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JD Group Limited and Profurn Limited (60/LM/Aug02) [2003] ZACT 23 (29 April 2003)

.RTF of original document


COMPETITION TRIBUNAL
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA


Case No: 60/LM/Aug02



In the large merger between:

JD Group Limited

and                                

Profurn Limited


________________________________________________________________________
Reasons for decision
________________________________________________________________________


CONDITIONAL APPROVAL

1.       The merger between the JD Group Limited (“JD”) and Profurn Limited (“Profurn”) was approved subject to conditions in an order issued on the 12 December 2002. The reasons for this decision follow.

THE TRANSACTION

2.       FirstRandBank is currently the controlling shareholder of Profurn with a 78,8% shareholding. It has entered into an agreement with the Profurn Group in terms of which the JD Group or one of its nominees will acquire from Profurn all the subsidiaries of Profurn, or all the businesses of the subsidiaries as going concerns including their assets and liabilities, or a combination of the subsidiaries, assets and liabilities. At the time of the hearing the parties had not elected which of these mechanisms they would follow but since the exact nature of the structuring is neutral on the merger’s effects in terms of the Act, it is not relevant for us to require them to make an election.

3.       What is clear is that in return for the sale FirstRand Bank would acquire shares in the JD Group as consideration and that in turn it would on sell 5/6ths of these shares to Daun and Cie a foreign investor.

4.       Subsequent to the transaction FirstRand and Daun & Cie would hold approximately 25% of the shares in the JD Group.

5.       Presently Old Mutual SA is the largest shareholder in the JD Group with a 27,26% stake.

6.       As part of the transaction the JD Group has entered into an interim agreement with FirstRand and Profurn in terms of which the JD Group will provide what it has described as “selected retail expertise and services to Profurn. This agreement, which was approved of by the Commission came into effect on June 28 2002 and was to last until the outcome of the adjudication of this matter before the competition authorities.

7.       On the 8 October 2002 the Commission recommended that this merger be unconditionally approved.

The Parties

8.       The primary acquiring firm, is JDG Trading (Pty) Limited, a wholly owned subsidiary of the JD Group Limited.

9.       The JD Group (whom we shall refer to hereafter as JD) boasts a phenomenal history of growth and expansion and has earned a reputation as the industry’s leader in technology and business management systems.

10.      David Sussman, the present chairman, founded the group in 1983 when he started the business with two Price ‘n Pride stores. Sussman’s company was to grow spectacularly from its modest origins through masterly timed acquisitions of troubled firms. In 1986 he acquired the then ailing, but larger Joshua Doore chain from the Russels group. In 1988 he acquired Bradlows and World from W&A and in 1993 he acquired the Rusfurn Group.

11.      The acquisitions were all successful and the group acquired a reputation as a successful acquirer and integrator of rival businesses. According to one analyst, furniture retailers were re-rated after the Rusfurn acquistion and, “in general, they generated superior earnings growth.”




12.      The group’s rapid acquisition and successful integration of Joshua Doore, Score Furnishers, World Furnishers and the Rusfurn group saw it become the leading furniture retailer in South Africa. In 2000 an attempt to acquire its most established competitor, Ellerines, was however prohibited by the Tribunal.

13.      JD is structured as a holding company listed on the J.S.E. It owns the following chains of stores that are located in South Africa:

i)      
Joshua Doore, Joshua Doore is the largest furniture, appliances and home entertainment products discounter in South Africa and Namibia.
ii)     
Bradlows, sells branded appliances, home entertainment products and furniture targeted at the LSM 6-8 group.
iii)    
Russells, sells furniture, branded appliances and home entertainment products targeted at the LSM 4-6 group.
iv)     
Price ‘n Pride, sells furniture and appliances targeted at the targeted at the LSM 3-5 group. It has recently positioned itself upwards and now claims to target the LSM 4-6 group.
v)      
Electric Express, acquired in 1993, is primarily a discounter of household electrical appliances and home entertainment products.

