MEC for Education: Kwazulu-Natal and Others v Pillay (CCT 51/06) [2007] ZACC 21 (5 October 2007)

Introduction

What is the place of religious and cultural expression in public schools? This case raises vital questions about the nature of discrimination under the provisions of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (the Equality Act) as well as the extent of protection afforded to cultural and religious rights in the public school setting and possibly beyond. At the centre of the storm is a tiny gold nose stud.

The Parties

The first and second applicants are the Member of the Executive Council for Education in KwaZulu-Natal and the School Liaison Officer for the KwaZulu-Natal Education Department. I will refer to them collectively as “the Department”. The third and fourth applicants are the headmistress of Durban Girls’ High School, Mrs Martin, and Mrs Knight, the Chairperson of the Governing Body of that School. I will refer to the two collectively and the Durban Girls’ High School itself interchangeably as either “the School” or “DGHS”. Any reference to “the applicants” is to all four applicants.

The respondent is Ms Navaneethum Pillay who appears on behalf of her minor daughter, Sunali Pillay (Sunali) who was, until the end of last year, a learner at DGHS. Ms Pillay runs a holistic centre known as Yabba Dabba Do! Centre of Creativity.

Factual Background

Sunali applied for admission to DGHS for the 2002 school year. Her mother signed a declaration in which she undertook to ensure that Sunali complied with the Code of Conduct of the School (the Code). Sunali was admitted to the School.

During the school holidays in September 2004 Ms Pillay gave Sunali permission to pierce her nose and insert a small gold stud. When she returned to School after the holidays on 4 October 2004, Ms Pillay was informed that her daughter was not allowed to wear the nose stud as it was in contravention of the Code. The relevant part of the Code reads:

“Jewellery: Ear-rings – plain round studs/sleepers may be worn, ONE in each ear lobe at the same level. No other jewellery may be worn, except a wrist watch. Jewellery includes any adornment/bristle which may be in any body piercing. Watches must be in keeping with the school uniform. Medic-Alert discs may be worn.”

Mrs Martin told Ms Pillay that Sunali had received a laminated card to indicate that she had been permitted to wear the nose stud only until the end of October 2004. This was in order to allow the piercing to heal so that the nose stud would be capable of being inserted and removed on a daily basis. October came and went and Sunali did not remove the nose stud. When the new academic year of 2005 commenced, Sunali returned to school with the nose stud still in place.

The School then requested Ms Pillay to write a letter motivating why Sunali should be allowed to continue to wear the stud. In a letter dated 1 February 2005, Ms Pillay apologised for not having discussed the issue of Sunali’s nose stud with Mrs Martin beforehand. She explained that she and Sunali came from a South Indian family that intends to maintain cultural identity by upholding the traditions of the women before them. The insertion of the nose stud was part of a time-honoured family tradition. It entailed that a young woman’s nose was pierced and a stud inserted when she reached physical maturity as an indication that she had become eligible for marriage. The practice today is meant to honour daughters as responsible young adults. When Sunali turned sixteen, her grandmother would replace the gold stud with a diamond stud. She claimed that this was to be done as part of a religious ritual to honour and bless Sunali. Ms Pillay made it clear that the wearing of the nose stud was not for fashion purposes but as part of a long-standing family tradition and for cultural reasons.

Following a meeting with the Governing Body on 2 February 2005, Mrs Martin consulted with recognised experts in the field of human rights and Hindu tradition in order to determine the School’s position. She was advised that the School was not obliged to allow Sunali to wear the nose stud. The Governing Body accepted this advice and, on 3 March 2005, Mrs Martin informed Ms Pillay of the decision not to permit Sunali to wear the nose stud.

Ms Pillay was aggrieved by the Governing Body’s decision. A stream of increasingly acrimonious correspondence ensued between her and Mrs Martin relating to the reasons for the decision and the steps that would be taken as a result. On 8 March 2005 Ms Pillay wrote to the Department of Education seeking clarity about its position, since she believed that the Governing Body’s decision violated her daughter’s constitutional right to practice her religious and cultural traditions. In May 2005, however, Ms Pillay was informed that the MEC supported the School’s approach. The School decided that if Sunali did not remove the nose stud by 23 May 2005 she would face a disciplinary tribunal. Sunali did not remove the nose stud and a hearing by the disciplinary tribunal was then re-scheduled for 18 July.

The disciplinary hearing in fact never took place as Ms Pillay took the matter to the Equality Court on 14 July and obtained an interim order restraining the school from interfering, intimidating, harassing, demeaning, humiliating or discriminating against Sunali. The Equality Court hearing for confirmation of the interim order was set down for 29 September 2005.

The Equality Court hearing

The issue before the Equality Court was whether the School’s refusal to permit Sunali to wear the nose stud at school was an act of unfair discrimination in terms of the Equality Act. The evidence presented by Ms Pillay amounted to the following: the practice of wearing the nose stud is a tradition that is some 4000 to 5000 years old, hailing predominantly from the south of India. When a girl comes of age, a stage marked by the onset of her menstrual cycle, the family honours the fact of her becoming a young woman. As part of the ritual, a prayer is performed and her nose is pierced on the left side for the insertion of the nose stud. The ritual also serves the purpose of endowing daughters with jewellery since a woman’s dowry in patriarchal society went to her husband and all she could claim as her own was her jewellery. Further, according to Ayurvedic medicine, the medicinal branch of the Vedas, the left side of the nose is directly related to fertility and childbearing. Ms Pillay stressed that the practice of wearing the nose stud or ring plays an important part in many religions and is not limited to Hinduism. On the other hand, Hinduism has a variety of sects that observe different practices.

Mrs Martin, on behalf of the School, made the point that the Code had been drawn up in consultation with the learners’ representative council, parents and the governing body. It is the practice of the School that exemptions, based on religious considerations, are made from the provisions of the Code. Asked why an exemption was not granted to Sunali on the basis of the religious reasons given by Ms Pillay, she stated that Ms Pillay had made it clear in her letter that the nose stud was worn as a personal choice and tradition and not for religious reasons.

Dr Vishram Rambilass, called by the School as an expert in Hindu religion, told the Court that the practice in question is an expression of Hindu culture. It was not obligatory, nor was it a religious rite. Under cross-examination, however, he conceded that it was difficult to distinguish between Hindu culture and Hindu religion and described the situation as a “universal dilemma of all cultures and religions”. He stated further that it is difficult to pinpoint what constitutes Hinduism, since there are various schools that have developed very differently.

The Equality Court held that although a prima facie case of discrimination had been made out, the discrimination was not unfair. It characterised the purpose of the Code as being “to promote uniformity and acceptable convention amongst the learners” and accepted Mrs Martin’s evidence that undue permissiveness could result in a conflict with the Code, “thereby creating a disorderly environment.” In reaching its conclusion the Court took into account several factors namely: Ms Pillay had agreed to the Code when she took Sunali to the School; the Code was devised by the School in consultation with the students, parents and educators; and also that Ms Pillay had failed to consult with the School before sending Sunali to it with the nose stud. The Court held that no impairment to Sunali’s dignity or of another interest of a comparably serious nature had occurred and concluded that DGHS had acted reasonably and fairly. In addition, the Court held that any harm that may have been caused “was as a result of [Sunali’s] and her mother’s own doing.” This decision by the Equality Court was taken on appeal by Ms Pillay to the Pietermaritzburg High Court.

