Such state and distressed condition of the victim as testified to by the above three witnesses provides corroboration of the victims
testimony with regard to sexual intercourse. In Abasi Kibazo vs. Uganda (1965) EA 507 the Justices of Appeal upheld the trial judges finding that in sexual offences the distressed condition of the complaint is capable
of amounting to corroboration of the complaints evidence depending upon the circumstances and the evidence.
The victim was examined on 25th February 2001 by Dr. Abiriga Jino, PW2. He testified that his findings were that there were signs of penetration, the victims hymen
had been recently raptured, there were injuries or inflammation on the vulva (covering of the vagina). That the injuries were consistent
with force having been used sexually. The witness tendered in evidence his report on PF3 as exhibit P1.
In his submission Mr. Lubega Submitted that the Doctors findings contradicted the testimony of PW3 in that the doctor did not find
any sperms or blood clots in the victims private parts in view of PW3’s testimony that the victims private parts had not been
washed before the medical examination. The law is that to establish sexual intercourse the prosecution does not need to establish
the rapture of the hymen or actual emission of sperms as the very slightest penetration of the hymen will do. This position of the
law is stated in Archbold Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice 36th Ed Para 2879 as follows:-
“To constitute the offence of rape there must be penetration. But any, even the slightest penetration will be sufficient. Where
a penetration was proved but not of such depth as to injure the hymen still it was held to be sufficient to constitute the crime
of rape. Proof of the rapture of the hymen is unnecessary. It is now unnecessary to prove actual emission of the seed. Sexual intercourse
is deemed complete upon proof of penetration.”
I am of the considered opinion that the above position of the law is equally applicable to the crime of defilement. See also: Hisebary Laws of England 4th Ed. Vol. II page 653 para 1228, Uganda v/s Stephen Mulengera (1996) KALR 140, Dan Mubiru v/s. Uganda Court of Appeal Criminal Appeal
No: 47 of 1996, Uganda v/s Ocero George (1996) 11 KALR 98
The accused’s counsel further argued that given the victims age as compared to the accused’s age, who was about 23 years
at the time of the alleged sexual intercourse, had there been sexual intercourse the consequential injuries would have been more
grave than those sustained by the victim. It is my considered opinion that due to the age of the victim full penetration was made
difficult for the assailant who must have been packing lest he is find in the act. The doctor’s findings indicate that there
was penetration sufficient to constitute sexual intercourse. I therefore find the victims testimony further corroborated by the medical
evidence. I find that the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that there was sexual intercourse.
Under section 129 (1) of the Penal Code to constitute the office of defilement such sexual intercourse must have been unlawful. In
Smith and Hogan Criminal Law 8th Ed. Page 478 “unlawful sexual intercourse” is defined to be sexual intercourse outside marriage. In her testimony the victim stated
that she is 12 years old, pupil in P.5 at Kigwoya Primary School. She was still staying with her parents, a fact testified to by
PW3 and PW4, the victim’s mother and father respectively. Further the marriage age in Uganda is 18 years and above. The victim
was not married and any sexual intercourse with her was outside marriage, thus unlawful. I accordingly find that the prosecution
has proved beyond reasonable doubt that there was unlawful sexual intercourse with the victim Nsekanabo Harriet.
The last ingredient is whether the accused was the one who had the unlawful sexual intercourse with Nsekanabo Harriet. The prosecution’s
only evidence on this ingredient is that of the victim PW1. She testified that on the material day the accused found her at her grandfather’s
home. He asked her to go with him so that he buys her biscuits. That on the way the accused took her into Joseph Kabagambe’s
banana plantation where the accused made her to lie down, removed her knickers and had sexual intercourse with her. I warned the
assessors, as I now wash myself, of the danger to act on the uncorroborated testimony of the victim, in the first place being the
testimony of a complainant in a sexual offence and secondly being the testimony of a single identifying witness. In both cases such
evidence must be corroborated by either independent direct or circumstantial evidence free of contradictions.
In Chila and Anor v/s R (1967) EA 722 it was held:
“The Law in East Africa on corroboration in sexual cases is as follows:-
The judge should warn the assessors and himself of the danger of acting on the uncorroborated testimony of the complaint, but having
done so he may convict in the absence of corroboration if he is satisfied that her evidence is truthful. If no such warning is given,
the conviction will normally be set aside unless the appellant court is satisfied that there has been no failure of justice”.
