Here one is concerned with a cession in securitatem debiti, that is to say, a cession given in order to secure a debt. Such a cession involves a pledge. A pledge is a contract whereby a debtor
places property in the hands of his creditor as security for his debt. To constitute a pledge which will be valid and effective against
other creditors of the pledgor there must be delivery, or what is legally equivalent to delivery, of the subject - matter of the
pledge by the pledgor to the pledgee.
Movable property is pledged by physical delivery. An incorporeal right is not susceptible of physical delivery, and hence in such
a case the pledgor must perform an act to show that he divests himself of that right and vests it in the pledgee. In the case of
incorporeals the juristic act by which the pledgor places his property in the hands of the pledgee is a cession.
In the instant case the subject - matter of the pledge for the loan was the cedent's contractual rights under the contract between
the cedent as sub-contractor and the garnishee as
6 contractor. It is trite that in general (and certainly so in the
present case) contractual rights, like other forms of incorporeal
property, are capable of transfer by cession. It was by this
means that in the case under consideration the cedent placed his
property in the hands of the cessionary.
In the law of cession a distinction has to be noticed between an absolute cession of rights, by which a cedent transfers his entire
interest in a right, and a cession in securitatem debiti by which the dominium in the ceded right remains with the cedent. Relying upon this distinction Counsel for the respondent urged upon us that since the
cessionary lacked actual ownership of the contractual rights ceded to him, his claim could not prevail over that of a judgment creditor
of the pledgor.
The argument is unsound. It is true that in the instant case the cessionary is able to assert and enforce the ceded rights only as
long as the cedent's loan remains unpaid. It is also true that the cessionary is legally obliged to make over to the cedent whatever
the cessionary may recover in excess of the
7 loan debt.
The important fact remains that pending satisfaction of the loan debt secured by the cession the cessionary can enforce his rights
to the full extent necessary to satisfy his claim against the cedent, and he can do so to the exclusion of other creditors of the
cedent.
In the result the appeal succeeds and the respondent's
cross-appeal falls away. The respondent must pay the costs of
the appeal. The order made by COTRAN J is set aside, and in its
place the following order is substituted: -
"The rights of the judgment creditor do not prevail over the rights of the cessionary under the cession in securitatem debiti. The application of the judgment creditor (Inco Fuel Centres (Pty) Ltd) under Order 55 is dismissed with costs which include the costs
occasioned by the joinder and opposition of the cessionary (Tswelelo (Pty) Ltd)."
DELIVERED IN OPEN COURT THIS 11TH DAY OF JULY 1995
G.G. HOEXTER JA
I AGREE J.H. STEYN
I AGREE
N. WILIE JA
SAFLII:
|
Terms of Use
|
Feedback
URL: http://www.saflii.org/bw/cases/BWCA/1995/33.html