[19]
It is, with respect to the second respondent, abundantly clear to me that there is no factual basis whatever
for at least the findings in sub-paragraphs (i), (ii) and (iv) of paragraph (d) of his award. I can find no suggestion of appellant's
witnesses having exaggerated the extent of disruption of the tournament. There is no question that what occurred was a major disruption.
The employees' version that they left the field of play after receiving a proper reply to their concerns is, overwhelmingly on the
probabilities, false. It is common cause that they were on the field for about three hours. Saayman testified that he arrived on
the field at about 8h30. After having spoken briefly to the fourth respondent and the third respondent, who were insisting that the
team play in the semi-finals, Saayman said that he went to Van Moerkerken, obtained a copy of the rules from him and showed the third
respondent the specific rule concerned. There is no reason to doubt this evidence; the rule was part of the fixture list which must
have been available. It follows that it could hardly have taken three hours to convey to the employees the fact that the Amplats
team had not qualified for the semi-finals in terms of the applicable rule and to show them the written rule concerned. It is clear
too, that the press had not given any approval to what had occurred and that its failure to report the incident was the result of
Van Moerkerken's intervention in this regard. In my view all three of the findings are irrational and not justifiable in relation
to the reasons given for such findings. Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO and Others (1998) 19 ILJ 1425 (LAC) at para [31] and [37], Crown Chickens Ltd t/a Rocklands Poultry v Kapp and Others [2002] 6 BLLR 493 (LAC) at para [58]. What about the second respondent's finding that the dismissal was unfair because it was too
harsh a penalty? What about the relief that the second respondent granted? Although the reasons that the second respondent gave for
that result were unsustainable, there are, in my view, ample reasons within the material that was properly before the second respondent
which render that finding and result justifiable. I proceed to give such reasons.
[20]
Counsel for the appellant stressed the finding by the second respondent that the employees were responsible
for the disruption of the game since they had total control over the members of the team and could have effected their leaving the
field. I did not understand counsel for the employees to contest this finding.
[21]
In determining whether dismissal was an appropriate sanction, a central question which arises is whether
the employees acted in good faith in occupying the field. This issue turns on whether they were apprised in advance of the rule applicable
during the tournament to a situation where two teams, in relation to qualifying for the semi-finals, scored the same points. The
employees say that they were not apprised of the applicable rule until officials of the appellant explained it to them on the field.
There is little of substance to gainsay this version. Of course, the very fact that the team took to the field for the semi-finals
on the fateful day is consistent with their believing they were entitled to do so.
[22]
The tournament rules were handed in during the arbitration. During Saayman's cross-examination he was
asked whether the copy of the rules before the arbitrator constituted the tournament rules of which he had been speaking and he said
yes. Asked to indicate the rule which had been contravened he said: "I see here is one page missing, that is the rules that
will determine who is going through to the semi-finals and finals". Van Moerkerken testified that during August 1998 a meeting
was held of group representatives at which the tournament rules were agreed, where Saayman represented Amplats, and that about two
weeks after the meeting the tournament rules and the fixture list were circulated to the group representatives. In this regard his
exact evidence is somewhat vague: "(T)hey were provided with a set of rules as well as with the fixtures where there was, where
there was certain rules applicable to but we decided on the format and we also decided on specific rules which was applicable to
the format. Mr Saayman was supplied with that approximately two weeks after the meeting." Saayman at one stage said that he
and the third respondent were at a meeting where the rule had been finalised. This evidence, at variance with that of Van Moerkerken,
is not relied upon by the appellant's counsel. And Saayman later said that he was the only person present at the meeting in August
1998 representing Amplats since the other members of the management team – the employees – had not been selected yet.
About one or two days before leaving for the competition he gave a copy of the minutes of the meeting and the rules to the third
respondent, he said. It is significant that he speaks of having given the third respondent a copy of the "minutes and the rules".
The applicable rule was in the fixture list, as I have indicated, according to Van Moerkerken.
[23]
Counsel for the appellant relies on an exchange between Saayman and the third respondent, and on another
between Saayman and the fourth respondent on the morning in question. Saayman said that, when he arrived at the field in the morning,
greeted the fourth respondent, and commented that it was a pity that they "did not make it to the semi-finals", the fourth
respondent said to him "that the Amplats team will play" and that he (fourth respondent) was "not prepared to argue
with" Saayman. Saayman says he then approached the third respondent and told him to get the Amplats team off the field since
they were not playing. The third respondent replied: "(T)his rules is not football rules and we will play". Counsel for
the appellant submits that the response of the fourth respondent evidences not confusion but outright defiance and aggression. Similarly
that of the third respondent, it was submitted, constituted flat defiance and truculence. In this regard counsel refers to the fact
that Saayman said that the third respondent was angry. In my view, the evidence relied upon constitutes no more than a makeweight.
Furthermore, counsel's argument depends on Saayman being able to recall and recount in exact terms what was said, and the order of
the statements made – something he could hardly be expected reliably to do. It is interesting to note, against the appellant's
argument, that Saayman said that after the exchange with the third respondent, he went to van Moerkerken to ask him for an extra
copy of the tournament rules, took it to the third respondent and showed him the specific rule. If Saayman had already given the
rule concerned to the third respondent he would, arguably, have immediately said so to the latter.
[24]
There is no reason to doubt Saayman's evidence that the third respondent told him that he would not order
the players off the field because "(t)hat (was) why people (were) being .. killed in the hostels", and that his attitude
towards Saayman was very poor and uncooperative. Counsel for the appellant points also to van Moerkerken's evidence that any problems
about the selection of the semi-finalists ought to have been raised with the tournament disciplinary committee and that the management
team would have known about this.
[25]
Counsel for the appellant relies also on the fact that Van Moerkerken, a pensioner who had served as
the tournament chairman for the past 13 years, went onto the field on another two occasions on the last of which he was "sworn
at and ... told to F-off because (he does) not know soccer and (does) not know the rules of soccer and ... must get off the field".
Van Moerkerken also testified that Danie Mulder, a member of the executive and vice-chairman, Johan Steyn, also a member of the executive,
and security staff all sought to convince the team to leave. According to Van Moerkerken the three employees "were very aggressive,
not only towards me but also towards .... the executive committee and the other people that approached them". He went on to
say "that Maseko at one stage pointed his finger right in my face". Counsel also points to the fact that at about 10h30,
after the team had been on the field for some two hours, Ilott says he went onto the field together with Charles Schwartz, who he
says, is a hostel manager, where he found "the chief security officer", Ben De Klerk "pleading with the officials
to please come off the field and he gave them the assurance that he would personally see that there was an investigation to this
whole case". The three employees made no attempt to co-operate and adopted a "very arrogant approach towards Ben de Klerk".
[26]
At one stage the team and management moved to the side of the field but as soon as the two semi-finalists
were ready to take to the field they "ran back on the field and invaded the field again", said Saayman.
[27]
The appellant's counsel relies too, on further incidents which occurred in the process of the team leaving
the field. According to Ilott, the fifth and fourth respondents "converged on ... Schwartz and became very abusive and threatening towards him", which resulted in the crowd becoming even "rowdier than before when it appeared that [he] perhaps was being threatened.... tempers flared and the chantings were louder that
before." When Ilott intervened, he was "abused verbally". He then walked with the fifth and fourth respondents towards the team bus, in the process of which the fifth respondent hit
Ilott with his tog bag – "a blow was swung at me deliberately hitting me in the stomach and it was done with force". (It was put to Ilott under cross-examination that the fifth respondent may have hit him inadvertently, to which he replied: "No,
definitely not". The fifth respondent's version in his evidence was that he assaulted no-one and that he only met Saayman for the first time at his
disciplinary enquiry). At the time, "there was a large security presence ... and immediately the ... security of the mine ... intervene(d) and took the two gentlemen and escorted
him immediately to the bus".
[28]
Counsel for the appellant also refers us to the fact that van Moerkerken also fell victim to the Amplats
team at the stage when he went to fetch something from his car which was parked close to the bus. As he put it, "I was then threatened by Amplats people that they are going to chop of my car, they are going to damage my car and that they are going
to kill my wife and myself". Saayman was also threatened. He testified that the Amplats goalkeeper had threatened his life.
[29]
I regard the threatening conduct of the fourth and fifth respondents towards Schwartz in a very serious
light. In the light of the fifth respondent's denial that he hit Ilott with his tog bag it is difficult to make a finding on the
probabilities that this incident occurred. However, even if it did, the assault, whilst of course constituting deplorable conduct,
is nevertheless, a relatively minor one. It is significant in this regard that Ilott did not lay a charge against the fifth respondent
and apparently suffered no injury as a result thereof. The threat Van Moerkerken unfortunately endured cannot in my view, be safely
ascribed to the employees and neither can the threat of the Amplats goal keeper which was directed against Saayman. Cf Fawu & Others v Amalgamated Beverage Industries Ltd [1994] 12 BLLR 25 (LAC).
[30]
As counsel for the appellant correctly points out the conduct of the employees in remaining on the field
after they had been apprised of the applicable rule was serious and in fact deplorable. Their evidence that they left once the position
had been explained to them is at variance with the probabilities and the admitted fact that they spent a number of hours on the field.
Clearly, they left only at the stage when it was dangerous for them to continue remaining on the field. By this conduct they placed
their own safety at risk and the safety of members of the crowd who might have become physically involved with attempting to remove
them,. I remain committed to the view to which we were referred and which I expressed in Scaw Metals Ltd v Vermeulen (1993) 14 ILJ 672 (LAC) at 675:
"A further consideration, stressed by Scaw's counsel, weighs with me. We live in a society wracked by violence. Where an employer
seeks to combat that evil, even by harsh measures, this court ought not to be astute to find unfairness."
However, in Scaw Metals Ltd the employee made his direct threat of serious violence with a firearm, albeit an unloaded one. In the present case the employees
did not directly threaten violence. What they did was to create a situation in which violence may well have occurred.
[31]
Counsel for the appellant stressed as aggravating too the fact that none of the employees expressed any
remorse for the incident. On the other hand there are a number of substantially extenuating factors. The whole incident was, it would
seem, the result of Saayman's failure adequately to communicate the applicable rule to the third respondent. Counsel for the appellant
contended that the hostel at which the employees and the team spent the Friday night must have been agog with the news of which teams
had reached the semi-finals; he referred also in this regard to the fact that the public address system on Friday was reported to
have announced the semi-finalists. There is, however, no evidence of the sleeping arrangements of the employees and the team, and
of what they must have heard at the hostel during Friday night, and it is also not clear that they heard the public announcement.
Clearly, on the probabilities, the team was fully prepared and psyched up to play in the semi-finals. Their disappointment at not
being able to do so because of a rule of which they were ignorant must have been immense. Then there is the fact that the three employees
were severely punished by the tournament committee's decision to ban them for life from future tournaments. The award of the second
respondent had the effect of depriving the employees of approximately 7 months of salary. This is a severe punishment.
[32]
Although it is true that the appellant remunerated the employees in full for their time spent at the
tournament where they were representing the appellant and were in fact its ambassadors, it is of significance that they were involved
with duties which were different from their normal ones. The fourth respondent had been employed by the appellant since 7 March 1977
and at the time of his dismissal was chief clerk at its Phula hostel. There does not appear to be any connection between his normal
duties and those he was responsible for on the fateful day. The same applies to the fifth respondent who was in the employ of the
appellant since 16 April 1990 as a clerk at the appellant's B-hostel. The fact that they will not participate in the tournament again
of course also renders a repetition of their misconduct most unlikely.
