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S v Mostert (A1945/2004) [2005] ZAGPHC 301 (8 August 2005)

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[4] The charge sheet alleged that on 6 January 1995 the appellant kidnapped, robbed and raped L L: that on 23 February 1995 the appellant kidnapped, robbed and twice raped N J v R, and that on 1 March 1995 the appellant attempted to rape E S S. The State case depended on the evidence of the three complainants, all single witnesses, supported by circumstantial evidence of the policemen who arrested the appellant and the doctors who examined the complainants. In respect of the incidents involving L and S the identity of the attacker was not in dispute. In each case the appellant admitted that he had been with the complainant and, in the case of S, the appellant admitted that he had grabbed S by the throat but that he had done so because of the stress of his marital problems and because he had mistaken S for someone else whom he suspected of hiding his wife. In respect of the incident involving J v R the appellant denied that he had been with the complainant at the time of the incident and claimed that he saw her for the first time at the identification parade held on 15 March 1995. In respect of L and S the appellant gave a different version of the events. In respect of J v R the appellant disputed her identification of him. He contended that she was unable to identify him and was told by the police who to point out at the identification parade. He also relied on an alibi. According to the appellant, at the time of the incident, he had been in hospital under the influence of drugs and alcohol. From the time the rape charge against him was withdrawn on 23 February 1995 he had taken drugs and attempted to hitch-hike to see his brother in Mpumalanga. He had no recollection of events during this period.

[5] In the appellant=s heads of argument the appellant=s counsel attacked L=s credibility. He argued that she cannot be believed because she did not attempt to escape or report her predicament despite having a number of opportunities to do so. He contended that these features undermine her credibility as a single witness. He also argued that the appellant=s version of events on the night of 6/7 January 1995 was reasonably possibly true. He launched a similar attack on J v R=s credibility and sought to rely on the alibi. On the charge relating to S he argued that her evidence was unreliable and that the appellant=s version was reasonably possibly true.

[6] The regional magistrate found the three complainants to be impressive witnesses. Despite lengthy and penetrating cross-examination they were not found wanting. There were no contradictions or inherent improbabilities in their evidence. Notwithstanding their traumatic, shocking and humiliating experiences they gave a chronological description of the incidents which was clear and satisfactory in every material respect. The regional magistrate also found the complainant=s demeanour impressive and was so impressed that he regarded this as a further guarantee for the reliability of their evidence. He also found that their evidence was corroborated by other witnesses. The regional magistrate was not impressed by the appellant as a person or by the quality of his evidence. He found that the appellant was a cunning witness. He portrayed himself as pious and honest in the witness box but this was belied by his actions. The appellant did not hesitate to besmirch L who the court found would not associate with a person like the appellant. The regional magistrate found the appellant an evasive witness who changed his evidence as he thought fit. He found his version on all the charges so improbable that it must be rejected. He could not believe that the appellant had behaved like a gentleman all night if L was prepared to accuse him of rape and other crimes in the morning. He also could not believe the defence of an alibi which was mentioned by the appellant for the first time in the course of his evidence-in-chief and was not put to any witness, particularly J v R, or disclosed to the investigating officer so that it could be investigated. The regional magistrate found this defence to be a recent fabrication and rejected it as untrue. He also rejected the appellant=s evidence regarding the events at 1 Military Hospital on 1 March 1995 on the grounds that it was so improbable that it could not be true.

[7] The following facts are common cause or cannot be disputed by the appellant -

(1) On 6 January 1995 the appellant and L encountered each other for the first time in Pretoria at some time between 17h00 and 18h00 and during that evening they travelled to Rustenburg in L’s car, a white VW Fox 1300. The appellant drove the car. On the way to Rustenburg they stopped at least once at an ATM where L drew money. She drew R800. After spending a few hours in Rustenburg they left for Pretoria. As they were leaving Rustenburg the appellant, who was still driving, stopped and picked up a black man who was standing next to the road.

