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Last Updated: 11 August 2004
THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
OF SOUTH
AFRICA
Case number : 38/03
In the matter between :
MAN TRUCK & BUS (SA) (PTY)
LIMITED APPELLANT
and
DORBYL LIMITED t/a DORBYL TRANSPORT
PRODUCTS AND BUSAF RESPONDENT
CORAM : MPATI DP, ZULMAN, FARLAM, CLOETE, LEWIS JJA
HEARD : 17 FEBRUARY 2004
DELIVERED : 25 MARCH 2004
Summary: Contractual obligations held to be reciprocal. A decision to refer motion
proceedings to evidence held not to be appealable.
JUDGMENT
CLOETE JA/
CLOETE JA:
INTRODUCTION
[1] The factual matrix against
which this appeal falls to be decided is the following. Africa Truck & Bus
(Pty) Limited (‘ATB’),
whose rights ultimately devolved upon the
appellant, entered into a lease agreement with Dusbus Leasing Co CC
(‘Dusbus’).
In terms of the lease agreement ATB leased 12 buses to
Dusbus for a period of 60 months and for a total consideration in excess of
R11
million, payable in instalments. ATB had manufactured the chassis of the buses
and a division of the respondent had supplied
the bodies, which had been
purchased from it by ATB for over R3 million. ATB further undertook to Dusbus,
in terms of a maintenance
agreement also concluded with Dusbus, to maintain the
buses for an agreed fee; and Dusbus agreed to make the buses available to ATB
to
enable this to be done.
[2] As ATB’s exposure in terms of the Dusbus
lease was significant, it concluded what has in these proceedings appropriately
been termed a ‘risk sharing agreement’ with the respondent. It is
the terms of that agreement, and in particular, clauses
4 and 5 thereof, which
lie at the heart of the dispute between the parties. (The references in the
agreement to ‘DTP’
are references to a division of the respondent.)
Clause 4 provides:
‘ATB will maintain, service and repair the 12 buses
under the terms of a maintenance agreement entered into by and between ATB
and
the debtor as far as the bus chassis are concerned. ATB will further make sure
that DTP can inspect the condition of the buses
from time to time but at least
every six months at the premises of ATB. Necessary other repairs will be carried
out at a workshop
dedicated by DTP, for the account of the
debtor.’
Clause 5 provides inter alia:
‘In the event of ATB
being required to re-possess the 12 buses under the lease agreement because the
Debtor fails to pay the
deposit, the accelerated instalment or/and any of the
monthly instalments or for any other reason DTP hereby undertakes to make
payment
of the guaranteed amount as defined per Par.6) to ATB within 7 days of
written notice to that effect being delivered by ATB on
DTP.’
[3] Dusbus defaulted by failing to pay instalments due in terms
of the lease agreement and the buses were repossessed. The appellant,
as the
successor in title to ATB’s rights, sued the respondent for payment of the
guaranteed amount. That amount was defined
in accordance with a formula set out
in clause 6 of the agreement.
[4] The guaranteed amount was calculated by
the appellant at over R1,4 million and the appellant, as applicant, instituted
motion
proceedings against the respondent for payment of this amount, interest
and costs. The court of first instance (Jordaan AJ) granted
such an order. On
appeal, the full court of the Witwatersrand Local Division (Cachalia J, Marais J
and Jajbhay AJ concurring) set
the order aside and referred the matter for the
hearing of oral evidence. The formulation of the issues was, by agreement, left
to
the parties and the full court required this formulation to be referred back
to it by a fixed date. Special leave to appeal further
was subsequently granted
by this court.
THE ISSUES
[5] The dispute between the parties has
essentially three facets:
(a) Did ATB, in terms of clause 4 of the risk
sharing agreement, undertake vis-à-vis the respondent to maintain the
buses in
terms of the maintenance agreement between ATB and Dusbus?
(b) If
so, was this undertaking reciprocal to the respondent’s obligation to pay
ATB the guaranteed amount if Dusbus defaulted
in its obligations in terms of the
lease agreement between ATB and Dusbus?
(c) If so, should the full
court’s decision to refer the matter for the hearing of oral evidence, be
set aside?
I shall deal with each question in turn.
OBLIGATION TO
MAINTAIN
[6] It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that the first
sentence of clause 4 of the risk sharing agreement was merely a recital
similar
to the recitals in clauses 1 to 3 of that agreement and that it imposes no
obligation on ATB to maintain the buses in terms
of the maintenance agreement.
There are three reasons why this argument is fallacious.
[7] First, there is
a clear change in language in clause 4 when contrasted with the language used in
clauses 1 to 3. Those latter
clauses begin:
‘1. ATB has entered into 12
Lease Agreements with “Dusbus Leasing cc...
2. ATB purchased the
adequate 12 bus bodies from BUSAF, a division of “DTP”...
3. DTP
is aware of the contents of the lease agreement...’
Clauses 1 to 3 are
obviously recordals. But the language of clause 4 is different. It does not
begin ‘ATB has undertaken to
Dusbus to maintain’. It begins
‘ATB will maintain’. These latter words are indicative of an
obligation undertaken
to the respondent to be performed in the future, not a
recordal of an obligation already undertaken by ATB to Dusbus. There was some
discussion during argument as to the content of the obligation undertaken by ATB
to the respondent. I do not appreciate the difficulty.
Clause 10 of the risk
sharing agreement expressly conferred the right on the respondent, in the event
of ATB breaching any of the
terms of that agreement, and provided seven days
written notice was given, to enforce the agreement by way of specific
performance
or to cancel the agreement and institute damages for its breach.
ATB’s obligation to the respondent was to comply with the
contract it had
with Dusbus. It is for that very reason that the second sentence of clause 4 of
the risk sharing agreement imposes
an obligation on ATB to make sure that the
respondent could inspect the condition of the buses from time to
time.
