[23]
The discussion, as my colleague points out, at the interview on 6 June 1997 is pivotal to the result
of this appeal. It is not in dispute that Menne informed Van Jaarsveld that he had identified him as one of the persons he required
for the SPI initiative; that he had the support of his Executive Director Emmett and that the intention was to second him to Amplats
for a period of six months to enable Menne to assess if he performed at the required level, instead of finalising the employment
and discovering afterwards that he did not meet the grade, something which had occurred in the past. I accept as my colleague Scott
does, that Menne told Van Jaarsveld that if he made the grade, he would be offered a permanent contract of employment by Amplats.
It is not in dispute that Van Jaarsveld was interested in the job offer presented by Menne and that the two agreed that Van Jaarsveld
would report for duty at head office on secondment for a period of six months starting on 1 July 1997. Van Jaarsveld testified and
was not contradicted that when he reported for work at head office in Johannesburg on 1 July 1997 he occupied an office next
to Menne’s and Emmett’s in the 10thfloor and that, Emmett took it upon himself to welcome him to the department. He worked with Mr John Wood, a level 3 employee within
the SPI.
[24]
My colleague finds that Menne only had authority to enter into a contract of secondment with Van Jaarsveld
and that he had no authority to bind Amplats to the contract of employment alleged by Van Jaarsveld. Reliance for this finding is
based on Menne’s seniority within Amplats and his knowledge of the procedures involved in the appointment of personnel at head
office as well as the need for such appointments to be approved by Amplats’ Administrative Committee (Adco). My colleague goes
on to find that it is most unlikely that Menne would ever have purported to bind Amplats in the manner alleged by Van Jaarsveld.
My colleague Scott then concludes that the probabilities are overwhelming that Menne did ‘no more than express a view, however
strongly, that at the end of the secondment period’ Van Jaarsveld ‘was likely to be appointed or that, Menne, would use
his best endeavours to procure’ his appointment.
[25]
I cannot agree with this analysis. In essence my colleague says Menne merely predicted that Van Jaarsveld
would be offered a contract of employment by Amplats at the end of the secondment if he performed well. I call this the prediction
thesis. This thesis does not take account of all the evidence and is incompatible with the documentary trail. The correct factual
analysis as I hope to show is that Menne with proper authorisation offered Van Jaarsveld a job subject only to proving himself in
the six month secondment. This Van Jaarsveld did. When therefore he was not appointed at the end of six months a breach of contract
occurred.
[26]
In my view the context within which Menne made the representation is also relevant and it is that Menne
and Emmett were concerned that the SPI, a key initiative of that department had fallen behind due to understaffing. That this is
so is demonstrated by the approach to Van Jaarsveld and the appointment in October/November 1997 of Messres Paul Brogan and Pieter
Du Preez into the SPI with effect from 1 January 1998. These appointments were not from within the group and were at Menne’s
instance. Du Preez was appointed to Wood’s position when the latter was transferred to the Operations Division with effect
from 1 January 1998. Even though Du Preez was appointed into that position Van Jaarsveld in actual fact took over Wood’s duties.
[27]
It is remarkable that these appointments were to take effect from the date put forward by Van Jaarsveld
as being the effective date of his permanent appointment if he made the grade during the six month secondment. What is also remarkable
about these appointments is that their passage through Adco was nothing more than a mere formality. In my view these appointments
coinciding, as they do, with the effective date put forward by Van Jaarsveld as the date he agreed with Menne within the SPI, initiated
by Menne and the ease with which Adco formalised them, shows that Van Jaarsveld’s appointment was in the same mould and was
meant to be treated similarly.
[28]
On 1 January 1998 the department was divided into two and Emmett became the marketing director. The other
section in which the SPI was located was headed from that date by Mr John Dreyer (Dreyer). It is not in dispute that just before
the end of the six month secondment period and thereafter when he returned from annual leave, Van Jaarsveld enquired on several occasions
from Menne about his permanent employment. He testified that on one of these enquiries during April/May 1998 Menne reported to him
that he had spoken to Dreyer about his situation and Dreyer’s response was that he could not understand why Van Jaarsveld had
a problem because Amplats was a big company, and that Van Jaarsveld did not have to worry about financial losses, as he would be
looked after and would not suffer any prejudice as a result of his delayed appointment.
