Relevant Market
11. According to the Commission the proposed transaction is a vertical one, in which the effects occurs in the upstream markets for
the production of manganese ore and high carbon ferromanganese and the downstream market(s) for the production of medium and low
carbon ferromanganese.
12. There are three products and geographic markets relevant in this transaction:
(i) The upstream market for the mining of manganese ore
(ii) The upstream market for the production of hot high carbon
ferromanganese
(iii) The downstream market for the production of medium and low
carbon ferromanganese
13. The Commission defined the relevant upstream product market as the mining of manganese ore. However it refrained from defining
the product market for both the upstream market for the production of hot high carbon ferromanganese and the downstream market for
the production of medium and low carbon ferromanganese, because it found that concluding on whether medium and low carbon ferromanganese
constitute distinct or separate markets is unnecessary for this transaction.
14. The Commission further defined the geographic market for the mining of manganese ore as national because its enquiry revealed
that the importation of manganese ore is not commercially viable. Given the minimal effect on the market structure as a result of
the proposed transaction, the Commission refrained from defining the geographic markets for the downstream market for the production
of medium and low carbon ferromanganese. We agree with the Commission.
Market Share and Competitive analysis
15. According to the parties the market shares for the relevant markets would be as follows:
Upstream
15.1 Mining of Manganese ore
|
Global Market |
National Market |
| Company name |
Production |
Estimated Market share (%) |
Production |
Estimated Market share (%) |
| Samancor Manganese |
2186 927 |
7 |
2186 927 |
54 |
| Assmang |
1 881 621 |
6 |
1 881 621 |
46 |
| Total |
30 000 000 |
100 |
4 068 551 |
100 |
Downstream
15.2. Production of medium carbon ferromanganese
|
2004 |
2005 |
| Company name |
Production in Kit |
Estimated market shares |
Production in Kit |
Estimated market shares |
| Total |
1 134 |
100 |
1 191 |
100 |
National market shares are as follows:
|
2004 |
2005 |
| Company name |
Production in Kit |
Estimated market shares |
Production in Kit |
Estimated market shares |
16. The Commission investigated two relevant sets of concerns that have been identified in anti-trust analyses of vertical mergers,
namely the likelihood of input foreclosure and the likelihood of coordinated conduct.
Input foreclosure
16.1 The Commission contacted competitors of Advalloy in the downstream market(s) for the production of medium and low carbon ferromanganese
and they indicated that they have no objections to the proposed deal. The parties also submitted that Samancor Manganese currently
supplies approximately 54% of its production of manganese ore to third parties that are unrelated to Samancor Manganese. In addition,
Ore and Metal, which competes with Advalloy in the downstream market, is vertically integrated to Assmang. Further, Transalloys,
a competitor of Advalloy procured its Manganese ore requirements from Samancor Manganese. The relationship between Samancor Manganese
and the producers of medium and low carbon ferromanganese existed pre-merger. We therefore agree with the Commission that input foreclosure,
as a result of this transaction is unlikely.
Ability to promote coordinated conduct
16.2 In investigating whether the proposed merger is likely to promote any coordination, the Commission used the shareholding structure
of the merging parties with respect to the affected subsidiaries as set out below.
| BHP Billiton |
|
Anglo American plc |
60%
40%
80%
Division
Division
50%(100)
Division
Hotazel
Mine
|
|
Metalloys |
|
Advalloy |
|
Transalloys |
16.3 The Commission found that the proposed merger is unlikely to heighten any coordination between Transalloys and Advalloy in the
downstream market for the production of medium and low carbon ferromanganese, because the business relationships and the shareholding
structure of the acquiring group existed pre-merger. We therefore agree with the Commission that post merger the proposed merger is unlikely to promote any coordination between Transalloys
and Advalloy in the downstream market for the production of medium and low carbon ferromanganese.
Public interest
17. No public interests issues arise from the merger.
Conclusion
18. Based on the above the transaction will not result in a substantial lessening or prevention of competition in the identified markets
and is accordingly approved unconditionally.
_______________
5 July 2006
D. Lewis Date
Concurring: Mokuena and N Manoim
For the merging parties:
E van Biljon
For the Commission:
Hardin Ratshisusu, Mergers and Acquisitions
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