8.
Midas is leading distributor and value-added provider of a wide range of automotive
parts, services and accessories from global and local manufacturers to the end-user in South Africa. Midas focuses on the “non-captive
market” – that is, the provision of automotive parts and accessories for vehicles, which are no longer, covered by warranty
i.e. parts and accessories for motor vehicles that are in the region of 2 years and older. Midas operates 329 franchised outlets, which are segmented into a number of brands. Midas also sells these products to the independent spare part shops, workshops, fleets, chain stores, engineering shops, etc. The Commission
has been advised that approximately 70% of the products sold by Midas are sourced locally and only 30% are imported. According to the parties, about 50% Midas’ sales are derived through its franchisees and the other 50% from independent motor vehicles repair or service workshops. NAPA, Midas’ only subsidiary, is a marketing and buying co-operative for locally sourced products.
9.
Assessed horizontally it seems that GMSA and Midas do not operate at the same functional levels of the market – GMSA is a distributor
whereas Midas is a retailer. The distinctive feature is that GMSA currently distributes its automotive parts and accessories solely
through its dealer network (which are downstream and independent firms to GMSA) whereas Midas focuses on the so-called “non-captive
market” for automotive parts and accessories. Put simply, Midas distributes and sells generic motor vehicle parts through its
franchisees and directly to motor vehicle workshops and chain stores. The parties advised us that these workshops are shops which
service a wide variety of motor vehicles and are not limited to any particular brands.
10.
The merging parties submitted that the proposed merger should be characterised as a vertical merger because following the merger GMSA
as manufacturer would be moving down the supply chain to sell its ACDelco service range of products such as batteries and filters
through Midas, a parts distributor. In its assessment, the Commission identified a broad market (i.e., the market for the retail of motor vehicles spare parts) as well
as a narrow one (i.e., the market of branded (GMSA spare parts) and non-branded spares (Midas).
Effect on competition
11.
Within the Commission’s broad market definition, the Commission identified a number of players with distinct market shares.
That is, Midas (25%); Super Group (Autozone) – 25%; Engine Parts – 4%; Imperial Group – 3%; Diesel Electric –
11%; Gaydons – 4%; Sparepro – 2%; and Others – 25%. The latter figures exclude GMSA. The Commission contended that should GMSA be viewed as a competitor to Midas then other Original Equipment Manufacturers also need
to be included in the analysis – thus resulting in the dilution of market shares. In such instance the post-merger market shares
of the merging parties would be 26%.
12.
The Commission’s view with regard to its narrow market is that although both GMSA and Midas distribute motor vehicle parts and
accessories they are active at two different functional levels of the market – that is, the GMSA branded spare parts may be
seen to target a different segment of the broader market than those products sold by Midas. The Commission contends that no competition
issues could arise given that GMSA spare parts are presently sold through GMSA contracted distributors and also that Midas does not
currently compete with these dealerships.
13.
The Commission stretched its analysis further by considering a worst case scenario where parties could be viewed as competing with
each other in the distribution and retail of automotive spare parts. In such event the Commission found that Midas would enjoy 30%
market share whilst GMSA only 2%.
14.
It was submitted that Midas’ ultimate customers are at liberty to acquire parts and accessories from other distributors, and
are able to switch between distributors as they require. The merging parties contend that upstream suppliers of Midas will be able
to continue to distribute their products to customers either through Midas or by alternative and viable means as they currently do.
We were informed that no upstream suppliers are dependent on distribution via Midas for their survival. The merging parties further
advised us that neither party exclusively supplies any technology, know-how, products and/or services which are required by any third
party in order to operate in any of the affected markets. They further argue that although Midas operates through a network of franchisees
that have a close relationship with Midas and expects minimum levels of purchases from them, however the franchisees have no contractual
obligation to buy from the company.
15.
We are satisfied that no substantial lessening or prevention of competition would arise in any of the relevant markets.
Conclusion
13. There are no substantial public interest issues, which militate against the approval of this transaction. The proposed transaction
is therefore unconditionally approved.
Y. Carrim
28 March 2006
Concurring: N. Manoim, M. Mokuena
For the merging parties:
Derek Lotter (Bowman Gilfillan)
For the Commission:
Edwell Mtantato and Maarten van Hooven (Mergers and Acquisitions).
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