[29]
Van Jaarsveld also testified that during the six month secondment he and Menne discussed his possible
participation in the Anglo American Platinum share option scheme. It was during this discussion that Menne, having been made aware
that as a mine employee Van Jaarsveld did not participate in the scheme, stated that it was critical that Van Jaarsveld be put on
the books of Amplats as soon as possible so that he did not lose out.
[30]
My colleague concludes that Van Jaarsveld failed to discharge the burden of proving that he was told
by Menne in April or May 1998 that he should not worry as the delay in his permanent appointment would not result in any financial
loss to him. The basis for this conclusion is based partly on the observation that Menne’s memo of 17 October 2001, (which
I deal with later) does not mention this. If one accepts, as I do, that Van Jaarsveld continuously pestered Menne about his permanent
appointment from the beginning of January 1998, then it is significant that these enquiries died down from April/May 1998 until just
before Menne left Amplats employ in October/November 1998 on medical grounds. Clearly Van Jaarsveld must have been given some assurance
hence he stopped his enquiries. He started his enquiries again when he realized that Menne was about to leave the employ of Amplats.
The probabilities are in my view overwhelming that Van Jaarsveld stopped his enquiries in April/May 1998 because he received the
necessary assurance from Menne. Furthermore Van Jaarsveld had specifically made reference to this assurance from Dreyer in an e-mail
he sent on 2 August 2000 to Baxter and in a memo he sent to Dreyer on 27 February 2001. Dreyer was aware of this correspondence
at the time and in actual fact responded to the memo of 27 February. He did not dispute giving the assurance alluded therein
in his response to the memo of 27 February. This shows in no uncertain terms that Dreyer gave the assurance. Objectively viewed the
giving of this assurance goes to the heart of the agreement concluded by Menne and Van Jaarsveld in that it preserves 1 January 1998
as the effective date of his permanent appointment.
[31]
It is not Amplat’s case that Van Jaarsveld did not make the grade during the six month secondment.
In this regard Van Jaarsveld testified, and was not challenged, that Menne informed him sometime in October 1997 that he and Emmett
were very happy with his performance and that he would be appointed permanently on 1 January 1998. That Van Jaarsveld was a star
performer is borne out by his appraisal by Menne around July 1998. By all accounts Van Jaarsveld scored very high in this appraisal,
scoring a final performance rating of +4 translated to mean ‘very good’. Menne commented on the form that: ‘APVJ
(Van Jaarsveld) has performed admirably. He has aptly demonstrated his expertise with respect to all aspects of mining engineering,
business and strategic planning’.
[32]
Another comment in the appraisal reads: ‘APVJ is currently on secondment from U/S since July 1998.
RM has on various occasions tried to get APVJ transferred to HO (correspondence to JAD dated April 1998 and August 1998 refers)’.
I pause to point out that at the pre-trial stage Van Jaarsveld’s legal representatives requested the discovery of this correspondence
but were informed that Amplats did not have the documents in question. Emmett signed this appraisal signifying his agreement with
it.
[33]
After Menne left the employ of Amplats his position was filled by Dr Rodney Baxter (Baxter) during
February 1999. Van Jaarsveld informed Baxter of his employment situation and requested the latter to take up the matter with Dreyer.
It is not in dispute that Van Jaarsveld directed further enquiries to Baxter in this regard, just like he did with Menne.
[34]
It is common cause that Van Jaarsveld continued to perform exceptionally. In this regard during 1999
when he was appraised by Baxter, Baxter commented:
‘Auret continues to be a major and valued contributor to the Department. The Department relies heavily on his technical mining experience
in evaluating the integrity and business cases of many capital investment proposals. The Department will continue to look to Auret
to fulfil the role of assessing projects from a technical as well as a business perspective, and to question and input into the technical
development teams and assist in their decision-making on the back of sound business assessments.’