14.      The primary target firm is Profurn Limited. The majority shareholder is FirstRand Bank Limited, a wholly owned subsidiary of FirstRand Bank Holdings Limited.

15.      The Profurn Group emerged out of the liquidation of Supreme Holdings in 1992. In 1997 the group acquired Freedom Furniture a Cape based chain. In 1998 it acquired the Morkels chain and in 1999, the appliance retailer Hi Fi Corporation.

16.      Between 1994 and 1999 Profurn grew its earnings by not less than 30 % per annum. This earnings growth was the product of an aggressive expansion strategy that fueled an increasingly competitive market and correspondingly a decline in margins, as well as consolidation in the sector resulting from JD’ s acquisition of Rusfurn. Because its margins were so squeezed the ambitious group was unable to fund growth internally and so increasingly relied on bank loans. This was to prove its downfall in the next decade when market conditions soured for retailers serving the lower end. In March 2002 the group’s chief executive Gavin Walker, said to be at the helm of the growth strategy, resigned. A committee comprising of the chairman, the chief financial officer, the chief operating officer and Mr Theunie Lategan, CEO of FNB Corporate, has since filled the embattled group’s CEO role.

17.      In June 2002 the group, with the support of its principal banker, FirstRand, undertook a rights offer in an attempt to reduce interest bearing-debt. The poor response to the rights offer resulted in FirstRand, as underwriter of the shares, becoming the controlling shareholder with 78,8% of the equity.

18.      Profurn like JD is a holding company listed on the J.S.E. and owns the following chains of stores that are located in South Africa and elsewhere:

i)      
Protea Furnishers, sells furniture, home audio-visual and household appliances, targeted at LSM 3-5 although like Price ‘n Pride it has ambitions of moving upwards to the LSM 4-6 market.
ii)     
Barnetts is part of the Protea division, focusing on the LSM 3-5 income groups.
iii)    
Freedom, is also part of the Protea division and its target market incorporates the LSM 4-6 income groups.
iv)     
Morkels, sells furniture and branded electrical products targeted at the LSM 5-8.
v)      
Home & Electric, an urban-based chain of specialist discount retailers, offering credit and focusing on key electrical, bedding and built-in furniture products for the home.
vi)     
HI-FI Corporation, is the largest audio-visual retailer in South Africa, and offers a wide range of imported audio-visual equipment at discount prices.
vii)    
Supreme Furnishers trades in 11 African countries outside the borders of South Africa under the brand names Supreme, Barnetts, Protea, and Hi-Fi & Electric City. The first three chains are credit outlets and the latter is a cash discounter dealing mainly in electronics.

The Intervenors

19.      A group of independent furniture manufacturers applied, in terms of Section 53(1)(c) of the Act, read with Rule 46(1) of the Tribunal Rules to participate in these merger proceedings. Although the merging parties expressed some reservations, they did not oppose the manufacturers’ application, thus leave to participate was granted.

20.      Prior to this these intervenors filed submissions detailing their opposition to the merger, with the Commission. Their fundamental opposition to the merger is founded on the ground of the vertical effects of the merger.

The Rationale

21.      The fundamental rationale for the transaction is said to be the imminent failure of Profurn. This in turn is a consequence of the general disarray prevalent in the furniture retail industry, as well as the particular expansion and credit granting strategies adopted by Profurn.
                
22.      The parties aver that if not for this transaction, Profurn will exit the market, approximately 7 000 jobs will be lost and a large number of suppliers and services providers will in turn suffer financial losses that may eventually see them exit the market as well.