(2) En route to Pretoria, at about 4 o’clock in the morning, they stopped at a shopping centre just outside Mooinooi where the appellant and the black man went in search of beer at a shebeen behind the shopping centre. While they were gone L remained in the car. A group of policemen found her there when they stopped to investigate what they thought was a suspicious vehicle. It was early in the morning and the vehicle was standing next to the shopping centre with its front passenger door open. The police found the complainant sitting in the front passenger seat her clothes dirty and creased and covered in spots of blood. The complainant immediately reported to the policeman in charge, sergeant Coetzee, that she had been overpowered while getting into her car, that she had been abducted and raped outside Pretoria and that the person who had done this had driven around with her all night. She also told Coetzee that the police must help her as the man was going to kill her. She gave Coetzee a description of the man and told him where he had gone. Coetzee saw that the keys of the car were not in the ignition. L told him that the man had taken the keys.

(3) Coetzee and his colleagues immediately went in search of the man. They found the appellant and a black man walking in the direction of the car. Coetzee recognised the appellant from an incident the previous week. He took the appellant to the complainant who identified him as her attacker. The appellant was shocked to be confronted by the police and immediately denied all wrongdoing. He refused to say anything else. He had the keys of the car in his hand when the police confronted him. Coetzee could see that the appellant had been drinking and was under the influence of alcohol. Coetzee arrested the appellant and the police took him to the Mooinooi police station. They took the appellant and L in separate vehicles as L told the police to keep him away from her. When she saw the appellant she started to cry hysterically and it was clear to Coetzee that L was very frightened of the appellant. The appellant repeatedly said that he had done nothing. L found the appellant=s Amoon bag@ in the back of her car and when she was sure that the appellant was in police custody she took the money which she found in the bag. It amounted to just over R700.

(4) At the police station L appeared to Coetzee to be shocked and confused. Coetzee said she did not know where she was and she was only able to give a brief description of the incident. She was very emotional and cried.

(5) Apart from the car keys the police found an empty wallet in the appellant=s possession. In the vehicle they found two empty 750 ml beer bottles and some cassettes.

(6) At about 06h30 on 7 January 1995 Dr Richards, a district surgeon, examined L. The reason for the examination was an alleged rape at 17h30 on 6 January 1995. He found scratch marks on the complainant=s right shoulder which he described as Alove bites@; bruising on her lower lip and a fresh tear of the hymen. The tear allowed two fingers and there was bruising of the vaginal wall. The hymen was bleeding and there was no clotting of the blood. The hymen bled when touched and the bleeding was extensive. Dr Richards concluded that the complainant was no longer a virgin and that the hymen had been intact before it was torn. He also concluded that penetration had taken place. He was not able to say whether intercourse had taken place voluntarily or not.

(7) L did not allege that anyone else had attacked her. At no stage did she tell anyone that a man called Piet Struwig had raped her or even that she and Piet Struwig had had intercourse that night. The appellant also did not allege that Struwig raped the complainant when the police arrested him.

(8) On 23 February 1995 the appellant appeared in court in Pretoria on a charge of rape. On that day, and without explanation, the state withdrew the charges against the appellant and he was released.

(9) At about 19h00 on 23 February 1995 the second complainant, N J v R, who was then a second year medical student, was walking back to the medical residence behind the Pretoria Academic Hospital when she was attacked. An unknown man approached her from behind, threw a jacket over her head and forced her to the ground. This man held her down and told her to be quiet. He told her that he had a gun and that if she did not keep quiet he would shoot her. By then he had removed the jacket which he has thrown over her head and she could see him. They then had a discussion and the man told he about what women had done to him. He asked for money and she told him she had some money in the bank which she would draw for him. They walked down Voortrekker Road to an ATM where she drew R60 and gave it to him. She did this because he said he would let her go if she gave him money. She could not escape from him because he held her arm in such a way that she could not get away. She did what he told her to do because she did not want him to hurt her.

(10) The man did not let her go as he had said. Instead he forced her to go with him to the bottle store across the road from the ATM. There he bought six bottles of beer and a packet of cigarettes. The man then forced her to walk further up Voortrekker Road to a park. The man told her to sit down while he drank the beer. He said that he would leave when he had drunk the beer and she must stay there until he was gone. She did as she was told because she was afraid of him. He offered her beer which she refused and then she attempted to run away. The man became very angry when she did this. He put his hands around her throat and made it very clear that he would not hesitate to hurt her. He then told her she had made him angry and he pulled down her jeans and had intercourse with her. At that time she was a virgin and she did not consent to this intercourse. She attempted to prevent him from having intercourse with her but she was not able to do so. The intercourse was painful and there was penetration. After this they had another conversation and the man told her that he had been to court in Pretoria that morning and had been set free because the girl could not prove that he had raped her. He also told her that he had taken a car from the girl and used the word Ahijack@. He told her that it was the girl=s word against his and that she would not be believed. He then told her he would not let her go and that she must go with him to Witbank.