Baxter and Dreyer signed this appraisal on 23 December 1999. In my view, the comments on the 1998 appraisal that Menne had tried on
several occasions to get Van Jaarsveld permanently appointed as well as Van Jaarsveld’s own ‘pestering’ of Menne
and Baxter is in line with him having concluded the agreement he alleges on 6 June 1997 to the effect that he would be permanently
appointed on 1 January 1998. Baxter’s comments further demonstrate that Van Jaarsveld was indispensable to the department
and was not viewed as a temporary sojourner, so to speak, but was a permanent and reliable member of the department.
[35]
My colleague makes the point that all appointments of head office personnel could be authorised only
by Adco. This is based on the evidence by Amplats to this effect and that it being so Menne had no such authority to bind it in his
discussions with Van Jaarsveld. This view, in my opinion, is not determinative of the matter and as stated not supported by the evidence.
Menne had a mandate from Emmett, his Executive Director, to recruit personnel to the SPI. The appointment of Brogan and Du Preez
and the ease with which these appointments went through Adco bears this out. Menne’s mandate as far as Van Jaarsveld is concerned
did not only encompass a six month secondment. The evidence shows that his mandate encompassed a six month secondment as a trial
period and an offer of permanent employment just like Brogan and Du Preez. No evidence was given by the Amplats’s witnesses
why Van Jaarsveld was to be treated differently.
[36]
It is inconceivable that Emmett would have given Menne only a mandate to offer Van Jaarsveld a six month
secondment without stating the purpose thereof. The absence of any evidence by Amplats that Van Jaarsveld was to be offered an open
ended secondment or why he was treated differently to Brogan and Du Preez shows that Menne’s mandate extended beyond the limits
fixed by my colleague Scott. In fact Emmett and Dreyer did not give evidence that having become aware of the agreement concluded
by Menne with Van Jaarsveld, that they told him that he was not authorised to do so. This demonstrates, in my view that they acquiesced
in what Menne had done. Their acquiescence shows in my view that Menne never acted out of line.
[37]
As far as Adco’s authority is concerned the evidence suggests that this could only mean that an
executive director placed any matter before Adco to be formalised. Indeed Menne did not qualify to place any matters before Adco
but Emmett and Dreyer did. It was therefore their responsibility to place Van Jaarsveld’s matter before Adco for his appointment
to be formalised. They did not do so and failed dismally to provide an acceptable reason why they omitted to do this on the expiry
of the six month secondment.
[38]
My colleague seems to attach a lot of significance to Dreyer’s assertions that before considering
Van Jaarsveld’s permanent appointment he had to finalise the department’s restructuring process which included Van Jaarsveld’s
position in the department. Significance seems to be also given to Baxter’s assertion that he was also unwilling to recommend
Van Jaarsveld’s permanent appointment as he was in the process of assessing the overall position of the department. In my view
no significance should be accorded to these assertions for the simple reason that they are not borne out by the evidence. Baxter
gave no evidence of exactly what he was assessing and what the end result was. He simply says it was only around July 1999 that he
felt comfortable to appoint Van Jaarsveld permanently but does not say what influenced this, other than of course that Van Jaarsveld
was a competent and reliable employee.
[39]
Dreyer for his part gave no evidence of the restructing he was allegedly engaged in. In fact the record
shows that no restructuring of any sort was undertaken by him. The only restructuring was the splitting of the department into two,
which occurred before Dreyer’s arrival and this had absolutely no effect on the position occupied by Van Jaarsveld and the
work he did on the SPI.
[40]
It is inconceivable that Menne would have expressed a view merely that Van Jaarsveld would be employed
at the end of the secondment. This finding is equally not borne out by the evidence. The memo written by Menne on 17 October
2001 clearly states that ‘with the agreement of Emmett’, Van Jaarsveld ‘was offered a secondment to head office for a six month period if his performance proved satisfactory, he would then be offered a
permanent position in the department’ (my emphasis). There is nothing predictive in this statement. It is a statement of fact. Clearly within the context of a department
that was behind in its work, and which was desperately looking for an experienced and reliable mining engineer, amongst others, it
is highly improbable that having found such a person and being satisfied with his performance his permanent employment would become
dependant on requirements other than those discussed on 6 June 1997.
