Competitor Market Share in respect of rental and installment sale agreements
| Institution |
Value (RM) |
% of Total |
| First National Bank |
23 569 |
28.9% |
| Standard Bank |
17 658 |
21.6% |
Saambou |
1 186 |
1.4% |
| FBC Fidelity Bank |
745 |
0.9% |
TOTAL |
77,626 |
100% |
Source: NRB’s Form CC4(2)Schedule 5
16.
On the parties’ estimates, the combined market share of the merged entity would be 2.3% post-merger.
Impact on competition
17.
While the post-merger market share of 2.3% is not significant enough to reduce competition in the
market, we must consider that on the parties’ admission, this figure includes other forms of asset financing, such as vehicle
financing. Since these turnover figures might be quite large for banks such as Stannic and FNB, this could distort shares when we
consider the narrower office equipment financing market. Were the parties able to obtain separate figures for this latter market,
such market shares could well be more inflated than the figure of 2.3%.
18.
After further questioning, it nevertheless appeared that the market for office equipment financing
is very competitive, with all the major banks participating therein. Furthermore, entry barriers are low since banks can quite easily
get involved in this type of financing provided they have adequate funds and sophisticated collection systems.
19.
On balance, the Tribunal is therefore of the opinion that this transaction will not substantially
lessen competition in respect of rental and installment sale transactions in the office automation equipment market.
Public Interest Considerations
20.
The parties submit that this transaction will have no effect on employment.
_____________
21 September 2001
D.H. Lewis
Date
Concurring: N. Manoim, D. Terblanche
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