TABLE 2: The market for MDF, including upgraded MDF
| Market participant |
Volume in m3 |
Market share |
| PG Bison |
4 143 |
61% |
| Sonae |
2 000 |
30% |
| Imports |
600 |
9% |
| Total |
6 743 |
100% |
It is clear that PG Bison is the largest player in both the market for particle board as well as the market for MDF. Chipboard Industries
(Pty) Ltd (“CIT”) only sells particle board, thus the market for MDF consists of only two producers, of which PG Bison
is the dominant player. Entry into these markets appears to be prohibitive in terms of the cost of building a factory as well as
in respect of access to raw materials.
However, there appears to be a large number of distributors, known as the board merchants or resellers. These merchants procure board,
either from the three manufacturers or through imports, store the products in warehouses and supply various users of particle board
and MDF.
The downstream markets
PG Bison estimates that between 24% and 40% of the total production of particle board and MDF are used as inputs in the domestic furniture
market. These products are particularly used in the manufacture of case goods (examples of case goods are hi-fi, TV and wall units, and coffee
tables) and in the manufacture of lounge furniture (also known as upholstered furniture), although to a lesser extent.
The furniture manufacturing industry delineates itself between the Steinhoff controlled manufacturers and non-Steinhoff manufacturers,
which are widely known as the “independents”. Thus, any reference to the independent furniture manufacturers, in fact refers to Steinhoff’s competitors in the furniture
manufacturing industry.
Steinhoff is active in both these markets, thus the relevant downstream product markets are:
i)
the market for non-solid case goods, and
ii)
the market for upholstered furniture, particularly lounge furniture.
The parties submit that Steinhoff’s market share in non-solid case goods is 13.0% and its market share in lounge furniture is
27.4%. None of Steinhoff’s competitors in these two markets has a market share of more than 10%.
The tables below depict the structures of the relevant downstream markets:
TABLE 3: The market for case goods
| Market participant |
Market share |
| Steinhoff |
13% |
| Pilot Furnishers |
3.57% |
| Furniture Perfection |
3.03% |
| Taurus |
3.00% |
| Harfred |
3.75% |
| Donnely |
3.21% |
TABLE 4: The market for lounge furniture
| Market participant |
Market share |
| Steinhoff |
27.4% |
| Motani |
8.2% |
| Supercraft |
3.3% |
| Cantoni |
2.7% |
| Style |
2.7% |
| Calgan |
2.7% |
The above lists are not exhaustive as the parties contend that there are numerous smaller manufacturers in both markets. Relying on
its customer data, PG Bison estimates that there are approximately 250 case goods manufacturers.
The evidence that Steinhoff has supply agreements with major furniture retail groups suggests that there may be a narrower sub-market
for the supply of furniture to the chain store or retail groups. Given that Steinhoff is the largest furniture manufacturer in the country and that it has supply arrangements with the retailers,
it would have a disproportionately higher share of this market.
The ability of the independent manufacturers to expand depends on their ability to supply larger volumes to the retail chains, which
would result in economies of scale. If, as is suggested, they are precluded from supplying the retailers that Steinhoff supplies,
then their expansion in the case goods and lounge furniture markets will be seriously hampered.
Impact on competition
Our analysis of this merger follows the analysis employed in previous vertical mergers, particularly the Mondi/Kohler and Coleus/Rheem mergers. The foundation for this analysis is to be found in the formative work of Riordan and Salop. The authors identify three main potential competition concerns that arise in vertical mergers:
i)
raising rivals costs by means of input or customer foreclosure,
ii)
ability to promote co-ordinated behaviour between competitors, and
iii)
ability of a vertically integrated firm to evade price regulation.
The possibility of evading price regulation is not relevant to this merger. The evidence and therefore the analysis of this merger
focused on the incentives for the merged entity to engage in foreclosure. Given that Steinhoff already owns the single largest shareholding
in PG Bison, the incentives to engage in foreclosure need to be evaluated in light of this fact.
Customer foreclosure
The concern to be evaluated here is whether PG Bison’s competitors could potentially be foreclosed from having Steinhoff as
a customer.
