3.
A submission that the accused were provoked by sudden witchcraft, but such submission was at odds with all the evidence.
I have already dealt with the evidence against accused Nos 5, 7 and 8.
I have no doubt that Mr. Twala’s clients were all correctly convicted.
When the court put its difficulties to Mr. Twala he abandoned his argument on the merits and limited it to the question of extenuating circumstances.
Mr. Mamba sought to amend his grounds of appeal by adding a further ground namely that the indictment was null and void as it reflected the
name of the King and not the Director of Public Prosecutions. This argument has no merit. The body of the indictment makes it clear
that it is the Director who is prosecuting and he does that in the name of the King who appears in the heading. Moreover this point
was not taken at the trial and is raised for the first time on appeal. The accused by not excepting to that indictment at the trial
may be taken to have acquiesced in it. In any event the point is without merit and the court refused Mr. Mamba’s application.
I am satisfied on all the evidence that accused nos 1,2,3,5,7, and 8 were all correctly convicted.
I turn now to deal with the question of extenuating circumstances. In holding that there were no extenuating circumstances on Count
2 the learned Judge regarded the deceased on that count as an innocent victim. The wizard was the first deceased. It was he who had
caused trouble to the accused not the deceased on Count 2. In his judgment the trial judge had referred to evidence that the two
deceased were witches. However, in his judgment on extenuating circumstances, he said that he had made a mistake and that, on playing
back the tapes, the evidence referred to “witch” in the singular.
Naturally I accept what the learned judge heard. However that does not explain what appears at page 13 of the record namely: “the
house was full of (my emphasis) witches and wizards.” Not does it account for the further evidence of PW1 at page 38 of the record that he heard
them singing after the killings that they had “destroyed the house where all (my emphasis) the witches and wizards were contained.” And when PW1 was asked in cross-examination (at page 48 of the record)
about the burnt house he said:
“What they said was Mandlenkhosi of Mashobeni area is dead and so is his wife (my emphasis), now they were going to live a trouble free life.”
I am aware of the fact that I have referred to these extracts earlier herein. I do so again to emphasise the point that the evidence
clearly shows that, although it was the deceased on Count 1 who had bewitched them, they regarded his wife as also being infested
by witchcraft. Moreover there is further evidence that the accused regarded the deceased on Count 2 as being part of the problem.
When she went to offer her condolences to the relatives of Phindile Mamba she was chased away. At that time she was told that the
people (my emphasis) who had caused her death were known and that accused No. 3 would bring axes and come with his own people to the homestead
for those people that have killed Phindile.”
I also disagree with the learned Judge when he held that the killing of the deceased on Count 2 was a separate transaction. It appears
from the evidence that, as soon as they had delivered the mortal blows on the first deceased, the group went in search of the second
deceased and when she was found she was hacked to death.
In my view the Court a quo, having found extenuating circumstances on Count 1, should also have made a similar finding on Count 2.
In my judgment the appeal against the finding on Count 2 that there were no extenuating circumstances must succeed and the sentence
of death must be set aside.
This was a most brutal and savage killing which deserves a very severe sentence. In my view a sentence of 18 years on count 2 would
be appropriate.
Finally I turn to the appeal against the sentence of life imprisonment on Count 1. It is contended that the sentence induces a sense
of shock. Reliance is placed on the accused’s belief in witchcraft and that as this is a case of recklessness (dolus eventualis)
and not dolus directus a lesser sentence ought to have been imposed. Counsel for the crown stated that in her experience a sentence
of between 10 and 15 years was usually imposed by the High Court in the Kingdom in witchcraft cases. This is in accordance with my
own recollection.
Finally I should add that although the court should always endeavour, if it is possible, to individualise sentences so that they fit
the criminal as well as the crime there is not sufficient evidential material before is to justify such a course being followed in
this case. These were particularly brutal and savage murders and that is why a sentence of 18 years is appropriate for count 1 as
well. That sentence differs sufficiently from that imposed by the trial court as to justify interference by this court.
In the result the following order is made:-
1.
The appeals of accused Nos 1, 2, 3, 5, 7 and 8 against their convictions are dismissed and the convictions are confirmed.
2.
The appeal against sentence on count 1 is allowed and the sentence on that count altered to 18 years’ imprisonment.
3.
The appeal against the finding on count 2 that there were no extenuating circumstances succeeds and the judgment of the court a quo is altered accordingly. The sentence of death on that count will be set aside and is replaced by a sentence of 18 years’ imprisonment.
4.
The sentences on counts 1 and 2 are ordered to run concurrently and are backdated to 16 March 1997.
________________________
LEON, JP
I AGREE
________________________
STEYN, JA
I AGREE
________________________
TEBBUTT, JA
DATED AT MBABANE this……….day of November, 2002
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