do mattered. Then there is the fact that he threatened to
stab the complainant with a knife. Rape is of course a crime
of violence, but the actions of the appellant took the violence
to a higher level. Another factor is that these are times of
AIDS/ HIV, sex can kill. This fact, even though there is no
evidence that this particular appellant was HIV positive at
the time of the rape, must be considered. The complainant
must deal with the possibility of HIV infection, especially in a
case such as this one, where she sustained tears during the
sexual encounter.
Taking all these factors into
consideration, the appellant is sentenced to 15 years imprisonment."
It is our conclusion that the learned judge was correct in taking the said factors into consideration and in deciding that in this
particular case a sentence more severe than the prescribed minimum sentence was justified.
We have one problem with the sentences passed by the learned judge.
Section 142 (5) of the Penal Code (as amended) provides as follows:
"(5) Any person convicted and sentenced for the offence of rape shall not have the sentence imposed run concurrently with any
other sentence whether the other sentence be for the offence of rape or any other offence."
The learned judge in this case erred in ordering that the sentence of 2 years imprisonment on count 2 would run concurrently with
the sentence for the rape. The learned judge therefore clearly misdirected herself as to one element relevant to the sentence to
be imposed. In the light of such a misdirection we are entitled to review the sentence. Indeed since it involves a direction which
is contrary to law we are in fact obliged to do so.