(11) They walked a distance towards the highway and then were given lifts to the highway. While they were travelling in one of the cars the man rested his right arm over the back of the front seat and J v R saw that he had tattoos on his arm. Later, when they were walking next to the highway, she stumbled and said she must rest. He said she could not rest next to the highway and that they must go into the trees. They went into the trees and she lay down. After a short while he took off all his clothes and forced her to take off her jeans and he raped her again. Once again it was painful. When he was finished he and the complainant dressed and he smoked a cigarette. He told that he would let her go but that he would not do it there as it was dangerous. They walked back to the highway and were picked up by a passing taxi. The taxi took them to the taxi rank in Blood Street, Pretoria. She got out of the taxi and walked away without any further interference from the man. She walked from there to the hospital where she presented herself at the casualty department. It was about 4 o=clock in the morning.

(12) At about 04h30 on 24 February 1995 Dr Esta Saayman was on duty in the casualty department. Her function was to evaluate patients and stabilise them and, if necessary, refer them for further treatment. She examined the complainant and completed a trauma card. She recalled that the complainant was emotional and crying and that the complainant reported to her that she had been raped that night. She had been walking past the nurses= residence on the way to the medical residence when a man grabbed her. Dr Saayman found a slight swelling under the complainant=s left eye and a red mark on her neck, about one centimetre by one centimetre. The vaginal examination revealed two small tears, one on each side of the hymen. There was no bleeding but she was not able to examine the complainant with a speculum because it was red and she thought it would be painful. Dr Saayman therefore did not find any other tears in the hymen. Although she could not be 100 per cent sure Dr Saayman thought that the complainant was a virgin before the incident. Based on the examination of the vagina Dr Saayman thought that the complainant had been raped. In support of this opinion she referred to the painfulness of the examination and the tears in the hymen.

(13) At about 09h00 on 1 March 1995 the third complainant, E S S, parked her car in the car park at 1 Military Hospital, Pretoria. She was accompanied by two ten year old girls. As she prepared to leave the car she was confronted by the appellant who grabbed her by the throat. When she screamed the appellant let go and ran away in the direction of the hospital. A short while later medical staff at the hospital apprehended the appellant and detained him until a Military policeman, corporal Erasmus, arrived. At the request of the military personnel the complainant identified the appellant and then corporal Erasmus searched the appellant. The complainant had alleged that her attacker had been armed with a knife. During the search corporal Erasmus found a small knife which matched the description of the knife given by the complainant. A small vegetable knife with a black handle about 7 centimetres long.

(14) On 15 March 1995 the appellant attended an identification parade arranged by the investigating officer, sergeant Bruwer. The three complainants were present and each complainant, separately, identified the appellant as the person who attacked them. J v R identified the appellant after requesting him to hold out his arms in front of him. The appellant had been standing with his hands behind his back. As soon as J v R saw the tattoos on his right forearm she identified him as her attacker. The appellant had a number of tattoos on his body including his right forearm.

[8] Regarding the first complainant, L, the appellant denied that he committed the crimes alleged. His account of the evening was completely innocent. Their accounts differ like day and night.

[9] According to L the appellant confronted and overpowered her when she was getting into her car at the Unitas Hospital after she finished work at about 17h00. The appellant then drove with her to the north of Pretoria where he found a deserted spot and raped her. When she resisted he became very angry and extremely violent. He grabbed her by the hair and dragged her out of the car. She submitted because she was terrified. He then drove with her to Rustenburg. On the way he stopped twice at ATMs where he forced her to draw money which he took. On each occasion she drew R400. After spending some time in Rustenburg they set off for Pretoria, picking up a black man on the way out of Rustenburg. When they got to Mooiniooi the appellant stopped at a shopping centre and the appellant and the black man went in search of beer at a shebeen behind the shopping centre. While they were gone the police arrived on the scene and she reported what the appellant had done to her and the police arrested the appellant. She made a statement at the Mooinooi police station and was examined by the district surgeon.