CIT does not currently supply Steinhoff with particle board. In fact, Mr Leoni, the managing director of CIT stated that CIT does
not supply any of the major manufacturers of case goods and lounge furniture. This appears to be largely attributable to a difference
or a perceived difference in the quality of CIT’s boards as compared to that of PG Bison and Sonae. With the exception of one,
all of CIT’s customers are board merchants or re-sellers, who buy board from the three manufacturers or import board for re-sale.
Mr Leoni stated that in the past he preferred not to supply the furniture manufacturers, particularly because CIT operates on a strict
30 day payment term basis while most of the furniture manufacturers required longer payment terms. Nonetheless, he would be willing
to supply any of the furniture manufacturers who are able to purchase the required industry minimum truckload volumes and meet the
payment terms.
Thus in the case of CIT, it is clear that there is no evidence to suggest that it would be foreclosed from having Steinhoff as a customer
as a consequence of the merger.
On the other hand, Steinhoff’s Pat Cornick and Victoria Lewis factories are Sonae’s largest furniture manufacturing customers,
accounting for approximately 4% of its combined sales of particle board and MDF. Mr Craig MacMurray, the CEO of Sonae, explained
that during 2000 Sonae made a conscious decision to tender for a larger part of Steinhoff’s custom by being competitive in
terms of price, quality and service. This strategy proved to be successful, as the evidence shows a dramatic increase in Steinhoff’s
purchases from Sonae between 2000 and 2003. Mr MacMurray pointed out that Steinhoff’s purchases from Sonae actually increased at the time that it acquired its current
shareholding in PG Bison. Given that Steinhoff’s current shareholding in PG Bison has not detracted its custom from Sonae in
favour of PG Bison, Mr MacMurray was confident that the acquisition of a 100% shareholding would not alter Steinhoff’s purchases
from Sonae.
It appears that the Steinhoff factories purchase particle board independently of each other. Sonae believes that despite Steinhoff
being a vertically integrated group, the purchasing methodology of the individual plants within the group is to buy from what is
deemed to be the best supplier for that particular plant. Each plant’s purchases of raw materials are also determined by the
volume and mix of products required for that specific operation. For example, Highpoint which is a case goods plant would require
larger volumes of particle board and MDF, than GommaGomma which is a lounge suite plant.
According to Sonae, PG Bison is operating at capacity and would have to forego some of its other customers in order to meet Steinhoff’s
total particle board and MDF requirements. Mr MacMurray believes that they would not do this as it would alienate the entire furniture
manufacturing industry. For these reasons Sonae is not concerned that it would be foreclosed from having Steinhoff as a customer
in the post merger scenario.
The merging parties submit that Steinhoff’s total particle board and MDF requirements would account for only 8.1% and 9.5% of
PG Bison’s total production of particle board and MDF, respectively. Thus, even if the merged entity were to self deal, at least 90% of PG Bison’s production would still be available to third
parties. Furthermore, the parties argue that the price differential between Sonae and PG Bison is such that for the period ended
June 2003, Steinhoff benefited in the region of R3.8 million by purchasing from Sonae at the expense of PG Bison. It would therefore not be economically rational to forego this benefit by self dealing.
In conclusion then, there is no evidence to suggest that the merged entity would engage in customer foreclosure. PG Bison’s
competitors, in particular Sonae, are not concerned that the merged entity would self deal. In fact, Mr MacMurray anticipates a growth
of approximately 5% in Steinhoff’s purchases from Sonae for 2004.
Input foreclosure
Essentially, input foreclosure encompasses the following concerns:
i)
that Steinhoff’s competitors would be foreclosed from access to supply from PG Bison, and would therefore potentially be faced
with Sonae as a monopoly supplier , and
ii)
that PG Bison would supply Steinhoff at cost, thereby engaging in price discrimination.
As noted earlier, during its investigation of the merger, the Commission invited Steinhoff’s competitors in the case goods and
lounge furniture markets, to provide information and to comment on the merger. In response three case goods manufacturers namely,
Furniture Perfection CC (“Furniture Perfection”), Pilot Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd (“Pilot Furniture”)
and Harfred Products (“Harfred”), submitted their concerns to the Commission. None of Steinhoff’s competitors in
the lounge furniture market responded to the Commission’s invitation. Representatives from the three case goods manufacturers
were asked to attend the hearing in order for us to examine the validity of their concerns.
