14
Mr Dippenaar describes the relationship between FirstRand, Discovery and Momentum in his affidavit. As a group, FirstRand espouses
a strong entrepreneurial spirit in all its operating subsidiaries and promotes an “owner manager” ethos in their management.
This means that management of its subsidiaries are given the freedom to set and pursue the goals of the companies concerned within
the governance framework set by FirstRand. It also entails allowing these companies to determine their own cultures. Without abandoning
this policy, there cannot be an “exchange of sensitive information at board level where a market division strategy could be
entertained”; and no information pertaining to operational matters is exchanged. The parties have no intention to change this
policy.
The FirstRand holding company delegates its authority to its subsidiary boards. It is not possible to govern the group in a different
manner. Certain FirstRand board members sit on the boards of the subsidiary companies in which appropriate policies are developed.
This, it seems to me, is good corporate governance and in keeping with spirit of the King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa – 2002(see Blackman Jooste & Everingham Commentary on the Companies ActVolume 2 (2005 Revision Service) at § 8-16.2 ff and §8-16.5). It is consistent practice across the FirstRand Group that
members of the FirstRand board, including its chief executive and chief financial officer are non-executive directors on the boards
of its major subsidiaries. This practice is not limited to the medical aid administration aspect of the business. The cross-directorships
are generally limited to those people concerned with the surveillance and accountability within the FirstRand group. By reason of
their positions in the FirstRand group, Mr Burger and Mr Dippenaar are deputed perform this task on behalf of FirstRand and
its subsidiaries. They are the appropriate people for the purpose and are seen as such. In the same spirit, it is the intention that
the new CEO of FirstRand (Mr P Harris), already a member of the Momentum board, will become a member of the Discovery board as well.
In these circumstances, it was deposed, an exchange of sensitive commercial information between the two groups will not be permitted.
It seems that the Tribunal’s reservations in this regard were ill-founded and, in the absence of full evidence, unjustified.
It is consequently clear why the parties tendered not to have cross-directorships at operating level but not at holding company level:
the tender would have been quite consistent with the policy allowing subsidiaries operating autonomy but quite inconsistent with
the position of the subsidiaries within the FirstRand Group. The kind of information that has to be considered at the level of the
holding company is different: it encompasses issues of financial and investment policy, corporate governance and the like that must
be filtered through to FirstRand itself. In the process of monitoring and assessing such matters, board members should be able to
consider the issues in a proper perspective within the context of the policies of the group as a whole.
15
In view of the aforesaid the following statement of the Tribunal is not justified: “Current
(pre-merger) cross-holdings and cross-directorships are a cause for concern, even at non-executive level, because there is a possibility
of exchange of sensitive information at board level where a market division strategy could be entertained” (§ 32). Finance
houses such as FirstRand are principally concerned with investment returns and growth on capital employed. For this purpose they
make strategic decisions on the extent to which they will invest in companies and provide them with continuing capital injections
and technical support. These decisions entail the evaluation, assessment and monitoring of the current and future performance of
companies within the group. Performance of this task requires a complete understanding of the position of each of the entities that
require comparison. The consolidation of information in this way is crucial to the proper management of a group. This exercise will
be undertaken within the top management of the holding company at the head of the group (FirstRand). Information will be submitted
by the subsidiaries to the board of directors of the holding company for deliberation. Management of FirstRand (for example, the
CEO and CFO) will be expected to be familiar with the facts of all group companies. This is the reason why they need to serve on
the boards of the main subsidiaries. Directors on the boards of the relevant subsidiaries need to be present on the FirstRand board
in order to ensure an understanding at FirstRand board level of the activities and positioning of the subsidiaries. They report back
to the subsidiary boards. They represent the subsidiary in deliberations at FirstRand board meetings and promote its interests.
It follows that there must be people on the subsidiary boards who are familiar with the overall policies and plans of the group and
who can ensure that they are carried through.
16
Section 12A requires of the Commission or Tribunal to “initially determine” whether
or not a merger is likely to “substantially” prevent or lessen competition, by assessing “the strength of competition
in the relevant market” and “the probability that the firms in the market after the merger will behave competitively
or co-operatively”. In doing so, it must take into account “any factor that is relevant to competition in that market”,
including the factors set out in s 12A(2) (see s 12A(1)). This makes it clear that a specific market must first be assessed. It is
also clear that the list of factors that must be considered is not a closed list and any other factor that is relevant as to whether
or not there will be a substantial lessening of competition can be taken into account.
