9.
Both parties offer individual and group life assurance products. The parties therefore offer the following long-term insurance products and services which are provided on a national basis:
θ
Assistance policies
θ
Disability policies
θ
Fund policies
θ
Health policies
θ
Life policies
θ
Sinking fund policies
θ
Linked policies
θ
Endowments
θ
Annuities
θ
Combinations of any of the above
10.
The merging parties state that insofar as they focus on distinct customer segments, they do not
compete. African Life is a smaller insurer, offering cover to low-income consumers, whereas Sanlam offers this product to medium
to high-income consumers. However, in their merger documents, the parties state that post-merger, Sanlam will cross-sell its products
to the African Life client base. It therefore appears that this differential according to income level is likely to be eroded to some extent.
11.
The merging parties assert that the relevant market is that for the provision of individual policies
on the one hand, and for the provision of group policies on the other. As in previous mergers, the Commission has raised the argument of supply side substitution so as to justify a broader market for
the provision of long-term insurance. The Commission asserts that since the insurer is issued with a license to provide both group and/or individual cover, it can render
either type of cover.
12.
It is accepted by the Commission that the merging parties’ products are offered throughout
South Africa and hence that the relevant geographical market is national.
13.
Previously, in similar mergers involving this industry, we have not made a definitive finding on
the relevant market where it appears that no competition concerns are raised. This is also the approach we adopt here.
Effect on Competition
14.
Using data received from the Financial Services Board, the Commission analysed the parties’
combined post-merger shares in the long-term insurance market, for both individual and group business, based on net premiums received,
value of assets and value of liabilities. The resultant market shares are set out below:
| Basis of market share |
Sanlam Life |
Safrican |
African Life |
Total Combined |
| Net Premiums Received |
12.09% |
0.10% |
0.99% |
13.08% |
| Value of Assets |
18.91% |
0.01% |
0.68% |
19.60% |
| Value of Liabilities |
18.40% |
0% |
0.56% |
18.96% |
Source: FSB 2003 Report
15.
On each basis of calculation of market shares, the target firm is adding less than 2% to the merged
entity’s share. The accretion in market share is minimal.
16.
Furthermore, there are a number of other competitors in this market. The major players are Old Mutual,
Liberty Group, Momentum Group, Investment Solutions and Metropolitan. There is also a category entitled “other”, accounting
for between 17% and 30% of the market under each heading used above to indicate market share.
Conclusion
We conclude that the merger will not lead to a substantial lessening or prevention of competition. There are no public interest concerns
which would alter this conclusion.
The Tribunal therefore approves the transaction unconditionally.
__________
31 October 2005
L. Reyburn
Date
Concurring: M. Mokoena, T. Orleyn
For the merging parties:
Jowell, Glyn and Marais Attorneys
For the Commission:
O. Strydom, Mergers and Acquisitions
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