[8] Secondly, it was, correctly, conceded on behalf of the appellant in
argument that the second and third sentences of clause 4 impose
obligations on
respectively ATB and the respondent ─ in the case of the former, to ensure
that the respondent could inspect
the buses from time to time; and in the case
of the latter, to carry out ‘necessary other repairs’ (which
obviously means
repairs other than the repairs to be performed by ATB in terms
of the maintenance agreement. That obligation was owed to ATB, not
to Dusbus as
is suggested in para [35] of the judgment of my learned colleague Lewis JA). The
language is the same in each case:
the word ‘will’ is used. It would
therefore be strange if the first sentence, which uses the same language, was
merely
a recordal of a past event and the two sentences which follow impose
positive obligations for the future. But what is decisive in
the language used
is that the second sentence, which clearly imposes an obligation on ATB, begins
‘ATB will further’.
The plain meaning is that an additional
obligation is being undertaken. The question ‘additional to what?’
receives an
obvious reply: additional to the obligation in the first
sentence.
[9] Thirdly, the creation of an obligation on the part of ATB
vis-à-vis the respondent to comply with its obligation to Dusbus
would
make commercial sense. The respondent was obliged to pay the guaranteed amount
if the buses were repossessed. If this took
place, the buses were, in terms of
clause 7 of the agreement, to be sold and the profit or loss was to be shared as
to 29,5 per cent
by the respondent and 70,5 per cent by ATB. The exposure of the
respondent was therefore significant. If the cause of Dusbus’s
default was
lack of maintenance of the buses by ATB, the respondent would in effect be
guaranteeing ATB’s default and agreeing
to bear part of the consequences
of that default ─ unless ATB undertook vis-à-vis the respondent to
maintain the buses
in accordance with the maintenance agreement.
[10] I
therefore conclude that ATB, in terms of clause 4 of the risk sharing agreement,
did undertake vis-à-vis the respondent
to maintain the buses in terms of
the maintenance agreement between ATB and Dusbus.That brings me to a
consideration of the next
question, namely, whether the obligations in the first
sentence of paragraph 4 are reciprocal to the obligations in paragraph 5 of
the
risk sharing agreement.
RECIPROCITY OF OBLIGATIONS
[11] The
appellant’s counsel advanced an argument as to the reciprocity of the
obligations which it would be convenient to dispose
of at the outset. The
argument was that the lease agreement contained a clause which provided that
Dusbus would not be entitled to
withhold payment of any rentals for any reason
whatsoever; and that the maintenance agreement provided that Dusbus had to pay
the
charges due in terms of that agreement without deduction or set off. The
suggestion was that, because of these clauses, Dusbus was
not entitled to raise
the exceptio non adimpleti contractus against the appellant for payments
due under either the lease or the maintenance agreement. It is not necessary to
analyse the effect
of these clauses. Assuming that counsel is correct, any
limitation of the rights of Dusbus in terms of its contracts with ATB cannot
enure to the benefit of ATB or its successor in title, the appellant, in terms
of its separate contract with the respondent. Put
conversely, the fact that the
risk sharing agreement made ATB’s obligations owed to Dusbus in terms of
the maintenance agreement
enforceable against ATB at the suit of the respondent,
does not mean that the respondent’s rights were limited in the same
way
that Dusbus’s rights may have been. Any limitations on Dusbus’s
rights in its contracts with ATB were, so far as
ATB’s contract with the
respondent is concerned, res inter alios acta.
[12] The essential
question in this part of the inquiry is whether the respondent’s
obligation to pay ATB the guaranteed amount
was reciprocal to ATB’s
obligation to the respondent to maintain the buses under the maintenance
agreement. In contracts which
create rights and obligations on each side, it is
basically a question of interpretation whether the obligations are so closely
connected
that the principle of reciprocity applies: B K Tooling (Edms) Bpk v
Scope Precision Engineering (Edms) Bpk 1979 (1) SA 391 (A) at 418B and
authorities there quoted. Where a contract is bilateral the obligations on the
two sides are prima
facie reciprocal, unless the contrary intention clearly
appears from a consideration of the terms of the contract: Rich and Others v
Lagerwey 1974 (4) SA 748 (A) at 761 in fine─762A; Grand Mines (Pty)
Limited v Giddey NO 1999 (1) SA 960 (SCA) at 971C─D. (The reference to
Grand Mines is to the minority judgment of Schutz JA but it is not in
conflict with the majority on this point ─ cf 966C.) But reciprocity
of
debt in law does not exist merely because the obligations which are claimed to
be reciprocal arise from the same contract and
each party is indebted in some
way to the other. A far closer, and more immediate correlation than that is
required: Minister of Public Works and Land Affairs and Another v Group Five
Building Ltd 1996 (4) SA 280 (A) at 288E─F. The overriding
consideration is the intention of the parties; and the question whether the
performance
of respective obligations was reciprocal, depends upon the intention
of the parties as evident from the terms of their agreement
seen in conjunction
with the relevant background circumstances: Grand Mines at 966C─E
and authorities there quoted.
[13] In the risk sharing agreement, the
obligation on the respondent at issue is to make payment of the guaranteed
amount if the buses
are repossessed. That was the whole purpose of the
agreement; clause 1 says so, in terms:
‘It is the purpose of this
agreement to record the shared risk to be borne by the parties in relation to
the lease agreements
pertaining to the buses in the instance of any default by
the “Debtor” on any or all of the leases and/or upfront
payments.’
Maintenance of the buses was important to the respondent. If
they were not maintained properly, they could not be used to best advantage
by
the lessee, Dusbus, and this would adversely affect their revenue earning
capacity ─ so increasing the possibility of a
default by Dusbus, a
repossession by ATB and the consequent obligation on the respondent to pay the
guaranteed amount. Maintenance
of the buses was equally important if the
repossession had nothing to do with lack of maintenance of the buses by ATB. As
I have
already said, in the event of repossession, the amounts recoverable by
the respondent in terms of clause 7 of the agreement would
be adversely affected
or the respondent’s loss would be increased, if the buses had not been
maintained. As a matter of commercial
reality it is therefore overwhelmingly
probable that the parties intended that the respondent’s obligation to pay
the guaranteed
amount would be in exchange for, and therefore reciprocal to,
ATB’s obligation to maintain the buses in terms of the maintenance
agreement. Indeed, ATB’s obligation to maintain the buses (and the
ancillary obligation to make the buses available to the
respondent for
inspection) was the only obligation it owed the respondent in terms of the risk
sharing agreement. I respectfully
point out that the contract does not, as the
appellant’s counsel contended, provide that the obligation on the
respondent to
pay the guaranteed amount was undertaken in return for the
financial outlay made by ATB in paying for the buses. It is also important
to
emphasize that, for the reasons given in paras [6] to [9] above, ATB owed a duty
enforceable by the respondent to maintain the
buses in terms of ATB’s
contract with Dusbus. That vital fact is, with respect, not accorded sufficient
weight by Lewis JA
in para [53] of her judgment. To paraphrase the reasoning of
Colman J in Rich (753 in fine) approved by this court (762A), this
does not appear to be a contract whereunder the respondent undertook,
unconditionally, to part
with a substantial sum of money merely because ATB had
made a promise to it. I accordingly respectfully disagree with the approach
of
Lewis J in para [38] of her judgment.
