Section 5
Section 5(1) of the Act reads:
An agreement between parties in a vertical relationship is prohibited if it has the effect of substantially lessening or preventing
competition in a market, unless a party to the agreement can prove that any technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive gain,
resulting from that agreement outweighs that effect.
In order to sustain a claim under this section of the Act, a number of elements have to be established. An agreement must be in existence,
it must be between vertically related parties, and its effect must be to substantially lessen competition in a market. If each of
these elements is established then the participants to the agreement are entitled to avail themselves of a pro-competitive defense.
We accept that there is an agreement in existence between Xstrata and Rand York and that they are in a vertical relationship to one
another. Nuco Chrome insists that the agreement effectively precludes Xstrata from supplying distributors other than Rand York, because
of the quantities that it has committed to supply and because of the lengthy duration of the agreement.
However, the evidence and assertions regarding the status and terms of the agreement are in dispute. Nuco Chrome alleges that Xstrata
has entered into a written agreement with Rand York, the material terms of which is that it has undertaken to supply Rand York with
10 000 tons of chrome sand per month and that the agreement is of three years duration.
Xstrata denies that a written supply agreement exists. It alleges that at one time it intended entering into a fixed-term supply agreement
for three years with Rand York, which was meant to commence in January 2002 and continue until the end of December 2004, but the
agreement was never signed. The reason for this, it explains, was that it did not want to commit itself to supplying 120 000 tons
of foundry grade sand per annum in the current market conditions. What it has done instead was to supply Rand York on a quarterly
basis, the terms of which were confirmed by letter each quarter, in advance. A typical example of this is a letter dated 15 December
2003, (see page 172 of the record), which states:
“ The new price will come into effect for all orders placed from 1 January 2004 to 31 March 2004. The price will be again reviewed during
March 2004.
"Xstrata South Africa (Pty) Ltd guarantees 500 metric tons maximum per month.”
Nuco Chrome in reply has not been able to dispute Xstrata’s version of the nature of the agreement nor has it been able to put
up any version of what it considers to be the contract in operation. For this reason we must prefer the version of Xstrata.
Having placed the status of its ‘agreement’ with Rand York in this context, Xstrata argues that the attenuation of Nuco
Chrome’s supply is a function of its policy in respect of the amount of chrome sand it wishes to make available to the market.
In other words, it is not the “agreement” between it and Rand York that is responsible for a reduction in Nuco Chrome’s
supply of chrome sand, but rather a unilateral decision, thus placing the reduction in supply beyond the bounds of Section 5. The
reason for this decision is the current boom in the international commodities market, which is reflected in an increase in demand
for ferrochrome, which is an input in the production of stainless steel. Xstrata thus needed to retain the chrome sand that it produced
for its own ferrochrome smelters.
In addition to the issue of the agreement, our dismissal of this claim rests on Nuco Chrome’s failure to prove – even
under the lower standards associated with an application for interim relief – that the agreement has substantially lessened
competition in a market.
Nuco Chrome has not clearly identified the market in question. Its assertions on this subject suggest that the middleman is an essential
aspect of its functioning. Hence it has defined the market as that for ‘the supply of chrome sand to middlemen in South Africa
for supply by them to the local market for chrome sand and for export.’
In our view the market is more accurately defined as the market for chrome sand. The applicant and other middlemen effectively provide
the participants in this market with a distribution service which they achieve by inserting themselves between the buyers and sellers,
by, in other words, performing a wholesaling function. However, should they attempt to extract a higher price for their service –
this would effectively mean either compelling the sellers to accept a price reduction or the buyers a price increase – there
is no reason to expect the wholesaling mode of distribution to remain inviolate. There are other modes of distribution. Above all, there is always the prospect that the sellers and buyers engage directly with each other in transacting their business.
This is, after all, a business in which competition between sellers of chrome sand appears virtually non-existent and in which there
is a small number of end users. In circumstances such as these, should the middlemen attempt to extract an undue return for their
minor contribution, they will be quickly by-passed.
But, assuming for the moment that the wholesalers are an essential element in the distribution of chrome sand and that the effect
of the agreement is to remove Nuco Chrome from the market, let us examine the claim that by eliminating wholesalers from the market
competition is substantially lessened.
Nuco Chrome rests its case on one simple assertion: it avers that it, in common with Rand York, relies on Xstrata for its supply of
chrome sand. Hence, the argument continues, the refusal removes it, a competitor, from the market for the supply of chrome sand. It claims that users of chrome sand (it presumably means, South African users) have only three possible sources of the product, these being Nuco Chrome and Rand York, who rely on Xstrata for their
supply of chrome sand, and a company called Mineral Alloys, which receives its supplies of chrome sand from Samancor, the largest
producer of Ferrochrome in South Africa.