The hearing

23.      A pre-hearing was held on the 18 October 2002 and hearing was held on the following days:

25 November 2002
29 November 2002
03 December 2002
04 December 2002

24.      The Commission did not call any witnesses.

25.      The merging parties called three witnesses:
Mr David Sussman, executive chairman JD Group
Mr Derrick Minnie, non-executive chair of Profurn
Mr Mias Strauss, MD JD Group

26.      The intervenors called six witnesses:

Mr Roy Pritchard, Oaktree
Mr Eshu Seevnarayan, Lylax Bedding
Mr Khan, Khwaja Lounge
Mr A Seevnarayan, Imperial Furniture
Mr Sewpersad, General Manufacturing
Mr H Salligram, FBW Taurus

27. The Tribunal called three witnesses:

Mr Kevin Boyers, CFO Profurn
Mr Peter Squires, CEO Ellerines
Mr Theunie Lategan, CEO FNB Corporate   

Background

28.      The background to this merger is the dramatic change in fortunes for the furniture retail groups since 1999/2000. There are a number of reasons for this, but they are most succinctly stated in the Profurn Group’s 2000 Annual report, where ironically, its erstwhile executive chairman, Gavin Walker, was to show great prescience about the state of the market, little knowing that his firm was soon to become one of the more spectacular victims:

The retail industry in South Africa in 2002 has undoubtedly experienced one of its toughest years ever. A spate of profit warnings, SARS investigations, consumer spending on cell phones, lottery tickets and gambling, and petrol price increases have all taken their toll on the sector”

This sentiment not only affects the capital markets but also the ability of retail companies to fund their businesses with debt. The major South African banks are at their prudential limits for retail exposure.”

29.      Walker’s pessimistic assessment is written even before the general crisis experienced in the micro-financing sector, which comes about in 2001/2 through the collapse of Saambou and the adverse impact of the troubles at Unifer, the micro-loan business acquired by ABSA. These setbacks further served to alarm banks about their over exposure to retailers who operate as extenders of credit to consumers in the lower end of the market. It is not surprising that they became the catalyst for changes that were to occur in this market and that ultimately led to this merger.

30.      In 2002 both Profurn and the Relyant Groups were compelled to re-capitalise through rights issues, while the JD Group had to reconsider its presence in the lower segment of the market.

31.     The prospects remain gloomy as a recent JD Report suggests:

During the period under review, market conditions in the durable credit retail market remained under pressure and the overtraded environment continued to impact negatively on product margin. Huge demands on the disposable income of the Group’s target market have further exacerbated the situation.”

32.     While this is not the first time the Tribunal has had to consider a merger in this industry, it is patently obvious that the prevailing industry conditions are vastly different from what they were in 2000. In fact in August 2000 Profurn was depicted as a vigorous competitor of both JD and Ellerines, two years later, it is presented to us as the industry’s ugly duckling. So much so we are told that all attempts to secure a buyer, other than JD, for the entire group, and not just its more attractive assets, have been in vain.

Competitive Evaluation

33.      We will be considering the merger in two respects -

a)      
The horizontal effects since it involves the merger of two competitors; and

b)      
The vertical effects insofar as they effect the merged firm’s buying power in the market for the purchase of furniture from manufacturers


Horizontal effects

34.      As we have seen from our earlier description, the two merging firms are both holding companies that own subsidiary businesses, which compete in the retail market selling furniture and appliances.

35.      Their businesses range from dedicated appliance discounters to furniture chains that sell a variety of goods and are aimed at distinct niches in the market.

36.      There is no dispute that the merging parties subsidiaries compete with one another. There is, however, some dispute as to the boundaries of the market in which they compete.

37.      To understand the differences in approach to defining the market in this case it is first necessary to understand how the retail furniture and appliance sector is structured and then to locate relevant markets for the purpose of competition analysis.

38.      Retailers who sell furniture and appliances have, not surprisingly, found many routes to the market.

39.      That all compete are in the business of selling furniture is not in doubt. What is in dispute is whether consumers consider these different routes to the market as equivalent offerings, and hence as substitutes for one another.

40.      Outlets differ from one another not only in terms of the range of products they sell and their level of prices, but which customers they target, whether they offer credit and where they are located, to name but a few distinctions.