[33]
The third respondent's position is different. The nature of his work does appear to be related to his
duties on the fateful day. The third respondent had held the position of senior welfare assistant at the Appellant's B-Hostel since
11 March 1991. Saayman, who, it will be recalled, was a sports organiser in the employ of the appellant, said that his own duties
were "to organise sport and tournaments for the employees and the company". This included representing the company at sports
tournaments. Saayman testified that the third respondent's duties as senior welfare assistant were "(b)asically to organise
sport and in fact to be my ... second in charge". This included the third respondent representing "the company Amplats
at various tournaments including provincial and national tournaments ..." Saayman said that it was the third respondent's duty
as team manager to look after the welfare of the team and to see that they behaved well and that they observed the tournament rules.
If there were any matters of concern to the players, he was obliged to communicate with Saayman in regard thereto.
[34]
Counsel for the employees argued that the appellant had not clearly indicated the extent to which the
third respondent's normal duties differed from those he undertook as team manager. This submission has some merit, but it does seem
to me clear that the third respondent's normal job was that of a sports organiser who organised sports and tournaments but did not
deal directly with players as a team manager was required to do. As sports organiser the third respondent's normal duties may notionally
bring him into a situation where a team involved in a sports event or tournament he has organised has a dispute with the authorities
concerned. The question is whether the employer is entitled to be reasonably afraid that the third respondent may not act responsibly
and that he may join those wrongly acting in defiance of legitimate authority. The third respondent's misconduct, all the relevant
circumstances, and the fact that, according to Saayman, he was a very experienced organiser and knew his responsibilities, support
the view that the answer is yes. So does the consideration that the employer was entitled to expect far better conduct from so senior
an employee. It is also relevant to note that Saayman was understandably very embarrassed and ashamed that the world leader in platinum,
Amplats was seen to have behaved as it had, and that Saayman expressed pride in the Amplats team which was always referred to as
well-dressed, well-behaved and well-organised, but now was labelled as hooligans.
[35]
A relevant consideration is whether we ought to distinguish between the third respondent and the other
two employees. I think not, for the following reasons: Counsel for the appellant did not suggest that we do so. Possibly this was
because differentiation would have to contend with a principle on which we were not addressed – the "parity principle",
which "comprehends the concept that employees who behave in much the same way should have meted out to them much the same punishment".
Post Office v Fennel (1981) IRLR 221 at 223 – quoted with approval in National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa and Others v Henred Fruehauf Trailers (Pty) Ltd 1995 (4) SA 456 (A) at 463G-J. I refrain from deciding whether it may have been fair to differentiate between the third respondent
and the other two employees given the particular circumstances of this case. Cf. Cape Town City Council v Masitho and Others (2000) 21 ILJ 1957 (LAC) at para [13]. Then there is the utter singularity of the event – requiring the confluence of a substantial
number of occurrences, including a tie on points and a misunderstanding on the applicable rule – which makes a repetition of
the misconduct highly unlikely. It follows that realistically the answer to the question I have posed in para [35] above is no. Furthermore
having been part of the body of players and management team, who believed they had made it to the semi-finals, the third respondent
may well have found it extremely difficult emotionally to break ranks with his companions, and to change his stance and back down.
[36]
The sanction of dismissal often amounts to a death knell in respect of an employee's employment not only
with the employer concerned but also in the open labour market. In all the circumstances, in my judgment, the penalties imposed by
the appellant on the employees were too harsh and it seems to me that the penalties effectively imposed in the second respondent's
award, and the lifetime bans imposed by the tournament disciplinary committee punished them sufficiently. The compensatory aspect
of the award was not attacked in the review application or in argument before us. Counsel on both sides argued the matter on the
basis that, if we found that the reasons given by the second respondent were unsustainable but we were of the view that the result
is correct or justifiable, we should not interfere with the award. I have found that the result of the arbitration is justifiable.
Accordingly there is no basis to interfere with the award and the appeal must fail.
[37]
I record our indebtedness to counsel on both sides for their able, helpful and full arguments.
[38]
In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs.
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