The final question is, to what extent does the applicant need to participate, in order for its interest to be adequately represented?
In this respect I should indicate that USAP during the course of argument offered two solutions. They argued that at best the applicant
had made out a case for arguing for a ‘distinctive remedy’ as its case on the merits was in real terms, no different
from that of the Commission. The fact that it might quibble over what allegations should form part of the Commission’s papers
did not mean that it had established that its interest was not ‘adequately represented’
That being so, USAP argued that the merits and the remedy could be separated and that given an adverse finding on the merits, the
applicant could then be permitted to intervene on remedies.
As an alternative, USAP also offered, by way of a tender, that if the Tribunal found against them and granted declaratory relief it
would undertake to be bound by such a declarator as if it were interdicted from doing so.
The applicant criticised the adequacy of both these remedies. The former remedy might lead to practical problems if the applicant
only became involved in the second round. By way of example, it might lead to the need to recall witnesses who had testified on the
merits but whose evidence might also be relevant to remedies. This second round would create inevitable disputes if the witnesses
appeared to be returning to the merits.
The latter remedy was also criticised. It was unheard of for a respondent to tender a remedy not sought and left the applicant with
a feeling of discomfort.
It is difficult for an adjudicator to determine what procedural rights can be granted to an intervenor on an a priori basis without
the risk of error. It would be dangerous for the Tribunal to form a view of what form of participation is adequate to found a case
for the relief sought, at the commencement of proceedings, when the Tribunal lacks a full appreciation of the extent of the case.
There is no obligation on the Commission, which is dominus litis in this matter, to traverse the type of evidence which might be
relevant to the intervenor’s relief but not that sought by the Commission.
The applicant for this reason sought only an order that it be allowed to intervene. Applicant’s counsel argued that the content of this right could then be determined at each procedural stage of the matter and
the Tribunal could then at the appropriate moment decide whether the issue related to its interest and if so then it could be heard.
This type of approach is in my view unsatisfactory. It leaves the ambit of the intervention uncertain throughout the course of proceedings.
The Tribunal would then be required to spend much time adjudicating demarcation disputes at every procedural stage of the case. Such
dissipation of time and energy to tangential issues is unwarranted.
It is also important from a point of fairness that the third and fourth respondents know on what basis the intervenor founds its relief
in order for them to meet that case. If the intervenor’s case only unravels in the course of proceedings without being ascertainable
from the outset, then the respondents are worse off than would be the case if the intervenor had been a co-plaintiff, as they would
lose the benefit of having a complaint referral setting out the case. It might be that the intervenor’s case once pleaded is
less distinct from that of the Commission once it has been stated, but it would be better to err on the side of granting them that
latitude than the alternative. The risk of denying an intervenor adequate representation could mean that it might be unable to establish its case for relief, not
because it is unable to prove it, but because of some pre-established stricture limiting its rights. The risk to the respondents,
on the other hand is more one of expense and inconvenience. The cost issue can be obviated by a costs order - the inconvenience is
an unfortunate consequence of litigation. There is also a practical benefit of having an intervenor with its own set of pleadings
as it means that demarcation disputes are less likely as one knows a priori what the intervenor’s case is.
The Commission neither opposed nor supported the application. Although invited to make submissions the Commission’s representative
declined to do so. In the absence of any opposition from the Commission there seems to be no policy reason for limiting the applicant’s
right to intervene.
For this reason I am allowing the applicant full rights of intervention provided that it is limited to seeking the relief it has made
out in its papers.
I make the following order –
1.
The applicant is granted leave to intervene in this matter in terms of Rule 46(2) subject to the following conditions:
1.1.
The applicant must file a statement of intervenor's particulars within 10 business days of this order. The intervenor's particulars
must comply with the requirements for a complaint referral in terms of rule 15 subject to the necessary changes required by context.
The respondents will be entitled to file an answer to the intervenor’s particulars and the applicant’s to file a reply.
The time periods and format set out in Rules 16-17, will apply subject to the necessary changes required by context
.
1.2.
The applicant’s relief will be confined to seeking an order contemplated by sub-sections 58(1)(a)(i) and 58(1)(a) (ii) of the
Act.
1.3.
The intervening particulars do not constitute a separate cause of action and are contingent on the continuance of and the validity
of the Complaint referral. Accordingly the intervenor has an interest in the validity of the complaint referral and will be entitled
to participate in any proceeding concerning objections to the Complaint referral.
1.4.
The intervenor will be liable for the costs of the respondent if the intervention is unsuccessful.
2.
The applicant’s right to intervene subject to paragraph one above, includes:
2.1.
adducing evidence and argument in support of the relief it seeks; and
2.2.
taking all said steps as are reasonably necessary to advance the case to be made in favour of the relief sought by it including:
2.2.1
the cross-examination of witnesses;
2.2.2
the production of documents;
2.2.3
the attendance of pre-hearing conferences;
2.2.4
the participation in any interlocutory applications which affect the relief sought by the First Complainant.
3.
Costs of this application are awarded to the intervenor including the costs of an additional legal representative.
-----------------------
Norman Manoim
Presiding Member
Date 4 June 2002.
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