[14] To sum up: the risk sharing
agreement was a bilateral agreement. The obligations of the parties were
therefore prima facie reciprocal.
No contrary intention appears from the terms
of the contract read in conjunction with the relevant background circumstances
─
indeed, the probabilities are that that is precisely what they intended.
I accordingly conclude, to use the words of Corbett J in
ESE Financial
Services (Pty) Limited v Cramer 1973 (2) SA 805 (C) at 809D─E, that
the first sentence of clause 4 of the risk sharing agreement and clause 5
thereof do constitute
‘such a relationship between the obligation to be
performed by the one party and that due by the other party as to indicate
that
one was taken in exchange for the performance of the other’.
[15] In
view of the considerable reliance placed by the appellant’s counsel on the
decision of the majority in Grand Mines and in particular, the phrase
‘reciprocal obligations in the strict sense’ used by Smalberger JA
at 967D, it would be
appropriate to analyse that decision in a little detail.
The facts are adequately set out in the headnote as follows:
The respondent,
as the liquidator of B, had sued the appellant in terms of a contract between B
and the appellant. In terms of the
contract B mined coal from a site owned by
the appellant and delivered it to the appellant. The amount to be paid to B was
calculated
on the 25th of each month and paid one month later. It was
a term of the contract that B was obliged to rehabilitate the site, which was an
opencast
mine, during the course of the mining. There had been no programme of
rehabilitation agreed between the parties nor had one been
laid down by the
Inspector of Mines. Prior to its liquidation B had fallen behind with the
rehabilitation, such that it had not complied
with its obligations in this
regard. In defence to the respondent’s action for payment for coal already
mined and delivered
the appellant had raised the exceptio non
adimpleti contractus, averring that B’s obligation to rehabilitate the
site was reciprocal to its obligation to pay.
Both judgments in the case
restated the general rule that the principle of reciprocity would normally apply
to a contract of letting
and hiring (966C; 971D). The majority found that the
intention of the parties was nevertheless that B’s obligation to
rehabilitate
was not reciprocal to the appellant’s obligation to pay. The
reasons for this conclusion appear from the passage at 966H─967D
as
follows:
‘Clause 2 of the agreement provided for measurement and the
payment clause (clause 5) stipulated that “month-end will
be the
25th of each month and payment is to be made by the 25th
of the following month”.
The effect of the agreement was that Grand
Mines was obliged, on the 25th of each month, and on presentation of
an invoice, to pay, at the stipulated rate, for all coal mined, measured and
delivered by the
25th of the preceding month. Its obligation to pay
was fixed both in relation to a date and a formula, and the amount payable by it
was
readily ascertainable. Payment due was calculated according to the tonnage
of coal delivered ─ the extent to which rehabilitation
had taken place did
not enter into the equation in determining payment. By contrast, rehabilitation
was an ongoing process permitting
of a degree of flexibility and latitude, to be
conducted in phases, with no dates, schedules or any other specific criteria
laid
down for or regulating its performance. The circumstances of opencast
mining are such that, to the knowledge of the parties, rehabilitation
of the
area in respect of which coal was removed and delivered, and payment called for,
could not always have preceded or occurred
simultaneously with the time fixed
for payment. Furthermore, given the nature and requirements of rehabilitation,
practical difficulties
could be anticipated in attempting to establish from
month-end to month-end (as defined) whether rehabilitation was up to date. In
short, while there was an agreed formula correlating mining and delivery of coal
with payment, there was no corresponding formula
governing the relationship
between rehabilitation and payment suggesting that the performance of the one
was intended to be in return
for the other.’
Smalberger JA then
continued at 967D:
‘Having regard to these considerations I am of the
view that the parties, notwithstanding the bilateral nature of their contract
and the degree of interdependence between payment and rehabilitation, could not
have intended that they would be reciprocal obligations
in the strict
sense.’
This latter passage must not be taken as laying down a new test
for reciprocity. All that the dictum means is that, although there were
bilateral obligations, the obligation to rehabilitate was not reciprocal to the
obligation to
pay.
[16] Counsel representing the appellant submitted that
there were four similarities between the facts in the present matter and those
in Grand Mines. The first was formulated as follows:
‘Payment of
the guaranteed amount is fixed both in relation to an event (i.e. repossession,
inter alia, “for any reason”) and a formula. This
event and formula take no account of whether ATB has performed its obligation to
maintain the buses.
No specific penalty is prescribed for failure to comply with
the obligation to maintain the buses other than the ability of the Respondent
to
invoke the general breach clause, something which it never did.’
But
Grand Mines did not hold that the obligation to rehabilitate was not
reciprocal to the obligation to pay, simply because there was no formula
regulating payment in respect of the obligation to rehabilitate. Grand
Mines held that because there was a monthly obligation to pay for coal
mined, measured and delivered, which was fixed in relation to a
date and a
formula, whereas there was no such formula in respect of the obligation to
rehabilitate, the parties could not have intended
the obligation to rehabilitate
to be reciprocal to the obligation to pay. It was the contrast which was vital
to the decision of
the majority. In the present matter the facts are entirely
different. The respondent was obliged to make a one-off payment if the
buses
were repossessed. The appellant was obliged, over a period of time, to maintain
the buses in accordance with the maintenance
agreement. There is simply no basis
for holding that the obligations are not reciprocal. And the absence of a
penalty clause begs
the question: if the respondent’s obligation to pay
the guaranteed amount was reciprocal to the appellant’s obligation
to
maintain the buses in terms of the maintenance agreement, there would be no need
for such a clause ─ the respondent could
resist a demand for payment on
the basis of the exceptio non adimpleti contractus.
