee and / or the institution may de deterred from making a report by the fact that not making the report within the relevant period constitutes an offence. The Commission recommends that the time limit should be set at ten days after becoming aware of the grounds that gave rise to the suspicion.
4.25 The types of transactions that should be reported are all transactions where amounts of cash exceeding the proposed threshold are involved, all transactions where funds of any amount are transferred across our borders electronically or by other means, all transactions involving the import or export of amounts of cash exceeding the proposed threshold, all currency exchanges exceeding the proposed threshold and any transaction that appears suspicious regardless of the type of transaction.
4.26 The information that should be reported should be prescribed by regulation. These requirements will not necessarily be the same for all types of institutions but should ideally be sufficient to enable investigating authorities to identify, the person or persons carrying out the relevant transaction, the numbers of the accounts that are involved, the true holders of accounts, the nature of the transaction, the payee or beneficiary, the form of payments or transfers as well as the origin and destination of funds. In respect of a suspicious transaction the reported information should also indicate whether the transaction is part of a regular tendency in that particular relationship with the client.
4.27 The manner in which reports must be made should likewise be prescribed by regulation. These requirements should be based on a manner and form that will best suit the needs of the body to which the information is to be reported and the institutions making the report.
4.28 It was suggested that a duty should also be imposed upon supervisory or regulatory bodies to report certain information. The Commission therefore recommends that supervisory and regulatory bodies should be included in the reporting structure.[58]
4.29 A very important issue in respect of the reporting of information is the protection of the person making a report. The persons or institutions making reports should be protected from any liability for breach of confidential relationships or any other form of civil liability. This protection should override any privilege or obligation to secrecy or confidentiality irrespective of the basis for its existence. [59]
4.30 The protection for persons reporting information, especially in respect of suspect transactions, should, however, go further than protection against liability. The identity of such a person and the fact that he or she has made such a report should be kept absolutely confidential for obvious reasons. To accomplish this the Commission recommends that the identity of a person who has made a report as well as the basis for the report should be inadmissible as evidence, unless that person agrees to testify in criminal proceedings. The person who has made a report or initiated the making of a report should be a competent but not compellable witness.[60] This will mean that, should such a person refuse to testify in criminal proceedings, the investigating and prosecuting authorities will not be able to base their case on the fact that a report was made or that the person who made the report was suspicious of the relevant transaction. The reporting of the relevant transaction will accordingly only serve as intelligence to identify an occurrence that should be investigated and will not in itself provide evidence of any criminal conduct. It will then be up to the investigating and prosecuting authorities to build their case upon the relevant bank records and other evidence they may find.
4.31 In their approach to implementing a framework of administrative measures, institutions should follow prosedures that are based on responsible business practice. This entails that institutions should develop internal policies to ensure the implementation of procedures to facilitate compliance with the proposed administrative framework. Specific aspects that should be included in internal policies should be prescribed by regulation. Provisions in this respect can, however, not be too prescriptive of the contents of the internal policies that institutions are required to adopt. Furthermore the contents of internal policies will not necessarily be the same for all the types of institutions to which this requirement will apply.
4.32 The implementation of a “know your customer” policy is essential to the success of an administrative framework to combat money-laundering. This is especially so if such a framework includes a suspicion-based reporting system as it is only through applying this policy that an institution will be enabled to notice suspicious or peculiar conduct on the part of a client.
4.33 A know your customer policy firstly entails being able to identify the customer. The proposals in this regard were already discussed. A know your customer policy further entails that an institution should be able to recognise trends in the manner in which a customer conducts his or her business with that institution. This should enable the institution to note transactions that do not conform with this trend and may for that reason appear suspicious. It may also enable the institution to note when such a trend itself appears suspicious.[61]
4.34 Institutions should be required to develop and implement procedures to ensure effective record-keeping.[62] This should include procedures to capture the information of which records must be kept. Such a policy should also include procedures to protect the privacy of the persons concerned against unauthorised use of the stored information.
