A purposive approach to interpretation is not merely a mantra to be waived in desperation
when an unsuccessful party is faced with clear and unambiguous words of a section. Agreed, words must be given a meaning within a
particular context but where the meaning within the context is clear, that is the end of the matter. In this particular case, the
legislature has expressed itself by way of the employment of a phrase which manifestly fits the purpose of the Act, namely that the
Act envisaged an application to a wide range of activities, being all economic activity which has an effect within the Republic.
This approach then allows the competition authorities to have jurisdiction to deal with questions, which may (or may not) finally
be determined in relation to anti-competitive effects. Were the words to be written into the Act by way of implication as urged by
the applicants, then, as the judgment of this Court has already noted, this form of wording would render the various tests contained
in Sections 4(1)(a) and 5(1) redundant. In short, there would have already been a determination of the anti-competitive effects in terms of section 3, long before the investigation mandated by the specific section of the Act could be instituted. The question must then be raised, why
would a duplication of the anti competitive test be mandated by the Act? This question poses an even more formidable hurdle for applicants
when the clear words of the section crisply dictate a conclusion to the contrary.
In my view, the Act is clear and the judgment of this court interpreted the section
in a manner whereby there is no reasonable prospect that another court would come to a different interpretation, even on the more
generalised test for leave to appeal. The application in this regard must fail.
Turning to Section 4, there is a measure of curiosity in the manner in which this application against the decision of the Court in respect of this section
had been brought. In their argument the applicants concede that the Tribunal defined the issue which it had to decide as, "does
Section 4(1)(b) allow for an efficiency defence?" he Tribunal decided that the wording of the section did not permit an efficiency defence.
The applicants concede in their heads of argument, ‘ that the unsurprising conclusion on the issue as so defined is "No”.
The conclusion is self-evident in the distinction between the rule of reason analysis mandated by s 4(1)(a) and the per se analysis implicit in the prohibitions imposed by Section 4(1)(b)".
One would have thought that was the end of the matter, but it is not. The applicants seek
to develop a range of further arguments which they say are definitive of the question. They argue that ,before as opposed to once
a transgression of Section 4(1)(b) can be established, the Court must determine whether the conduct complained of falls within the ambit of the section. This particular
argument which entails a process of characterisation, would then result in a conclusion that in the case of an open, transparent
and legitimate joint venture corporation created to promote trade and achieve efficiencies (this is the manner in which Applicants
have described their activities), the competitive effects of this conduct would trump the complainant’s contention that this
form of joint venture should be struck down.
Section 4(1)(b), does entail some fact based analysis to conclude whether the situation is one which is contemplated by the per se prohibition. Once the conduct envisaged in the section is determined there is no need for scrutiny on the basis of the rule of reason
test in sub-section (a). This statement requires some examination of the applicable section .
Section 4(1) provides that an agreement between, or concerted practice by, firms, or a decision by an association of firms is prohibited if it is between parties
in a horizontal relationship and if –
(a)
it has the effect of substantially preventing or lessening competition in a market, unless a party to the agreement, concerted practice
or decision can prove that any technological efficiency or other pro-competitive gain resulting from it outweighs that effect; or
(b)
it involves any of the following restrictive horizontal practices:
i)
directly or indirectly fixing a purchase or selling price or any other trading condition;
ii)
dividing markets by allocating customers, suppliers or territories or specific types of goods and services;
iii)
collusive tendering.
It is clear that the textual differences between section 4(1)(a) which contains an expressed proviso and section 4(1)(b) which does not manifest incorporates a body of comparative competition law which in effect can be termed the per se and rule of reason approaches to competition law. In short, section 4(1)(a) incorporates within the context of South African law, a rule of reason approach to these matters, whereas Section 4(1)(b) envisages a per se approach
Where an impugned agreement falls within the ambit of Section 4(1)(b), the Court has to ask the question prefigured in the express words of the provision namely: ‘Does the agreement involve price
fixing, the fixing of trading terms and conditions, a market sharing arrangement or conducive tendering? If it does, then the agreement
is hit by the prohibition in Section 4(1)(b) and the prohibition applies. If it is found that the agreement does not involve any of these activities, then the conduct is not
immune to scrutiny and falls to be assessed under the rule of reason in terms of Section 4(1)(a).