41.      Like JD and Profurn, certain retailers have organized themselves in chains - not only to afford themselves a wider geographic exposure, but also so that they encompass, within a single corporate structure, a range of routes to market.

42.      One type of store is referred to in the industry as the ‘mass discounter’. Mass discounters are stores whose competitive advantage is on price. They trade in high volumes and can be price competitive because of low margins. In order to operate in this type of market a mass discounter must be able to turn over a high volume of product in a short time, have a regular cash flow and offer consumers a wide choice of product. For this reason mass discounters operate from large stores usually located in urban areas where customer volume densities are more assured, sell on a cash only basis and offer minimum service.

43.      The sale of appliances as opposed to furniture is the dominant product offering of the mass discounter.

44.      The next type of store is the furniture retail outlet. This type of store is, in the hands of the chains, organized like a consumer product according to a carefully marketed brand aimed at a targeted group of consumers. Within the JD and Profurn groups we see this as well, as we observed above in the description of the parties. These retail outlets are usually targeted at a range of consumer Living Standard Measure (LSM) categories, typically a brand will target between 3 to 4 LSM bands. The chains’ carefully research consumer behaviour to ensure that the particular brand remains aligned to its targeted LSM groupings. This entails different product offerings, price ranges, store location and medium of advertising. These stores not only sell furniture, but also appliances and cell phone services.

45.      These stores are smaller in size than the mass discounters but are for that reason more ubiquitous or, in the language of retailers, have a wider footprint. The chains refer in their reports to their roll out of stores in a particular chain. What they mean is that they are continually on the lookout for new locations for their stores whilst at the same time reassessing the location of existing branches. Like skilful chess players the chains’ managements are continually moving their pieces to outflank their opposition or to avoid being removed from the board. Hence this type of store is less rooted to any one location than the mass discounter.

46.      The management challenge is to match the brand to its targeted market in product, price and location.

47.      Within this universe of furniture chains at least three broad segments exist -a mass market, middle market and mid/ upper market.

48.      What distinguishes the furniture chains inter alia from the mass discounters is that the former sell to the consumer on credit, a fact particularly important for consumers who are ineligible for credit cards. As they have with targeting their market in terms of product choices, so the chains have developed the granting of credit into an art. They spend vast resources on creating models of likely risk and use sophisticated information technology to assess and reassess their credit policies.

49.      The JD Group has indicated that it has undergone significant changes to its credit granting policies as a result of the decline in the lower end of the market.
They are able to do so through sophisticated IT systems that enable them to develop and continually update sophisticated risk profiles.

50.      In a recent report this is described as follows:

This process has been successful in predicting the payment behaviour of debtors with a particular status in a specific geographical area. This has resulted in a reduction of risk allowing for greater levels of predictability at store level.”

51.      The final type of player in the market is the ‘independent’ store, so called, because they are not part of any chain or group and are usually managed by their owners. The independents are typically single outlet businesses with the largest type of business in this category not exceeding four outlets. Independent stores vary from being specialist outlets e.g. retailers of expensive high- tech equipment to general dealers who sell a bit of everything.

52.      As mentioned above we have previously had to deal with a merger in this industry in the Ellerines case. In that decision we adopted the following market definition:

In summary then we conclude that the relevant market is composed of furniture shops (with a product mix of furniture and appliances) directed at credit sales to consumers in the LSM 3 –5 category)”

53.      The merging parties have urged us not to adopt the same market definition in this merger and have argued instead for a relevant market that is composed of all furniture and appliance retailers aggregated together into a national geographic market.

54.      Using the Ellerines decision as their point of departure, they go on to consider the possible ways of segmenting this market. These according to them might be based upon:

a)       Price and Quality differences
b)       Furniture store – cluster or product cluster
c)       Credit sales
d)       LSM customer grouping

55.      They conclude after an examination of each of these possibilities that there is no valid basis for finding narrower markets by applying any of these criteria.

56.      As to the geographic market they make the contention, whose logic is not easy to follow, that: