5.2
Accused who was carrying a brown okapi knife stabbed deceased once on the head. Deceased ultimately succumbed to death consequent
to the knife injury to her head.
This statement leaves more questions than answers as to how the fight was started, and what kind of intervention occurred.
3.
However, how the fracas commenced is elucidated somewhat by the same “Statement”
when detailing the factual basis for the plea of guilty of common assault. In so far as relevant, it reads as follows:
4.1
Accused and complainant were fighting over liquor, which accused wanted to forcefully take from complainant.
4.2
Complainant kicked accused on the face, accused reacted by stabbing complainant on his shoulder with a knife.
4.
Although not as uninformative as the statement in the Xaba matter, this rendition also leaves
questions to be answered; e.g. how did the deceased “try to intervene”?; did she use physical force when doing so, did
she use an object such as alleged by the accused before us (a shoe), and did she cause him any injury or injuries?
5.
However, there is sufficient evidence in this case, particularly if regard is had to the averments in paragraphs 4.1 and 4.2 above,
for the court a quo to make some assessment of the degree of the appellant’s moral guilt. As in the Xaba case however, the learned Judge here also
tended to overemphasize the aggravating features of the appellant’s conduct and has shown little regard for certain mitigating
features of the fracas. It was indeed a drunken brawl – the complainant was intoxicated when examined by the doctor shortly
after the event. However it was the unlawful conduct of the appellant that initiated the fight. He had no right to use a knife. Moreover,
he not only stabbed his contestant, but also stabbed the deceased, a 53 year old woman in the head, fracturing her temporal bone
and penetrating her skull.
6.
Whilst therefore a sentence of 10 years (1 year suspended) is a severe sentence, I am not of the view that the sentence we would have
imposed differs sufficiently from that imposed by the High Court so as to entitle us to interfere. I would however point out to the
learned Judge that, when a lengthy sentence is imposed it makes little sense just to suspend 1 year of such sentence. As to the considerations
that should be borne in mind when imposing a wholly or partially suspended sentence. See S V NDLOVU 1982 (3) S.A. 519 (Z.H.).
7.
There is no need to interfere with the sentence on count 2.
8.
For these reasons the appeal is dismissed and the convictions and sentences are confirmed.
J.H. STEYN
Judge of Appeal
I agree
R. A. BANDA
Chief Justice
I agree
N. W. ZIETSMAN
Judge of Appeal
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