As correctly found by the court a quo, the signature above the typed name Sobhuza II is illegible. There is no dispute about this
fact. Accordingly, this annexure does not assist the appellants. Moreover, it seems highly unlikely that His Majesty the King would
grant an eviction order without designating the place where the deceased was to be taken to. This, it would seem, would be against
established practice.
[30]
But perhaps more important is the fact that section 20 of the Swazi Administration Act 1950 quoted in
annexure “AG2” had nothing to do with eviction orders by His Majesty the King. That section, which has since been repealed,
provided as follows:-
“20.
Any Swazi who contravenes or fails to comply with any provision of this Act or any regulation or
rule made thereunder in respect of which no special penalty is provided shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to
a fine not exceeding one hundred rand or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year or both.”
[31]
The court a quo rejected annexure “AG2” on the ground that it failed the admissibility test in the sense that:-
(1)
It was not the original document.
(2)
The appellants failed to prove its authenticity. They failed to call the evidence of someone who saw the author thereof write or sign
it. Nor did they call someone who could identify the author’s handwriting. See the South
African Law of Evidence – 4th Edition: Hoffman and Zeffert.
(3)
The document was “so illegible that it [was] virtually impossible to identify”.
(4)
The document did not comply with the Stamp Duties Act 37/1970.
[32]
Annexure “AG1” is in turn entitled “Removal Order”. It reads as follows:-
“In exercise of the rights and powers in me vested by King, Sobhuza II, Ngwenyama of Swaziland under the Swazi Laws and Customs, and
by section 20 of the Swazi Administration Act, 1950. MZIKAYISE NTSHANGASE of Chief SALEBONA is hereby ordered to leave MKHWAKHWENI
AREA together with his dependants, on or before the 31st August, 1982.
(PRINCE GABHENI)
MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
cc.
Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, Commissioner of Police, Officer In charge, Shiselweni
district. District Commissioner, Shiselweni.”
The fact that annexure”AG1” bears DW4’s signature in his capacity
as a Minister is, to say the least, strange. This is so because he testified that His Majesty the King did not give him the command
concerning deceased’s eviction in DW4’s capacity either as a Minister or as one of the royal blood.
[33]
In these circumstances, the learned Judge a quo,
after carefully analysing the evidence, came to the conclusion that there was no lawful and enforceable order issued by any recognised
authority in terms of which the deceased was evicted from Mkhwakhweni Area. In the event, the Judge held that it was not necessary
for her to pursue guidelines 2 and 3 of this Court as fully set out in paragraph [12] above. I consider that the learned Judge a quo’s finding that there was no lawful and enforceable order of eviction against the deceased is fully justified on the facts, as I have
endeavourd to highlight them above. The probabilities, as pointed out in paragraphs [26], [27], [29] and [30 – 32] above, coupled
with lack of proof concerning the authenticity of annexure “AG2”, favour the respondents’ version in this regard.
In my view this conclusion disposes of the matter in favour of the respondents.
[34]
In his able argument, Adv. Sutherland S.C. for the appellants sought to persuade the Court, however, that the provisions of section 10 (3) of the Swazi Administration Act (as
amended) are not peremptory. It is not mandatory, so he submitted, that His Majesty the King should designate a place where a person
he evicts must go to. I do not agree. The section in question reads as follows:-
“10 (3)
The Ngwenyama in Libandla may at any time make an order, containing such conditions as he may consider appropriate
for the removal of any person or any of his dependants living with him from one Swazi area to another Swazi area”.
The plain language used in the section points to the contrary. In this regard one must give effect to the words “from one Swazi
area to another” which mean exactly what they say and therefore require no further elaboration. This much is clear, however.
Eviction is a drastic step which impinges on a citizen’s rights. Section 10 (3) must therefore be construed strictly and restrictively.
It must only be resorted to where an alternative place has been designated for the evicted person. His Majesty the King has always
recognised this factor as evidence shows.
[35]
But perhaps there is a more fundamental reason why counsel’s submission must fail. The section
he relies upon is apparently an amendment to the Swazi Administration Act, 1998. It has nothing to do with the position at the material
time in 1982 when the deceased was allegedly evicted.
[36]
It follows from the aforegoing considerations that the court a quo was justified in accepting the respondents’ version as opposed to that of the appellants. In this context the order of absolution
from the instance needs to be corrected. In my view the facts justify the granting of respondents’ application in the court
below. In any event, I venture to suggest that, in terms of the High Court Rules, absolution is not a proper remedy for applications.
On the contrary, it is a remedy specifically designed for trial actions in terms of sub-rule 39 (6). In its relevant parts, this
sub-rule reads as follows:-
“(6) At the close of the case for the plaintiff, the defendant may apply for absolution from the instance, in which event the defendant
or one counsel on his behalf may address the court and the plaintiff or one counsel on his behalf may reply. The defendant or one
counsel on his behalf may thereupon reply on any matter arising out of the address of the plaintiff or his counsel”.
Applications on the other hand are governed by Rule 6 of the High Court Rules. In relevant parts, sub-rules (4), (8), (17), (18) and
(19) provide as follows:-
“(4)
Every application brought ex parte by way of petition or notice of motion shall, save in matters
of urgency, be filed with the Registrar and set down not later than midday on the court day preceding the day on which the application
is to be heard.
.
.