The High Court

In its judgment, the High Court^¹ (Kondile J with Tshabalala JP concurring) held that the conduct of the School was discriminatory against Sunali and was unfair in terms of the Equality Act. It held that our society prohibits both direct and indirect discrimination and aims to eliminate entrenched inequalities. It held further that the Equality Court had failed to consider properly the impact of the Constitution and the Equality Act on the Code and that both religion and culture are equally protected under the Equality Act and the Constitution. Because the nose stud had religious and/or cultural significance to Sunali, the failure to treat her differently from her peers amounted to withholding from her “the benefit, opportunity and advantage of enjoying fully [her] culture and/or of practising [her] religion” and therefore constituted indirect discrimination.

The High Court rejected arguments by the applicants that Sunali had waived her right to insist on wearing the nose stud; that she could not complain about the prohibition because the Code had been the product of extensive consultations; and that because Sunali had failed to testify on her own behalf her religious or cultural belief in relation to the nose stud had not been established. The High Court held that Sunali’s failure to testify was irrelevant as her mother had acted on her behalf, in her role as a parent and as a representative of the “Hindu/Indian” community.

In reaching the conclusion that the conduct of the School amounted to unfair discrimination, the High Court noted that Sunali was part of a group that had been historically discriminated against and that the School’s contention that its rule prohibiting the wearing of jewellery was a general one applicable to every learner served only to prolong that discrimination. It highlighted the vulnerable and marginalised status of Hindus and Indians in South Africa’s past and present, the demeaning effect of denying Sunali’s religion ― and hence her identity ― and the systemic nature of the discrimination. It held that the insistence by the School on uniformity or similar treatment was inappropriate as it failed to dismantle structures of discrimination. The Court held further that the desire to maintain discipline in the School was not an acceptable reason for the prohibition as there was no evidence that wearing the nose stud had a disruptive effect on the smooth-running of the School. The High Court found that, in any event, there were less restrictive means to achieve the laudable objectives of the School as it could simply explain to its learners that Sunali’s religion or culture entitles her to wear the nose stud.

The High Court accordingly set aside the decision and order of the Equality Court and replaced it with an order declaring “null and void” the School’s “decision, prohibiting the wearing of a nose stud, in school, by Hindu/Indian learners”. The School now applies for leave to appeal to this Court against the decision of the Pietermaritzburg High Court.

Proceedings in this Court

The application for leave to appeal against the decisions of the Pietermaritzburg High Court was set down for hearing in this Court on 2 November 2006. The hearing was however postponed at the request of Ms Pillay because Sunali was about to write her examinations. The hearing eventually took place on 20 and 21 February 2007.

The Department then lodged a notice purporting to withdraw from the case on the basis that the matter had become moot on two grounds. Firstly, Sunali would no longer be at school by the time the case was decided and, secondly, new guidelines^² on school uniforms had been issued by the National Department of Education after the institution of the case. The Department contended that any future case on the issue would have to be brought in terms of the new guidelines and any decision in the present case would no longer be relevant.

New directions specifically required the parties to address the issue of mootness as well as the merits. The Department was directed to file written submissions notwithstanding their purported withdrawal.

Three institutions were admitted as amici curiae. These were: the Governing Body Foundation (GBF); the Natal Tamil Vedic Society Trust (NTVS); and the Freedom of Expression Institute (FXI). The GBF, a voluntary association of 500 public school governing bodies with a total population of over 300 000 learners, generally supported the appeal. It stated that it interacts with government on issues relating to education and believes that the High Court judgment will have significant consequences for all schools, including its members and accordingly it has a keen interest in the case. It has conducted a survey of its member schools to determine their opinion on the nose stud issue and the responses indicate that the majority of schools do not allow nose studs to be worn. In the view of the member schools, the wearing of a nose stud pursuant to the High Court’s decision would impact negatively on discipline in their schools.

The NTVS had been admitted as amicus curiae in the High Court and applied for that status again in this Court. It is a religious and cultural organisation with origins as far back as 1957. Its members are Tamil speakers and its aims are to “foster the Tamil language and culture and the religious practices of Tamil South Africans.” The NTVS also has a more general interest in the promotion of cultural and religious diversity. The NTVS supported Sunali’s right to wear the nose stud as part of her Tamil heritage.

Finally, the FXI, a non-profit organisation with the stated objective of promoting freedom of expression in South Africa averred that it is particularly concerned with the development of South African law relating to freedom of expression. Its interest in the matter involved highlighting freedom of expression issues raised by the case in addition to the equality issues already raised by the parties.

Submissions before this Court

The Department contended that the High Court erred in characterising the matter as an equality claim within the contemplation of the Equality Act. It argued that there can be no case for discrimination where it cannot be said that there is a “dominant group” that is treated better than Sunali. The complaint should rather have been brought as a freedom of religion claim and recourse to the Equality Court was, according to the applicants, entirely misplaced. The applicants submitted that in any event, the Code cannot be said to be discriminatory as it affected all religions equally. The School further criticised the failure to lead Sunali’s evidence as, in their view, this makes it impossible to determine if discrimination had occurred.

It was further contended that in the event of it being found that there was discrimination against Sunali, such discrimination was not unfair. In that context the applicants pointed to a number of factors, namely: that the Code was compiled on the basis of prior consultations with all relevant parties; the fact that Ms Pillay had agreed to the Code; the popularity of nose studs outside of Sunali’s culture; the importance of uniforms in maintaining discipline; the need to give deference to school authorities; and the fact that the ban on the wearing of a nose stud could only have a limited effect on Sunali’s culture since she was at liberty to wear the nose stud when she was not at school.

These contentions were substantially supported by the GBF. The Department did not persist with its contention that the issue before the Court was moot; on the other hand, the School and the GBF argued that the matter was not moot because of its impact on all other schools. It also disputed the claim that Sunali formed part of an identifiable culture.

For her part, Ms Pillay took the view that the issue is moot because Sunali was no longer a learner at DGHS and, according to her, the new guidelines have changed the legal landscape. She also submitted that under the Equality Act it was unnecessary to show a comparator or a dominant group. As long as a rule imposes disadvantage, it can be discriminatory. She contended further that Sunali’s failure to testify was irrelevant as it was not raised when Ms Pillay was cross-examined in the Equality Court. Ms Pillay downplayed the need to accord deference to the school authorities as well as the role of consultation. She argued that there was no evidence that refusing Sunali an exemption improved discipline at the School. While her primary case was based on equality, she also sought to assert the rights to freedom of expression and freedom of religion as independent claims.

The NTVS and the FXI submitted argument together. They emphasised the importance of culture. While accepting that culture and religion differ, they argued that once a cultural practice is established, it should be treated exactly the same as a religious practice. They also took issue with the reliance placed by the School and the GBF on the perception of the nose stud as a desirable fashion accessory. They further argued that freedom of expression could be considered as a separate right but that even if it could not, it was still relevant in interpreting the Equality Act. They contended that Sunali’s right to freedom of expression had been unjustifiably limited because Sunali’s nose stud posed no risk of substantial disruption to school activities.

Leave to Appeal

The parties were agreed that the case raises a constitutional issue; it was also not disputed that the applicants have reasonable prospects of success on appeal. There are, however, two issues that must be examined in order to determine whether leave to appeal should be granted. The first is the fact that the Supreme Court of Appeal has been bypassed and the second is the issue of mootness. The central enquiry is whether it is in the interests of justice for leave to appeal to be granted.

It is clear that the issues in this case involve matters that must eventually be decided by this Court. The parties themselves have made this patently clear. These issues have been fully canvassed in two courts. We have also had the benefit of comprehensive argument, presented by the parties and the three amici curiae. In my view, it is not in the interests of justice in this case to require the parties to incur the additional expense of going to the Supreme Court of Appeal before the matter is decided by this Court.

With regard to mootness, this Court has held that:

“A case is moot and therefore not justiciable if it no longer presents an existing or live controversy which should exist if the Court is to avoid giving advisory opinions on abstract propositions of law.”^³

Sunali is no longer at DGHS and the issue is therefore moot. This Court has however held that it may be in the interests of justice to hear a matter even if it is moot if “any order which [it] may make will have some practical effect either on the parties or on others.”^⁴ The following factors have been held to be potentially relevant:

the nature and extent of the practical effect that any possible order might have;^⁵
the importance of the issue;^⁶
the complexity of the issue;^⁷
the fullness or otherwise of the argument advanced;^⁸ and
resolving disputes between different courts.^⁹

I do not agree with Ms Pillay’s contention that the new guidelines that have been issued by the Department have altered the “legal landscape” in which these questions must be considered. The implication of this submission is that any decision this Court may make will have no relevance as it will have been decided under a legal regime that is no longer applicable.

The guidelines are not mandatory but are exactly what they purport to be – a guide. The following features all demonstrate the non-binding nature of the guidelines: section 8(3) of the South African Schools Act^¹⁰ which empowers the Minister to make the guidelines states that they are for the “consideration” of schools; while some of the regulations are couched in mandatory language,^¹¹ the vast majority – including those relating to religious and cultural diversity – use the suggestive word “should”; the section on religious and cultural diversity is solely to “assist” schools in determining their uniform policy;^¹² when a governing body adopts a new code, the only requirement is that it “should make [its] decision in terms of these guidelines”;^¹³ and the strongest obligation that exists on governing bodies is that they must “consider” the guidelines.^¹⁴ That hardly alters the “legal landscape” as schools, including DGHS, might consider the guidelines and lawfully decide to adopt exactly the same provision that is currently before us. Any aggrieved party would be entitled to bring exactly the same challenge. That Ms Pillay might have an additional challenge based on a failure to consider the guidelines does not seem relevant.

As already noted, this matter raises vital questions about the extent of protection afforded to cultural and religious rights in the school setting and possibly beyond. The issues are both important and complex, as is evidenced by the varying approaches of the courts below as well as courts in foreign jurisdictions. Extensive argument has been presented, not only from the parties but from three amici curiae. There is accordingly no doubt that the order, if the matter is heard, will have a significant practical effect on the School and all other schools in the country, although it will have no direct impact on Sunali. It is therefore in the interests of justice to grant leave to appeal.

What is at issue?

The first question is whether the discrimination complained of by Ms Pillay flows from the Code or from the decision of the School to refuse an exemption. Ms Pillay specifically identifies the decision of the School as the problem, but the major part of the arguments addressed to the Court by all the other parties focused on the discriminatory nature of the Code. To my mind, it is the combination of the Code and the refusal to grant an exemption that resulted in the alleged discrimination, not the one or the other in isolation.

There are two problems with the Code, which operate together. The first is that it does not set out a process or standard according to which exemptions should be granted, for the guidance of learners, parents and the Governing Body. The School has itself developed a tradition of granting exemptions in certain circumstances. The second problem is the fact that the jewellery provision in the Code does not permit learners to wear a nose stud and accordingly required Sunali to seek an exemption in the first place.

It is true, however, that even taking these flaws into account, this dispute would never have arisen if the School had granted an exemption to Sunali. Whether the policy according to which that decision was taken was part of the Code, or existed only as the Governing Body’s tradition, would ultimately have made no difference. Nonetheless, it is still necessary for the Court to address the underlying problems of the Code. A properly drafted code which sets realistic boundaries and provides a procedure to be followed in applying for and the granting of exemptions, is the proper way to foster a spirit of reasonable accommodation in our schools and to avoid acrimonious disputes such as the present one. In sum, the problem is both the decision to refuse Sunali an exemption and the inadequacies of the Code itself.

The correct approach to “discrimination” under the Equality Act

Unfair discrimination, by both the State and private parties, including on the grounds of both religion and culture, is specifically prohibited by sections 9(3) and (4) of the Constitution, which read:

“(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.

(4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds in terms of subsection (3). National legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination.”

The Equality Act is clearly the legislation contemplated in section 9(4) and gives further content to the prohibition on unfair discrimination.^¹⁵ Section 6 of the Equality Act reiterates the Constitution’s prohibition of unfair discrimination by both the State and private parties on the same grounds including, of course, religion and culture.^¹⁶ Although this Court has regularly considered unfair discrimination under section 9 of the Constitution, it has not yet considered discrimination as prohibited by the Equality Act. Two preliminary issues about the nature of discrimination under the Act therefore arise.

The first is that claims brought under the Equality Act must be considered within the four corners of that Act. This Court has held in the context of both administrative and labour law that a litigant cannot circumvent legislation enacted to give effect to a constitutional right by attempting to rely directly on the constitutional right.^¹⁷ To do so would be to “fail to recognise the important task conferred upon the legislature by the Constitution to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights.”^¹⁸ The same principle applies to the Equality Act. Absent a direct challenge to the Act, courts must assume that the Equality Act is consistent with the Constitution and claims must be decided within its margins.

The second issue is how the definition of “discrimination” in the Equality Act should be interpreted. Section 1 of the Equality Act defines “discrimination” as:

“any act or omission, including a policy, law, rule, practice, condition or situation which directly or indirectly—

(a) imposes burdens, obligations or disadvantage on; or

(b) withholds benefits, opportunities or advantages from,

any person on one or more of the prohibited grounds”.

The School, the GBF and, to a lesser extent, the Department argued that in this case, there was no comparator in the form of a group that was treated better than Sunali. They contended that although a comparator is not specifically mentioned in the definition in the Equality Act, it should be implied as a requirement. Absent a comparator therefore, no discrimination could be established. Ms Pillay’s response to this line of reasoning spawned a deeper debate about the extent to which the Act must be informed by section 9 of the Constitution and this Court’s interpretation of that section.

