[10]
In terms of sec 14(2)(b)(ii) of the MSA, if sec 14(1) of the MSA applied to a particular situation, the
sec 12 notice or any amendment of a sec 12 notice was required to regulate the legal, practical and other consequences of the total
or partial disestablishment of an existing municipality, including “the transfer of staff from the existing municipality to the superseding municipality, or if there is more than one superseding municipality,
to any of the superseding municipalities”. For the sake of completeness it can also be mentioned that what a sec 12 notice was required by sec 14(2)(b)(ii) to do in regard
to staff was also required by sec 14(2)(b)(iii) of the MSA in respect of “assets, liabilities, rights, obligations and administrative and other records.” In other words just as an MEC for local government could under sec 14(2)(b)(ii) transfer an employee from a disestablished
municipality to any one of a number of superseding municipalities - where there was one or more superseding municipalities –
which seems to suggest to me that the MEC could do this even against the employee’s will – the MEC could also transfer
an asset or liability of a disestablished municipality to any one of the superseding municipalities even against the wishes of either
the councillors or the personnel. One assumes that this would be permissible where to do so was in the public interest.
[11]
The question which arises is whether the MEC for Local Government in the North-West Province did transfer
the personnel previously employed by the Rustenburg Transitional Local Council, which included the appellant, to the superseding
Rustenburg Local Municipality by way of a sec 12 notice as contemplated in sec 14(1)(b)(ii) of the MSA. Item 8 of the sec 12 notice
dealt with the transitional provisions relating to personnel. I think that the transition contemplated therein was to be the period
from the entry of the personnel of a disestablished municipality in the employ of the superseding municipality pending the rationalisation
or restructuring of the superseding municipality to the end of such rationalisation. The end of the transitional period would, as
far as personnel were concerned, end when all the positions that had to be filled pursuant to the rationalisation were filled.
[12]
In paragraph 3 of his founding affidavit the appellant stated that “all assets and liabilities as well as all personnel of the erst- while Rustenburg Transitional Local Council (hereinafter referred
to as the TLC were transferred to the First Respondent.” In the same paragraph he said that “(t)his had been done (i)n terms of section 3 contained in the schedule to notice NO 428 of 2000 as published in the North West
Extraordinary Government Gazette NO 5634 dated 21 December 2000 as well as in terms of sections 7(1) and 7(2) contained in the schedule
to Notice No 316 of 2000, as published in the North West Extraordinary Government Gazette, No 55 74 dated 29 September 2000 proclaimed
in terms of Section 14(2)(b)(iii) of the mentioned Act on Local Government: Municipal Structures …”. In par 18 of its answering affidavit the first respondent stated that these allegations are not in dispute. This means that it is
common cause between the parties that all the personnel who were employed by the Rustenburg Transitional Local Council – which
included the appellant – were transferred into the first respondent’s employ. That is a transfer of personnel that the
MSA and the sec 12 notice referred to. Accordingly, this matter must be approached on the basis that upon the disestablishment of
the Rustenburg Transitional Local Council and the coming into existence and operation of the first respondent, the appellant was
transferred into the employ of the first respondent.
[13]
Item 8(1) of the sec 12 notice reads:
“Any person in the employ of the disestablished municipalities referred to in section 2(2) shall, in accordance with a determination
by the responsible member made after consultation with the affected municipalities and with effect from a date mentioned in such
determination, be transferred and placed in the service of the local municipality within the district area, on such terms and conditions
of service as are not less favourable under which such person previously served; Provided that –
a)
……
b)
…….
c)
…….
d)
Such person shall not, as a consequence of such transfer, acquire a right to retire or to be offered a severance or retrenchment package;
e)
…..
f)
…..
g)
…..
h)
Any person who refuses or withholds his or her consent to be transferred as contemplated by this section, shall not be entitled to
any severance benefit or benefits.
Provided, further, that the provisions of this subsection shall not prevent the municipality concerned from implementing a scheme
to re-organise its personnel subject to the Labour Relations Act, 1995 (Act No 66 of 1995).”
Item 8(2) of the sec 12 notice reads:
“(2)The employment of personnel referred to in subsection (1)-
a)
must be regularised in accordance with any collective agreement reached between the municipality concerned and the trade unions representing
those employees; and
b)
is subject to section 197 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 (Act No 66 of 1995).
Item 8(3)(a) provides that a determination contemplated in subsection (1) shall be published in the Provincial Gazette for information.