[17] Lewis JA in
para [48] of her judgment quotes a passage from Ese Financial Services
and concludes:
‘One would have expected the risk-sharing agreement in
this case likewise to have spelled out in clear terms that, in the event
of ATB
failing to maintain the buses, it would not be entitled to payment of the
guaranteed amount.’
With respect, I disagree. In Ese Financial
Services there were two obligations on the defendant: to pay a fee to the
plaintiff for the management of the defendant’s investment
portfolio; and
to pay a bonus equivalent to one-sixth of the capital appreciation of the
portfolio in excess of ten per cent. The
former obligation was obviously
dependent on the plaintiff’s performance of its obligation to manage the
portfolio. The latter
was held not to be so dependent. It was in this context
that Corbett J made the remarks at 810H─811A quoted by Lewis JA,
namely:
‘Had the parties intended the payment of the bonus to depend,
as a precondition, not only upon the achievement of the required
capital
appreciation but also upon the satisfactory performance by plaintiff of its duty
of management, then one would have expected
the contract to have reflected this
in clear terms.’
The present is not an analogous case. As I have
already pointed out, the obligation which ATB undertook vis-à-vis the
respondent
to maintain the buses in terms of the maintenance agreement was the
only obligation undertaken by ATB to the respondent in terms
of the risk sharing
agreement.
[18] The third similarity between the facts in Grand Mines
and the present appeal relied upon by the appellant’s counsel was
formulated as follows:
‘Maintenance of the buses is by definition not
something which can take place simultaneously with payment of the guaranteed
amount upon repossession of the buses. In theory, repossession of the buses
could occur even before any bus has been brought in for
its first
service.’
But it is trite that the mere fact that one party has to
perform first and in full, does not mean that the other party’s obligation
cannot be reciprocal. And if a bus were to be repossessed before it had been
brought in for its first service, that would mean that
there would be no room
for the exceptio. It does not mean that the obligation to maintain in
terms of the maintenance agreement cannot be reciprocal to the obligation to
pay.
[19] The second and fourth similarities relied upon by the
appellant’s counsel were said to be the following (the italicised
quotations are from the passage in Grand Mines set out in para [15]
above):
‘The obligation to maintain the buses (to the extent that it
can be interpreted as an obligation owed to the Respondent and
not to the
lessee, Dusbus) is an obligation required to be performed as an
“ongoing process permitting a degree of flexibility and latitude
“ over a protracted period of time. The obligation to pay the guaranteed
amount is not.’
And:
‘As in the Grand
Mines’ case, “given the nature and
requirements” of bus maintenance “practical difficulties
could be anticipated in attempting to establish” at the time when
payment of the guaranteed amount is demanded that maintenance is “up to
date”.... Will a failure
to effect a proper oil change enable the
Respondent to escape an obligation in excess of R1 million?.... If a service is
conducted
two days late, does that trigger the exceptio?’
These
arguments are also without merit. In Grand Mines the majority did not
hold that the obligation to rehabilitate was not reciprocal to the obligation to
pay simply because of practical
difficulties. It held that the difficulties in
ascertaining whether the obligation to rehabilitate was up to date, in contrast
with
the fixed and definite formula correlating mining and delivery of coal with
payment, militated against a finding that the obligation
to rehabilitate was
reciprocal to the obligation to make payment. If the appellant’s argument
were correct, it would mean that
the majority decision in Grand Mines
would be authority for the proposition that, in a contract of locatio
conductio operis where A undertook to maintain B’s fleet of motor
vehicles and B undertook to pay A each month for doing so, the obligations
of
the parties are not reciprocal because it would be difficult to ascertain
whether the maintenance was up to date at the end of
each month ─ which
plainly is not the law.
[20] In conclusion on this aspect: the attempt by the
appellant’s counsel to find similarities between the facts in Grand
Mines and the facts in the present matter overlooks the reasoning of the
majority, which was that obligations contained in a contract of
locatio
conductio operis are prima facie reciprocal; but that on the particular
facts of that case the intention of the parties was that the obligation to
rehabilitate was not to be reciprocal to the obligation to pay. In the present
matter, for the reasons given in paragraph [13] above,
the intention of the
parties as a matter of commercial probability must have been that the obligation
on the respondent to pay the
guaranteed amount was reciprocal to ATB’s
obligation to maintain the buses in terms of the maintenance agreement. I agree,
with respect, with Lewis JA’s statement in para [52] of her judgment that
the materiality of an obligation does not render
it per se reciprocal.
But where, as here, both parties know that it is important to a party who may be
called upon to perform an obligation
that the other party should have performed
its obligation, the probabilities must be that the parties intended the latter
performance
to be reciprocal to the former.
REFERRAL TO
EVIDENCE
[21] It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that there was
not a sufficient dispute of fact to warrant the full court referring
the matter
for the hearing of oral evidence. The short answer to this submission is that
this direction is not appealable. It is
not a ‘judgment or order’
within the meaning of those words in s 20(1) of the Supreme Court Act, 59 of
1959. This court
held in Zweni v Minister of Law and Order 1993 (1) SA
523 (A) at 532J─533B:
‘A “judgment or order” is a
decision which, as a general principle, has three attributes, first, the
decision must
be final in effect and not susceptible of alteration by the Court
of first instance; second, it must be definitive of the rights
of the parties;
and third, it must have the effect of disposing of at least a substantial
portion of the relief claimed in the main
proceedings (Van Streepen &
Germs (Pty) Ltd [v Transvaal Provincial Administration 1987 (4) SA
569 (A)] at 586I─587B; Marsay v Dilley 1992 (3) SA 944 (A) at
962C─F). The second is the same as the oft-stated requirement that a
decision, in order to qualify as
a judgment or order, must grant definite and
distinct relief (Willis Faber Enthoven (Pty) Ltd v Receiver of Revenue and
Another 1992 (4) SA 202 (A) at 214D─G).’