4.35 Institutions should also develop policies on the identification of information to be reported and on the procedure to report such information.[63] Internal procedures for the reporting of information will differ from one institution to another but should ideally include the appointment of a reporting officer or reporting office, depending on the size of the institution. Such an officer should serve as a central communication point between an institution and the body to which information must be reported. If such an officer is granted access to the institution’s records on clients and transactions it will enhance the institution’s ability to identify suspicious behaviour by a client.
4.36 Training is very important to the success of a system of administrative control measures. Institutions should therefore develop training policies to ensure that their staff at all levels are aware of the phenomenon of money laundering and the effects thereof. Staff should also be informed of the relationship between money laundering and the proceeds of crime and should be guided as to the circumstances that should raise suspicion.[64]
4.37 A crucial element of a system to control money laundering is the establishment of a body to record and utilise reported information. The Commission therefore recommends that a statutory body referred to as the Financial Intelligence Centre (henceforth referred to as “the Centre”) should be instituted.[65] The task of such a body will mainly be to receive information through the reporting system, to analyse that information, to conduct investigations into money-laundering activities and to disseminate information that warrants investigation to the appropriate investigating authorities. The Centre should also fulfil the function of a supervisory body to oversee the compliance by the relevant institutions with the administrative framework.[66]
4.38 A body such as the proposed Centre will have to be well-resourced in order to cope with the workload associated with its proposed functions. This will be even more so if a reporting system involving threshold reporting is adopted. In this regard it may be of interest to note that there are various software packages that are developed for analysing reported information, drawing the necessary conclusions about transactions and links between various accounts at different institutions and persons operating such accounts. The types of transactions that may be classified as anomalous or unexpected are transactions involving disproportionately high amounts, economically unjustifiable transactions, numerous transactions by one client that appear similar, frequent transactions on the behalf of third parties who never appear in person, short term transfers of funds between accounts and currency exchanges. It must, however, be remembered that this is an aid to identify transactions that are sufficiently suspicious to warrant investigation, and is not aimed at replacing the investigating authority.
4.39 In order to perform its functions efficiently a body such as the proposed Centre must have administrative support. For this reason the Commission recommends that the Centre should administratively fall under the Minister of Finance.
4.40 Some difference of opinion exists between respondents on the main function of the Centre. Some suggest that this should be to investigate money laundering activities up to the stage where a prosecution can be instituted. The basis for this point of view is a strong perception that the existing investigating authorities will not be in a position to react to information supplied by the Centre and that this will create a lack of follow-through on the information supplied by the Centre. In this form the Centre will function as a money laundering investigation unit. The advantage of this approach is that it will ensure swifter action where a possible money laundering scheme is identified, and better follow-up on reported information indicating money laundering activities.
4.41 A number of other respondents feel that the Centre should function in conjunction with existing investigating authorities as a body to identify information that warrants investigation, but should not itself investigate and prepare money-laundering cases for prosecution. The reason for this is that the investigation of crime is essentially a police responsibility. The creation of another body with similar investigating functions as the police and bodies such as the Office for Serious Economic Offences will add to the problem that too many bodies exist with similar powers, leading to fragmented investigations. In this regard it must be borne in mind that a successful money laundering investigation will in all probability uncover the initial offence from which the laundered proceeds were derived. From an investigator’s point of view it would be preferable to investigate these offences whole. Another important fact in this regard is that not all money laundering investigation will stem from information reported to the Centre. Police officials regularly uncover information indicating the existence of money laundering activities during their investigations. This will probably happen more often as the attention of investigators is extended to the proceeds of an offence once the Proceeds of Crime Bill is enacted.
