At the commencement of hearing the appeal, the Court suo motu raised the issue relating to the evidence of Arafa Abeid (PW1) to be addressed first. Mr. Luoga, learned State Attorney, who declined
to support the conviction submitted that the evidence of PW1, the victim of the alleged defilement, was not properly received in
terms of the provisions of section 127 (2) of the Evidence Act, 1967 (hereinafter the Act). He said that at the time PW1 testified
she was a child of tender age because she was 13 years old. It was therefore necessary for the trial court to conduct a voire dire examination, the State Attorney urged. As the provisions of the law was not complied with, the evidence of PW1 should not be relied
upon without corroboration, Mr. Luoga insisted. In that situation, the State Attorney also submitted, there was no other evidence
upon which the conviction against the appellant could be grounded. He referred to the decision of this Court in Jonas Raphael v Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 42 of 2003 and Rashid Bakari v Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 49 of 2001 (both unreported).
There is no denying the fact that Arafa Abeid (PW1) was 13 years of age when she
testified at the trial. In terms of section 127 (5) of the Act, PW1 falls within the category of gchild of tender ageh.
Under the provision of this subsection, a child of tender age means a child whose apparent age is not more than fourteen years (14).
For a child of tender age who is called as a witness in a criminal trial the procedure for receiving such evidence is provided under
subsection (2) of section 127 of the Act (Cap. 6). As its application is central in the determination of this appeal on this point,
we think it is appropriate to reproduce it in extenso; It reads:
g127 (2) Where in any criminal cause or matter any child of tender age is called as a witness does not in the opinion of the court,
understand the nature of an oath, his evidence may be received, though not given upon oath or affirmation, if in the opinion of the
court, to be recorded in the proceedings, he is possessed of sufficient intelligence to justify the reception of his evidence, and
understands the duty of speaking the truth.h
From these provisions, it is imperative for the trial judge or magistrate when the
witness involved is a child of tender age to conduct a viore dire examination. This is to be done in order for the trial judge or magistrate to satisfy himself or herself that the child understands
the nature of an oath. If in the opinion of the trial judge or magistrate, to be recorded in the proceedings, the child does not
understand the nature of an oath but is possessed of sufficient intelligence and that the witness understands the duty of speaking
the truth, such evidence may be received though not upon oath or affirmation.
It is apparent from our perusal of the record that the trial magistrate did not conduct
a voire dire examination on PW1. With respect, the learned judge on first appeal apart from her attempt to look for corroborative evidence, did
not address the issue relating to voire dire examination of PW1 in terms of section 127 (2) of the Act.
It is now settled that where in a criminal case involving the evidence of a child
of tender age, the trial court does not conduct a vire dire examination in terms of the provisions of section 127 (2) of the Act, the reception of such evidence is improper. Decisions of the
erstwhile Court of Appeal for East Africa and this Court are abound on this point. More recently, this Court expressed the same view
in Jonas Raphael v The Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 42 of 2003 (unreported). In the same vein, in this case as there was no voire dire examination conducted on PW1, her evidence was improperly received. It would follow that with the evidence of PW1 discarded, there
is no other cogent evidence upon which the conviction of the appellant could be sustained.
In that situation, the case of Chozi Andrew v R (1987) TLR 68 to which the learned judge on first appeal was referred with regard to corroboration is not relevant. That case, we
think would be relevant only if the evidence of a child of tender age is properly received. In the instant case, as the evidence
of PW1 was improperly received, there is no further evidence which could be corroborated to justify the conviction.
All in all therefore, for the foregoing reasons we are satisfied that the case against
the appellant was not proved to the required standard in a criminal case.
In the event, we allow the appeal, quash conviction and set aside the sentence. The
appellant is to be released forthwith unless otherwise lawfully held.
DATED at DAR ES SALAAM this 5th day of July, 2006.