I deal with that deeper problem first and then turn to the specific question of the need for a comparator. Section 39(2) of the Constitution makes it clear that the Act must be interpreted in light of the “spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights” which includes section 9. That does not mean that the Act must be interpreted to restate the precise terms of section 9. The legislature, when enacting national legislation to give effect to the right to equality, may extend protection beyond what is conferred by section 9. As long as the Act does not decrease the protection afforded by section 9 or infringe another right, a difference between the Act and section 9 does not violate the Constitution. It would therefore not be a problem if the definition of discrimination in the Act included forms of conduct not covered by section 9 as long as the prohibition of those forms of conduct conformed to the Bill of Rights.

Fortunately, on the approach I adopt below, the final determination of the more direct question of whether the Equality Act always requires a comparator can be left for another day. I hold that there is an appropriate comparator available in this case. It is those learners whose sincere religious or cultural beliefs or practices are not compromised by the Code, as compared to those whose beliefs or practices are compromised. The ground of discrimination is still religion or culture as the Code has a disparate impact on certain religions and cultures. The norm embodied by the Code is not neutral, but enforces mainstream and historically privileged forms of adornment, such as ear studs which also involve the piercing of a body part, at the expense of minority and historically excluded forms. It thus places a burden on learners who are unable to express themselves fully and must attend school in an environment that does not completely accept them. In my view, the comparator is not learners who were granted an exemption compared with those who were not.^¹⁹ That approach identifies only the direct effect flowing from the School’s decisions and fails to address the underlying indirect impact inherent in the Code itself.

It follows, therefore that the Code coupled with the decision to refuse Sunali an exemption will be discriminatory if they imposed a burden on her or withheld a benefit from her. In the circumstances of this case that will require a showing that Sunali’s religious or cultural beliefs or practices have been impaired. It is to that question that I now turn.

Discrimination

The prohibition of discrimination on the basis of religion or culture in terms of the Equality Act and section 9 of the Constitution is distinct from the protection of religion and culture provided for by sections 15^²⁰ and 30^²¹ of the Constitution. The two rights may overlap, however, where the discrimination in question flows from an interference with a person’s religious or cultural practices.^²² Therefore, in order to establish discrimination in this case, Ms Pillay must show that the School in some way interfered with Sunali’s participation in or practice or expression of her religion or culture. This inquiry is similar to an inquiry under sections 15 or 30, but it is not identical because the Court must go on to consider whether the discrimination, if any, was unfair.

The alleged grounds of discrimination are religion and/or culture. It is important to keep these two grounds distinct. Without attempting to provide any form of definition, religion is ordinarily concerned with personal faith and belief, while culture generally relates to traditions and beliefs developed by a community. However, there will often be a great deal of overlap between the two; religious practices are frequently informed not only by faith but also by custom, while cultural beliefs do not develop in a vacuum and may be based on the community’s underlying religious or spiritual beliefs. Therefore, while it is possible for a belief or practice to be purely religious or purely cultural, it is equally possible for it to be both religious and cultural.

With that brief introduction in mind, I now address the facts of this specific case. The first question is whether Sunali is part of an identifiable religion or culture. It was not contended that Hinduism is not a religion or that Sunali is not a Hindu. The GBF argued however that Sunali did not show that she was part of an identifiable culture. While I do not propose to provide a comprehensive definition of culture, it is necessary to consider the matter briefly. The GBF supported Lord Fraser’s understanding of “ethnic group” in the United Kingdom’s Race Relations Act 1976^²³ as being an appropriate starting point to define “culture”. Lord Fraser held that for a group to constitute an “ethnic group” it must at least have a long shared history and a cultural tradition of its own, including family and social customs and manners. Other relevant factors would include a common geographical origin; a common language; a common literature peculiar to the group; and a common religion different from that of neighbouring groups or from the general community surrounding it.^²⁴

While foreign jurisprudence is useful, the context in which a particular pronouncement was made needs to be carefully examined.^²⁵ Lord Fraser’s remarks were crafted in the specific context of the English Race Relations Act and concerned legislation specifically directed at race and ethnicity, not at the concept of culture, broadly understood. They are accordingly, in my view, not a reliable guide in interpreting the Equality Act. In addition, discrimination on the basis of race, ethnic or social origin, religion and language is already prohibited by the Constitution and the Equality Act. Our understanding of “culture” must therefore extend beyond the limits of those terms which seem to have been the focus of Lord Fraser’s definition. At the same time, if too wide a meaning is given to culture, “the category becomes so broad as to be rather useless for understanding differences among identity groups.”^²⁶ (Footnote omitted.)

The outer limits of culture fortunately do not concern us in this case. Even on the most restrictive understanding of culture, Sunali is part of the South Indian, Tamil and Hindu groups which are defined by a combination of religion, language, geographical origin, ethnicity and artistic tradition. Whether those groups operate together or separately matters not; combined or separate, they are an identifiable culture of which Sunali is a part.

Next, we need to consider the religious and cultural significance of the nose stud. There were two interrelated areas of contention. The first was whether a claim that a practice has religious or cultural significance should be determined subjectively or objectively. The second concerned the absence of any evidence from Sunali herself.

It is accepted both in South Africa^²⁷ and abroad^²⁸ that, in order to determine if a practice or belief qualifies as religious a court should ask only whether the claimant professes a sincere belief. There is however no such consensus concerning cultural practices and beliefs. There was much argument in this Court that because culture is inherently an associative practice, a more objective approach should be adopted when dealing with cultural beliefs or practices. It is unnecessary in this case to engage too deeply in that debate as both the subjective and objective evidence lead to the same conclusion. It is however necessary to make two points.

Firstly, cultural convictions or practices may be as strongly held and as important to those who hold them as religious beliefs are to those more inclined to find meaning in a higher power than in a community of people. The notion that “we are not islands unto ourselves”^²⁹ is central to the understanding of the individual in African thought.^³⁰ It is often expressed in the phrase umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu^³¹ which emphasises “communality and the inter-dependence of the members of a community”^³² and that every individual is an extension of others. According to Gyekye, “an individual human person cannot develop and achieve the fullness of his/her potential without the concrete act of relating to other individual persons”.^³³ This thinking emphasises the importance of community to individual identity and hence to human dignity. Dignity and identity are inseparably linked as one’s sense of self-worth is defined by one’s identity.^³⁴ Cultural identity is one of the most important parts of a person’s identity precisely because it flows from belonging to a community and not from personal choice or achievement. And belonging involves more than simple association; it includes participation and expression of the community’s practices and traditions.