There was no such express initial determination of anti-competitive consequences by the Tribunal that must lead to a conditional approval
of the merger. The Tribunal accepted that the market share of ALH was small and its acquisition would serve to increase the stake
in the market of Momentum by 3% at most (§ 29). Generally, in the absence of a link between Momentum and Discovery, the acquisition
of ALH would not have raised competition concerns (§ 15), and apparently this would be so even though ALH was of strategic importance
to Momentum (§ 29). The Tribunal accepts that there is vigorous competition between the groups (§ 20), and, while appreciating
that there might be some capacity to act co-operatively (§ 23), seems to accept that there is no such co-operation at present.
In its view, there is accordingly a basis for aggregating the market shares of the two groups, making at least 31.32% pre-merger
and 34.62% post-merger (§ 12). The Tribunal found that there is increasing consolidation in the medical aid administration market
(§ 30). Whilst it is accepted that in the provision of medical services generally, especially in hospital services, there is
a measure of concentration between the players, this is by no means obviously so in other fields. As the Tribunal accepted, the barriers
to entry within the field of medical aid administration are low and significant countervailing power exists. Medical aid schemes
come and go with some frequency, and the same is true of organizations that provide administrative services to such schemes. There
are several fairly large players and a significant number of smaller players within the market for the provision of medical aid administration
services. Discovery is the largest, but it has several competitors of significant size.
17
On the basis of these findings, the Tribunal stated that “[t]he rivalry between the two
groups is important, especially post-merger” (§ 25) and “it is imperative to maintain the rivalry between these
entities” (§ 31). the Tribunal accepted that it was impossible to ignore the fact that the two groups are members of a single corporate group (FirstRand)
but that they must be forced to continue to operate as competitors. However, if they are separate entities, then there is no basis
for concluding that the merger will create anti-competitive consequences. Momentum has a relatively small share of this market. Taken
separately, it can be argued that the transaction is pro-competitive by enhancing Momentum’s presence in the market and enabling
it to compete more effectively with the larger participants.
18
The Tribunal stated: “The concern raised by this merger is that post merger there would
be an enhanced incentive to co-ordination, rather than rivalry” (§ 31). is no evidence to support this proposition and it is not borne out by the probabilities. The evidence shows that FirstRand has embarked
upon a policy of “two horses in one race” and intends to adhere to it. The merger enhances this competition by strengthening
Momentum's position in the market and provide it with the capacity to compete more effectively with the larger players, such as Discovery
and Medscheme. As I have said, FirstRand could, if it insisted, depart from this policy. Through its majority holding in the two
groups, it is notionally correct that it could, if it wished, have produced this result. There are, however, commercial reasons why
it prefers not to do this, and these were placed in uncontested evidence before the Tribunal. Besides the factors referred to above,
they include the large investment, both in financial and emotional terms, of the founders of Discovery and their continued involvement
in the management and leadership of the group.
The Tribunal never expressly rejected the evidence to this effect; it assumed, instead, that a convergence of the two groups is a
notional possibility. But even on this approach there is still no basis for coming to the conclusion it did. Prior to the merger
Momentum, through African Life, had a one third stake in ALH, which had a 3% share of the market. The effect of obtaining the balance
of the equity in the company was to increase Momentum’s penetration of the market by two thirds of 3% - ie 2%. By virtue of
that interest, pre the merger, the FirstRand Group also had three representatives on the board of African Life . It is not clear
why any increase of market share should encourage co-ordination between the two groups; and even less so where the small increase
accrues to a participant in the market that is itself very small.
19
The Tribunal did not deal expressly with the reasons for its apparent conclusion that there
will be a substantial lessening of competition in the relevant market. Discovery and Momentum have existed together as part of the FirstRand Group prior to the merger and the cross-directorships between
them are historical and unrelated to the merger that was considered by the Tribunal. The Tribunal recognised this when it considered
the acquisition by Momentum of Sovereign Health. It is consequently assumed for the purposes of this judgment that it is not the
combination of the Momentum and Discovery interests per sethat leads to an inference of a future lessening of competition but rather the increase of market share from just over 31% to approximately
35%. Although a market share of 35% post-merger is not insignificant, the market power associated with such market share is diminished
in a market that has a large number of competitors, is fiercely contested, exhibits relatively low barriers to entry and effective
countervailing power, evidence of which was presented to and accepted by the Commission. A finding, if it has been made, that the
approximate 3.3% increase in the aggregated market share of the FirstRand Group tip the scale cannot be correct in the face of uncontested
evidence of the fact that no anti-competitive results would flow from the merger.
20
The conditions were imposed without the Tribunal fully having the benefit of the insights of
the merging parties of their commercial effect. It follows that both the review application and the appeal should succeed. The following
order was made on 2 February 2006:
The merger is approved unconditionally.
Malan AJA
Davis JP and Mailula AJA concurred