The direction of the
full court that evidence be led, has none of these attributes. The position is,
for practical purposes, identical
to that dealt with in Union Government
(Minister of the Interior) and Registrar of Asiatics v Naidoo 1916 AD 50. In
that matter, a single judge of the Transvaal Provincial Division directed an
application made upon motion to stand
over for the production of oral evidence.
Both parties consented in writing to an appeal being had direct to the Appellate
Division.
The court held that special leave to appeal was necessary, but, as no
order had been made upon the motion, an application for such
leave was premature
and should be refused. Innes CJ said at 52:
‘There has been an
application for relief, but no decision upon it. The prayer of the petition
falls under nine separate heads,
and in regard to none of them has any order
been made. The application has merely been postponed for further evidence. When
the enquiry
is resumed the judge may decide in favour of the present applicants
on the facts; or he may possibly, though very improbably, revise
his view of the
law upon further argument. But if he does neither; if he finds against the
applicants on the law and the facts, and
grants the relief prayed for, it will
then be competent for them to appeal and to raise every point upon which they
now wish to rely.
The fact is that the present application is for leave to
appeal not against the order of the learned judge ─ for he has made
none
─ but against his reasons. It is entirely premature, and must at this
stage be refused.’
CONCLUSION
[22] The appeal is dismissed
with costs, including the costs of two counsel.
_______________
T D CLOETE
JUDGE OF APPEAL
Concur: Mpati DP
Zulman JA
Farlam JA
LEWIS JA
[23] The central issue in this appeal is whether obligations
undertaken by the parties under a so-called ‘risk-sharing agreement’
were reciprocal, such that malperformance by the appellant entitled the
respondent to raise the exceptio non adimpleti contractus as a defence
against a claim for payment in terms of the contract. If the obligations are
found to be reciprocal, the second issue
arises, namely whether there are
factual disputes between the parties which preclude the matter being decided
without the hearing
of evidence.
[24] The court of first instance,
although finding that the obligations were reciprocal, such that the
exceptio would avail the respondent in the event of malperformance on the
part of the appellant, considered that there was not clear evidence
before it
that the appellant was guilty of a failure to perform, and granted the
application. On appeal with the leave of the court,
a full bench (Johannesburg
High Court, per Cachalia J, Marais J and Jhajbhay J concurring) agreed with the
court below on the issue
of reciprocity, but referred the matter to oral
evidence for the determination of what it considered to be disputes of fact on
the
nature of the appellant’s performance. Special leave to appeal against
these findings was granted by this court.
Background
[25] The appellant is the cessionary of rights under
the risk-sharing contract originally between Africa Truck & Bus (Pty) Ltd
(‘ATB’) and the respondent. That contract was one of several
concluded between various parties at much the same time,
and which formed part
of what was essentially one commercial transaction. Those germane to the dispute
between the parties included
a contract of lease between ATB and Dusbus Leasing
CC (‘Dusbus’), under which ATB let to Dusbus 12 buses for a period
of 60 months. ATB entered into a further contract with Dusbus undertaking to
maintain the buses during the currency of the lease.
ATB was the manufacturer of
the bus chassis. The respondent supplied the bus bodies. The risk-sharing
contract was concluded because
of the exposure to risk of ATB in terms of the
lease. I shall deal with this aspect later.
[26] The buses were
delivered to Dusbus, which in due course failed to make two monthly payments, in
February and in May 1999. The
lease was accordingly cancelled in May 1999, and
the buses repossessed, by a finance company in which the rights vested at the
time.
The appellant, in whom the rights under the lease and the risk-sharing
agreement vested pursuant to cessions from the finance company
and ATB, demanded
payment of the sum guaranteed by the respondent under the risk-sharing
agreement. The exceptio was raised by the respondent as its principal
defence: ATB had failed to maintain the buses in accordance with the terms of
the maintenance
agreement, and in accordance with an obligation undertaken to
the respondent in the risk-sharing agreement so to do. It could thus
not claim
performance from the respondent.
The salient terms of the agreements
The lease
[27] Dusbus hired the buses on the basis that it would pay rental to
ATB in accordance with a schedule attached to the lease. Clause 8.1
provided:
‘The Lessee shall pay the Lessor as rental for the use of the
Goods [the buses], the amounts specified in the First Schedule
at the time or
times therein stipulated. All payments in terms of this Agreement shall be made
without deductions of any kind . .
. .’
Clause 8.2
stated:
‘As long as this Agreement remains in force the Lessee
shall not be entitled to withhold payment of any rentals for any reason
whatsoever. Without derogating from the generality of the aforegoing the
Lessee shall not be entitled to withhold payment of any rental by reason of the
fact that the Goods are defective, have been damaged
or cannot be operated or
used or have been lost or stolen or that the Seller [the definition in the
contract includes the manufacturer of the goods or the seller
of the goods to
the lessor] or anyone else has failed to make good any breach or fulfil any
warranty or representation and in the
event of any dispute arising between the
parties, the Lessee shall, pending settlement of or a decision in such dispute,
continue to pay all rentals and other amounts payable in terms hereof on
their due dates for payment as set out in the First Schedule
on the basis
however that no such payment shall derogate from any liability of the
Lessor.’ (My emphasis.)
The maintenance agreement
[28] This contract, also between ATB and Dusbus, imposed on ATB obligations
to maintain and to service the buses at regular intervals
during the currency of
the lease. In turn, Dusbus was liable to make the buses available for inspection
and repair and to use the
buses in a fashion regulated by the contract. Clause
4.5 of the contract provided that Dusbus would pay to ATB the charges calculated
in terms of the agreement monthly ‘without deduction or
set-off’.
The risk-sharing agreement
[29] Although the contract was referred to by the appellant, during the
course of the litigation, as a ‘risk-sharing agreement’
counsel for
the appellant submitted at the hearing of the appeal that it was more
appropriately termed a ‘guarantee agreement’.