Secondly, while cultures are associative, they are not monolithic. The practices and beliefs that make up an individual’s cultural identity will differ from person to person within a culture: one may express their culture through participation in initiation rites, another through traditional dress or song and another through keeping a traditional home. While people find their cultural identity in different places, the importance of that identity to their being in the world remains the same. There is a danger of falling into an antiquated mode of understanding culture as a single unified entity that can be studied and defined from outside. As Martin Chanock warns us:

“The idea of culture derived from anthropology, a discipline which studied the encapsulated exotic, is no longer appropriate. There are no longer (if there ever were) single cultures in any country, polity or legal system, but many. Cultures are complex conversations within any social formation. These conversations have many voices.”^³⁵

Cultures are living and contested formations. The protection of the Constitution extends to all those for whom culture gives meaning, not only to those who happen to speak with the most powerful voice in the present cultural conversation.

The second debate I mentioned earlier related to the absence of any evidence from Sunali. The School argued that Sunali’s failure to testify in the Equality Court or to provide any affidavit renders it impossible for a court to determine what her beliefs are and this Court is accordingly precluded from making a finding of discrimination.

It is always desirable, and may sometimes be vital, to hear from the person whose religion or culture is at issue. That is often no less true when the belief in question is that of a child. Legal matters involving children often exclude the children and the matter is left to adults to argue and decide on their behalf. In Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education^³⁶ this Court held, in the context of a case concerning children, that their

“actual experiences and opinions would not necessarily have been decisive, but they would have enriched the dialogue, and the factual and experiential foundations for the balancing exercise in this difficult matter would have been more secure.”^³⁷

That is true for this case as well. The need for the child’s voice to be heard is perhaps even more acute when it concerns children of Sunali’s age who should be increasingly taking responsibility for their own actions and beliefs.

However, as an analysis of the evidence shows, Sunali’s failure to testify is not fatal to Ms Pillay’s case. It is important to note that the School does not directly challenge the veracity of Ms Pillay’s testimony; it simply argues that we should have heard Sunali as well. I agree with Ms Pillay that any difficulties they had with her testimony should have been raised in the Equality Court during cross-examination, and not for the first time on appeal. It is possible that if Ms Pillay had been challenged on whether she correctly represented Sunali’s belief, she would have called Sunali, who was present in court, as a witness.

In any event, we have the specific admission of Mrs Martin that the nose stud has cultural significance to Sunali although she denies it has independent religious significance. And we know how Sunali acted. Although when Mrs Martin first confronted her about the nose stud she agreed to remove it, she consistently thereafter defied the will of the School in order to adhere to her belief. The initial failure can easily be explained as a young woman uncertain about the consequences of standing up against the imposing authority of the School’s headmistress. Sunali also endured a large measure of insensitive treatment from her peers, including the prefects of the School, and media exposure, yet continued to stand by her belief. All this points to the conclusion that Sunali held a sincere belief that the nose stud was part of her religion and culture.

The expert evidence of Dr Rambilass, the School’s own expert witness, confirms the impression that Sunali’s own conduct created. The Doctor accepted that the nose stud is a cultural practice that clearly has “significance and value” and testified that according to Hindu tradition, nose piercing is part of the Shringaar which is concerned with love, beauty and adornment, not from the religious texts. While Dr Rambilass disputed that the nose stud had independent religious significance, he accepted under cross-examination that it is difficult to separate Hindu culture and Hindu religion and that there are many different sects of Hinduism with different beliefs and practices. His evidence on religion was also self-consciously focused on defining Hindu religion according to the specific wording of the Vedic texts rather than on a broader view of religion as being informed and even defined by culture, tradition and practice.

In conclusion, the evidence shows that the nose stud is not a mandatory tenet of Sunali’s religion or culture; Ms Pillay has admitted as much. But the evidence does confirm that the nose stud is a voluntary expression of South Indian Tamil Hindu culture, a culture that is intimately intertwined with Hindu religion, and that Sunali regards it as such. The question arises whether the nose stud should be classified as a religious or cultural practice, or both. This Court has noted that “the temptation to force [grounds of discrimination] into neatly self-contained categories should be resisted.”^³⁸ That is particularly so in this case where the evidence suggests that the borders between culture and religion are malleable and that religious belief informs cultural practice and cultural practice attains religious significance. As noted above, that will not always be the case: culture and religion remain very different forms of human association and individual identity, and often inform peoples’ lives in very different ways. But in this matter, culture and religion sing with the same voice and it is necessary to understand the nose stud in that light – as an expression of both religion and culture.

The final question is whether the Equality Act and the Constitution apply to voluntary religious and cultural practices. This question has not yet arisen before South African courts. The School and the GBF have argued that voluntary practices should not be protected or should be accorded less protection while Ms Pillay has taken the opposite stance.

The traditional basis for invalidating laws that prohibit the exercise of an obligatory religious practice is that it confronts the adherents with a Hobson’s choice between observance of their faith and adherence to the law.^³⁹ There is however more to the protection of religious and cultural practices than saving believers from hard choices. As stated above, religious and cultural practices are protected because they are central to human identity and hence to human dignity which is in turn central to equality.^⁴⁰ Are voluntary practices any less a part of a person’s identity or do they affect human dignity any less seriously because they are not mandatory?

Freedom is one of the underlying values of our Bill of Rights^⁴¹ and courts must interpret all rights to promote the underlying values of “human dignity, equality and freedom”.^⁴² These values are not mutually exclusive but enhance and reinforce each other. In Ferreira v Levin NO and Others and Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others^⁴³ Ackermann J wrote that:

“Human dignity has little value without freedom; for without freedom personal development and fulfilment are not possible. Without freedom, human dignity is little more than an abstraction. Freedom and dignity are inseparably linked. To deny people their freedom is to deny them their dignity.”^⁴⁴

A necessary element of freedom and of dignity of any individual is an “entitlement to respect for the unique set of ends that the individual pursues.”^⁴⁵ One of those ends is the voluntary religious and cultural practices in which we participate. That we choose voluntarily rather than through a feeling of obligation only enhances the significance of a practice to our autonomy, our identity and our dignity.

The protection of voluntary as well as obligatory practices also conforms to the Constitution’s commitment to affirming diversity. It is a commitment that is totally in accord with this nation’s decisive break from its history of intolerance and exclusion. Differentiating between mandatory and voluntary practices does not celebrate or affirm diversity, it simply permits it. That falls short of our constitutional project which not only affirms diversity, but promotes and celebrates it. We cannot celebrate diversity by permitting it only when no other option remains. As this Court held in Minister of Home Affairs and Another v Fourie and Another; Lesbian and Gay Equality Project and Others v Minister of Home Affairs and Others:^⁴⁶

“The acknowledgment and acceptance of difference is particularly important in our country where for centuries group membership based on supposed biological characteristics such as skin colour has been the express basis of advantage and disadvantage. South Africans come in all shapes and sizes. The development of an active rather than a purely formal sense of enjoying a common citizenship depends on recognising and accepting people with all their differences, as they are. The Constitution thus acknowledges the variability of human beings (genetic and socio-cultural), affirms the right to be different, and celebrates the diversity of the nation.”^⁴⁷ (Footnotes omitted.)