[10] According to the appellant he met the complainant at the Sterland ice rink at about 18h00 on 6 January 1995 and, after a brief conversation, and at her request, he agreed to drive her in her car to Rustenburg to meet Piet Struwig .He drove her to Rustenburg where she met Struwig. There was an altercation between him and Struwig and when L intervened Struwig threw her to the ground. After that L went off with Struwig for some time. When she returned she sat in her car outside the hotel until he invited her inside. She came inside and sat on his lap, put her arms around him and kissed him on the cheek. After that they danced and then decided to drive back to Pretoria. As they were leaving Rustenburg he saw a black man that he knew and he stopped to give him a lift. When they got to Mooinooi they stopped to buy beer at the shebeen at a shopping centre. When they were walking back to the car the police appeared on the scene and arrested him on a charge of rape.

[11] With regard to J v R the appellant disputed that he was the assailant. He did this on the basis of an unreliable identification by the complainant, primarily because he was in hospital at the time. Because of this defence the appellant could not dispute the complainant=s version of the events. As already mentioned she gave a very good account of what happened. As far as the appellant=s alibi was concerned the complainant identified the appellant as her attacker. Apart from the fact that the she had an opportunity to observe the man in the bottle store she testified that the man who had attacked her had complained to her about his marriage breaking up (the appellant=s marriage was), told her that he had been at court that morning on a charge of rape and that the charge had been withdrawn (all of which had happened to the appellant) and that she had seen a tattoo on his right forearm (the appellant had a number of tattoos, including one on his right forearm). J v R could not have testified about these matters unless she had met the appellant. It was not suggested to her that someone had given her this information. It was also not explained why the alibi had not been put to the state witnesses for their comment. Clearly the appellant=s defence cannot be accepted.

[12] With regard to S the appellant did not dispute that he had confronted her in the car park at 1 Military Hospital on the morning in question and had grabbed her by the throat. He disputed that he had threatened S by saying that if she screamed he would kill her and the children and that he had pressed a small knife against her chest. Once again this denial cannot be accepted. Not only was S a very good witness but the knife which she described in her evidence was found by corporal Erasmus when he searched the appellant shortly after the incident. Erasmus said he found the knife in the appellant=s rolled-up sleeve. The appellant did not dispute that a knife of the description was found by Erasmus but said that it had been lying on the table in the room when Erasmus searched him - the implication being that Erasmus had planted it on him. This would be a truly remarkable coincidence if the appellant was telling the truth. It also suggests great dishonesty on the part of Erasmus who had never met the appellant and clearly had no motive to falsely implicate the appellant in the matter.

[13] On a perusal of the evidence it cannot be said that the regional magistrate erred in his assessment of the evidence given by the complainants and the appellant - or the other witnesses referred to. The complainants were intelligent and articulate and gave logical and coherent accounts of the incidents in which they were in involved. There were no contradictions and there were no improbabilities. The main point made in argument that the complainants had not attempted to run away or call attention to their predicament cannot be upheld. The two complainants concerned testified how frightened they were and the paralysing effect this fear had. This is borne out by independent evidence. The appellant’s evidence is in so many respects so improbable that it simply cannot be believed. It is clear that, just as the regional magistrate found, the appellant is prepared to say anything if he thinks it will help his case. It is inherently improbable that the appellant would go to Pretoria to fetch his stepson and not visit him in hospital; that he would go to Sterland ice skating rink instead; that L would ask the appellant, a complete stranger, to drive her to Rustenburg; that L would stop at two ATMs on the way to Rustenburg and draw R800 to pay debts the next day; that L would sit on the appellants lap and kiss him after an altercation with her friend Struwig; and that she would falsely accuse the appellant of raping her when Struwig did. It is also inherently improbable that the appellant would receive a message that his wife was at 1 Military Hospital on the morning of 1 March and that a complete stranger would accuse him of assault and another complete stranger would plant a knife on the appellant. When questioned about these matters the appellant alleged that there was a conspiracy against him. There is clearly no basis for this allegation. The appellant=s counsel conceded, correctly in my view, that he could not argue that the regional magistrate=s credibility and factual findings were wrong and he conceded that the appellant had been properly convicted on all counts. The appeal against the convictions must therefore be dismissed.