In my view, nothing
turns on the label of the agreement and I shall refer to it as the
‘risk-sharing agreement’. It is
this agreement that is the crux of
the dispute.
[30] This contract was concluded between ATB and the
respondent. It records, in clause 1, that ATB had entered into the lease with
Dusbus in respect of the 12 buses with an ‘aggregate net asset
value’ of R7 385 832, payable over six months. The clause
continues:
‘It is the purpose of this agreement to record the shared
risk to be borne by the parties in relation to the lease agreements
pertaining
to the buses in the instance of any default by the “Debtor” [Dusbus]
on any or all of the leases and/or upfront
payments.’
[31] Clause 2
records that ATB had purchased the buses from BUSAF, a division of the
respondent, for the sum of R3 111 721.20; that
sum represented 42,13 per cent of
the ‘total net asset value of the buses’. Clause 3 set out the
details of the payment
schedule. It is clause 4 that is central to this
dispute. It reads
‘ATB will maintain, service and repair the 12 buses
under the terms of a maintenance agreement entered into by and between ATB
and
the debtor as far as the bus chassis is concerned. ATB will further make sure
that DTP [the respondent] can inspect the condition
of the buses from time to
time but at least every six months at the premises of ATB. Necessary other
repairs will be carried out
at a workshop dedicated by DTP, for the account of
the debtor.’
[32] Clause 5 provides that in the event of ATB
having to repossess the buses because of Dusbus’s failure to pay the
deposit
or any instalment due in terms of the lease, on the receipt of written
notice to this effect, the respondent will pay to ATB a ‘guaranteed
amount’ determined in accordance with clause 6. Clause 6 sets out a
formula for the determination of the amount, and it is
this sum that the
appellant claims from the respondent. Clause 10 sets out the remedies of the
parties in the event of breach: on
notice to the other party to remedy any
breach, either party may demand specific performance or cancel and claim damages
for the
breach.
[33] The respondent relies on the breach of the
obligation to maintain the buses said to have been imposed on ATB by clause 4
in
asserting that the appellant cannot claim the guaranteed amount. At no stage
did the respondent call upon ATB to remedy any breach,
nor did it seek to cancel
the contract, in terms of clause 10.
The meaning of clause 4 of the
risk-sharing agreement
[34] The appellant argues that clause 4, or at
least the first sentence of the clause, is no more than part of a preamble to
the contract,
recording the contractual arrangements between ATB and Dusbus. An
examination of the contract does indeed reveal that the first three
clauses
recite the background against which the contract is concluded. But the fourth
clause is more difficult to classify as introductory,
or as a simple recital.
The first sentence states that ‘ATB will maintain, service and
repair the 12 buses under the maintenance agreement’. The second sentence
reads ‘ATB will further make sure that DTP can inspect the
condition of the buses from time to time but at least every six months at the
premises of ATB’. The
third sentence is of a different ilk:
‘Necessary other repairs will be carried out at a workshop dedicated by
DTP, for the
account of the debtor [Dusbus]’.
[35] The respondent
argues that the wording of the first sentence clearly indicates that ATB is
undertaking an obligation not only
to Dusbus but also to the respondent to
maintain the buses in terms of the maintenance agreement. The second sentence,
it contends,
is even clearer: ATB undertakes to make the buses available for
inspection. The third sentence, on the other hand, seems to impose
an obligation
on the respondent to Dusbus: other repairs will be done at a workshop
‘dedicated by DTP, for the account of the
debtor’. The nature of
this undertaking was not the subject of any debate and is not in
dispute.
[36] The first sentence, the respondent contended, could not
have been intended simply as a recital, when the second clearly imposes
an
obligation on ATB to make the buses available for inspection, and the third can
be read as imposing an obligation on the respondent.
It would be strange,
contended the respondent, to include in one clause a recital of background
relating to the maintenance agreement,
as well as two undertakings. The presence
of the two undertakings was further indicative of the conclusion that the first
sentence
also amounted to an undertaking.
[37] Counsel for the appellant
conceded that the second sentence does embody an obligation. And it was not
disputed that the third
sentence likewise required the respondent to effect
‘other repairs’ to the buses – presumably those not covered
by
the maintenance agreement.
[38] The clause is certainly not a model of
clarity. The context, and a reading of the three agreements together, suggest in
my view
that the first sentence was probably intended to mean no more than that
ATB had undertaken the obligation to maintain the buses to
Dusbus, and that it
would honour that undertaking. Its obligation to the respondent was not to
maintain the buses, but to comply
with the contract with Dusbus. But whatever
the intention may have been, the language used is not appropriate to a recital,
and is
different from the first three clauses which are clearly recordals.
[39] If clause 4 imposed an undertaking on ATB to the respondent to
maintain the buses, and if Dusbus had not defaulted in the payment
of rentals,
but ATB had failed to maintain the buses, or done so in an unacceptable fashion,
could the respondent, rather than Dusbus,
sue ATB for performance or to remedy
the defective performance? What would the content of the obligation be? Is it
simply an obligation
to comply with the contract with Dusbus? The respondent
argues that in effect the ‘relevant clauses’ of the maintenance
agreement are incorporated in the agreement between ATB and itself. The
respondent would, on that basis, have been entitled to claim
performance in
terms of the maintenance agreement between ATB and Dusbus.
[40] In my
view this is a very strained interpretation of the provision. It is highly
improbable that the parties, when reaching the
agreement, intended that the
respondent, rather than Dusbus, could enforce ATB’s obligation to Dusbus
to maintain the buses.
It is not necessary, however, to decide this point. For
even if the first sentence of clause 4 is construed as an undertaking to
the
respondent, can it be said that the respondent’s obligation to pay to the
appellant the guaranteed amount is dependent
on the appellant’s having
maintained the buses?
Are the obligations of the parties reciprocal?
[41] The court below, confirming the decision of the court of first instance
in this regard, held that the risk-sharing contract between
the parties was such
as to impose reciprocal obligations. Taking into account the wording of clauses
1, 2 and 3 of the contract,
the court concluded that the parties had intended
that ATB be indemnified only if it had fulfilled its obligations to Dusbus under
the maintenance agreement. It would not make commercial sense, said the court,
for Dusbus to enter into the lease if it had no guarantee
that the buses would
be maintained. Thus, concluded the court, because the obligations of the parties
were reciprocal, failure to
perform in terms of clause 4 – that is,
failure to maintain the buses in the respects alleged – entitled the
respondent
to raise the exceptio non adimpleti contractus.
