PRODUCER |
MARKET SHARE BEFORE MERGER
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MARKET SHARE AFTER MERGER |
CIL’s post-merger market share in the relevant market for tiles is 50% and its main competitor, Johnson tiles’ market
share is 15%. Several other domestic manufacturers have either closed operation or have been acquired in recent years. CIL attributes
the decline in manufacturers to their outdated production methods and operational inefficiencies, which meant that these manufacturers
were unable to remain competitive in the face of increasing foreign competition.
Although concentration in this market is extremely high, the Tribunal is satisfied that imports, which account for 35% of the market
share, are adequate to discipline the pricing strategies of the domestic producers. The demand for imported tiles has increased despite
the 20% tariff currently operative.
CIL, moreover, submitted evidence to show that the price of Vitro’s main punched tile product, the Ibumba Rouge, has decreased
by 15% since the merger, from R36 per square meter to R28.50 per square meter. This they attribute to production efficiencies introduced
at the Vitro plant in Lekoa Vaal.
Vertical Impact
Although the links between Italtile and CIL are complicated we have assumed, for the purposes of our assessment, that CIL and Italtile
are controlled by the same ultimate shareholders and can be said to form part of the same group.
Within this group CIL is the manufacturing operation and Italtile the retailing operation. Italtile, which is the largest tile retailer
in South Africa, represents approximately 50%, of CIL’s customer base. Italtile is also a significant importer of tiles. CIL,
however, says an agreement exists between the two companies, which require them to conduct their business on an arms-length basis.
Despite the vertical integration of CIL and Italtile, Tile Africa Italtile’s major competitor, has grown considerably over the
past few years by selling imported tiles
Some of the tile retailers, who the Commission had interviewed, alleged that CIL applied certain restrictive practices in conducting
its business. The Tribunal adjourned its first hearing to allow these firms and competitors of CIL an opportunity to make submissions
to it on the merger. None of them did, and accordingly the Tribunal has no evidence before it that the merger will have any adverse
effects on either competitors of CIL or Italtile.
In light of the above the Tribunal is satisfied that the merger does not substantially prevent or lessen competition in the relevant
horizontal or vertical
markets. The merger also does not raise any public interest concerns listed in section 16(3).
N.M. Manoim
12 May 2000
Concurring: D.H. Lewis and S. Zilwa
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