[14] Regarding sentence the appellant=s counsel did not argue that the sentences imposed in respect of each count were startlingly inappropriate or that the regional magistrate committed any irregularity. He conceded that the sentences were proper sentences in the circumstances. His only argument was that the effective sentence of 40 years imprisonment was startlingly inappropriate and should be reduced. He suggested that an effective term of 25 years imprisonment would be appropriate. This could be achieved by making the various sentences run together as the regional magistrate did, but so that the result is 25 years instead of 40 years. The respondent=s counsel strongly opposed any reduction in the effective sentence imposed. She emphasised that the appellant still denied that he had committed the crimes of which he was convicted and that he had not shown remorse, both of which, she submitted, are prerequisites for rehabilitation. She referred to the probation officer=s report which pointed out that the appellant has had repeated brushes with the law and that despite opportunities for rehabilitation had not taken them. The respondent=s counsel submitted – very reluctantly - that if the court interfered with the effective sentence it should ensure that the appellant served a sentence in respect of each complainant. She suggested that the appellant should serve each sentence imposed for rape and that the sentences imposed for the other crimes be served concurrently with those sentences and that the 3 year sentence imposed for the assault on S be served. This would result in an effective sentence of 33 years imprisonment.

[15] There is clearly no 25 year rule - the appellant=s counsel did not contend that there was -but a sentence of 25 years imprisonment has been described as Aexceptionally long according to our practice@- see R v Mzwakala 1957 (4) 273 (A) at 278: S v Whitehead 1970 (4) SA 424 (A) at 438H. Such a sentence has also been said to be the maximum which should be imposed and then only in very exceptional circumstances -see S v Tuhadeleni and others 1969 (1) SA 153 (A) at 189: S v Whitehead supra at 438H. But there is no prohibition on sentences exceeding 25 years and the practice in the South African courts in more recent times has been to impose very heavy sentences when the circumstances called for such sentences. See S v M 1993 (1) SACR 126 (A) at 135c-d. Although it is not an uncommon occurrence for a sentence in excess of 25 years to be imposed, it will always depend on the facts of a particular case whether a sentence in excess of 25 years is appropriate - see S v M supra: S v Mhlakhaza and another 1997 (1) SACR 515 (SCA) at 523b-e: S v Masiko 1998 (1) SACR (T). Where the effective sentence for multiple offences has been found to be to be exceptionally long so that it is regarded as inappropriate and unrealistic the court on appeal has interfered with that sentence - see S v Siluale en >n ander 1999 (2) SACR 102 (A) at 106g-107a and the cases there cited: S v Whitehead supra at 438F-439H.

[16] The only reasonable inference to be drawn from the length of the effective sentence and the magistrate=s comments is that he intended to remove the appellant from society for as long as possible. There was good reason for this approach. The appellant is inherently evil. He is a predator who lay in wait for his victims and did not hesitate to terrorise them. He raped the two complainants and then forced them to stay with him throughout the night - clearly a terrifying experience. He used violence to convince them that they must cooperate with him or suffer injury. Although they did not sustain serious injuries the psychological consequences are far-reaching. His assault on S was calculated and took place in the presence of two terrified ten year olds who must have been clearly visible to the appellant in the car. Yet that did not deter him. The appellant=s previous record is also a clear indication that he has no respect for the law or societal values. His record dates from when he was eleven years old. Some of the convictions were for serious crimes. Apart from these considerations it is clear that the appellant’s anti-social personality virtually rules out the possibility of rehabilitation.

[17] What must play an important role in this case is the damning report and evidence of the probation officer, Mrs Van Vuuren. Her assessment of the appellant was as follows (I translate):

‘The accused was as a child exposed to his parents’ abuse of alcohol and serious matrimonial problems. These disruptive circumstances could possibly have had a prejudicial effect on his personality development.

At a young age the accused fell into a pattern of crimes involving dishonesty and aggressive behaviour. Even after being placed in a hostel and the involvement of school psychologists his anti-social behaviour escalated and repeated clashes with the law followed. No sentences or forms of punishment had any effect on his behaviour. On the contrary the seriousness of his crimes simply increased.

His referral to a reformatory also did not have a positive effect on his behaviour. He became part of the drug subculture, he was continuously absent and just became more criminalised.