[42] The general principles governing the determination whether obligations
of parties to a contract are reciprocal, such that the
exceptio may be
raised, have been set out most recently by this court in Grand Mines (Pty)
Ltd v Giddey NO 1999 (1) SA 960 (SCA), a case relied upon extensively by
both the courts below, and by counsel for the appellant. Smalberger JA,
delivering the judgment of the majority of the court (Schutz JA dissenting on
the facts) stated (at 965E-I):
‘Where the common intention of parties
to a contract is that there should be a reciprocal performance of all or certain
of their
respective obligations the exceptio operates as a defence for a
defendant sued on a contract by a plaintiff who has not performed, or tendered
to perform, such of his
obligations as are reciprocal to the performance sought
from the defendant. Interdependence of obligations does not necessarily make
them reciprocal. The mere non-performance of an obligation would not per
se permit of the exceptio; it is only justified where the obligation
is reciprocal to the performance required from the other party. The exceptio
therefore presupposes the existence of mutual obligations which are intended to
be performed reciprocally, the one being
the intended exchange for the other
. . . Furthermore, for the exceptio to succeed the plaintiff’s
performance must have fallen due prior to or simultaneously with that demanded
from the defendant.
. . . Whether or not obligations in terms of a contract
satisfy these requirements and are reciprocal in the above sense . . . is
ultimately a matter of interpretation. Provided the requirements for the
exceptio are met, it may equally be invoked in a contract where provision
is made for periodic performance or performance in instalments.’
(My
emphasis.)
See also ESE Financial Services (Pty) Ltd v Cramer 1973 (2)
SA 805 (C) especially at 808G-9G and Motor Racing Enterprises (Pty) Ltd (in
liquidation) v NPS (Electronics) Ltd 1996 (4) SA 950 (A) at 961E-H.
[43] Thus while bilateral contracts are generally presumed to
embrace reciprocal obligations, the parties may determine otherwise.
In general,
contracts of sale, lease and service are reciprocal: the seller must deliver the
goods before the buyer pays the price;
the lessor must provide vacant possession
of the goods or the premises before the lessee pays the rental; and the builder
or any
other service-provider must do the work before claiming payment. If there
is no performance then nothing is payable. But parties
very often do change the
usual consequences of the contract. Accordingly, even though there is a
presumption that fully bilateral
contracts impose reciprocal obligations, in
determining whether the exceptio will avail a defendant one must construe
the contract itself in order to determine the parties’ intention. And for
the obligation
to be reciprocal in the strict sense ‘there must be such a
relationship between the obligation to be performed by the one party
and that
due by the other party as to indicate that one was undertaken in exchange for
the performance of the other and, in cases
where the obligations are not
consecutive vice versa . . .’ (per Corbett J in Ese Financial
Services above at 809D-E).
[44] The appellant contends that if it has
an obligation to the respondent to maintain the buses, imposed on it by the
risk-sharing
agreement, it is not given in exchange for, and is not dependent
on, the obligation to pay a guaranteed amount on the repossession
of the buses.
The essence of the contract is that the respondent agrees to bear a share of the
risk undertaken by the appellant in
terms of the lease agreement with Dusbus. It
does so, argues the appellant, in return for the financial outlay made by ATB in
paying
for the buses (as recorded in clause 2 of the risk-sharing agreement).
That is reinforced by the statement in clause 1 that the ‘purpose
of this
agreement’ is to ‘record the shared risk to be borne by the parties
in relation to the lease agreement . . .
in the event of any default’ by
Dusbus.
[45] Any obligation to maintain the buses imposed on it, the
appellant argues, is reciprocal only to the obligation imposed in clause
4 on
the respondent to effect ‘other repairs’. In Grand Mines
above, which counsel for the appellant submitted was particularly instructive in
this case, this court found that the obligations
of the parties were not, in the
strict sense, reciprocal, and thus that performance from the one could be
claimed despite the failure
to perform by the other. The obligations of one
party, Bercon Mining, were to mine coal from a site, and, because the mine was
opencast,
to rehabilitate the site during the course of mining. The obligation
of the appellant was to pay a monthly sum to Bercon calculated
on the basis of
what had been mined the previous month. Bercon had fallen behind with its
rehabilitation (no programme for rehabilitation
had been agreed) and was thus in
breach of an obligation. When the liquidator of Bercon sued for payment the
appellant raised the
exceptio. In concluding that the obligations to pay
and to rehabilitate were not reciprocal, Smalberger JA said (at
966H-967E):
‘The effect of the agreement was that Grand Mines was
obliged, on the 25th of each month, and on presentation of an
invoice, to pay, at the stipulated rate, for all coal mined, measured and
delivered by the
25th of the preceding month. Its obligation to pay
was fixed both in relation to a date and a formula, and the amount payable by it
was
readily ascertainable. Payment due was calculated according to the tonnage
of coal delivered – the extent to which rehabilitation
had taken place did
not enter into the equation in determining payment. By contrast, rehabilitation
was an ongoing process permitting
of a degree of flexibility and latitude, to be
conducted in phases, with no dates, schedules or any other specific criteria
laid
down for or regulating its performance. The circumstances of opencast
mining are such that, to the knowledge of the parties, rehabilitation
of the
area in respect of which coal was removed or delivered, and payment called for,
could not always have preceded or occurred
simultaneously with the time fixed
for payment. Furthermore, given the nature and requirements of rehabilitation,
practical difficulties
could be anticipated in attempting to establish from
month-end to month-end (as defined) whether rehabilitation was up to date. In
short, while there was an agreed formula correlating mining and delivery of coal
with payment, there was no corresponding formula
governing the relationship
between rehabilitation and payment suggesting that performance of the one was
intended to be in return
for the other. Having regard to these considerations I
am of the view that the parties, notwithstanding the bilateral nature of their
contract and the degree of interdependence between payment and rehabilitation,
could not have intended that they would be reciprocal
obligations in the strict
sense. This would be in keeping with what would seem to have been the main
purpose of the parties in entering
into the agreement, viz, the mining and
delivery of coal for resale by Grand Mines and payment to Bercon for the
quantities of coal
delivered by it.’
