Ferrochrome Prices
Ferrochrome prices are set internationally on a quarterly basis via negotiations between producers and customers and are published
in, for example the Metals Bulletin. These publications only indicate rough estimates of prices as confidential volume discounts,
ranging between 5-10%, are negotiated between suppliers and their customers, thus eliminating the possibility of price transparency
and therefore collusion.
Ferrochrome is mostly purchased via long term supply contracts, with suppliers and customers negotiating volumes annually and prices
quarterly. In Europe ferrochrome prices are constrained by stainless steel scrap, which is abundantly available in Europe, and therefore
acts as a competitive constraint on ferrochrome suppliers.
Although stainless steel scrap is not abundant in South Africa and not regarded by Columbus Stainless as a substitute, it does indirectly
affect the price that Columbus Stainless pays for its ferrochrome, since its long-term ferrochrome supply agreement with Samancor
includes a price formula based on the European price of ferrochrome lump less the pipeline cost (i.e. transport cost) which is the delivered price to Middelburg. Accordingly if the price of ferrochrome is 60 cents in Europe, Columbus will pay 60 cents minus the pipeline cost of 10 cents because
they have the benefit of being close to Middelburg where Samancor is located. If the price in Europe increases by 5 cents the local
price will also increase by 5 cents because it is an international market.
Samancor is Columbus Stainless’ main supplier, supplying approximately 80% of its ferrochrome, however it also buys spot tonnages
on an annual basis on the open market of between 30 000 to 40 000 tonnes, normally at a price lower than the reference price.
According to Hernic smaller producers are price followers. Large producers such as Xstrata and Samancor would negotiate quarterly prices with the large stainless steel producers in Europe.
Although the market is characterised by a number of very large players these producers have never, according to Hernic, been able
to dominate the market because smaller producers, such as Hernic, react very quickly to an increase or decrease in the reference
price.
Hernic, who regards itself as a new entrant, has managed to increase its market share during the past 10 years since it started and
is regarded by players such as Samancor as somewhat of a maverick in the market, undercutting prices to gain long-term contracts. Hernic avers that there are too many small ferrochrome producers globally that would undermine prices rendering the market too unstable
for effective price collusion.
Countervailing power
According to Hernic the price of ferrochrome is driven to a large extent by the large stainless steel producers in Europe. Moreover, although a general reference price is negotiated quarterly secret discounts are negotiated between ferrochrome producers
and each of their large stainless steel customers on an individual basis frustrating the possibility of collusion even more. Customers
can also switch easily to other ferrochrome producers if the parties do not agree on price or to scrap metal, as is the case in Europe,
without any adjustment to their production process. This suggests that large buyers have countervailing power.
Conclusion
Although the ferrochrome market is highly concentrated we find that it is unlikely that the merged entity will behave anti-competitively
or co-operatively since entry barriers are low, surplus capacity exists, prices negotiated between producers and customers are not
transparent because of secret discounts and large buyers with countervailing power are present.
Vertical effect of the transaction
Local producers of ferrochrome are all vertically integrated and the merger is therefore unlikely to raise any foreclosure concerns.
Public interest issues
The transaction will have no effect on any public interest issues.
____________
13 June 2006
Y Carrim
Date
Concurring: N Manoim, M Mokuena
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