Were this Court to adopt the approach urged upon us by the applicants, it would in effect
be blurring the distinction between per se and rule of reason and effectively render Section 4(1)(b) a form of the rule of reason approach. A court would first have to investigate whether there were justifications for the practice
and then conclude, if there were not, that it was per se prohibited. That however is not the way per se jurisprudence works, nor does it reflect the clear intention of the Act which adopted a clear policy choice. The policy choice it
made was to highlight three separate forms of activity being price fixing, dividing up of markets and collusive tendering, which,
as with much comparative competition law, are regarded as egregious activities of a kind, which competition authorities must prohibit
. There is nothing odd about this policy. A division and the section is clearly unambiguous in its establishment of these set of
principle
In my view, there is no basis by which another Court could reasonably come to a different
interpretation to the structure of Section 4(1)(a) and (b) so as to justify the arguments which have been urged upon us by the applicants.
I now turn to the third issue, which is the question of the locus standi.
Section 53 of the Act provides inter alia that:
(1) The following persons may participate in hearing the person or through a representative and may put questions to witnesses in
respect of any documents or items presented at the hearing.
(a) The hearing is terms of Part C –
(ii)
the Complainant
if:
(aa)
the Complainant referred the complaint the Competition Tribunal;
(bb)
in the opinion of the presiding member of the
CompetitionTribunal, the Complainant's
interests is not adequately
represented by
another participant and then only to the extent
required for the Complainant's interest to be
adequately represented.
It is trite that in common law, the test of a direct and substantial interest in
the subject matter of the action is decisive. Our Courts have followed this approach, particularly as articulated in Henri Viljoen (Pty) Ltd v Awerbuch,Brothers 1953(2) SA 151 (O) Act 169, namely an interest in the right which is the subject matter of the investigation, which in common law does not mean merely a financial
or commercial interest.
Section 53(1)(a) does not require that a complainant show a direct and substantial interest or indeed a material interest in the sense adopted in
common law. It contemplates a showing of an interest not adequately represented by another participant and then only to an extent
required for the Complainant's interest to be adequately represented. The second and third respondents are complainants and they
submitted a complaint against the Applicant. To show an interest, as Mr Unterhalter correctly submitted, the applicant for leave
to intervene must establish some interest in the outcome of the proceedings. It must establish that it has an interest, cognisable
by the competition authorities, which may be effected by the Tribunal's decision regarding the matter. It therefore follows that
the Act recognises that there is a need, on occasion, to protect an interest different from the general public interest. That interest
must be an anti-trust one .It necessary follows that the Act serves not just to protect the general public interest but will express
the anti-trust interest of different class of persons including customers, competitors, suppliers and consumers, as envisaged in
Section 2 of the Act, which also includes the interest of the historically disadvantaged.
Even were this Court to adopt the test of Patz v Greene 1907TS 424, where a reading
of the Act or from such a reading within the context of the likely surrounding circumstances, it can be concluded that an act is
prohibited in the interest of the class of persons, any member of that class may seek the intervention of a Court to enforce the
prohibition without proof of special damages, for the damage will be presumed.
In my view, Section 4(1)(b) is clearly designed to protect the interest of several classes of persons, namely customers, competitors and suppliers, from such
forms of agreement. Section 53 confirms that such interests are cognisable under the Act and for this reason whether on an interpretation of Section 53, or by application of the rule articulated in Patz v Greene, the second and third respondents have a right to approach the competition
authority, including the Tribunal and this Court. For this there is, in my view, is no reasonable prospect that another Court would
adopt the kind parsimonious approach to standing, as urged upon us by the Applicants.
For these reasons the application for leave to appeal on all three grounds, should
be dismissed, whether or not this court were to adopt the generalised, as opposed to the stricter test for leave to appeal.
The application for leave to appeal is dismissed, and the costs of this appeal which
in the case of the second and third respondents includes the costs occasioned by the employment of two councils are to be borne by
applicants
Davis JP
Jali JA and Malan AJA concurred.
30 October 2003
APPEARANCES:
For the Applicant:
Adv M S M Brassey SC
instructed by J Y Meijer of Cliff Decker Inc
For the First Respondent:
Adv W Pretorius
instructed by the Legal Services Division of the Competition Commission
For the Second and Third Respondents:-
Adv D Unterhalter SC and Adv A Gotz
instructed by Martin Versveld of Webber Wentzel Bowens
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