As a result of his continuing crimes involving dishonesty the accused was at the youthful age of 19 sentenced to imprisonment. During his imprisonment he was certified as a psychopath and admitted to the hospital prison for psychopaths. He functioned reasonably well within the strictly controlled and strong therapeutic structure of the hospital prison. After his release the accused again relapsed into an unstable way of life which was characterised by alcohol and drug abuse, a variable work record and aggressive and destructive behaviour. The accused has shown a history of aggressive behaviour since his child years. He has defective impulse control and he manifests violent behaviour in the pattern of marital violence, regular involvement in fights and the present crimes.

It appears that his spouse’s desertion unleashed intense feelings of rage. The accused also experienced great frustration because he could not trace her. This rage and frustration was probably projected onto the victims in the absence of his spouse.

The accused’s total denial of his crimes and lack of remorse is a matter of concern. He accepts no responsibility for his acts and projects all blame onto the victims, the investigation officer and the legal system. He has no understanding of the suffering which he has caused the victims and regards himself as the victim instead.

Acknowledgment of a crime followed by genuine remorse is the basis for rehabilitation. The accused’s prognosis for rehabilitation appears therefore to be poor.

The seriousness of the accused’s crimes and the undeterminable suffering which he has caused the victims must be emphasised. The trauma which the victims went through can possibly have far-reaching consequences for them. Because of the increase in and high prevalence of rape heavy sentences and deterrent measures are necessary.

In the light of the accused’s long history of recidivism, his tendency to aggressive behaviour, his inability to learn from previous experience, the fact that he has been classified as a psychopath in the past, the seriousness and extent of the present crimes and his strong anti-social personality traits it would appear that he is a serious danger for the community.’

[18] In evidence she commented (again, I translate):

‘… what worries me is that he was for a long period in Zonderwater Prison where he was exposed to a multi-disciplinary treatment program. It was in a strictly controlled environment. He was decertified. They thought at this stage that he was fine, that he could go back into society. He is not going to be a danger for anyone but he relapsed. So what guarantee have we and the court today that the same would not happen again? That he will again in the short term while he is in an artificial environment like the prison he reacts and his behaviour is measured. He adapts well but the moment he is released into society and this monitoring is no longer there, the structure is no longer there, the therapy is no longer there, how is he going to react? What guarantee have we that he will not follow the same path as the accused. The other thing which worries me is the fact that he denies these crimes, that he has no remorse about the crimes. Now it is generally accepted that the basis for rehabilitation is an acknowledgment of the crime followed by remorse and then one can rehabilitate. In the case of the accused it is not so. He regards himself as the victim and it makes me really worried and makes me think what is the real prognosis of rehabilitation. In my eyes it is poor.’

[19] When asked if she could say anything in his favour all she could say was (my translation):

‘I can just say in mitigation that he did not have ideal child years. He was exposed to disruptive circumstances. His parents were probably not the ideal parents and I give him the benefit of the doubt that there was probably excessive chastisement at a stage although his mother denies it but it can still not explain this long record and all the things of which he has made himself guilty. It does not excuse this. The accused has had repeated opportunities for rehabilitation. He did not take them. Every time he relapsed. I feel that there have been attempts to help him particularly in the period in prison and he has not really reacted’

[20] The case was heard before Act 105 of 1997 came into operation (1 May 1998) and the magistrate therefore did not have the provisions of that Act at his disposal. All he had was an effective sentence. In all the circumstances – and on the assumption that it was not proved that the appellant was certified as a psychopath - I am satisfied that this is one of the cases when a period of 40 years imprisonment is justified.

[21] The appeal against the convictions is dismissed and the convictions are confirmed.

[22] The appeal succeeds to the extent that it will be ordered that certain of the sentences will run concurrently so that the appellant serves an effective term of imprisonment of 40 years:

(1) The sentences imposed in respect of each count are confirmed;

(2) It is ordered that the sentences in respect of counts 1 and 3 will run concurrently;

(3) It is ordered that the sentences in respect of counts 4 and 7 will run concurrently;

(4) It is ordered that the sentence in respect of count 8 will run concurrently with the sentence on count 2.

__________________

B.R. SOUTHWOOD

JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT

I agree

__________________

P.M. MABUSE

ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT

HEARD ON: 2005-08-08

FOR THE APPELLANT: ADV H C J VAN RENSBURG

INSTRUCTED BY: LEGAL AID BOARD

FOR THE RESPONDENT: ADV S U ROELOFFS

INSTRUCTED BY: STATE ATTORNEY