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THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
OF SOUTH AFRICA
Reportable
Case No.110/99
In the matter
between:
McCARTHY RETAIL
LTD Appellant
and
SHORTDISTANCE CARRIERS
CC Respondent
Coram: SMALBERGER ADCJ, HARMS, OLIVIER, SCHUTZ and CAMERON JJA
Heard: 27 FEBRUARY 2001
Delivered: 16 MARCH 2001
JUDGMENT
HARMS JA/
HARMS JA:
[1] Although I agree with the order proposed I am, with
some diffidence, unwilling to concur with everything said in the judgment
of
Schutz JA. My hesitation flows from a number of considerations. Counsel were
prepared to argue the condictio sine causa and little else; although
seemingly an unusual case, upon reflection it becomes clear that the matter can
be accommodated under
well-established principles; and, I believe, this area of
the law should develop incrementally and not in leaps and bounds. That
does not
mean, however, that Schutz JA's prophetic views are incorrect.
[2] I agree
with him that the garage's case fits neatly within the niche of the action of
the bona fide occupier who expended money
and material on the improvement of
another's property (9 Lawsa re-issue par 102). There appears to me to be
no logical reason why A, who mistakenly believed that he had a contract with B,
is
entitled to an enrichment claim in respect of what he has expended on
improving B's property (Rubin v Botha 1911 AD 568) but not if he believed
that he had a contract with C (the effect of the judgment a quo). The
remaining question is whether the general requirements underlying all enrichment
actions are present. They are that (a) the
defendant must be enriched, (b) the
plaintiff must be impoverished, (c) the defendant's enrichment must be at the
expense of the
plaintiff and (d) the enrichment must be without cause (sine
causa), i e unjustified (op cit par 76).
[3] The owner did not
place the first two requirements in issue but concentrated on (d), as did the
trial Judge, and relied to a
lesser extent on (c). The Court below postulated
two scenarios. The first was based upon the finding (which is now accepted by
both parties) that the repudiation of liability under the insurance policy was
not justified. In that event, it held that the garage
-
“. . . would
have repaired the vehicle under the mistaken impression that it was doing so at
the request of the insurance company,
and the [owner] on the other hand received
the repaired vehicle in terms of its contract with the insurance company. It
thus received
the benefit for which it had paid its premiums and was not
unjustly enriched or enriched sine causa.”
In the alternative and on
the assumption that the insurer was entitled to repudiate, the same would apply
because -
“(t)he [owner] accepted delivery of the repaired vehicle
acting in terms of its contract with the insurance company. When delivery
was
taken the insurance company had not repudiated liability. The insurance policy
was the primary source of the performance of
the work and
enrichment.”
[4] These findings may by implication equate the sine
causa requirement with causation. Since the owner (or for that matter, the
insurer) had no right against the garage to have the vehicle
repaired and
because the garage had no other claim against either of them, the shift of
assets was without any legal ground and therefore
sine causa. We are not
concerned with what the position would have been had there been no repudiation
or if the insurer had given the garage
an instruction to repair because -
“[d]ie vraag of appellant deur die bewaring van die meubels deur die
respondent verryk is, moet in die lig van die omstandighede
wat in werklikheid
geheers het, bepaal word, en nie in die lig van omstandighede wat sou geheers
het indien mev. Bond nie in gebreke
sou gebly het om haar kontraktuele
verpligtings na te kom nie.
Waar, byvoorbeeld, die eienaar van 'n saak dit in
die sorg van 'n opsigter laat wat teenoor die eienaar teen vergoeding
kontraktueel
verbind is om dit te bewaar, en in gebreke bly om sy verpligtings
behoorlik na te kom, met die gevolg dat die saak aan beskadiging
blootgestel
word, kan die eienaar klaarblyklik nie teenoor die negotiorum gestor,
wat die saak in bewaring neem en uitgawes aangaan vir die behoud en beskerming
daarvan, aanvoer dat hy nie deur die bewaarneming
van die saak deur die
gestor verryk is nie aangesien hy die opsigter, wat kontraktueel verplig
was om die saak teen beskadiging te bewaar, reeds ten volle vir
sy bewaarneming
vergoed het. Hy sou ewe min kon beweer dat die bewaarneming deur die
gestor onnodig sou gewees het indien die opsigter nie in gebreke sou
gebly het nie om sy verpligtings na te kom.”
Per Botha JA in
Brooklyn House Furnishers (Pty) Ltd v Knoetze & Sons 1970 (3) SA 264
(A) 272A-D. The facts of that case are instructive. Mrs Bond had purchased
goods on hire-purchase from the appellant.
In breach of this contract she
entered into a storage agreement with the respondent. The latter was entitled
to assert a right
of retention (since Mrs Bond had failed to pay the storage
fees) against the appellant although, had Mrs Bond complied with her contract
with the appellant, the appellant would have stored the goods at less
cost.
[5] As far as causation is concerned, I agree with Schutz JA that the
enrichment of the owner was not juridically connected to the
insurance policy.
It took place regardless, and not because, of the existence of the policy. The
shift of assets occurred between
the garage and the owner and that indicates
that the owner was enriched at the expense of the garage. This view is in
conformity
with Brooklyn House (at 273 in fine - 274A):
“Dat
verryking van die eienaar ten koste van die besitter, wat die noodsaaklike of
nuttige uitgawes aangegaan het, 'n vereiste
vir die totstandkoming van so 'n
rentensiereg is, moet toegegee word. Dit is byna vanselfsprekend dat verryking
van die eienaar deur
die besteding van nuttige of noodsaaklike uitgawes aan die
saak, ten koste is van die persoon wat die uitgawes aangegaan het, en
na my
oordeel is dit, met betrekking altans tot die bestaan, al dan nie, van so 'n
retensiereg, nie ter sake nie dat die uitgawes
aangegaan is ingevolge 'n geldige
kontrak met 'n derde teen vergoeding.”
And at 275G-H:
“Dit sou
dus, met betrekking tot die vraag of 'n retensiereg teen die eienaar tot stand
gekom het, nie verkeerd wees nie om
te aanvaar dat, totdat die besitter deur
òf die eienaar òf die derde persoon behoorlik vergoed word, die
verryking
van die eienaar in werklikheid ten koste van die besitter is wat die
saak verbeter of bewaar het. In iedere geval, 'n besitter wat,
ingevolge so 'n
ooreenkoms met 'n derde, besit van die saak vir verbeterings of bewaring kry,
kom nie op onregmatige wyse in besit
daarvan nie, en bewaar of verbeter hy die
saak ten voordele van die eienaar, voldoen hy aan al die vereistes vir die
totstandkoming
van 'n retensiereg teen die eienaar.”
[6] The fact that
Brooklyn House was wrong to the extent that it held that a lien could
exist independently of an enrichment action (cf Buzzard Electrical (Pty) Ltd
v 158 Jan Smuts Avenue Investments (Pty) Ltd en 'n Ander 1996 (4) SA 19 (A)
26I-27C) and that these passages focus on liens, does not affect the validity of
the underlying principles. At
the end of the day the owner had the repaired
vehicle as well as a claim under the policy. His failure to have pursued the
claim
cannot be laid at the door of the garage.
_____________________
L T C HARMS
JUDGE OF APPEAL
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