The evidence relied upon by Nuco Chrome in support of its various allegations concerning the relevant market is conspicuously sparse
and confusingly presented. Hence, although Nuco Chrome appears to insist that there are only two local sources of chrome sand, namely
Xstrata and Samancor, evidence brought by Nuco Chrome contradicts this assertion – a media report, attached to its Heads of
Argument, states that ‘South Africa boasts 10 large producers of chrome sand’, noting that ‘many of these producers
do not supply to small volume clients’.
Samancor is clearly South Africa’s largest producer of chrome sand. While it appears to market its residual chrome sand output
through a single middleman, Mineral Alloys, we do not know whether or not this is an exclusive arrangement. Indeed, Nuco Chrome averred
that it could not access Samancor chrome sand because of a commercial dispute between itself and Samancor, rather than because of
the operation of an exclusive dealing arrangement with Mineral Alloys. Accordingly, on the evidence presented we cannot properly
assess whether Nuco Chrome, a middleman, has alternative sources of supply of chrome sand.
We know even less of the downstream market, the market in which the end users purchase chrome sand from the middlemen. As already
noted, of the three South African middlemen identified, at least one, Rand York, appears to on-sell exclusively to customers outside
South Africa. Nor do we know whether all of the residual supply of chrome sand is marketed through middlemen or whether, either currently,
or, pertinently, in the absence of an effective middleman, chrome sand would be traded in a direct exchange between the producer
of chrome sand and the various end users.
Not a shred of evidence has been submitted regarding these end users, the downstream customers. We do not even know the identity of
any of them. All that we have been told that is that chrome sand is used in certain foundry processes and in the production of some
unspecified chemical and pharmaceutical products. Moreover, we do not know whether it is substitutable by any other intermediate
products. Again, our assumption, given South Africa’s large position in the world chrome market, is that, the vagaries of the
ferrochrome market notwithstanding, South Africa produces chrome sand in excess of local requirements and, hence, the attraction
of the international market for a middleman like Rand York.
Finally, no coherent evidence has been submitted regarding the pricing of chrome sand. Our assumption – and this was put to
the hearing and not contradicted – is that the price of chrome sand is largely derived from the ferrochrome price. As already
noted, there is a very low value added in the distribution process, i.e. by middlemen. In fact, Nuco Chrome says in its papers that
it can only compete with other middlemen on service and price. However, we are not told what the competitive market price for chrome sand is and how Nuco Chrome’s customers would react to
non-competitive pricing in the market. Would and do Nuco Chrome’s customers have the choice of moving to other suppliers if it increased its prices? We were not supplied
with any of this information.
All this is, needless to say, precisely the sort of evidence that would help establish whether or not the agreement had indeed diminished
competition. Why is Nuco Chrome not able to access alternative supplies of chrome sand? If Nuco Chrome is forced to exit the market
what impact will this have on the supply and price of chrome sand to the various end users? Indeed, noting that we have already gone
through a period when Nuco Chrome’s supplies from Xstrata have been reduced, has this had a discernible impact on the availability
and price of chrome sand in South Africa?
For reasons best known to itself Nuco Chrome has chosen not to submit basic evidence essential to the adjudication of the claims that
it has itself placed before the Tribunal. Section 5(1) clearly places the onus for establishing the anti-competitive effect of the
agreement complained of on the applicant, and its failure to discharge this onus must lead us to reject the application.
Section 8(c)
Section 8(c) reads:
It is prohibited for a dominant firm to –
(c) engage in an exclusionary act, other than an act listed in paragraph (d), if the anti-competitive effect of that act outweighs
its technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive gain
In order to sustain a claim under Section 8, the applicant must establish that the perpetrator of the alleged abuse is a dominant
firm. Section 7 of the Act provides that
A firm is dominant in a market if –
(a)
It has at least 45% of that market;
(b)
it has at least 35%, but less than 45%,of that market, unless it can show that it does not have market power; or
(c)
it has less than 35% of that market, but has market power.
Again, we have not been presented with evidence that enables us to establish the existence of dominance.
As indicated at the outset, the lion’s share of chrome sand that is produced never enters the market but is instead consumed
in the vertically integrated process of mining chrome and producing ferrochrome. The market for chrome sand then consists of that
residual quantity that is not utilized in the production of ferrochrome and that is sold to other users of the product, principally
for use in foundry processes and in the production of certain chemical and pharmaceutical products.
We have no way of knowing whether Xstrata, the alleged perpetrator of the abuse complained of, is a dominant firm as defined. No coherent
evidence has been presented regarding its market share. We do know that it is not the largest supplier of chrome sand to the market, a position occupied by Samancor.
In fact, the allegation of dominance appears to be based on the argument that, because Nuco Chrome depends on Xstrata for its supply
of chrome sand, the latter is accordingly, dominant in relation to Nuco Chrome.