These values are shared with other jurisdictions, such as Canada, to name one, where the Supreme Court has affirmed the necessity of protecting voluntary religious practices.^⁴⁸

The protection of voluntary practices applies equally to culture and religion. Indeed, it seems to me that it may even be more vital to protect non-obligatory cultural practices. Cultures, unlike religions, are not necessarily based on tenets of faith but on a collection of practices, ideas or ways of being. While some cultures may have obligatory rules which act as conditions for membership of the culture, many cultures, unlike many religions, will not have an authoritative body or text that determines the dictates of the culture. Any single member of a culture will seldom observe all those practices that make up the cultural milieu, but will choose those which she or he feels are most important to her or his own relationship to and expression of that culture. To limit cultural protection to cultural obligations would, for many cultures and their members, make the protection largely meaningless.

It follows that whether a religious or cultural practice is voluntary or mandatory is irrelevant at the threshold stage of determining whether it qualifies for protection. However, the centrality of the practice, which may be affected by its voluntary nature, is a relevant question in determining the fairness of the discrimination. That is a point I return to later.

I therefore find that Sunali was discriminated against on the basis of both religion and culture in terms of section 6 of the Equality Act. I proceed now to consider whether or not that discrimination was fair.

Unfairness

Section 13(2)(a) of the Equality Act^⁴⁹ tracks section 9(5) of the Constitution^⁵⁰ in placing the onus on the applicants to prove that discrimination on a listed ground is fair. Section 14 of the Equality Act deals with the determination of unfairness. It reads:

“(1) It is not unfair discrimination to take measures designed to protect or advance persons or categories of persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination or the members of such groups or categories of persons.

(2) In determining whether the respondent has proved that the discrimination is fair, the following must be taken into account:

(a) The context;

(b) the factors referred to in subsection (3);

(c) whether the discrimination reasonably and justifiably differentiates between persons according to objectively determinable criteria, intrinsic to the activity concerned.

(3) The factors referred to in subsection (2)(b) include the following:

(a) Whether the discrimination impairs or is likely to impair human dignity;

(b) the impact or likely impact of the discrimination on the complainant;

(c) the position of the complainant in society and whether he or she suffers from patterns of disadvantage or belongs to a group that suffers from such patterns of disadvantage;

(d) the nature and extent of the discrimination;

(e) whether the discrimination is systemic in nature;

(f) whether the discrimination has a legitimate purpose;

(g) whether and to what extent the discrimination achieves its purpose;

(h) whether there are less restrictive and less disadvantageous means to achieve the purpose;

(i) whether and to what extent the respondent has taken such steps as being reasonable in the circumstances to—

(i) address the disadvantage which arises from or is related to one or more of the prohibited grounds; or

(ii) accommodate diversity.”

The list of factors in section 14(3) includes issues that traditionally fall under a fairness analysis ((a), (b), (c) and (e))^⁵¹ and questions normally relevant to a limitation analysis under section 36(1) of the Constitution^⁵² ((d), (f), (g) and (h)). Accordingly, the fairness test under the Equality Act as it stands may involve a wider range of factors than are relevant to the test of fairness in terms of section 9 of the Constitution. Whether that approach is consistent with the Constitution is not before us, and we address the question on the legislation as it stands.

Before considering the fairness of the discrimination in this case, it will be convenient to make a few comments about the form of the unfairness inquiry under the Equality Act in circumstances such as the present. Much was said by both parties in argument about the principle of “reasonable accommodation”. Ms Pillay specifically argued that Sunali’s case should be decided on that principle. It is therefore necessary to consider both the content of the idea of reasonable accommodation and its place in the Equality Act.

The concept of reasonable accommodation is not new to our law – this Court has repeatedly expressed the need for reasonable accommodation when considering matters of religion.^⁵³ The Employment Equity Act^⁵⁴ defines reasonable accommodation as “any modification or adjustment to a job or to the working environment that will enable a person from a designated group to have access to or participate or advance in employment”^⁵⁵ and recognises making reasonable accommodation for designated groups as an affirmative action measure.^⁵⁶ There is also specific mention of the concept in the Equality Act. It recognises that “failing to take steps to reasonably accommodate the needs” of people on the basis of race,^⁵⁷ gender^⁵⁸ or disability^⁵⁹ will amount to unfair discrimination. The Equality Act places a duty on the state to “develop codes of practice . . . in order to promote equality, and develop guidelines, including codes in respect of reasonable accommodation”^⁶⁰ and permits courts to order that a group or class of persons be reasonably accommodated.^⁶¹ Finally, section 14(3)(i)(ii) lists as a factor for the determination of fairness the question whether the applicant has taken reasonable steps to accommodate diversity.

But what is the content of the principle? At its core is the notion that sometimes the community, whether it is the State, an employer or a school, must take positive measures and possibly incur additional hardship or expense in order to allow all people to participate and enjoy all their rights equally. It ensures that we do not relegate people to the margins of society because they do not or cannot conform to certain social norms. In Christian Education,^⁶² in the context of accommodating religious belief in society, a unanimous Court identified the underlying motivation of the concept as follows:

“The underlying problem in any open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom in which conscientious and religious freedom has to be regarded with appropriate seriousness, is how far such democracy can and must go in allowing members of religious communities to define for themselves which laws they will obey and which not. Such a society can cohere only if all its participants accept that certain basic norms and standards are binding. Accordingly, believers cannot claim an automatic right to be exempted by their beliefs from the laws of the land. At the same time, the State should, wherever reasonably possible, seek to avoid putting believers to extremely painful and intensely burdensome choices of either being true to their faith or else respectful of the law.”^⁶³

The idea extends beyond religious belief. Its importance is particularly well illustrated by the application of reasonable accommodation to disability law. As I have already mentioned, the Equality Act specifically requires that reasonable accommodation be made for people with disabilities. Disabled people are often unable to access or participate in public or private life because the means to do so are designed for able-bodied people. The result is that disabled people can, without any positive action, easily be pushed to the margins of society:

“Exclusion from the mainstream of society results from the construction of a society based solely on ‘mainstream’ attributes to which disabled persons will never be able to gain access. Whether it is the impossibility of success at a written test for a blind person, or the need for ramp access to a library, the discrimination does not lie in the attribution of untrue characteristics to the disabled individual. The blind person cannot see and the person in a wheelchair needs a ramp. Rather, it is the failure to make reasonable accommodation, to fine-tune society so that its structures and assumptions do not result in the relegation and banishment of disabled persons from participation, which results in discrimination against them.”^⁶⁴

While the extent of this exclusion is most powerfully felt by the disabled, the same exclusion is inflicted on all those who are excluded by rules that fail to accommodate those who depart from the norm. Our society which values dignity, equality, and freedom must therefore require people to act positively to accommodate diversity. Those steps might be as simple as granting and regulating an exemption from a general rule or they may require that the rules or practices be changed or even that buildings be altered or monetary loss incurred.