Item 8(3)(b) and (c) read thus:
“(b)
The effective date of a determination referred to in paragraph (a) may be a date prior to the date
of publication of a notice for information as contemplated in this subsection.
c)
The responsible Member may amend a determination contemplated in subsection (1)”
Item 8(4) reads thus:
“(4)
The local municipality referred to in section 2(1) may, by agreement with the relevant district municipality or any other local municipality
within the district municipal area and with effect from a date determined by such agreement, after due consultation with the relevant
trade union and with the consent of the employee concerned, transfer or second any of its employees to or place the services of any
such employee at the disposal of the district or local municipality concerned: Provided that in the event of a transfer such employee
shall be employed on such rights and privileges as are not less favourable than those applicable to him or her at the time of such
transfer.”
[14]
Subsequent to the establishment of the first respondent, the first respondent embarked upon a re-organisation
or rationalisation or restructuring to create posts which would be filled by employees. The employees who would fill such posts would
include the former employees of the Rustenburg Transitional Local Council. One does not need much imagination to understand that,
as there were two other municipalities which had been disestablished and were replaced by the first respondent, this was a situation
where for any post there could be two or three people who had previously occupied similar or corresponding posts in the disestablished
municipalities each of whom may have hoped to get either the corresponding post in the first respondent or a post as close as possible
to the one they had occupied in the disestablished municipalities. Obviously, the first respondent had to deal with the challenge
of how to accommodate all the employees from all the three disestablished municipalities. In most cases it would be impossible to
give each employee exactly the same post or position that he or she had occupied in the relevant disestablished municipality. All
that the first respondent could realistically be expected to do was to make employees reasonable offers of employment in certain
positions. It would never succeed if it sought to satisfy every employee in respect of every issue. It is now necessary to consider
the events which occurred subsequent to the disestablishment of the three municipalities and the establishment of the first respondent
in so far as they are relevant to this matter.
[15]
In 1973 the appellant was employed by the Rustenburg Town Council. Later the Rustenburg Town Council
was disestablished and replaced by the Rustenburg Transitional Local Council. This was in the post – 1994 period. The capacity
in which the appellant had been employed by the Rustenburg Town Council was that of Assistant Town Engineer (Water and Sewerage Section)
until 1974 when he was promoted to the position of Deputy Town Engineer. In 1989 he was promoted to the position of City Engineer:
Civil Services. That was the position that the appellant occupied on the 5th or 6th December 2000 at the time of the disestablishment of the Rustenburg Transitional Local Council and the establishment of the first
respondent.
[16]
In his founding affidavit the appellant referred to an agreement that was concluded on the 31st October 2000 between, on the one hand, the North-West Government Association (“NORWELOGA”), of which the first respondent was, at all material times, a member, and, on the other, the South African Municipal Workers Union
(“SAMWU”) and the Independent Municipal Association of Trade Unions (“IMATU”). The appellant was at all material times a member of IMATU. A copy of that agreement was annexed as “NP1” to the appellant’s founding affidavit.
[17]
In the record there is an advisory arbitration award that was issued by an arbitrator who had been asked
by either all or at least some of the parties who had signed the “NP1” agreement to give an advisory arbitration award on a number of issues. The fact that the award is an advisory one means that
it is not binding on any of the parties thereto. One of the issues on which the arbitrator had been asked to give an opinion was
whether or not the “NP1” agreement is a collective agreement. The arbitrator concluded that the “NP1” agreement is not a collective agreement. Obviously, no court is bound by that conclusion. Indeed, as I have said, that conclusion
is not binding even on the parties to that advisory award.
[18]
The arbitrator who issued the advisory award based his conclusion in this regard on the provisions of
the constitution of the South African Local Government Bargaining Council, particularly clause 3.2 thereof read with clause 3.1.
In terms of clause 3.2 collective agreements in the bargaining council must be concluded at a certain level. The arbitrator stated
that this had not been complied with in the case of the “NP1” agreement. For this reason he concluded that the “NP1”
agreement was not a collective agreement.
[19]
I am not certain whether the terms of reference of the arbitrator required him to give his opinion on
whether the “NP1” agreement is a collective agreement on the basis of the constitution of the bargaining council or whether no restriction was
placed with regard to what could form the basis of his opinion. What is conspicuous by its absence from the matters that the arbitrator
took into account in arriving at his conclusion that the “NP1” agreement is not a collective agreement is a consideration of whether the “NP1” agreement falls within the definition of a collective agreement contained in sec 213 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 (Act
66 of 1995) (“the Act”). That definition reads as follows:
“Collective agreement’ means a written agreement concerning terms and conditions of employment or any other matter of mutual interest concluded by one or
more registered trade unions, on the one hand and, on the other hand –