But in R v. BLOM 1939 AD 188 at 202-203 cited with approval in Gofhamodimo v. The State 1984 B.L.R. 119 at 134 Watermeyer C.J. cautions that:
"In reasoning by inference there are two cardinal rules of logic which cannot be ignored:
(1)
The inference sought to be drawn must be consistent with all the proved facts. If it is not, the inference cannot be drawn.
(2)
The proved facts must be such that they exclude every reasonable inference from them save the one sought to be drawn. If they do not
exclude other reasonable inferences, then there must be a doubt whether the inference sought to be drawn is correct."
Applying the above caution to the following facts that:
(a)
the appellant furnished the vehicle Mazda Rustler BE 2754 used in the robbery;
(b)
the appellant was seen driving the Mazda Rustler BE 2754 with three men in it immediately before the robbery;
(c)
soon after the robbery the Mazda Rustler BE 2754 was observed departing the scene of the robbery at high speed, with the three robbers
seated at the back, proceeding eastwards;
(a)
(d)
the police travelled in the direction that the driver of Mazda Rustler BE 2754 had driven in pursuit of the vehicle;
(e)
the police met and stopped the driver of Mazda Rustler BE 2754 returning to town on that road;
(f)
the driver of Mazda Rustler BE 2754, when it was stopped was none other than the appellant;
(g)
the three robbers, who made their get-away in Mazda Rustler BE 2754 were no longer in the vehicle when it was stopped by the police;
(h) and the appellant admitted dropping them somewhere in the bush a little further on;
What other competing reasonable inference can be drawn from them, other than that the appellant was deeply involved in the robbery
from the inception right to the end.
I entertain no doubt that having regard to the cumulative effect of all the facts, the only reasonable inference to be drawn is that
the appellant
took his brother's vehicle in order to facilitate the robbery and effect a clean get-away for the robbers.
In his extra-curial statement the appellant said:
"Khumbulane Nkomo who is my brother's friend left his car at Plot 4097 where I live...He left the car on 22/7/94. Eddie Nkomo
the elder brother to Khumbulane came on 4/8/94 in the evening to my place at Old Stands...Eddie Nkomo told me that their friends
brought a car from Botshabelo. Eddie Nkomo asked for a key to the car that my brother left and I gave it to him."
But at the trial, Danisa Ndlovu testified that Mazda Rustler BE 2754 was his car. His assertion of ownership of the vehicle was not
challenged by the appellant. Mbatisa Madoma (PW7) also confirmed that he knew the appellant and also that he Mbatisa Madoma sold
the Mazda Rustler to Danisa Ndlovu. It is already on record that when Danisa Ndlovu left for Zimbabwe he told the appellant not to
touch his vehicle.
Why, one would ask, should the appellant fabricate a story that the vehicle belonged to Khumbulane Nkomo when he well knew that Danisa
was the owner of the vehicle? He did so because he wanted to create the
impression that there was nothing sinister about giving the keys to the Mazda Rustler BE 2754 to Eddie Nkomo, who is the elder brother
to Khumbulane Nkomo, in order to distance himself from the offence; for if Khumbulane Nkomo rather than Danisa Ndlovu was the owner
of the vehicle, then handing the keys of the vehicle to Eddie, the elder brother of Khumbulane, is not susceptible of an adverse
inference.
Lies told by an accused person in order to distance himself from an offence may, in such circumstances, be taken as a make-weight
to strengthen the case for the prosecution. Thus in BROADHURST v. R. 1964 A.C. 441 at 457; cited with approval in Gofhamodimo v. The State 1984 B.L.R. 119; LORD DEVLIN said:
"In suitable cases, the Court may take into account as a factor that the accused has given false evidence - his untruthfulness
is a factor which a trier of fact can properly take into account as strengthening the inference of guilt."
The appellant's explanation of how he came to be driving the vehicle that day was most improbable. He said Eddie Nkomo and his friends
told him they were going to look for a man from whom one of them had bought a car at Botshabelo Location within Selebi-Phikwe and
drove away in the car leaving the appellant behind. They returned later saying they were unable to locate the man. A few minutes
later they set off again, this time accompanied by the appellant, and drove towards
Tobane Village still saying they were looking for the man they bought a car from. They stop in the bush and Eddie Nkomo and all his
friends alight and instruct the appellant to drive the vehicle back to Selebi-Phikwe. The appellant complied without questioning
why they had abandoned their search for the man they were looking for and had decided to alight in the bush. By his explanation,
the appellant wished to create the impression that if BE 2754 was used in the commission of the offence, it was so used on the first
occasion when Eddie Nkomo and friends said they were going to Botshabelo Location and he was not with them.
Recounting the evidence of PW6 which was not controverted by the appellant, that he saw the appellant driving the vehicle shortly
before the robbery with three people at the back, and PWl's testimony that the registration number of the get-away vehicle was BE
2754, the appellant's explanation cannot reasonably possibly be true. It was an attempt to distance himself from the scene.
The appellant also called a witness Annah Mmusi (DW2) to come and corroborate his story in part, but this witness stated that she
did not know why she had been called and further that she did not even know the appellant. This demonstrates the inherent falsity
of the appellant's version of events.
I am satisfied that the prosecution adduced sufficient evidence to justify the inference of the appellant's complicity and involvement
in the commission of the offence charged.
The appeals against both conviction and sentence are dismissed. DELIVERED IN OPEN COURT THIS 28th DAY OF JULY 2000