The difficult question then is not whether positive steps must be taken, but how far the community must be required to go to enable those outside the “mainstream” to swim freely in its waters. This is an issue which has been debated both in this Court^⁶⁵ and abroad^⁶⁶ and different positions have been taken. For instance, although the term “undue hardship” is employed as the test for reasonable accommodation in both the United States and Canada, the United States Supreme Court has held that employers need only incur “a de minimis cost” in order to accommodate an individual’s religion,^⁶⁷ whilst the Canadian Supreme Court has specifically declined to adopt that standard^⁶⁸ and has stressed that “more than mere negligible effort is required to satisfy the duty to accommodate.”^⁶⁹ The latter approach is more in line with the spirit of our constitutional project which affirms diversity. However, the utility of either of these phrases is limited as ultimately the question will always be a contextual one dependant not on its compatibility with a judicially created slogan but with the values and principles underlying the Constitution.^⁷⁰ Reasonable accommodation is, in a sense, an exercise in proportionality that will depend intimately on the facts.

It is now necessary to crystallise the role that reasonable accommodation can play in the Equality Act. As noted earlier, the principle is mentioned on a number of occasions in the Equality Act. What concerns us in this case, however, is section 14(3)(i)(ii) which states that taking reasonable steps to accommodate diversity is a factor for determining the fairness of discrimination.^⁷¹ From this it is clear that reasonable accommodation will always be an important factor in the determination of the fairness of discrimination. It would however be wrong to reduce the test for fairness to a test for reasonable accommodation, particularly because the factors relevant to the determination of fairness have been carefully articulated by the legislature and that option has been specifically avoided.

There may be circumstances where fairness requires a reasonable accommodation, while in other circumstances it may require more or less, or something completely different. It will depend on the nature of the case and the nature of the interests involved. Two factors seem particularly relevant. First, reasonable accommodation is most appropriate where, as in this case, discrimination arises from a rule or practice that is neutral on its face and is designed to serve a valuable purpose, but which nevertheless has a marginalising effect on certain portions of society. Second, the principle is particularly appropriate in specific localised contexts, such as an individual workplace or school, where a reasonable balance between conflicting interests may more easily be struck.^⁷² Even where fairness requires a reasonable accommodation, the other factors listed in section 14 will always remain relevant.

The present case bears both these characteristics and therefore, in my view, fairness required a reasonable accommodation. Whether that required the School to permit Sunali to wear the nose stud depends on the importance of the practice to Sunali on the one hand, and the hardship that permitting her to wear the stud would cause the School. Before I address that question, there were two points raised about the context within which fairness should be determined. These relate to the need for deference and the consultation that went into the making of the Code.

Deference

The School and the GBF argued that courts should show a measure of deference to governing bodies that are statutorily required to run schools and have the necessary expertise to do so. They relied for this proposition on decisions of the European Court of Human Rights^⁷³ and the House of Lords^⁷⁴ which invoke the doctrine of the “margin of appreciation”. The doctrine has been described as

“a recognition by the [European Court] that the domestic authorities of any given Member State are generally in a better position than an international court of supervisory jurisdiction to reach a decision on an individual case or to determine the extent to which a measure was ‘necessary’ to deal with a particular issue.”^⁷⁵

This Court has held that the doctrine is not a useful guide when deciding either whether a right has been limited^⁷⁶ or whether such a limitation is justified.^⁷⁷

This Court has recognised the need for judicial deference in reviewing administrative decisions where the decision-maker is, by virtue of his or her expertise, especially well-qualified to decide.^⁷⁸ It is true that the Court must give due weight to the opinion of experts, including school authorities, who are particularly knowledgeable in their area, depending on the cogency of their opinions. The question before this Court, however, is whether the fundamental right to equality has been violated, which in turn requires the Court to determine what obligations the School bears to accommodate diversity reasonably. Those are questions that courts are best qualified and constitutionally mandated to answer. This Court cannot abdicate its duty by deferring to the School’s view on the requirements of fairness. That approach is obviously incorrect for the further reason that it is for the School to show that the discrimination was fair. A court cannot defer to the view of a party concerning a contention that that same party is bound to prove.

Consultation

In urging that the Code should be respected, the School stressed the fact that it was devised after extensive consultation with parents, educators, staff, and learners, and accordingly represented the combined wisdom of all who participated in its construction and should therefore be respected. There is no doubt that consultation and public participation in local decision-making are good and deserve to be applauded. They promote and deepen democracy. In the context of the Code, it means that the School community is involved in the running of the School and acquires a sense of ownership over the Code. In Doctors for Life v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others^⁷⁹ Ngcobo J held, in the context of public participation in crafting national legislation, that:

“participation by the public on a continuous basis provides vitality to the functioning of representative democracy. It encourages citizens of the country to be actively involved in public affairs, identify themselves with the institutions of government and become familiar with the laws as they are made. It enhances the civic dignity of those who participate by enabling their voices to be heard and taken account of. It promotes a spirit of democratic and pluralistic accommodation calculated to produce laws that are likely to be widely accepted and effective in practice. It strengthens the legitimacy of legislation in the eyes of the people.”^⁸⁰

This, however, does not immunise the resultant decisions, in effect the opinion of the school community, from constitutional scrutiny and review.^⁸¹ The reality is that many individual communities still retain historically unequal power relations or historically skewed population groups which may make it more likely that local decisions will infringe on the rights of disfavoured groups. In sum, while local democratic processes and consultation are important constitutional values in their own right, their role in the evaluation of the substance of decisions, if any, should not be overstated.

I turn now to the question of the importance of the nose stud to Sunali and its effect on the School.

The severity of the infringement

The School submitted that the infringement of Sunali’s right, if any, is slight, because Sunali can wear the nose stud outside of school. I do not agree. The practice to which Sunali adheres is that once she inserts the nose stud, she must never remove it. Preventing her from wearing it for several hours of each school day would undermine the practice and therefore constitute a significant infringement of her religious and cultural identity. What is relevant is the symbolic effect of denying her the right to wear it for even a short period; it sends a message that Sunali, her religion and her culture are not welcome.

The School further argued that the nose stud is not central to Sunali’s religion or culture, but is only an optional practice. I agree that the centrality of a practice or a belief must play a role in determining how far another party must go to accommodate that belief. The essence of reasonable accommodation is an exercise of proportionality. Persons who merely appear to adhere to a religious and/or cultural practice, but who are willing to forego it if necessary, can hardly demand the same adjustment from others as those whose identity will be seriously undermined if they do not follow their belief. The difficult question is how to determine centrality. Should we enquire into the centrality of the practice or belief to the community, or to the individual?

While it is tempting to consider the objective importance or centrality of a belief to a particular religion or culture in determining whether the discrimination is fair, that approach raises many difficulties. In my view, courts should not involve themselves in determining the objective centrality of practices, as this would require them to substitute their judgement of the meaning of a practice for that of the person before them and often to take sides in bitter internal disputes. This is true both for religious and cultural practices. If Sunali states that the nose stud is central to her as a South Indian Tamil Hindu, it is not for the Court to tell her that she is wrong because others do not relate to that religion or culture in the same way.

