Chandefs case, the single Judge also held that the appeal did not require leave to appeal as it came from the LART Tribunal, which is like
the High Court, in its original jurisdiction. Counsel for the respondent emphasized the same. Mrs. Rwebangira contended that leave
to appeal is, and was, necessary because the intended appeal was on a matter which did not, and does not, conclusively determine
the LART case in question, i.e. the intended appeal is on the rejected preliminary objection which was an interlocutory matter which could
be appealed against at that time. The law changed later so appeals on interlocutory rulings and orders are now barred by Act No.
25/2002.
As the applicant has already obtained the required leave to appeal, counsel for the
applicant prayed that the application be granted with costs.
Resisting the application, Mr. Kamugisha observed that the applicant had a right
of appeal to this Court under the provisions of Section 20 (1) (2) of the LART Act as Amended by Act No. 5 of 1995 so it was not
necessary for the applicant to waste time seeking leave for appeal to this Court. Contending that the application for extension of
time lacks merit, counsel for the respondent pointed out that appeals on interlocutory matters like the intended appeal, have since
been prohibited by the provisions of Act No. 25 of 2002 so the application for extension of time is misconceived an ought to be dismissed
with costs and let the LART case proceed on merit as ordered on the 29.8.2000.
The issue is whether there is sufficient reason for extending the period of appeal
against the preliminary ruling in the material LART Tribunal case.
The reply to the above question is positive for the reasons. One, the Ruling complained
of was determined on the 29.8.2000, about two years before the enactment of Act No. 25 of 2002 so the ruling could be challenged
by way of appeal at the material time. Two, because the intended appeal is on an interlocutory matter, the necessary leave was duly
obtained as evidenced by Annexture C to the affidavit in support of the application. Three, the delay to institute the intended appeal,
as reflected at paragraph 6 of the affidavit in support of the application, was caused by the Courtfs delay in determining
the application for leave which was determined six days after the period of appeal had expired.
For the reasons stated above, there are sufficient grounds for extending the period
of appeal. The period of appeal is accordingly extended for 14 days from today, the intended appeal to be filed by the 15th day of September, 2005.
Costs within the cause.
DATED at DAR ES SALAAM this 1st day of September, 2005.