All three manufacturers expressed the concern that the merged entity would adopt a pricing strategy and a supply strategy that favoured
Steinhoff, which would negatively impact on their ability to compete with Steinhoff in a market already characterised by low margins.
Furniture Perfection and Harfred purchase 100% of their particle board and MDF requirements from PG Bison. Pilot Furniture sources
between 75% to 80% of its requirements from PG Bison, having decided to spread some of its custom to Sonae when Steinhoff acquired
the 34.9% in PG Bison. Thus all three manufacturers depend on PG Bison for the major part of their board requirements.
However, Mr Pritchard, from Pilot Furniture, stated that there have been times when he has imported board and the landed cost was
“literally within cents of the going PG Bison price”. While imports are competitive in terms of price, it is not convenient in terms of delivery times, which are crucial in the furniture
manufacturing industry.
The furniture manufacturing industry is cyclical, with production at its lowest during the first quarter of the year, slightly higher
in the second quarter and peaking from September to December. It is vital for the manufacturers to operate optimally from September
to December to ensure that they are able to survive the quieter times. It follows that any constraints on their ability to source
raw materials efficiently and timeously during their busiest times, will severely hamper their profitability and could ultimately
threaten their survival.
In light of the above, it is not surprising then that all three furniture manufacturers were concerned that the merger could potentially
give Steinhoff, their dominant competitor, the ability to influence or manipulate the supply of an important input for which they
depended heavily on PG Bison. Essentially, their concern was that the supply of board to them could be constrained in favour of Steinhoff
factories, particularly during the peak season and in times of shortages.
This concern is not without foundation. The independent manufacturers have in the past experienced supply shortages during the most
critical time of their production cycle as well as during the quieter times of the year. Mr van Niekerk from PG Bison and Mr MacMurray
from Sonae confirmed that there were shortages in the board market in 2002. The reasons for this are not entirely clear – Sonae
says it experienced shortages as a result of production downtime due to maintenance being carried out at its plants and that the
perception of a shortage in the market was overstated, PG Bison says it underestimated the demand for that year and some of the furniture
manufacturers believe that the shortage may have been caused from an increase in exports by both PG Bison and Sonae.
The independent furniture manufacturers were also concerned that in the event that PG Bison decided not supply them or to diminish
its supply to them, they would be confronted with Sonae, to all intents and purposes, as a monopoly supplier. It is clear that the
industry does not regard the quality of CIT’s board as being of a high standard and therefore CIT cannot readily be considered
as an alternative supplier. It was also explained to us that one cannot simply switch to a different supplier of board, as it is
imperative to have consistency in the thickness, surface and quality of the boards. The use of substandard board could result in
production problems. All three independent manufacturers indicated that PG Bison’s board is of the best quality in the country.
Mr Coffin-Grey and Mr Cornwall from Furniture Perfection were particularly concerned that since they had not supported Sonae in the
past, they would not be able to extract similar rebates as they had over the years negotiated with PG Bison.
These two witnesses also expressed the concern that the merged entity would engage in price discrimination in favour of Steinhoff
factories. The merging parties contend that this would not be economically rational as the concomitant loss at PG Bison would exceed
the benefit gained at Steinhoff. Mr Coffin-Grey conceded that it would not make sense for the merged entity to sell to itself at
cost.
However, they did testify that if PG Bison were to discriminate in its pricing in favour of Steinhoff, it would be difficult for Steinhoff’s
competitors to detect, they would only know this in the event that the furniture retailers informed them that Steinhoff’s prices
were more than 5 -7% lower than their prices.
The furniture manufacturers confirmed that the prices for particle board and MDF are generally negotiated annually and that the volume
based discounts are integral in ensuring competitive pricing. Thus, if we were to impose a condition to the merger that sought to
curtail price discrimination, the effect could in fact nullify these discounts and thereby erode the competitive pricing of the furniture
manufacturers.
Mr Pritchard indicated that his broader concern was the increasingly dominant role of Steinhoff in the furniture industry. Not only
is Steinhoff the largest furniture manufacturer, it also has significant interests in raw material operations and has entrenched
supply arrangements with the major furniture retailers. Mr Pritchard’s concern was that the independent furniture manufacturers
have to source their raw materials from their largest competitor and that they are then excluded from supplying those retailers which
have supply arrangements with Steinhoff.