[41]
Clearly at the end of the six month secondment Amplats was obliged to inform Van Jaarsveld either that
he had not made the grade and to return him to his mine if this was so. No one told him this.
The agreement
reached between Menne and Van Jaarsveld was a probationary agreement for a period of six months. Because Van Jaarsveld was employed
within the group it became necessary to agree that another agreement would be concluded if he made the grade during the secondment
period. Had Van Jaarsveld been an outside employee only one agreement would have been concluded, as was the case with Brogan and
Du Preez, followed by a mere formalisation of the employment by Adco if he made the grade. Because Van Jaarsveld was within the group
the only way in which he would be employed at head office was through a permanent transfer from his mine to head office. That is
what was agreed should have happened if he make the grade. That this is so is borne out by the fact that the secondment of Van Jaarsveld
was known by his immediate boss Knock and his superior Beamish. Furthermore Van Jaarsveld’s position in the mine was filled
in 1998 (after the secondment) and he remained on the mine’s books in name only, a source of irritation to the mine managers
at Union Section. In my view his position would not have been filled after the six month secondment if he was coming back. If anything
this is a powerful indication that his passage through the secondment period with flying colours was to result in his permanent transfer
to head office.
[42]
Van Jaarsveld realized for the first time that his appointment required Adco approval in July 2000 when
his appointment was processed. No one had told him this before and no case is made out by Amplats that this was done. Emmett and
Dreyer never placed Van Jaarsveld’s matter for consideration by Adco until Dreyer did so in August 2000 under pressure from
Van Jaarsveld. Adco approved Van Jaarsveld’s appointment at its meeting on 14 August 2000. The minute of the meeting reflects:
‘Auret van Jaarsveld
JAD reported that the formal appointment of Auret van Jaarsveld at C&OO (Business Planning) had been delayed depending on the
evaluation of his job and the overall structure of Business Planning. The initial evaluation of the position did not make a transfer
to C&OO attractive. The job grading was subsequently reviewed and evaluated at Level 4. As a result of the delay in the appointment
process, AvJ had not received a salary increase for the past two years. He had taken legal advice on this situation.
The position had been advertised and AvJ was the only applicant.
JAD recommended, and it was agreed (subject to BEN’s confirmation that the prescribed recruitment process had been duly followed)
that a job offer be made to Auret van Jaarsveld on the terms and conditions of a Level 4 appointment with back-pay for his loss of
annual increases. AvJ’s performance was satisfactory.’
It is instructive that this minute does not mention that the appointment was delayed because Dreyer was busy with a restructuring
or that Baxter was still assessing the department’s needs. These are the reasons advanced by Amplats for the delay in appointing
Van Jaarsveld permanently. If anything this minute goes to show that Amplats’ failure to appoint Van Jaarsveld permanently
on 1 January 1998 was not because Menne was not authorised to conclude the agreement of employment with Van Jaarsveld, but that the
appointment was not put before Adco timeously due to administrative bungling.
[43]
Having dealt with the aforegoing factual analysis it remains for me to cite two pieces of correspondence
which in my view sketch the true background of the matter. One is from Van Jaarsveld to Dreyer dated 27 February 2001. This memo
sketches the bureaucratic bungling that accompanied his situation from the moment he started work at head office on 1 July 1997.
I find it necessary to cite the memo in full:
‘1.
In August 2000, during the time of crisis concerning my situation at Anglo Platinum, you invited
me to come to you directly in future should there be any further problems. A matter of great concern to me has arisen in relation
to my share options, and I am appealing to you to assist in resolving it.
2.
The problem is briefly this. Whereas I have in substance been a permanent employee of H/O since
January 1998, purely as a result of bureaucratic delays, that situation was only formalised with effect from 1 September 2000.
3.
However, as a direct result of these delays, my participation in the share option scheme was
delayed by 33 months, during which period the share price rose dramatically. If matters are allowed to stand, I will lose an amount
in excess of R2 million. As I am approaching possible early retirement due to my health, this is a matter of the utmost importance
to me and my and my family and one which I trust the company will rectify for the reasons which I will set out below.
