letter dated 10.2.2003 were,now ready for collection, and after that the Registrar would issue a certificate in terms of Rule 83 (1).
We deprecate what appears to be the clandestine obtaining of court ^documents and we cannot give our blessing to such conduct. We
must discourage it at any cost. With respect, we subscribe to the observations made by the late Lugakingira, J. A. in Civil Application
No. 100 of 1999 between Mohsin Mohamed Taki Abdallah and Tariq Mirza and 4 Others (unreported) that it is the duty of the High Court to supply documents applied for and supply them promptly and that parties should exercise, diligence
in the conduct of their cases. The Registrar did not respond to the letter dated the 10.2.2003. Nor did the Registrar inform the
learned advocates for the appellant that the copy for the last part of the proceedings was ready for collection. The learned advocates it would seem informally
obtained the said copy from the court as is evident from their letter of 3.6.2003 confirming having obtained the missing documents
from the Court, not that it was given to them! We say informally because Prof. Mwaikusa admitted that no court fees was paid when
he obtained the document on the 23.5.2003. This date has assumed importance
because the limitation period would start to run from this date in filing the appeal under Rule 83.(1). In the case of P. T. Dobie & Company (Tanzania) Ltd. v. N. B. Mwaitebele (1992) TLR 152 this "Court at page 154 made the following observations:-
uWe have to point out at once that the
Registrar's certificate is not and cannot be,
beyond question. It is true that the Registrar
has power to issue the certificate under the
proviso to rule 83 (1) of the Court of Appeal
Rules. But we are quite clear in our minds
that if there are grounds for thinking that the
certificate is incorrect or otherwise improper,
that would justify interfering with it."
This takes us to Section 122 of the Evidence Act , 1967 which
provides -
122. The Court may infer the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course
of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case/'
This provision deals with presumptions of fact and therefore the court may presume that judicial and official acts have been regularly
performed. In the case at hand, there is a presumption that the Registrar issued a proper certificate under Rule 83 (1). In the case
of The Commissioner of Income Tax v. C. W. Armstrong (1963) E. A. 505, Newbold, J. A. stated at page 513 that -
"This section authorizes the presumption that an official act, which is proved to have been performed, has been performed regularly;
and
this is a presumption which is not lightly overridden." (emphasis supplied).
v The presumption under section 122 of the Evidence Act, 1967 is rebuttable; it is not a conclusive presumption. The words "may
infer" in the section leave it to the court to make or not to make the presumption depending upon the circumstances of the particular
case, (see: Civil Reference No. 14 of 1997 between African Marble Company Limited v. Tanzania Saruii Corporation (unreported). A question we ask ourselves, is this a proper case in which to disregard a certificate given by the Registrar under Rule 83 (1) of
the Court Rules?
We know that the notite of appeal was filed on the 10.2.2003 and so the appeal had to be instituted within sixty days of the notice
of appeal. Since, this was not the case, it was essential for the appellant to rely on the exception to Rule 83 (1) which is to the
effect that in computing the sixty days, the time taken to obtain a copy of the proceedings from the Registrar shall be excluded
as
certified by the Registrar. We hope we have amply demonstrated that the certificate issued by the Registrar was incorrect. It was
misleading since by the 23.5.2003, there was no evidence that part \of the proceedings or for that matter the documents the appellant
had requested from the Registrar had been supplied to him. What the Registrar's certificate purported to certify was factually untrue.
A certificate under Ruie 83 (1) of the Court Rules is a vital document in the process of instituting an appeal. It comes into play
after the normal period of sixty days for filing an appeal has expired. We are of the view that there must be strict compliance with
the Rule. The Registrar had not supplied the appellant with the documents requested for, thus rendering the certificate incorrect.
This is a serious error. The certificate was false and this fountain of justice cannot overlook such an error in the cause of advancing
justice as Prof. Mwaikusa so eloquently urged us to do.
In the result, we uphold the preliminary objection and strike out with costs the certificate of delay dated the 14.7.2003.
DATED at ARUSHA this 27th day of October, 2004
A. S. L. RAMADHANI JUSTICE OF APPEAL
H. R. NSEKELA JUSTICE OF APPEAL
S. N. KAJI JUSTICE OF APPEAL
I certify that this is a true copy of the original.
S. M. RUMANYIKA DEPUTY REGISTRAR
SAFLII:
|
Terms of Use
|
Feedback
URL: http://www.saflii.org/tz/cases/TZCA/2004/6.html