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Molefi v The State (Criminal Appeal No. 9 of 1989 ) [1989] BWCA 9 (4 July 1989)

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE
REPUBLIC OF BOTSWANA
Criminal Appeal No. 9 of 1989 High Court Cr. App. 50 of 1988
In the matter of:
ALFRED BUKI MOLEFI       Appellant
vs
THE STATE        Respondent
Appellant in person
Miss P. Solomon for the Respondent
JUDGMENT
Coram: A.N.E. AMISSAH, JP. B.A. DOYLE, JA. G. BIZOS, JA.
BIZOS JA:
The applicant Alfred Buki Molefi as accused number two was charged together with OTSUGILE MMELESI as accused number one before the Magistrate sitting in Lobatse with two counts of Robbery with violence contrary to Section 297 of the Penal Code. They were both convicted on both counts. Neither of them were represented at any stage of these proceedings.
The conviction on Count I related to robbery from one Mmamonnye Jonase at Lobatse on 24th December, 1986. The conviction on Count II related to robbery from one Betty Jomo Richard at Lobatse on 24th December, 1986. On 23rd February, 1988, the Magistrate sentenced the 1st appellant to 5 years' imprisonment on each count to run concurrently and 6 strokes, and the 2nd appellant to 7 years' imprisonment on each count to run concurrently and 6 strokes.

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The two accused appealed to the High Court against their convictions and sentence. The appeal succeeded on Count II but was dismissed on Count 1. The applicant asked for leave to appeal to this Court. The Chief Justice dismissed his application.
OTSUGILE MMELESI allowed the matter to rest but the applicant in an application asking for leave to appeal to this Court submits that his conviction and sentence should be set aside as it was not shown that he was correctly identified as having taken part in the commission of the offence. He also complains against the investigating officer, the Magistrate and the Chief Justice. These complaints cannot be taken seriously but some of the grounds he advances require careful attention. They are set out in his own words:
1.       The court should consider the fact that the complainant was unable to identify her assailant when reporting the matter to the police. The investigating officer also pointed out in court that he arrested me, just because all he knew was that I am my co-accused best friend, so I might know something about this matter. Now the description given to the court by the complainant was just too weak to be considered because it would have been very difficult for the investigating officer to tell who exactly would those descriptions best suite.
2.       The complainant pointed out that somebody at the BMC stalls (shelter) was her assailants when the incident occured but then she didn't call that her particular witness to come and point out this in court.
3.       As far as I am concerned the complainant pointed me as being her assailant though the lecture she got from the prosecutor before the court resumed. She only heard and saw my features when they were being lectured by the prosecutor in his office because I was there.
1.      

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4. When the chief justice dismissed my appeal he pointed out that the description given by the complainant made him suspicious that I might have been the one who committed that crime, which makes me wonder as to whether I was judged on mights or on realistic grounds."
In order to decide whether or not there are prospects of success on appeal it will be necessary to consider the facts both on Count I and Count II even though the appellant was acquitted on appeal on Count II by the Chief Justice because the facts are somewhat interwoven and have some bearing on the question of identification.
The main facts and most of the arguments have been correctly
summarised by the Chief Justice. We can do no better than set
them out.
"The prosecution case was that on the evening of 24th December, 1986, the appellants travelled as passengers in a motor van from Gaborone to Lobatse. At some stage of the journey Betty Jomo Richard, (PW3) a 21 year old lady, who is the complainant in Count II joined the vehicle. Three were sitting in front and the two appellants and another man were sitting in the truck. Later another passenger (PW4) joined the vehicle and sat in the truck. PW3 had luggage consisting of two bags. The two appellants molested and threatened PW3 with knives during the journey. At some stage she observed that her bags had been removed from their original positions. One of the bags was then on the left side of the 2nd appellant and the other was lying on the other side of the 2nd appellant. Immediately the vehicle arrived at the Cumberland Hotel bus stop in Lobatse the appellants and the other gentleman who had been in the vehicle when PW3 joined it jumped out and ran in different directions. When PW3 alighted from the vehicle she discovered that her bags had been opened and her purse containing money and a pair of wedding rings removed therefrom. Sometime during that same evening Mmamonnye Jonase (PW1) a 19 year old lady arrived at the bus rank in Lobatse carrying a bag on her back. The items of clothing. It was dark. She walked along the main road running on the eastern side of the railway line. She stopped at the BMC gate to wait for