4.
In order to assist in understanding the situation, I will briefly list the sequence of events
from June 1997 to September 2000.
5.
RL Menne (RLM) offered me a position in his department (Business Development and Planning ie
BD&P) in June 1997. Our agreement was that I would be on secondment from the mine for a trial period of six months and if RLM
was satisfied with my performance, my position would become permanent. I accepted the offer.
6.
Before the six month period had expired and in about October 1997, RLM told me that he was
highly satisfied with my performance and that I would be permanently appointed to H/O in January 1998.
7.
Late in 1997, RLM told the department that we were getting a new director, namely, yourself,
and that Paul Brogan and Pieter du Preez would be joining the department. He said that our new director would probably restructure
the department and formalise my permanent appointment.
8.
RLM indicated to me that my situation would be resolved in a few weeks and indeed that he was
continuously discussing the matter with you. He gave me an assurance, on behalf of the company that I would not be financially compromised
by any delays in formalising my appointment to H/O.
9.
In the meanwhile my position on the mine was filled. It follows that my transfer to H/O was
a fait accomplieven if the paperwork was not yet in place.
10.
Late in 1998, RLM retired and Larry Cramer acted as departmental head for a short period. Rod Baxter
(RCB) was appointed as departmental head and I immediately informed him of my unresolved situation and my unhappiness with it. He
undertook urgently to address it.
11.
On 3 February 1999, RCB told me that he had discussed my situation with you and that he was instructed
immediately to proceed with the administrative process of my transfer to H/O.
12.
Since that time I was told on numerous occasions that the formalisation of my transfer was delayed
by administrative and workload problems in the HR Department. At the time I accepted this in good faith. I believed that the company
was committed to a policy of fair dealing and integrity and that I would not be compromised by these bureaucratic delays. In addition,
I had a very heavy workload (Maandagshoek, SPI and ad hoc projects) and believing, as I did, that I would not be prejudiced, I could
not spend too much time dealing with what was after all, a purely bureaucratic matter, or so I believed.
13.
In August 1999, I was informed that the Business Manager of Union Section refused to authorise my
annual salary increment because I was an H/O employee. I reported this to RCB and he suggested that we ignore it and handle it as
part of the process of my formal transfer to H/O. I was told that my transfer was imminent and again I accepted this in good faith.
14.
Late in 1999 / early 2000, I was told that due to the introduction of the Employment Equity Bill,
all new appointments (including mine) would be made according to new procedures adopted by the HR Department. The process of my transfer
was administratively delayed yet again although, I was assured on numerous occasions that there had been progress.
15.
In May 2000, Paul Grogan acted in RCB’s position. He was asked by RCB to handle aspects of
my transfer, which I believe he discussed with you. When he discussed it with me it became apparent that the process was far from
complete.
16.
In July 2000 I was told that my transfer would definitely be finalised at a meeting to be held on
26 July 2000. However, the meeting never took place and at that point I sought legal advice and put the company on notice on 31 July
2000, to resolve the matter. With your help and involvement my transfer to H/O was concluded within a mere three weeks, for which
I sincerely thank you.
17.
My appointment was formalised on the 1 September 2000 and I received a shares option offer on 22
December 2000 which was back-dated to 1 September 2000.
18.
As I understand the position, the share option scheme is intended to incentivise and reward H/O
executives for their efforts. I have given nothing less than my best. I contributed to projects of more than R4 billion, I developed
the SPI model and I introduced the Alcar software to the department / company. I have had three performance assessments (1998, 1999
and 2000), all of them excellent. I received H/O bonuses in 1998, 1999 and 2000.
19.
I have no doubt that had my transfer been formalised, as it ought to have been, in January 1998,
I would immediately have been invited to participate in the share option scheme, in accordance with the normal practice in the company.
20.
To summarise:
Since July 1997 I have fulfilled my role as a member of the BD&P Department at
H/O.
On the basis on which I was initially seconded and the subsequent assurances given
to me by RLM, I would, but for purely arbitrary and bureaucratic delays, have been permanently appointed with effect from January
1998.