See also Charles Katende vs. Uganda (1971) 2 ULR10. With regard to identification by a single identifying witness it was held in Abdulla Bin Wendo & Another vs. R (1953) 20 EACA 186 that:-
“The testimony of a single witness regarding identification must be tested with the greatest care. The need for caution is even
greater where it is known that the conditions favouring correct identification were difficult. What is needed before convicting is
other evidence pointing to the guilt of the accused.”
I accordingly cautioned the assessor, as I now caution myself, to safeguard against a conviction based on mistaken or erroneous identification
of the accused person. The test here is whether the evidence of the identifying witness can be accepted as free from the possibility
of error and whether it is truthful. Guidelines to be followed by court when dealing with the evidence of identifying eye-witness
were extensively discussed by the Supreme Court in Bogere Moses & Another vs. Uganda S.C. Criminal Appeal No. 1 of 1997 (The Supreme Court of Uganda certified Criminal Judgments 1996 – 2000 page 185), wherein a number of leading authorities were
discussed. The Supreme Court held:-
“The starting point is that court ought to satisfy itself from the evidence whether the conditions under which the identification
is claimed to have been made were or were not difficult and warn itself of the possibility of mistaken identity. The court should
then proceed to evaluate the evidence cautiously so that it does not convict or uphold a conviction, unless it is satisfied that
mistaken identity is ruled out. In so doing the court must consider the evidence as a whole, namely the evidence, if any, of the
factors favouring co
rrect identification together with those rendering it difficult. It is trite law that no piece of evidence should be weighed except
in relation to all the rest of the evidence ……”.
In Nabulere and others v/s Uganda (1979) HCB 77 the court set down the factors that should be considered when determing as to whether or not a witness has positively identified
an accused person. The first factor is whether there was light, that is as to visibility. The victim, PW1 testified that when the
accused came to her grand father’s home and went away with her and eventually defiled her it was in the after noon during day
time around 4.00 p.m. The victims testimony in this regard is corroborated by the testimony of her mother PW3. She testified that
on that day she came back home from a party at around 5.30 p.m. That on arrival she entered the house and immediately heard a child
crying. She came out to see who was crying and she saw the victim who reveal her ordeal to her. By 5.30 p.m. the victim had already
been defiled, therefore the incident took place in broad day light.
The second factor is whether the witness knew the accused before or he was a complete stranger. It is the victim’s testimony
that the accused person was her village mate whom she had seen on the village for a long time, the accused was at family friend and
used to come to see them a their home. The victims testimony is corroborated by both PW3 and PW4, the victim’s parents, who
testified that the accused is a village mate, that before the incident he was a family friend and used to come to their home. Therefore
the accused was not a stranger to the victim. The accused in his defence admits that he was a resident of the same village with the
victim and knew her.
The third factor is whether the witness had sufficient time to look at the accused or whether she only had a fleeting glance. According
to the victim the accused found the victim and her sister at her grandfather’s home called Abel. The accused got a bunch of
banana from her grandfather. The accused asked her to carry the bunch for him but it was too big for her and she refused to carry
it. Then the accused asked her to go with him so that he buys her biscuits. They moved together and on the way the accused took her
to Joseph Kabagambe’s banana plantation where the accused defiled the victim. After which the accused held the victim by the
hand and led her to Kyamanywa’s shop where he bough for her biscuits and the two parted.
The last fact is closeness of the witness to the accused at the time of commission of the offence. The above evidence shows that
the witness was familiar to the accused person, was at all time in close actual contact with the accused and had sufficient time
to identify the accused whom she knew before and during day time. All the evidence put together leave no doubt as to the victims
ability to positively identify the accused.
The accused in his defence testified that on 24th February 2001 in the afternoon he had gone to Kinyara to sell his products as a blacksmith. That he left Kinyara at around 6.00 p.m.
The accused thus put up a defence of an Alibi.
In Mushikoma Watete alias Peter Wakhokha & 3 others vs. Uganda S.C. Crim. Appeal No: 10 of 2000 (ISCD) (CRIM) 1996 of 2000 page 22)
their Lordships the justices stated:
“The defence of alibi is set up when an accused person, wishing to show that he could not have committed the offence charged,
asserts that at the time the offence was committed he was in a different place from the scene of the crime. The law is well settled,
that an accused person who puts forward an alibi as an answer to the charge against him, does not assume any burden of proving that
answer. The burden remains on the prosecution to prove that the accused was at the scene of crime and not at the different place
where he claims to have been.
This emanates from the general principle propounded in the well known decision of the House of Lords in Woolming vs. D.P.P. (1935)
ac 462 to the effect that, with the exception of the defence of insanity and some other statutory defences which are not relevant
here, no burden rests on an accused person to establish his defence. That is true if the defence of alibi also. An accused person
does not have any burden to prove his alibi.