a taxi. While she was waiting she saw the two appellants approaching from the opposite direction. The 2nd appellant addressed her in a threatening manner and then forcibly took her bag from her, while the 1st appellant forcibly took her wrist watch. The 2nd appellant then ran away with her bag. The 1st appellant remained at the scene. Aided by another man who had appeared at the scene, the 1st appellant violently assaulted her and pinned her to the ground. They released her and ran away only when they saw the headlights of an approaching vehicle. She sustained a laceration on her left cheek and lost consciousness as a result of the assault. The bag was subsequently recovered from the 1st appellant.
It is convenient to deal with the appeal against the conviction on Count II first. In arguing his appeal the 1st appellant pointed out that he was not the only passenger in the van on the journey from Gaborone to Lobatse. In arguing his appeal the 2nd appellant emphasized that although the complainant had deposed that he (the 2nd appellant) had threatened her at all; and that none of the property alleged to be stolen was found in his possession. Learned State Counsel conceded that the evidence in support of this count did not establish that either of the appellants stole the complainant's property. He therefore did not seek to support the conviction. It will be recalled that apart from the complainant, PW4 and the two appellants, there was at least one other passenger in the truck of the vehicle during the journey to Lobatse. There is no evidence as to which of the passengers took the missing purse from the bags of the complainant. Indeed Detective Sgt. Nawala (PW5) said in cross-examination by the 2nd appellant that the complainant did not know who had had taken her purse. And in her evidence she did not say that she saw the missing purse being taken by any of the passengers. There is therefore no evidence that either of the appellants stole the purse or its contents. In the circumstances, the charge was not proved and the appellants are entitled to an acquittal.
I now turn to the appeal against conviction on count I. The 1st appellant stated that he picked up the bag alleged to belong to the complainant (PW1) along the river near BMC and took it home, but that he did not examine its contents. The 2nd appellant emphasized that te robbery was alleged to have been committed at the same time that he was in the vehicle travelling to Lobatse. He argued in effect that it was impossible for him to commit the crime in Lobatse while he was still a passenger in the vehicle. Learned State Counsel submitted that the 1st appellant

had failed to give a satisfactory explanation of how the bag came into his possession. With regard to the 2nd appellant, learned State counsel said that there seemed to be a problem relating to his identification. He also confessed that he had had difficulty reconciling the times the two offences were alleged to have taken place.
The first question I propose to consider is whether the evidence relating to the times of the two offences can be reconciled. According to the evidence of PW3 she boarded the vehicle at Gaborone around 7 p.m. She said that at around 8 p.m. after she had been molested, she observed that her bags had been removed from their original positions. According to PW4 he arrived at Boatle at 7.30 p.m. and boarded the vehicle later. He did not say when he boarded the vehicle. And neither PW3 nor PWA said when the vehicle arrived in Lobatse. All that can be gathered from PW3's evidence is that at 8 p.m. the vehicle had not arrived at Lobatse. On the other hand according to the evidence of PW1 when she arrived at the bus rank it was already dark. She said that it was around 7 p.m. She walked from the bus rank along the main road. Later she stopped and waited for a taxi. She did not say for how long she walked or waited for a taxi. Indeed a common feature of the evidence is that all the witnesses were imprecise as to time. In my view when the whole of the evidence regarding time is considered it cannot be said with any certainty that the 1st and 2nd appellant had not arrived in Lobatse when the incident involving PW1 took place. Indeed it is reasonable to infer from the evidence and all the circumstances that they had arrived in Lobatse and were at the scene where PW1 was attacked.
On the question as to identification, PW1 testified that she saw the two appellants approaching her and that the 2nd appellant actually uttered some words. She said that she was able to properly observe their faces as they were very close to her and there was a street light a short distance away. She said that the 2nd appellant was wearing a yellow overall at the time. PW3 also said the 2nd appellant was wearing a yellow overall when he travelled in the vehicle that evening. PW4 also confirmed to the Police investigating officer (PW5) that the 2nd appellant had been putting on a yellow overall on the evening in question. There was therefore ample evidence before the learned magistrate on which the reliability of identification of the appellant by PW1 could be assessed. In my opinion the learned Magistrate properly evaluated the evidence as to the identity of the assailants of PW1 and came to a reasonable

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conclusion.
With regard to the bag which PW1 said was taken from her by the 2nd appellant, the evidence is that it was found in possession of the 1st appellant. The 1st appellant himself admitted that it was found in his possession but explained that he had found it on the river bank. In my opinion the learned magistrate rightly rejected that explanation. The learned Magistrate found that the 1st and 2nd appellants were together when they robbed PW1 of her wrist watch and bag. In my judgment that was a reasonable conclusion based on the evidence.
Both appellants also complained that the learned Magistrate had not conducted the trial fairly and that he was biased. I find no merit in those complaints.
It is necessary to look at the evidence relating to the
applicant's identification more closely. The complainant in her
evidence in chief says about her three assailants:
"I lost consciousness for a short while after I was choked. I was able to properly observe the faces of each of the accused persons. They were too close to me and as such I was able to see them with ease. There was a street light emitting light from a distance of about 2.5 to 3 metres away from where the incident took place."
In answer to the applicant in cross-examination she said
that he had a yellow overall on and that she described him to the
"When I looked at him he kept on winking his eys. His face was dark in complexion. He was a tall man."
The applicant who appeared before us fits this description.
What the complainant described as "winking" is in fact an old
serious injury or deformity of the right eye the lid of which
involuntarily moves up and down and the left eye at times
responds in sympathy with the right one. The complainant
persisted in her version. There is nothing in her evidence taken