4.42 The Commission views the utilisation of the information supplied by the Centre as a crucial element of the whole administrative system. The Commission is of the opinion that any inability of investigating authorities to utilise the information supplied by the Centre to its fullest potential will defeat the purpose of the whole administrative framework. This will render these measures to becoming a dead letter on the statute book with significant yet fruitless cost implications for the business community. These concerns induced the Commission to recommend that the Centre should also have the function of an investigating authority in respect of money-laundering activities.[67]
4.43 If the Centre is to carry out money-laundering investigations its powers will have to be extended to enable it to do so efficiently. In this respect the Commission recommends that the Centre should have similar powers to that of the Office for Serious Economic Offences. The Commission further recommends that the Centre should also have powers similar to those used in respect of investigation into exchange control contraventions.[68]
4.44 An important aspect that is associated with a body such as the proposed Centre is control over access to the information held by the Centre. The information in the possession of such a body will naturally reflect the manner in which a person conducts his or her business. It is likely that this information can be used to gain an unfair business advantage or to infringe upon a person’s privacy. It is also possible that information held by the Centre can indicate the identity of a person who made a report in a specific case. Access to this information should therefore be limited to investigating authorities. The Centre should also have the discretion to share information with its counter parts and other investigating authorities outside the Republic where this requested in the course of an investigation.[69]
4.45 The issue of feedback to institutions by the Centre was raised by a number of respondents and also a number of times at a national money-laundering conference held in Midrand in July 1996. Institutions require feedback on specific transactions mainly to be able to decide how to proceed with their relationship with the client in question. A lack of feedback will also lead to the institutions losing interest in continued cooperation with the relevant authorities as their efforts are not seen to be accomplishing anything. Feedback by the Centre will also enhance the institutions’ knowledge of money laundering which will facilitate a better quality of reporting. The giving of feedback to the relevant institutions is an operational matter of the Centre and should not be regulated by legislation. The recommended legislation should, however, be sensitive to this issue and should not render the giving of feedback, even on a case by case basis, impossible.[70]
4.46 The Commission realises the value of a co-operative approach to the administration of an administrative framework. The Commission therefore recommends the institution of a body, referred to as the Money-laundering Policy Board to assist the Minister in formulating, revising and implementing an anti money-laundering policy and in administering the administrative framework.[71] Such a board should consist of representatives of all the types of institutions to which the framework will apply.
4.47 The functions of the Board should include issuing guidance notes to the relevant institutions, assisting institutions in their efforts to comply with the administrative framework and monitoring compliance with the framework.[72] The Minister should be enabled to grant exemptions from the duties imposed by this proposed administrative framework. In executing this discretion the Minister should be assisted by the Board. The Board should also periodically interact with the Centre on issues concerning the manner in which the Centre’s functions are performed.
4.48 Public awareness is important to the success of an administrative framework. The conducting of a public awareness campaign on an ongoing basis should be part of the Board’s functions. Fostering public support for the proposed administrative measures will go some way to alleviate the burden the implementation of such measures will place on the relevant institutions.
4.49 The Commission is of the opinion that a dual approach should be relied upon in respect of enforcing these administrative measures. On the one hand offences together with appropriate penalties should be created to enable the framework to be enforced by means of the criminal law. On the other, appropriate administrative sanctions should be employed as the criminal law may not be sufficiently effective to ensure the enforcement of the framework.
4.50 One of the issues that was frequently raised by respondents is that the administrative framework should not result in criminalising the institutions of the business sector in an effort to combat the real criminals that are harder to track down. Administrative sanctions should therefore be developed to ensure compliance with the Proposed Bill. The Commission recommends that this function should also be performed by the Centre.[73]
4.51 The type of administrative sanction that the Commission recommends is an administrative penalty which is similar to an admission of guilt in that payment of the penalty is done voluntarily as an alternative to facing prosecution.[74] Payment of the penalty does not amount to a criminal conviction but a prosecution may not be instituted once such a penalty is payed. To enable the Centre to justly come to the conclusion that an institution is guilty of contravening a provision of the Proposed Bill and to decide upon an appropriate penalty the Commission recommends provisions for the conducting of an inquiry.