Needless to say, However, that for the prosecution to negative it and more so for the court to consider it as the defence, the alibi
has to be put forward as the answer to the charge.”
The accused in his testimony does not state the time at which he left his home village Kiguruya where the offence was committed for
Kinyara. Nor does he state the time when he arrived at Kinyara. Instead the accused gives time when he left Kinyara and arrived back
home – that is that he left Kinyara at 6.00 p.m. and arrived home at 9.00 p.m. The prosecution evidence on record shows that
the offence was committed around 4.00 p.m, according to the victim PW1. Further it is her testimony that after the accused had bought
her biscuits he left her to go home and he went to his home. The accused movements thereafter are unknown. He could the same afternoon
have proceeded to Kinyara after the incident. In R Chemulon Wero Olango (1937) 4 EACA 46 it was stated:
“The burden on the person setting up the defence of alibi is to account for so much of the time of the transaction in question
as to render it impossible as to have committed the inputed act.”
I find the accused evidence short of satisfying that burden in that he has not accounted for the time within which the accepted offence
was committed.
Further the defence of an alibi should be disclosed at the earliest possible opportunity. See Festo Androa Asenua & Another vs Uganda S.C. Crim. Appeal No: 1 of 1998 (1 SCD (CRIM) 1996/2000 page 91:) When cross-examined as to why he in his statement to the police recorded on 1st March 2001 he never mentioned about being at Kinyara but that he had only stated that he was drinking beer with his colleagues the
accused only stated:
“I might have so stated because of fear and torture, otherwise I do not drink.”
The accused did not raise the alibi at the earliest possible opportunity. I found the victim, though young, a straight forward and
truthful witness and her testimony squarely put the accused at the scene of crime at the material time. I believe the victims testimony
and reject the accuseds testimony on the alibi.
In further defence the accused testified that the charges were fabrications against him because of the grudge between him and the
victims family. He testified that since 1995, PW4 the victims further has been chasing the accused from his Kibaija. He testified
that he was occupying a Kibanja on the land of the Basiitta clan to which PW4 belongs and was the accused’s maternal uncle.
However, PW4 was not cross-examined about any dispute over land between him and the accused. PW3, the wife of PW4, and PW5, the defence
secretary L.C.I. who were cross-examined about the alleged dispute denied any existence of any such dispute. According to PW5, PW4
belonged to the Babitto clan. PW3 testified that their kibanja was neighbouring that of the Basiita clan on which was the accuseds
land and she testified that there was no land dispute between PW4 and the Basiitta clan. In his testimony and during cross-examination
the accused was confused as to his clan. In examination in chief he said he was of the Basiitta clan, the same clan as his mother,
then in cross-examination he said he belonged to the Mubwijwa clan and when pressed further he admitted that he knows that he is
not a Musiitta. The accused impressed me as a good lier. I accept the testimony of the prosecution witnesses that there is no land
dispute between the victims family and the accused.
The accused further testified that in 1997, PW3 (the victim’s mother) had gone to the accused’s house and injured the
accuseds newly born baby’s embrical code. That the accused reported the matter to the L.C.1 Executives, including PW5, and
that the accused had since never gone back to the victim’s parents home. PW3 was not cross-examined about that incident. PW4
and PW5 who were cross-examined about it denied the occurrence of such an incident. To the contrary all the prosecution witnesses
PW1, PW3, PW4 and PW5 testified that before the commission of this offence PW4 and the accused were friends. PW1 testified that the
accused was a family friend who before the incident used to visit their home twice a week on average. PW3 testified that before the
incident relationship between the accused and their family was good. That the accused used to come to their home so frequently that
she cannot count how many times he had visited their home. PW4 testified that the accused’s home was his home and they used
to visit each others home frequently.
I believe that prosecution witnesses evidence as to the relationship between the accused and the victim’s family before this
incident. More still the accused accepted that there was no grudge between him and PW5 therefore no reason why he should have given
evidence against him. I therefore reject the accused’s story of a grudge between him and the victim’s family. It was
a lie calculated to conceal the truth from court. I find that the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused
had unlawful sexual intercourse with Nsekanabo Harriet on 24th February 2001.
In agreement with the gentleman and lady assessor who in their joint opinion advised me to find the accused guilty I find the accused
guilty of the offence of defilement contrary to section 129 (1) of the Penal Code Act as indicted and he is accordingly convicted.
Lameck Mukasa
AG. JUDGE
22/4/2004