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alone and weighed against the applicant's bare denial and alibi that would have persuaded us that she was mistaken or untruthful.
However detective Sergeant Nawala gave evidence after the complainant. He said in his evidence in chief that the complainant was unable to give descriptions of her assailants to him. The applicant's repeated allegations that the prosecutor and the investigating officer "lectured" the complainant and other witnesses was not supported by any evidence whatsoever. The contradiction between the two witnesses on this point goes a long way to negative the suggestion.
The Magistrate preferred the evidence of the complainant without disbelieving the police officer pointing out that he was involved in the investigation of many serious cases of robbery and that he could not be expected to remember the facts and circumstances "of each and every case by heart". He had no reason to doubt any of the other evidence of detective Sergeant Nawala.
Had the evidence of the complainant stood alone we may have shared the misgivings expressed by Counsel for the State before the Chief Justice. The evidence does not, however, stand alone. There is material corroboration that the complainant correctly pointed out the applicant.
The applicant was in the company of OTSUGILE MMELESI on the 24th December, 1986. This is proved beyond doubt by the evidence of the witnesses who gave evidence on the Count on which they were acquitted, not on the ground that they were not properly identifified but because they were not seen actually removing

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the complainant's property on that Count from her bag and another person in the vehicle may have done it. Otsugile and the applicant were with a third person. The complainant on Count I was robbed by three people one of whom OTSUGILE was found in possession of her property. The applicant's denial that he together with OTSUGILE could not have been at the place where the crime was committed was therefore false.
This is sufficient corroboration of the complainant's evidence to satisfy us beyond reasonable doubt that he is guilty as charged.
In perusing the Magistrate's record of the proceedings we noticed that two statements were admitted by the Magistrate admittedly made by the applicant and marked " "Q" and "R". They did not form part of the record placed before us. They are not referred to in the judgment of the Magistrate nor do they seem to have been brought to the notice of the Chief Justice. No one was able to explain to us how this came about. We asked the Assistant Registrar to look into the original record in which they were found.
Exhibit "Q" was made available to us. It appears to be of considerable importance in that the applicant puts himself on the spot. When this was drawn to his attention he informed us that the Magistrate found something wrong with them during the course of the trial. If this was so, we could find no reference to such a finding in the record. In the circumstances we thought it unwise to look at Exhibit "R". Our conclusion was not based on anything contained in these statements.
We are of the view that the importance of putting a complete

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and carefully compiled record before the High Court and the Court of Appeal has to be restated. Everyone responsible should take special care to ensure that this is done.
Be that as it may, we are satisfied that no prejudice was suffered by the applicant.
His application for leave to appeal on the merits has no prospect of success and is therefore refused.
The applicant also asks for leave to appeal on sentence. In
passing sentence the Magistrate said:
"The offences of which you have been convicted are very serious ones each carrying a maximum sentence of imprisonment sentence of imprisonment for life with corporal punishment. Offences of this nature are too prevalent in Botswana as a whole and as such deserve deterrent sentences so that the situation be remedied. The Court is alarmed by accused 2's record of previous convictions. He is indeed qualifying as a habetual criminal. In a nutshell the accused 2 has 29 previous convictions which are relevant to the present offences as they involve elements of dishonesty and violence. The Court has no option but to take them into account for purposes of sentence.
         I will also take into account the fact that
these offences were committed upon young women who could not defend themselves. Most of their valuable things were not recovered and it is clear to me that both accused persons had total disregard of law and order. In order to protect the society both the accused must be removed from it for a considerable length of time."
The sentence of 7 years and six strokes imposed is not in
the circumstances excessive. We agree with the Magistrate that
society requires protection from a violent and dishonest person
that the applicant has shown himself to be. There is no
prospect of success that his period of imprisonment will be
decreased.

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During the period December, 1971 to November, 1985 no less than 70 strokes have been administered on 19 separate occasions varying from two to four strokes at a time for the 35 offences he has committed. When the offence for which he is to be punished was committed he was barely 27 years of age. He came into conflict with the criminal law when he was barely 14 years of age.
The question that arises is what good purpose will the further 6 strokes have. They are not likely to reform him. The probable effect is to brutalise him. Unhappily we are unable to delete them altogether as strokes are compulsory for the crime of robbery. Had the Court had the power to delete them it would probably have deleted them altogether.
In the circumstances two strokes only should be inflicted.
The following order is made:
(1)      Leave to appeal on the merits and on the sentence is refused.
(2)      The corporal punishment of 6 strokes is reduced to two strokes.
G. BIZOS
Judge of Appeal
Judge President

B. A. DOYLE Judge of Appeal
GIVEN AT LOBATSE THIS 4TH DAY OF JULY, 1989.


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