Centrality must be judged with reference only to how important the belief or practice is to the claimant’s religious or cultural identity.^⁸² In reaching that decision the Court can properly look at a range of evidence including evidence of the objective centrality of the practice to the community at large. That evidence however is only relevant in so far as it helps to answer the primary inquiry of subjective centrality. The fact that a practice is voluntary may also be relevant as many people will not feel that voluntary practices are central to their religious or cultural identity. But there will also be those who, although they do not feel obliged to observe a certain practice, feel that it is central to their identity that they do so. They too deserve protection. In sum, the School and this Court must consider all the relevant evidence, but the ultimate question they must answer is: “How central is the nose stud to Sunali’s religious and cultural identity?” However, the need for a subjective investigation takes us back to the complaint that Sunali did not give evidence regarding that importance.

Ms Pillay’s case would no doubt have been assisted by Sunali’s evidence. However, the Court must evaluate such evidence as there is. Ms Pillay stated that the nose stud was not imposed on Sunali; she had wanted her nose pierced since the age of four. The nose stud was not worn for fashion reasons but was inserted as part of a traditional ritual and an expression of her religious and cultural identity. In her first letter to the School, Ms Pillay wrote that the stud “serves not only to indicate that we value our daughters, but in keeping with Indian tradition, that our daughters are the Luxmi (Goddess of Prosperity) and Light of the house.” In her testimony Ms Pillay stated that by inserting the stud:

“we acknowledge our daughters, the women in our family, as a very vital part of family life. We honour them and we honour the divine within them. And that’s important. It’s important for every child to know that she garners respect.”

The wearing of the nose stud was also not without consequences to Sunali. She was obviously under a great deal of stress and her grades dropped because of the School’s reaction to the nose stud and the related publicity. She was regularly required to explain herself to staff members and prefects at the school and was threatened with disciplinary action. In spite of these difficulties, Sunali did not alter her conduct or belief. None of this evidence was disputed and it all points to a very strong belief on Sunali’s part that the nose stud was important for her identity. I am accordingly convinced that the practice was a peculiar and particularly significant manifestation of her South Indian, Tamil and Hindu identity. It was her way of expressing her roots and her faith. While others may have expressed the same faith, traditions and beliefs differently or not at all, the evidence shows that it was important for Sunali to express her religion and culture through wearing the nose stud.

The next string of the School’s centrality bow was that the infringement of Sunali’s right to equality is less severe because the nose stud is a cultural rather than a religious adornment. This was also the basis originally relied upon by the School for refusing the exemption and why it could recognise the stud’s cultural significance without granting Sunali an exemption. To my mind the argument is flawed. As stated above,^⁸³ religious and cultural practices can be equally important to a person’s identity. What is relevant is not whether a practice is characterised as religious or cultural but its meaning to the person involved. Pre-determining that importance based on what will often be an imperfect or artificial categorisation reinforces ideas about the respective roles and importance of religion and culture in peoples’ lives and fails to accommodate those who do not conform to that stereotype.

The School also argued that if Sunali did not like the Code, she could simply go to another school that would allow her to wear the nose stud. I cannot agree. In my view the effect of this would be to marginalise religions and cultures, something that is completely inconsistent with the values of our Constitution. As already noted, our Constitution does not tolerate diversity as a necessary evil, but affirms it as one of the primary treasures of our nation.^⁸⁴ There may, however, be occasions where the specific factual circumstances make the availability of another school a relevant consideration in searching for a reasonable accommodation. However, there are no such circumstances in this case and the availability of another school is therefore not a relevant consideration.

The Code limits freedom of expression

While considering the centrality of the practice to Sunali or the effect that its prohibition would have on her dignity, it bears mentioning that the ban affects other constitutional rights as well. The dual purpose of the NTVS and FXI’s submission was to stress the relevance of the right to freedom of expression to the case and to show that it had been infringed. They argued that freedom of expression was relevant both as a self-standing right and as a relevant factor in determining unfair discrimination. This was disputed by the applicants and the GBF on the basis that the case had been brought under the Equality Act which does not make provision for non-equality claims.

It is unnecessary in this case to decide whether it is possible to rely directly on the right to freedom of expression under the Equality Act, or whether the ban on the nose stud is an unjustifiable limit on that right. It suffices to say that the extent to which discrimination impacts on other rights will be a relevant consideration in the determination of whether the discrimination is fair and that the ban on the nose stud limited Sunali’s right to express her religion and culture which is central to the right to freedom of expression.

The effect on the School

It is no doubt true that even the most vital practice of a religion or culture can be limited for the greater good.^⁸⁵ No belief is absolute, but those that are closer to the core of an individual’s identity require a greater justification to limit. The question is whether, considering the importance of the stud to Sunali, allowing her to wear the stud would impose too great a burden on the School.

The primary argument of both the School and the GBF was that allowing Sunali to wear the nose stud or allowing others like her similar exemptions would impact negatively on the discipline in schools and, as a result, on the quality of the education they provide.

This evaluation is correctly characterised by Ms Pillay as relating to the factors in section 14(3)(f), (g) and (h) of the Equality Act that are also part of the traditional section 36 analysis. It is also part of determining whether allowing the stud imposes an undue burden. If allowing the stud would cause indiscipline and a drop in academic standards, that might indeed be an undue burden to impose on the School.^⁸⁶ It is helpful to separate the inquiry into its constitutive parts: Is there a legitimate purpose? Does the limitation achieve the purpose? Are less restrictive means available to achieve the purpose?

Both discipline and education are legitimate goals. However, care must be taken not to state the School’s interest too broadly. Sunali’s interest in wearing her nose stud could never outweigh the general importance of ensuring discipline in schools. The interest of the School must be confined to refusing Sunali an exemption, not to the wearing of uniforms in general because this case is not about uniforms, but about exemptions to existing uniforms.^⁸⁷

This is important because Mrs Martin presented evidence about the importance of uniforms in promoting a culture of discipline and respect for authority. According to her, children, especially teenagers, need boundaries and the school environment should be a place where the influences of modern commercial life are moderated to create a better learning environment. The pressures of modern fashion are particularly intense as girls try to imitate and out-do each other. Uniforms help to limit the impact of that competition on the learning experience. There is no reason to question this evidence and Ms Pillay does not do so. The guidelines too recognise the importance of uniforms in the school environment.^⁸⁸

Rules are important to education. Not only do they promote an important sense of discipline in children, they prepare them for the real world which contains even more rules than the schoolyard. Schools belong to the communities they serve and that ownership implies a responsibility not only to make rules that fit the community, but also to abide by those rules. Nothing in this judgment should be interpreted as encouraging or condoning the breaking of school rules.

But this case is not about the constitutionality of school uniforms. It is about granting religious and cultural exemptions to an existing uniform. The admirable purposes that uniforms serve do not seem to be undermined by grantin

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South Africa: Constitutional Court

MEC for Education: Kwazulu-Natal and Others v Pillay (CCT 51/06) [2007] ZACC 21 (5 October 2007)