I was expressly assured that I would not be financially compromised as a result of
the delays in formalising my appointment.
21.
In the circumstances I cannot accept that I am not entitled to the same incentives as my colleagues,
some of whom joined the department after I did.
22.
The basis for Anglo Platinum’s code of ethics is “. . . a fundamental belief that business should be conducted honestly, fairly and legally. The Group expects all employees to share
its commitment to high moral, ethical and legal standards.” I humbly appeal to you for assistance to ensure that these values are also applied to me in my current situation.’ (p
903-908)
[44]
The other memo is the one by Menne to Geldenhuys dated 17 October 2001 to which reference was made earlier.
This memo is also a critical piece of evidence and I also find it necessary to cite it in full:
‘1.
I refer to your telephone call in late June, 2001 regarding APvJ’s inexplicably delayed
appointment to Anglo Platinum head office – and the impact this has had on his associated share option entitlement(s). The
purpose of this memorandum is to add further perspective to this unfortunate event and my involvement in same. It is believed that
APvJ has indeed been severely compromised by events beyond his control and the Corporation should redress the issue as soon as possible.
2.
By mid 1997 it had become apparent that the planning department of the Commercial Division
was severely under-resourced. As head of department, and with the agreement of the Commercial Director, Mr Emmett (“DTGE”),
I canvassed both “in house” and externally for an experienced mining engineer with the appropriate analytical skills
to assist with the extra workload of the department. The opportunity presented itself in the form of APvJ – then planning manager
at Union Section – and who indicated his interest at moving to head office. Furthermore, it was established that he could be
released from his current position by the Mine Manager (with the concurrence of the Operations Director). With the agreement of DTGE,
APvJ was offered a secondment to head office for a six-month probation period. If his performance proved to be satisfactory, he would
then be offered a permanent position in the department. The implication was always that any administrative procedures required would
follow timeously. APvJ accepted the offer on this basis.
3.
It should be stressed that APvJ was initially known to me only by reputation, which included
a published article on the inefficiencies of the gold mining industry which struck my colleagues and myself as particularly insightful
(if unpopular within the mining fraternity). Subsequent meetings with APvJ also reinforced my opinion of his suitability to contribute
to the department’s ongoing development of long term mining options (the so-called strategic planning initiative).
4.
Once at head office, APvJ soon demonstrated his value to the department. Such sentiments were
conveyed to him by myself who, in addition, advised DTGE that APvJ was indeed a major asset to the division and his appointment to
head office should be formalised forthwith. Unfortunately, a number of events conspired against any immediate action, including
(i)
the intense workload of the Planning Department (manifested by two additional appointments made
within APvJ’s probation period (PLB) and PEdP) to further strengthen the department’s resource base,
(ii)
my deteriorating health condition, and
(iii)
an executive decision in December 1997 to split the division as it then existed with Mr Dreyer (“JAD”)
accepting the position of executive director of the Business Development and Strategic Planning Division (in which the planning department
resided), while DTGE retained and further developed the Marketing Division.
5.
In discussions with JAD (DTGE no longer having executive control of planning), APvJ’s
delayed appointment was highlighted and recommendations were made that such be formalised. JAD – while appreciating APvJ’s
contribution to the department – requested patience from all parties while he reviewed his division’s function, and how
to best arrange and rationalise his resources. In any event, such was my interpretation of JAD’s position. Accordingly, it
was thus hardly appropriate for met to request that the Human Resources Division proceed with APvJ’s appointment at that time.
6.
Unfortunately, by mid 1998 my health had deteriorated to the extent that I applied for –
and was granted – disability status in October of that year. The intervening few months were extremely busy in finalising my
involvement with the current affairs of the department. To my discredit, I failed to secure APvJ’s appointment. Be that as
it may, I took no further part in the affairs of the Division/department from October 1998 onwards. I recall, however, urging the
new head of department, Dr Baxter, to accelerate the unsatisfactory state of affairs regarding APvJ, both with respect to a permanent
appointment and indeed, a merit promotion.