4.52 Emphasis should, however, be placed on fostering a co-operative relationship between the business community and other interested parties. Experience in other jurisdictions has shown that promoting such a spirit of co-operation is far more effective than heavy-handed enforcement in ensuring compliance with an administrative framework. It is hoped that the institution of a body such as the Money-laundering Policy Board will facilitate co-operation among all interested parties.
4.53 It should be clear that implementing and maintaining a framework of administrative measures along the lines I have discussed, will be costly to the institutions and bodies involved. It must be accepted that combatting money-laundering is in the national interest of the Republic as it is one of the measures that can be implemented to combat large scale crime. Furthermore money-laundering poses a threat to the national economy of the Republic. Combatting money-laundering should therefore be one of Government’s responsibilities for which it should bear the major part of the costs.
4.54 In this respect the Commission urges the Department of Finance and other relevant authorities to consider the creation of a fund into which the confiscated proceeds of crime can be deposited. The funds accumulated in such a fund can be applied to defray the cost of investigations and prosecutions as well as facilitate compensation for persons who suffered loss as a consequence of the offence in question. The expenditure of bodies such as the Financial Intelligence Centre and the Money-laundering Policy Board will also have to be budgeted for by the department who takes responsibility for these bodies. An “asset forfeiture fund” may also be able to provide funds in this respect.
4.55 A serious concern of the Commission is that little purpose will be served by enacting the proposed legislation unless the executive, through the appropriate ministries, is committed to implementing the entire administrative scheme. As was indicated previously the effective operation of the Centre will be vital to the success of the administrative system as whole. This will in particular require obvious budgetary planning and anticipatory allocations; swift steps to be taken to identify and recruit appropriate staff; and immediate decision-making relating to the establishment of the Centre. Unless this commitment and these steps are forthcoming, the legislation will be an empty gesture with a significant yet pointless burden upon and cost to the private sector bodies.
[46] See clause 1(1) of the Proposed Bill, Annexure A.
[47] See clause 1(2) of the Proposed Bill, Annexure A.
[48] The offence of “assisting another to benefit form the proceeds of crime” is proposed by the Commission in the Report on International Co-operation in Criminal Matters, Project 98.
[49] See clause 54 of the Proposed Bill, Annexure A.
[50] See clause 2 of the Proposed Bill, Annexure A.
[51] See clause 3 of the Proposed Bill, Annexure A.
[52] See clause 4 of the Proposed Bill, Annexure A.
[53] See clause 5 of the Proposed Bill, Annexure A.
[54] See clause 4 of the Proposed Bill, Annexure A.
[55] See clause 7 of the Proposed Bill, Annexure A.
[56] See clauses 8 and 9 of the Proposed Bill, Annexure A.
[57] See clause 9(2) of the Proposed Bill, Annexure A.
[58] See clause 11 of the Proposed Bill, Annexure A.
[59] See clause 16(1) of the Proposed Bill, Annexure A.
[60] See clause 16(2) and (3) of the Proposed Bill, Annexure A.
[61] See clause 18 of the Proposed Bill, Annexure A.
[62] See clause 19 of the Proposed Bill, Annexure A.
[63] See clause 20 of the Proposed Bill, Annexure A.
[64] See clause 21 of the Proposed Bill, Annexure A.
[65] See clause 22 of the Proposed Bill, Annexure A.
[66] See clause 23(1)(g) of the Proposed Bill, Annexure A.
[67] See clause 22(1)(b) of the Proposed Bill, Annexure A.
[68] See clauses 26, 27, 28 and 29 of the Proposed Bill, Annexure A.
[69] See clause 33(1)(a) to (d) of the Proposed Bill, Annexure A.
[70] See clause 33(1)(d) of the Proposed Bill, Annexure A.
[71] See clause 35 of the Proposed Bill, Annexure A.
[72] See clause 36 of the Proposed Bill, Annexure A.
[73] See clause 22(1)(g) of the Proposed Bill, Annexure A.
[74] See clause 30 of the Proposed Bill, Annexure A.
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