[46] The appellant contends
that the similarities in this case to Grand Mines are significant. First,
payment of the guaranteed amount is fixed in relation to an event – the
repossession of the buses for
any reason. The payment guaranteed was fixed by
formula set out in clause 6 of the agreement. Second, the obligation of ATB to
maintain
the buses was ongoing and to be performed over the period of the lease.
Maintenance of vehicles by its nature cannot take place simultaneously
with
payment of an amount in the event of repossession. And it would be
impracticable to determine what maintenance was outstanding
at the time of
repossession. What degree of failure, asks the appellant, would justify the
refusal to pay the guaranteed amount?
[47] The appellant relies also on
Ese Financial Services (above) in which it was held that the obligation
to manage a share portfolio was not reciprocal to the payment of an amount on
the
occurrence of a particular event, the appreciation in value of the shares.
This amount was in the nature of a bonus and was payable
in the event of
‘a planned objective being achieved’: it was not, said the court (at
810E-G), payable as consideration
for the ‘satisfactory performance by the
plaintiff of its duty of management’. The satisfactory performance might
have
contributed to the achievement of the objective, but this was not
necessarily the case. Similarly, in this case, proper maintenance
of the buses
might have precluded Dusbus’s default: but the obligation to maintain the
buses could hardly be said to have been
given as consideration for
payment of the guaranteed amount.
[48] In Ese Financial Services
(at 810G-H) Corbett J pointed out that the appreciation of the investment might
have been achieved despite the ‘supine inactivity’
of the plaintiff
or because of its ‘perfect efficiency in administration’. But, he
continued (at 810H-811B):
‘Had the parties intended the payment of the
bonus to depend, as a precondition, not only upon the achievement of the
required
capital appreciation but also upon the satisfactory performance by
plaintiff of its duty of management, then one would have expected
the contract
to have reflected this in clear terms.’
One would have expected the
risk-sharing agreement in this case likewise to have spelled out in clear terms
that, in the event of
ATB failing to maintain the buses, it would not be
entitled to payment of the guaranteed amount.
[49] A further argument
adduced by the appellant is that the lease and maintenance agreements between
ATB and Dusbus both contain
clauses (set out above) requiring Dusbus to pay
rental and charges without deduction notwithstanding any failure in performance
by
ATB, and that these clauses throw light on the intention of the parties to
the risk-sharing agreement. Reciprocity was expressly
excluded in those
contracts, it was argued, and thus must be excluded in the risk-sharing
agreement too. If Dusbus is required to
pay no matter what, why should the
respondent be in a different position?
[50] In my view, however, the
risk-sharing agreement is completely different in nature from the lease and
maintenance agreements.
There were no regular payments to be made by any party.
Only one payment was to be made, by the respondent, if and only if the buses
were repossessed. One cannot thus infer from the exclusion of reciprocity in the
contracts between ATB and Dusbus any intention that
payment was to be made
despite the non-performance by ATB under the contract with the respondent.
[51] The respondent contends that the reciprocity of the obligation to maintain and the obligation to pay the guaranteed amount is to be found in the fact that the contract is bilateral: the respective obligations are accordingly presumptively reciprocal. Reciprocity is also to be found by having regard to the commercial context. The purpose of the risk-sharing contract was to spread the risk of the lease with Dusbus in the event of default by Dusbus. It was fundamental to the arrangement that the buses be properly maintained: if not, the risk would obviously be increased. That was why the parties agreed expressly, in clause 4, that ATB maintain the buses.
[52] This argument is flawed, in my view, for it assumes that the materiality of an obligation renders it per se reciprocal. That is not so. Obligations are reciprocal where the parties intend that the performance of the one obligation be dependent on, and given in exchange for, the performance of the other obligation. That the obligations are important does not make them dependent on nor given in exchange for their respective performances.
[53] I also do not accept the contention that, because the reason – the motive – for including the obligation to maintain the buses in the risk-sharing agreement was the wish to reduce the risk of default by Dusbus, the obligation became reciprocal to the respondent’s obligation to pay the guaranteed amount. The motive for including a term in a contract cannot affect the meaning of the term or the ordinary consequences of the contract. Put differently, the respondent might have assumed the risk only because there was a maintenance agreement between ATB and Dusbus in place. But it does not follow from that that the obligation to pay the guaranteed amount was dependent on an obligation to a different party (Dusbus) to maintain the buses.
[54] In my view, the respondent’s obligation to pay the guaranteed amount was not dependent on ATB’s obligation to maintain the buses. The respondent undertook to pay the guaranteed amount on repossession of the buses on Dusbus’s default or ‘for any reason’. The amount was guaranteed, and was payable on the happening of an event. The obligation to pay was absolute once the event occurred. ATB undertook to maintain the buses in a separate and independent maintenance agreement with another party – Dusbus. Maintenance was an ongoing operation throughout the currency of the lease. It was required to be performed irrespective of any obligation of the respondent to ATB. The obligations were accordingly not reciprocal in the sense required for the successful invocation of the exceptio.
[55] The conclusion reached does not have the effect of leaving the respondent without a remedy. Provided that there was indeed an obligation to the respondent imposed on ATB to maintain the buses, and if it can prove damages as a result of the failure to maintain the buses in terms of the maintenance agreement, then it will have a claim against the appellant. Clause 10, referred to earlier, sets out the remedies available to either party in the event of breach of the contract. But the respondent cannot escape payment by raising the appellant’s non-performance if any. Accordingly, it is in my view unnecessary to determine whether there were disputes of facts warranting a referral to evidence.
[57] I would uphold the appeal with costs, and order the respondent to pay the sum of R1 418 396.50; and interest on this sum at the rate of 15,5 per cent per annum from 7 July 2000 to date of payment.
C H Lewis
Judge of Appeal
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